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Economic	 development	 is	 closely	 related	 to	 the	 financing	 conditions	 of	companies.	 In	 developing	 and	 emerging	 market	 economies,	 the	 domestic	financial	 system	 usually	 does	 not	 offer	 adequate	 financial	 instruments	 for	companies	 that	want	 to	 realize	 investment	projects,	which	 require	a	 long-term	commitment.	 Instead,	 the	 companies	 in	 these	 countries	 can	 often	 only	 choose	from	short-term	finance	and/or	foreign	currency	denominated	funding	sources.	As	a	consequence,	the	companies	either	incur	higher	maturity	and/or	exchange	rate	 risks	 or	 they	 desist	 altogether	 and	 less	 investment	 projects	 are	 put	 into	action.	 While	 the	 first	 option	 raises	 financial	 fragilities,	 which	 might	 cause	 a	financial	 and/or	 currency	 crisis	with	 adverse	 effects	 on	 the	 real	 economy,	 the	second	option	hampers	economic	development	more	directly.	The	establishment	of	 a	 domestic	 corporate	 bond	 market	 can	 help	 to	 solve	 these	 problems	 by	providing	a	market	for	long-term	debt	securities	in	local	currency.	The	question	is	 how	 a	 country	 might	 be	 able	 to	 promote	 the	 development	 of	 a	 domestic	corporate	bond	market.	Although	academic	 literature	has	 shown	 increased	 interest	 in	 this	question	 for	the	 past	 two	 decades	 and	 several	 cross-country	 studies	 were	 completed	 that	pointed	towards	important	determinants,	only	few	in-depth	analyses	of	country	cases	were	 conducted	 that	 are	 capable	 of	 detecting	 the	 interrelations	 between	different	factors,	which	might	explain	more	accurately	the	drivers	and	barriers	of	corporate	bond	market	development	in	a	specific	context.	In	particular,	the	role	of	the	state	is	still	poorly	understood.	Research	has	focused	on	preconditions	for	the	establishment	of	a	corporate	bond	market	such	as	macroeconomic	stability,	judicial	protection	and	legal	certainty,	which	the	state	was	expected	to	provide.	Furthermore,	 it	 recognized	 the	 strong	 relationship	 between	 sovereign	 and	corporate	 bond	 markets,	 but	 it	 lacked,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 a	 more	 thorough	analysis	 of	 the	 underlying	 mechanisms	 at	 work.	 This	 lack	 of	 attention	 is	significant	because	knowing	about	the	channels	through	which	the	state	is	able	to	promote	corporate	bond	market	development	will	provide	policy	makers	with	new	insights	as	to	how	improve	state	actions	and	policies	in	order	to	foster	the	development	of	these	markets.	Well-developed	corporate	bond	markets,	in	turn,	enhance	 economic	 development	 and	 mitigate	 financial	 fragilities,	 which	 is	especially	important	in	emerging	market	and	developing	economies.	In	 order	 to	 address	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 under-examined	 role	 of	 the	 state,	 this	thesis	 will	 analyze	 three	 notable	 determinants	 of	 corporate	 bond	 market	development	 in	 Brazil,	 i.e.	 the	 influence	 of	 public	 debt	management,	monetary	policy,	and	public	finance	for	development.	A	case	study	is	best	fit	to	understand	the	underlying	mechanisms	and	relationships.	The	case	of	Brazil	was	chosen	for	several	 reasons	 that	 will	 be	 explained	 further	 below.	 The	 research	 design	followed	a	mixed	method	and	triangulation	approach	to	combine	 the	results	of	the	 conducted	 field	 research	 including	 expert	 interviews	 with	 those	 of	 the	descriptive	data	analysis	and	the	literature	review.	The	analytical	 framework	is	built	 on	 Post	 Keynesian	 theories	 explaining	 the	 processes	 of	 capital	 formation	
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and	asset	choice	 in	a	world	reigned	by	uncertainty.	Due	 to	uncertainty,	market	participants	 take	 their	 decisions	 based	 on	 their	 expectations,	 which	 can	 be	influenced	by	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 state	 in	 the	 fields	 of	 public	 debt	management,	monetary	 policy,	 and	 public	 finance	 for	 development.	 That	 is	 how	 the	 state	 is	able	 to	 foster	 or	 hamper	 the	 evolution	 of	 corporate	 bond	markets	 within	 this	framework.	 This	 thesis	 will	 answer	 the	 question	 of	 how	 the	 Brazilian	 state	influenced	 the	 development	 of	 a	 domestic	 corporate	 bond	market	 through	 its	actions	in	the	three	policy	fields	mentioned.	The	hypothesis	is	that	the	Brazilian	state	had	a	protagonist	role	in	the	development	of	the	domestic	corporate	bond	market,	but	only	exerted	it	passively	and	not	constructively.	
1.1 Context:	short-term	finance,	long-term	funding,	and	
economic	development	
For	 centuries,	 economists	 have	 inquired	 into	 the	 connection	 between	 finance	and	 economic	 development.	 Although	 there	 is	 strong	 evidence	 in	 favor	 of	 a	causal	 relationship,	 there	 is	 also	 room	 for	 doubts	 in	 this	 respect,	 for	 example,	related	to	recurring	financial	crises.	As	a	consequence,	a	lively	and	wide-ranging	finance	 and	 development	 debate	 emerged	 and	 some	 of	 its	 most	 important	strands	 are	 presented	 in	 chapter	 2.1.	 A	 large	 body	 of	 literature	 analyzed	 the	finance	and	growth	nexus	 (see	chapter	2.1.1),	which	can	be	explained	with	 the	functions	 that	 a	 financial	 system	 provides	 including	 risk	 diversification,	reduction	of	transaction	costs,	improved	capital	allocation,	as	well	as	monitoring	and	supervision.	The	majority	of	research	is	of	empirical	nature	and	dates	back	to	 Goldsmith	 (1969),	 who	 first	 found	 a	 positive	 correlation	 between	 financial	development	and	growth,	but	it	was	only	during	the	1990s	that	the	finance	and	growth	literature	provided	empirical	evidence	for	the	causal	relationship.	The	 discussion	 of	 financial	 vulnerabilities	 associated	 with	 underdeveloped	financial	 markets	 and	 related	 topics	 such	 as	 financial	 and	 currency	 crises	represents	 another	 important	 strand	 of	 literature	 in	 the	 finance	 and	development	 debate	 (see	 chapter	 2.1.2).	 A	 typical	 characteristic	 of	 developing	and	emerging	market	economies	is	a	high	share	of	foreign	currency	debt,	which	makes	them	more	vulnerable	to	exchange	rate	fluctuations.	The	limited	number	of	 hedging	 instruments	 available	 in	 these	 underdeveloped	 financial	 markets	aggravates	the	financial	fragilities.	Furthermore,	monetary	policy	is	restricted	in	its	 implementation	 by	 the	 limited	 functionality	 of	 its	 tools	 in	 a	 less	 developed	money	 market,	 with	 implications	 on	 its	 open	 market	 operations	 and	 on	 the	exchange	 rate.	 Hence,	 financial	 development	 can	 enhance	 the	 macroeconomic	stability	of	a	country	with	positive	effects	on	its	long-term	growth	rate.	Due	 to	 the	 strong	 impact	 of	 financial	 and	 currency	 crises	 on	 the	 economic	development	 of	 a	 country,	 it	 became	 crucial	 to	 understand	 these	 crises.	 Three	
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generations	of	models	explaining	currency	crises	emerged,	pointing	towards	the	worsening	 of	 macroeconomic	 indicators,	 speculative	 attacks	 triggered	 by	 self-fulfilling	market	expectations,	and	financial	system	fragilities,	which	might	cause	balance	sheet	effects,	a	concept	that	shifted	the	focus	from	flow	variables	such	as	the	GDP	to	stock	variables	such	as	external	debt.	Exchange	rate	fluctuations	and	interest	 rate	 adjustments	 can	 deteriorate	 economic	 agents’	 net	 wealth,	 if	 they	have	currency	and/or	maturity	mismatches	in	their	balance	sheets.	In	emerging	market	 and	 developing	 economies	 market	 participants	 often	 take	 on	 foreign	currency	debt,	while	generating	income	in	domestic	currency,	causing	a	currency	mismatch;	or	they	take	on	short-term	liabilities	while	carrying	long-term	assets,	causing	 a	 maturity	 mismatch.	 A	 maturity	 mismatch	 (as	 well	 as	 interest	 rate	indexed	 debt)	 raises	 the	 risk	 that	 a	 debtor	 becomes	 unable	 to	 pay	 his	 or	 her1	debt	due	to	an	interest	rate	increase.	Conversely,	net	creditors	holding	long-term	fixed	 rate	 debt	 securities	 are	 also	 exposed	 to	 the	 interest	 rate	 risk	 and	 suffer	from	 a	 reduction	 of	 the	 market	 value	 of	 their	 assets	 in	 case	 the	 interest	 rate	increases.	Since	different	types	of	mismatches	are	usually	connected	both	within	individual	balance	sheets	and	across	sectors,	they	can	reinforce	each	other.	The	 balance	 sheet	 approach	 pointed	 out	 the	 increased	 risk	 of	 suffering	 from	financial	and	currency	crises	by	opening	up	the	capital	account	and	engaging	in	financial	 integration	 into	global	markets.	Moreover,	 it	 showed	monetary	policy	options	for	net	debtor	countries	and	emphasized	the	important	role	of	domestic	financial	 market	 development	 in	 diminishing	 their	 vulnerability	 to	 a	 volatile	exchange	rate.	Furthermore,	it	highlighted	policies	that	may	foster	a	reduction	of	vulnerabilities,	 including	 public	 debt	 management,	 incentives	 for	 the	 private	sector	 to	 avoid	 balance	 sheet	 exposures,	 and	 the	 buildup	 of	 foreign	 exchange	reserves.	 The	 original	 sin	 literature,	 based	 on	 the	 empirical	 observation	 that	most	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	 economies	 are	 neither	 able	 to	 borrow	abroad	 in	 their	 own	 currencies	 (international	 component),	 nor	 to	 borrow	domestically	with	long	maturities	and	fixed	interest	rates	in	their	own	currencies	(domestic	component),	corresponds	to	the	balance	sheet	approach	with	respect	to	 the	 emphasis	 of	 the	 adverse	 effects	 of	 net	 external	 debt,	 but	 differs	 in	 the	evaluation	 about	 the	 problem	 solving	 power	 of	 macroeconomic	 policies.	 Both	approaches	are	relevant	for	this	thesis,	because	they	show	the	important	role	of	domestic	capital	market	development.	




Most	studies	analyzing	questions	related	to	financial	and	economic	development	focused	 on	 the	 banking	 sector	 and	 the	 equity	market.	 Important	 contributions	were	 made	 in	 literature	 strands	 analyzing	 financial	 fragilities	 as	 well	 as	 the	finance	and	growth	nexus,	among	other	things.	More	recently,	the	attention	of	a	few	 researchers	 was	 caught	 by	 a	 surge	 in	 bond	 issuance	 by	 companies	 from	emerging	 markets	 that	 were	 placed	 on	 international	 markets,	 termed	 “The	Bon(d)anza”	 by	 Bastos,	 Kamil,	 and	 Sutton	 (2015):	 Between	 2009	 and	 2014,	annual	volumes	of	non-financial	corporate	bond	issuance	registered	a	more	than	threefold	 increase	 (Ayala,	Nedeljkovic,	 and	 Saborowski	 2015,	 4).	However,	 the	majority	of	research	on	domestic	bond	market	development	only	enquired	into	sovereign	bonds,	which	 reflects	 the	 initial	 intend	of	governments	 to	build	up	a	bond	market	 in	 order	 to	 finance	 their	 fiscal	 deficits,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	very	 incipient	 stages	 of	 domestic	 corporate	 bond	 markets	 in	 most	 emerging	market	and	developing	economies,	on	the	other	hand.	Although	 a	 large	 body	 of	 literature	 on	 the	 development	 of	 domestic	 bond	markets	 emerged	 over	 the	 last	 two	 decades	 and	 several	 cross-country	 studies	identified	 important	 determinants,	 there	 are	 only	 few	 in-depth	 country	 case	studies	 that	 could	 discover	 the	 links	 and	mutual	 relations	 of	 different	 factors,	which	 is	 important	 for	 a	 comprehensive	 understanding	 of	 the	 relevant	determinants	 that	might	 hamper	 and/or	 foster	 the	 development	 of	 a	 domestic	corporate	bond	market	 in	a	 specific	 context.	Among	 the	determinants	detected	by	 large-n	 studies	 were	 structural	 variables	 like	 the	 country	 size,	macroeconomic	variables	such	as	inflation,	and	institutional	variables	including	judicial	 uncertainty.	 A	 country	 might	 be	 too	 small	 to	 bear	 the	 costs	 of	establishing	a	domestic	bond	market	alone,	so	that	it	might	be	more	reasonable	to	engage	 in	efforts	 to	 create	a	 regional	bond	market,	which	happened	 in	Asia.	Large	macroeconomic	instabilities,	e.g.	expressed	in	high	inflation	rates,	impede	the	formation	of	long-term	expectations,	which	are	vital	for	the	development	of	a	market	 for	 corporate	bonds	–	on	both	 sides	of	 the	market:	Companies	will	not	supply	the	market	with	bonds,	i.e.	ask	for	funding	resources,	if	they	are	unable	to	make	plans	about	the	profitability	of	their	investment	project	and	wealth	holders	will	 not	 demand	 bonds,	 if	 they	 are	 unable	 to	 preview	 the	 real,	 i.e.	 inflation-adjusted,	value	of	their	financial	yields	and	assets.	Similarly,	the	lack	of	a	reliable	and	 efficient	 jurisdiction	 might	 hamper	 the	 development	 of	 a	 corporate	 bond	market,	because	economic	agents	hesitate	to	engage	in	long-term	debt	contracts.	Among	 the	most	 relevant	 literature	 guiding	 this	 thesis	was	 the	 compilation	 of	research	 on	 Latin	 American	 bond	 markets	 published	 by	 Borensztein	 et	 al.	(2008a),	including	an	examination	of	the	Brazilian	bond	market	development	by	Leal	 and	 Carvalhal-da-Silva	 (2006),	 and	 the	 analysis	 of	 determinants	 of	 bond	market	development	in	Brazil	by	Paula	et	al.	(2009)	that	was	part	of	a	research	project	examining	the	role	of	Brazilian	public	banks	in	domestic	financial	market	development.	Both	studies	contributed	to	an	improved	general	understanding	of	corporate	bond	market	development	(CBMD)	in	Brazil	and	identified	the	central	
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relationship	between	the	public	and	the	private	bond	markets.	However,	they	fell	short	in	further	exploring	the	role	of	the	state	in	CBMD.	The	impact	of	different	state	 actors	 and	 their	 policy	 measures	 on	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 private	 bond	market	was	not	made	explicit.	As	a	consequence,	 the	 influence	of	 the	state	as	a	key	 player	 not	 only	 in	 the	 domestic	 financial	 system,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 Brazilian	economy	 as	 a	 whole,	 on	 CBMD	 could	 not	 be	 thoroughly	 understood,	 implying	that	 its	 policy	 actions	 could	 neither	 be	 properly	 evaluated,	 nor	 aligned	accordingly.	
1.3 Response:	the	role	of	the	state	in	corporate	bond	market	
development	
This	thesis	will	perform	a	case	study	to	examine	the	 link	between	state	actions	and	corporate	bond	market	development.	The	case	study	approach	allows	one	to	perform	more	in-depth	analysis	of	the	relevant	determinants,	actors,	structures,	and	 institutions.	Moreover,	 the	 researcher	 is	 able	 to	 draw	more	 substantiated	conclusions	from	a	small-n	study,	however	with	the	disadvantage	that	the	result	cannot	be	generalized	as	easily	 (Ragin	1997).	The	 case	 selection	was	based	on	various	factors	that	led	to	the	choice	of	Brazil.	The	first	reason	to	choose	Brazil	was	 the	strong	role	 that	 the	state	played	 in	 the	Brazilian	economy,	 turning	 the	argument	reasonable	that	it	also	occupied	an	important	part	in	the	development	of	 a	 corporate	 bond	 market.	 Secondly,	 and	 closely	 related,	 the	 public	 bond	market	 in	Brazil	was	very	 large	so	 that	 the	 (lack	of	 the)	market	 creation	effect	could	be	examined.	A	 third	point	 is	 related	 to	 the	provision	of	macroeconomic	stability,	which	markedly	 increased	after	 the	 implementation	of	 the	Plano	Real,	but	 continued	 to	 post	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	 Brazilian	 authorities	 with	 important	implications	for	the	evolution	of	the	corporate	bond	market.	Another	reason	for	the	 case	 selection	 was	 the	 central	 role	 of	 the	 public	 finance	 for	 development	system	in	the	Brazilian	economy,	especially	in	the	funding	of	long-term	projects.	Finally,	 the	 author’s	 prior	 acquaintance	 with	 the	 country	 together	 with	 his	academic	 advisors’	 existing	 institutional	 as	 well	 as	 personal	 relationships	 to	Brazil	facilitated	the	realization	of	the	research	project.	The	 aim	 of	 this	 research	 is	 to	 spell	 out	 the	 relevant	 impact	 vectors	 of	 state	actions	with	respect	to	the	development	of	a	domestic	corporate	bond	market	in	Brazil.	 Accordingly,	 the	 main	 research	 question	 asks	 about	 the	 role	 of	 the	Brazilian	state	 in	CBMD.	Based	on	a	Post	Keynesian	 theoretical	 framework,	 the	evolution	of	 the	Brazilian	corporate	bond	market	and	the	 influence	of	 the	state	are	examined	over	the	period	of	two	decades,	between	1995	and	2014.	In	order	to	 define	 the	 main	 determinants	 of	 (corporate)	 bond	 market	 development	 in	Brazil,	the	conducted	expert	interviews	in	the	country	were	particularly	helpful	and	 led,	 together	with	an	extensive	 literature	 review,	 to	 the	definition	of	 three	major	 determinants	 of	 CBMD	 in	 Brazil:	 namely	 public	 debt	 management,	
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monetary	policy,	and	public	finance	for	development.	Therefore,	we	can	further	specify	 the	 main	 research	 question	 by	 asking,	 first,	 how	 the	 state	 influenced	CBMD	through	 these	policy	variables	and,	 second,	whether	 the	state	hampered	or	 fostered	CBMD	 in	 this	way.	 In	other	words,	 this	 thesis	 intends	 to	show	how	the	 independent	variable,	 the	 influence	of	 the	Brazilian	state	on	CBMD	through	its	 public	 debt	 management,	 monetary	 policy,	 and	 public	 finance	 for	development,	 determined	 the	 dependent	 variable,	 the	 development	 of	 the	Brazilian	private	bond	market.	The	hypothesis	of	this	thesis	is	that	the	Brazilian	state	had	a	protagonist	role	in	the	 development	 of	 the	 domestic	 corporate	 bond	 market,	 but	 only	 exerted	 it	passively	 and	 not	 constructively.	 In	 order	 to	 adequately	 answer	 the	 research	questions	 and	 test	 the	 hypothesis,	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 market	 for	 corporate	bonds	is	divided	into	three	sub-periods	that	allow	a	more	precise	examination	of	the	 determining	 factors	 at	 work.	 Furthermore,	 the	 complex	 interrelations	between	 important	 actors	 in	 the	 market	 as	 well	 as	 connections	 and	 feedback	effects	of	the	determinants	of	CBMD	in	Brazil	are	best	captured	and	exposed	by	a	narrative	description	and	exploration	of	the	arguments	together	with	a	historical,	structural,	and	institutional	contextualization	of	the	analysis.	Following	 a	 mixed	 method	 and	 triangulation	 approach,	 this	 thesis	 gained	 its	insights	 from	 the	 back	 and	 forth	 between	 the	 relevant	 literature,	 expert	interviews,	 and	 bond	market	 data.	 The	 data	 covered	 the	 period	 from	 1995	 to	2014,	 included	 information	 on	 the	 volume	 issued	 on	 the	 primary	markets	 and	the	 stock	 of	 outstanding	 bonds	 in	 the	 secondary	 markets,	 and	 was	 openly	available	 at	 the	websites	 of	 several	 Brazilian	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 Brazilian	central	 bank	 (Bacen),	 the	 Brazilian	 Association	 of	 the	 Entities	 of	 the	 Financial	and	Capital	Markets	(Anbima),	or	the	Securities	Commission	(CVM).	The	expert	interviews	were	conducted	during	three	field	research	stays	in	Brazil	between	 2010	 and	 2012	 that	 lasted	 between	 six	 weeks	 and	 three	 months.	 In	total,	 thirty	 interviews	 were	 carried	 out	 with	 experts	 from	 academia,	 state	institutions	such	as	 the	CVM	or	 the	Bacen,	private	 institutions	such	as	Anbima,	the	 securities	 exchange	 BM&F	 Bovespa	 as	 well	 as	 capital	 market	 institutions,	including	not	only	banks,	 but	 also	 investment	 and	pension	 funds.	According	 to	the	 interview	 partners,	 the	 interviews	 were	 grouped	 into	 four	 categories:	university	professors	(U),	associations	(A),	financial	market	participants	(F),	and	state	institutions	(S).	The	category	abbreviations	serve,	together	with	a	number	to	make	each	interview	identifiable,	as	source	reference	for	citations	throughout	the	thesis.	Citing	an	interview	partner	who	belongs	to	a	state	institution	might	be	referenced	with	“S03”,	for	example.	The	 semi-structured	 interviews	 followed	 pre-defined	 guidelines	 that	 included	open	 questions	 about	 key	 issues	 and	 were	 adjusted	 throughout	 the	 research	process	according	to	newly	gained	insights.	The	shortest	interview	lasted	about	fifteen	minutes	and	the	longest	almost	two	hours.	On	average,	the	duration	of	the	interviews	was	 a	 little	more	 than	 one	 hour.	 Each	 round	 of	 field	 research	was	followed	by	a	period	of	interview	analysis,	data	analysis,	and	literature	study	in	order	 to	 explore	 the	 subject,	 narrow	 down	 the	 research	 questions,	 define	 the	appropriate	theoretical	approach,	and	pinpoint	novel	scientific	findings,	which	in	
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turn	 led	 to	 the	 preparation	 of	 the	 following	 field	 research	 that	 aimed	 at	answering	 open	 questions,	 understanding	 important	 interconnections,	 and	discovering	relevant	drivers	and	barriers	of	bond	market	development	in	Brazil.	My	 original	 contribution	 to	 knowledge	 is	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 state	policies	on	the	development	of	a	domestic	corporate	bond	market	in	Brazil.	More	specifically,	 this	 thesis	reveals	how	public	debt	management	determines	CBMD	through	different	 effects	 that	 stem	 from	 changes	 in	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 public	debt.	Furthermore,	I	demonstrate	that	a	low	and	stable	monetary	policy	rate	is	a	necessary,	 but	 on	 its	 own	 not	 sufficient	 condition	 for	 the	 development	 of	 a	corporate	 bond	 market.	 Finally,	 I	 show	 that	 public	 finance	 for	 development	schemes	generally	hampered	CBMD	in	Brazil,	despite	recent	efforts	aiming	more	directly	at	its	promotion.	Apart	 from	 that,	 my	 piece	 of	 research	 contributes	 to	 the	 theoretical	understanding	 of	 the	 topic	 primarily	 with	 respect	 to	 three	 aspects.	 First,	 the	impact	vectors	of	how	the	different	policy	variables	influence	the	development	of	a	 corporate	 bond	 market	 are	 examined	 in	 detail	 and	 the	 workings	 of	 the	mechanisms	are	spelled	out	explicitly.	Second,	this	thesis	puts	the	development	of	 a	 corporate	bond	market	 in	 the	 context	of	 emerging	market	 and	developing	economies	 that	 are	 usually	 marked	 by	 structural	 heterogeneity	 with	 different	modes	of	production	and	points	out	how	CBMD	conduces	to	the	propagation	of	the	monetary	economy.	Third,	I	can	broaden	the	Monetary	Keynesian	view	of	the	capital	formation	process	by	expounding	the	role	of	bonds	as	a	source	of	funding,	because	Monetary	Keynesians	have	so	far	been	negligent	of	funding	in	the	capital	formation	process	by	emphasizing	the	central	role	of	finance	and	key	actors	such	as	the	banker	and	the	entrepreneur	in	the	development	process.	
1.4 Roadmap	
The	 research	 is	 structured	 into	 four	 chapters.	 This	 introduction	 is	 followed	by	the	theoretical	discussion	in	chapter	two.	The	empirical	analysis	is	presented	in	chapter	three.	Finally,	chapter	four	draws	the	conclusions.	The	 theoretical	 part	 begins	with	 sub-chapter	2.1	 that	 gives	 an	overview	of	 the	finance	 and	 development	 debate,	 emphasizing	 those	 threats	 of	 the	 discussion	that	 are	 most	 important	 for	 this	 research.	 In	 section	 2.1.1,	 the	 finance	 and	growth	 nexus	 is	 explored	 in	 more	 detail.	 Section	 2.1.2	 displays	 the	 causes	 of	financial	fragilities	that	usually	pose	a	threat	to	emerging	market	and	developing	economies.	According	to	the	balance	sheet	approach,	these	countries	suffer	from	maturity	and	currency	mismatches.	Moreover,	this	literature	shows	that	both	the	buildup	 of	 a	 domestic	 market	 for	 long-term	 debt	 securities	 and	 the	implementation	of	 public	 finance	 for	development	 schemes	 can	help	 to	 reduce	financial	 fragilities.	 State	 interventions	 according	 to	 developmentalist	 state	
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policies	and	the	role	of	public	finance	for	development	institutions	are	explained	in	 section	 2.1.3.	 Since	 the	 adverse	 effects	 of	 market	 failures	 in	 the	 financial	system	 are	 usually	 more	 severe	 than	 those	 of	 government	 failures,	 the	 state	should	intervene	and	foster	financial	development,	in	particular	CBMD.	The	 state	 of	 the	 art	 sub-chapter	 2.2	 covers	 different	 aspects	 of	 domestic	 bond	market	development,	starting	with	a	classification	relative	to	equity	and	banking	markets	 in	 section	 2.2.1,	 which	 comes	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 economic	development	is	generally	independent	of	the	financial	structure	of	an	economy.	While	 the	 banking	 sector	 evolves	 first	 and	 attends	 better	 the	 needs	 of	 smaller	companies,	 capital	 markets	 evolve	 later	 and	 serve	 better	 larger	 companies.	Section	 2.2.2	 discusses	 the	 main	 advantages	 of	 domestic	 bond	 market	development,	 including	 reduced	 financial	 vulnerability	 due	 to	 balance	 sheet	effects,	 improved	 capital	 allocation	 and	 risk	 sharing,	 as	 well	 as	 better	implementation	 of	 fiscal	 and	 monetary	 policies.	 The	 determinants	 and	preconditions	 for	 the	development	of	a	domestic	bond	market	are	described	 in	section	 2.2.3:	 The	 economy	must	 not	 be	 too	 small,	 the	 legal,	 institutional	 and	macroeconomic	environment	of	the	country	has	to	be	strong,	and	the	necessary	financial	 market	 infrastructure	 needs	 to	 be	 installed.	 In	 section	 2.2.4,	 a	 more	focused	literature	review	is	conducted,	compiling	the	latest	research	on	domestic	(corporate)	bond	market	development	in	Latin	America	and,	more	specifically,	in	Brazil.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	main	 research	 gaps	 are	 identified,	 pointing	 to	 previous	negligence	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 in	 CBMD.	 The	 sub-chapter	 closes	 with	 an	appreciation	 of	 the	 influence	 of	 three	 policy	 variables	 on	 CBMD,	 already	mentioned	beforehand	throughout	 the	 theoretical	discussion.	The	choice	of	 the	policy	variables	public	debt	management,	monetary	policy,	and	public	finance	for	development	was	 based	 on	 insights	 acquired	 both	 from	 the	 expert	 interviews	and	the	literature	review.	The	first	two	sub-chapters	laid	the	foundation	for	the	Post	Keynesian	analytical	framework	 that	 is	 developed	 in	 sub-chapter	 2.3.	 The	 framework	 makes	 clear	how	the	state	is	able	to	influence	CBMD	through	the	policy	variables	public	debt	management,	monetary	policy,	and	public	 finance	 for	development.	The	 first	of	three	sections	explains	the	Post	Keynesian	capital	formation	process,	which	can	only	 function	 smoothly	 if	 there	 are	 instruments	 for	 long-term	 funding	 such	 as	bonds.	 Section	2.3.2	examines	how	economic	agents	 form	 their	expectations	 in	order	 to	 understand	 the	 (portfolio)	 decision	 making	 process	 in	 a	 monetary	economy	that	is	marked	by	uncertainty.	After	the	wealth	holder	is	introduced	as	the	 ultimate	 decision	 maker,	 the	 competition	 to	 win	 over	 the	 favor	 of	 wealth	holders	between	financial	assets,	in	particular	between	public	and	private	bonds,	is	 addressed.	 The	 expectation	 formation	 process	 is	 discussed	 as	 well	 as	 the	concept	 of	 liquidity	 preferences,	 which	 are	 both	 influenced	 by	 the	 above	mentioned	 policy	 variables	 and,	 together,	 form	 the	 basis	 for	 economic	 agents’	asset	 choices.	 In	 principle,	 that	 is	 how	 the	 state	 can	 hamper	 or	 promote	 the	development	of	a	corporate	bond	market.	A	more	detailed	analysis	of	 the	 impact	vectors	 is	performed	 in	section	2.3.3.	 In	the	model	of	general	asset	choice	presented	 in	 this	section	the	total	yield	of	an	asset	 is	 determined	 by	 four	 attributes	 (expected	 values	 for	 the	 yield,	 cost,	appreciation,	and	liquidity	premium	of	the	asset)	that,	in	turn,	depend	on	various	
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factors	 including	 the	 currency	premium	and	 institutional	market	 liquidity.	 The	section	elaborates	the	influence	of	the	policy	variables	on	each	of	these	attributes	and	factors,	and	therefore	also	on	wealth	holders’	asset	choices.	Additionally,	 it	clarifies	 the	 implications	 for	 the	 development	 of	 a	 domestic	 corporate	 bond	market.	As	a	result,	we	gain	an	in-depth	understanding	of	how	the	state,	through	its	policy	variables,	affects	CBMD.	The	 final	sub-chapter	2.4	briefly	summarizes	the	 knowledge	 gained	 in	 the	 theoretical	 chapter.	 By	 focusing	 on	 the	 most	relevant	points	and	emphasizing	the	links	with	the	policy	variables,	it	serves	as	a	preparation	for	the	subsequent	empirical	chapter.	The	third	chapter	contains	the	case	study	of	the	role	of	the	Brazilian	state	in	the	development	of	corporate	bond	market	development.	The	empirical	part	begins	with	 sub-chapter	 3.1,	 which	 gives	 a	 focused	 historical	 account	 of	 the	 financial	system	development	with	 references	 to	 relevant	macroeconomic,	 political,	 and	international	 events,	 emphasizing	 those	 evolutions	 that	 are	 most	 relevant	 for	CBMD.	It	is	divided	into	two	sections,	of	which	the	first	one	relates	the	financial	history	up	to	the	implementation	of	the	Plano	Real	in	1995,	and	the	second	one	from	then	onwards	up	to	2014.	The	central	aim	of	section	3.1.1	is	to	provide	the	historical	context	for	a	better	understanding	of	the	evolution	of	key	institutions.	Section	3.1.2	covers	the	period	of	investigation	and	mainly	aims	at	providing	the	necessary	 background	 for	 the	 subsequent	 in-depth	 analysis	 of	 CBMD	 in	Brazil.	The	section	is	structured	according	to	three	sub-periods	that	are	predetermined	by	 changes	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 corporate	 bond	 market.	 The	closing	 section	 3.1.3	 briefly	 summarizes	 the	 main	 points	 of	 the	 first,	contextualizing	sub-chapter.	The	 core	 of	 the	 empirical	 research	 is	 presented	 in	 the	 second	 sub-chapter.	 Its	structure	also	corresponds	to	the	three	sub-periods	referred	to	above.	Each	sub-period	is	analyzed	in	a	separate	section,	always	following	the	same	pattern:	After	a	short	introductory	review	of	major	events,	the	role	of	the	state	and	its	influence	on	CBMD	through	the	policy	variables	public	debt	management,	monetary	policy,	and	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 are	 examined.	 Each	 policy	 variable	 is	discussed	 in	 a	 separate	 sub-section,	 resulting	 in	 three	 sections	with	 three	 sub-sections.	The	 first	 section	 of	 sub-chapter	 3.2	 describes	 the	 years	 following	 the	implementation	 of	 the	 Plano	 Real,	 from	 1995	 to	 2003.	 Even	 though	 Brazil	regained	 inflation	 control,	 macroeconomic	 instabilities	 persisted	 and	 the	domestic	corporate	bond	market	continued	to	play	only	a	very	minor	role	in	the	Brazilian	 financial	 system.	 Section	 3.2.2	 covers	 the	 years	 from	 2004	 to	 2008.	During	this	phase	of	strong	and	sustained	growth,	the	public	debt	structure	was	markedly	improved.	However,	the	monetary	policy	rate	remained	on	an	elevated	level,	 so	 that	most	 of	 the	 funding	 seeking	 companies	 opted	 for	 the	 issuance	 of	shares	 instead	of	bonds	on	 the	domestic	capital	markets.	The	 third	sub-period,	from	2009	to	2014,	 is	analyzed	in	section	3.2.3.	 In	reaction	to	the	 international	financial	 crisis,	 the	 Brazilian	 government	 implemented	 counter-cyclical	 policy	measures	 that	 provided	 for	 a	 fast	 economic	 recovery,	 but	 the	 upturn	 did	 not	endure	 for	 long.	 Moreover,	 various	 measures	 that	 specifically	 aimed	 at	 the	promotion	 of	 the	 corporate	 bond	 market	 in	 Brazil	 did	 not	 lead	 to	 a	 clear	breakthrough	in	market	development.	
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There	 is	a	general	 consensus	among	economists	about	 the	positive	 impact	of	a	country‘s	financial	development	on	its	economic	growth	(see	for	example	Levine	2005,	 1997).	 Since	 foreign	 indebtedness	 has	 been	 a	 long-standing	 and	 bitter	issue	for	developing	countries	and	emerging	markets,	 they	have	become	highly	interested	in	alternative	ways	of	financing,	namely	the	development	of	domestic	debt	markets	 (Borensztein	et	 al.	 2008a).	Empirical	 evidence	also	points	 in	 this	direction:	 "Our	 analysis	 implies	 that	 the	 domestic	 versus	 external	 public	financing	is	relevant	to	growth	and	highlights	the	importance	of	the	development	of	 the	 domestic	 bond	 markets	 to	 promote	 long-lasting	 economic	 growth."	(Kutivadze	 2011,	 20–21).	 Historically,	 developing	 countries	 and	 emerging	markets	 were	 only	 able	 to	 issue	 debt	 in	 foreign	 currency	 and/or	 short-term.	Domestic	bond	markets	promise	to	offer	a	solution	to	this	problem,	because	they	provide	 instruments	 for	 long-term	 debt	 in	 domestic	 currency.	 Given	 certain	conditions	 of	 controlled	 inflation,	 widespread	 trust	 and	 sufficient	 savers,	government	bond	markets	are	supposed	to	pave	the	way	for	the	private	market	(Borensztein	 et	 al.	 2008a):	 Building	 up	 the	 necessary	 infrastructure	 and	signaling	 the	 interest	 rate	path,	 large	and	 liquid	public	bond	markets	 can	have	positive	effects	on	corporate	bond	markets.	For	 that	 reason,	 public	 debt	 management	 is	 an	 important	 determinant	 of	corporate	 bond	 market	 development	 (CBMD),	 which	 also	 depends	 on	 sound	monetary	 policy	 to	 provide	 macroeconomic	 stability.	 At	 last,	 financial	development	 in	 the	 context	 of	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	 economies	usually	 requires	 an	 active	 role	 of	 the	 state,	 including	 public	 finance	 for	development	 schemes	 that	might	 be	 guided	 by	 developmentalist	 state	 policies	and	implemented	by	public	development	banks.	Ocampo	and	Vos	also	emphasize	the	 relevance	 of	 an	 economic	 and	 financial	 development	 strategy	 along	 these	lines:	
“[M]erely	 focusing	macroeconomic	policies	on	 low	 inflation	and	 restoring	
the	 fiscal	 balance	 may	 be	 too	 narrow	 of	 an	 approach	 to	 achieve	 [the]	
desired	 growth	gains,	 especially	 if	 the	 emphasis	 on	monetary	 restrictions	
and	 fiscal	 prudence	 depresses	 economic	 activity	 in	 the	 short	 run	 and	
restricts	broader	developmental	policies.	[…]	The	potential	contribution	of	
financial	 development	 to	 economic	 growth	 is	 considerable	 […].	 However,	
[…]	 these	 contributions	 to	 growth	 cannot	 be	 taken	 for	 granted,	 and	 the	
growth	impact	depends	on	the	construction	of	the	appropriate	institutional	
structure.	 […]	What	matters	 is	 that	 the	 financial	 sector	ensures	adequate	
finance	 for	 productive	 investment	 of	 enterprises	[…]	 and	 for	 long-term	
investment.	 Depending	 on	 the	 stage	 of	 development,	 doing	 so	may	 imply	
ensuring	a	domestic	bond	market	 for	 long-term	financing	 in	the	domestic	
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currency	 and	 reserving	 an	 important	 role	 for	 public	 sector	 banks	




Ever	 since	 economists	 have	 analyzed	 the	 development	 of	 market-based	economies,	 they	 wonder	 about	 the	 role	 of	 finance	 in	 this	 process	 and	 even	though	 for	 Nobel	 laureate	 Merton	 Miller	 the	 idea	 “that	 financial	 markets	contribute	 to	 economic	 growth	 is	 a	 proposition	 too	 obvious	 for	 serious	discussion”	 (Miller	1998,	14),	economists	have	not	reached	a	consensus	on	 the	question	what	role	finance	plays	in	economic	development.	Adam	Smith	(1776)	recognized	 that	money	 lowers	 transactions	 costs,	 allowing	producers	 to	 spend	more	resources	on	specialization,	which	in	turn	fosters	technological	innovation.	Alexander	Hamilton	(1781,	published	1961,	618),	who	would	later	become	one	of	 the	 creators	 of	 the	 US	 financial	 system,	 described	 banks	 as	 “the	 happiest	engines	that	ever	were	invented”	for	spurring	economic	growth.	Walter	Bagehot	(1873)	was	very	much	aware	that	“[m]oney	is	economical	power”	(Bagehot	1873,	2)	 and	 showed	 the	 importance	 of	 finance	 for	 the	 understanding	 of	 economic	development.	 The	 discussion	 about	 the	 link	 between	 finance	 and	 growth	 is	explored	further	in	section	2.1.1,	but,	in	the	first	place,	the	following	paragraphs	give	 a	 quick	 overview	 of	 several	 other	 important	 strands	 in	 the	 finance	 and	development	debate.	 In	sections	2.1.2	and	2.1.3,	 two	threads	of	 the	debate	that	are	 especially	 relevant	 for	 this	 study	 are	discussed	 in	more	detail,	 scrutinizing	financial	fragilities	and	the	role	of	the	(developmentalist)	state.	Curiously,	development	economists	attributed	problems	of	underdevelopment	to	the	“real	economy”	and	neglected	the	 issue	of	 finance,	 for	decades	(cf.	Stallings	and	 Studart	 2006,	 1).	 A	 collection	 of	 essays	 under	 the	 title	 “pioneers	 in	development”	(Meier	and	Bauer	1984)	didn’t	discuss	the	subject	of	finance	at	all.	Joan	Robinson	(1954,	86)	argued	that	“where	enterprise	leads	finance	follows”.	According	to	this	view,	the	“financial	sector”,	 instead	of	causing	growth,	merely	responds	 to	 changing	 demands	 from	 the	 “real	 economy”.	 In	 the	 same	 vein,	Robert	Lucas	(1988)	affirms	that	finance	as	a	determinant	of	economic	growth	is	“over-stressed”.	The	theoretical	debate	about	the	central	position	money	and	credit	occupied	in	economic	 development	 and	 growth	 was	 essentially	 initiated	 by	 Joseph	Schumpeter	(1912),	who	emphasized	the	pivotal	role	of	financial	intermediaries	in	 economic	 development,	 together	 with	 John	 Maynard	 Keynes	 (1936,	 1937),	who	 explained	 the	 relevance	of	 both	 finance	 and	 funding	 for	 the	 realization	of	investment	projects,	which	are	necessary	for	economic	development.	Theoretical	work	followed	that	explicitly	referred	to	the	 financial	system	including	seminal	articles	by	Gurley	and	Shaw	(1955),	McKinnon	(1973),	Shaw	(1973),	and	Minsky	(1986).	Post	Keynesians	putting	less	emphasis	on	Keynesian	“final	demand”	and	“fiscal	 policy”,	 but	 instead	highlighting	 the	 supremacy	of	 the	 financial	 over	 the	real	goods	and	factors	sphere	are	known	as	Monetary	Keynesians	(Nitsch	1995,	61)	 and	 formulated	 a	 theory	 of	managing	wealth	 in	 uncertain	 conditions	 as	 a	
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“universal	principle	of	economic	activity”	(Riese	1990,	37)2.	This	doctoral	thesis	stands	 in	 the	 Monetary	 Keynesian	 tradition	 and	 applies	 a	 Post	 Keynesian	analytical	framework	that	will	be	developed	in	sub-chapter	2.3.	In	opposition	 to	Keynes,	 the	 theory	of	 finance	 that	mainly	built	on	 the	work	of	McKinnon	(1973)	and	Shaw	(1973)	as	well	as	development	strategies	and	policy	advices	 derived	 from	 it	 (see	 for	 example	 Fry	 1995;	 World	 Bank	 1989;	 Drake	1980)	suggested	that	the	main	barrier	to	economic	development	was	not	the	lack	of	 investment	 opportunities,	 but	 insufficient	 savings:	 Financial	 repression	hampered	 development	 and	 financial	 deepening3	could	 be	 achieved	 through	financial	 liberalization,	 referring	 both	 to	 the	 deregulation	 of	 the	 domestic	financial	system	and	the	opening	up	to	the	 international	 financial	system.	After	several	 Latin	 American	 countries	 were	 among	 the	 first	 to	 implement	 the	liberalization	strategy	 in	the	 late	1970s,	 they	suffered	from	frequent	and	costly	crises,	 culminating	 in	 the	major	debt	crisis	of	 the	region,	which	 led	 to	 the	 “lost	decade”	 in	 Latin	 America	 and	 was	 well	 captured	 by	 Diaz-Alejandro’s	 article	“Good-bye	 financial	 repression,	 hello	 financial	 crash”	 (1985).	 Later,	 the	 UN	organization	 responsible	 for	 economic	 development	 UNCTAD	 established	 that	the	neo-classical	model	had	 failed	 in	explaining	and	predicting	 the	relationship	between	 finance	 and	 development	 (UNCTAD	 2008,	 67).	 That	 is	 one	 important	reason	for	the	pursuit	of	a	Post	Keynesian	approach	in	this	thesis.	One	 explanation	 for	 the	 particularly	 damaging	 effects	 of	 the	 liberalization	 of	financial	 markets	 relative	 to	 other	 markets	 was	 developed	 by	 Kindleberger	(1978),	who	built	on	the	writings	of	Marshall	(1923),	Keynes	(1936),	and	Minsky	(1977a)	 and	 conceived	 financial	 crises	 as	 responses	 to	 previous	 excessive	behavior	of	economic	agents	in	the	financial	markets,	noting	that	this	would	be	more	 common	 in	 liberalized	 financial	 systems.	 Reinhart	 and	 Rogoff	 (2008)	studied	the	tendency	of	financial	markets	towards	boom-bust	cycles	in	historical	perspective	and	showed	their	recurrent	appearances,	suggesting	that	this	was	a	central	 market	 failure	 of	 financial	 systems.	 International	 capital	 flows	 to	emerging	 market	 and	 developing	 economies	 followed	 a	 similar	 pattern,	characterized	 as	 surges	 and	 reversals	 (Ffrench-Davis	 and	 Griffith-Jones	 1995),	the	 latter	more	 famously	 termed	 “sudden	 stops”	 by	 Calvo	 and	 associates,	who	showed	that	the	surge	of	capital	flows	into	Latin	America	was	largely	determined	by	 external	 factors,	 such	 as	 the	 base	 rate	 in	 the	 USA	 (Calvo,	 Leiderman,	 and	Reinhart	1993).	 Since	 the	mid-1990s,	 several	 emerging	market	and	developing	economies	 were	 involved	 in	 and	 suffered	 from	 a	 series	 of	 financial	 and/or																																																									2	Major	 contributions	 to	 the	 discussion	 in	 English	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 Journal	 of	 Post	Keynesian	 Economics	 and	 came	 from	Davidson	 (1984),	 Kregel	 (1980),	Minsky	 (1980,	1977b),	and	Moore	(1979),	while	the	discussion	in	German	is	mainly	conducted	by	Riese	(1989,	1986a)	and	his	“Berlin	School”	with	Paula,	Fritz,	and	Prates	(2015),	Nitsch	(1993),	Tober	 (1991),	 Herr	 (1989),	 Lüken-Klaßen	 and	 Betz	 (1989),	 Riese	 and	 Spahn	 (1989),	Hauptmann	(1987),	and	Stadermann	(1986).	3 	Both	 financial	 deepening	 and	 financial	 broadening	 refer	 to	 financial	 market	development	and	are	somewhat	overlapping	so	 that	 the	concepts	are	best	understood	together	(Barger	1998,	11):	While	deepening	refers	to	the	increase	of	the	financial	asset	to	GDP	ratio,	broadening	refers	to	the	expansion	in	terms	of	number	and	variety	of	both	participants	and	instruments.	
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currency	 crises	 that	 gave	 rise	 to	 new	 theoretical	models	 attempting	 to	 explain	the	underlying	causes,	which	are	presented	in	section	2.1.2.	Another	 approach	 to	 explain	 financial	 crises	was	 given	by	 Stiglitz	 (1994),	who	argued	 that	 market	 failures	 in	 the	 financial	 sector	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 endemic,	because	 financial	markets	are	very	 information	 intensive,	 raising	 the	 relevance	and	disruptive	consequences	of	asymmetric	and	imperfect	information	as	well	as	incomplete	contracts	with	respect	to	other	sectors	of	 the	economy	(Stiglitz	and	Weiss	 1981).	 The	 implications	 of	 financial	 sector	 turbulences	 for	 the	 real	economy	were	outlined	by	Mishkin	(1996,	17):	
“A	 financial	 crisis	 is	 a	nonlinear	disruption	 to	 financial	markets	 in	which	
adverse	selection	and	moral	hazard	problems	become	much	worse,	so	that	
financial	markets	are	unable	to	efficiently	channel	funds	to	those	who	have	
the	most	productive	investment	opportunities.”	As	a	consequence,	government	failures	in	the	financial	system	tend	to	have	less	detrimental	 effects	 than	market	 failures,	 turning	 state	 interventions	 especially	beneficial,	e.g.	through	financial	market	regulation,	capital	account	management,	or	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 schemes.	 This	 is	 an	 important	 finding	 with	regard	to	this	thesis,	which	attributes	an	important	role	to	the	state	in	CBMD	and	more	particularly	explores	the	role	of	public	debt	management,	monetary	policy	and	public	finance	for	development	institutions.	Several	 examples	 of	 bank	 failures,	 capital	market	 bubbles,	 as	well	 as	 systemic	banking	and	currency	crises	in	the	history	of	finance	(Reinhart	and	Rogoff	2008)	provoked	a	vast	production	of	literature	on	financial	fragility	and	its	counterpart	financial	 stability,	 which	 is	 especially	 relevant	 for	 emerging	 market	 and	developing	 economies4.	 Financial	 deepening	 and	 liberalization	 might	 not	 only	spur	growth,	but	can	also	be	sources	of	risks	and	fragilities,	 for	example	due	to	the	 maturity	 transformation	 of	 banks,	 as	 shown	 by	 the	 Diamond	 and	 Dybvig	(1983)	model.	 Apart	 from	 historic	 surveys	 and	 case	 studies,	 there	 are	 several	systemic	 cross-country	 studies	 exploring	 the	 causes,	 determinants	 and	socioeconomic	 costs	 of	 financial	 fragility	 (Beck	 2012,	 3–4).	 The	 literature	 on	banking	crises	was	discussed	by	Demirgüç-Kunt	and	Detragiache	(2005)	and	the	literature	on	sovereign	debt	crisis	management	was	discussed	by	Nitsch	(1995,	70ff.).	Teunissen	and	Akkerman	 (2004)	edited	a	book	 that	was	 contributing	 to	the	 formulation	 of	 a	 new	 development	 agenda	 in	 the	 post-Washington-Consensus	era.	In	the	same	vein,	Griffith-Jones	(2013)	called	for	a	more	prudent	approach	 towards	 financial	 liberalization.	 Financial	 stability	 is	 also	 a	 recurring	topic	 in	the	IMF	working	paper	series	(see	 for	example	Almarzoqi,	Naceur,	and	Kotak	2015;	Sahay	et	al.	2015).	Furthermore,	 the	 finance	 and	development	 debate	 comprises	 of	 literature	 that	treats	 several	 international	 aspects	 of	 finance,	 for	 example	 by	 exploring	 topics	such	as	global	 financial	architecture	 (Crotty	2009;	Eichengreen	1999),	 regional	monetary	 cooperation	 (Mühlich	 2014;	 Dullien	 et	 al.	 2013),	 and	 international	capital	 flows	 in	 their	 various	 forms,	 including	 foreign	 direct	 investment	 (FDI),	international	 commercial	 bank	 loans	 and	 portfolio	 flows,	 bilateral	 and																																																									4	Financial	fragilities	are	also	the	subject	of	(sub-)sections	2.1.2,	2.3.1.3,	and	2.3.3.4.	
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multilateral	 aid,	 e.g.	 stemming	 from	 official	 development	 assistance	 (ODA)	 or	multilateral	 development	 banks	 (Ocampo,	 Kregel,	 and	 Griffith-Jones	 2007),	 as	well	as	migrants’	remittances	(Fritz,	Ambrosius,	and	Stiegler	2008;	Ratha	2005).	For	a	broad	review	of	the	literature	on	international	financial	integration	and	its	benefits	as	well	as	its	costs,	see	Kose,	Prasad,	Rogoff,	and	Wei	(2009).	Since	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 1980s,	 financial	 innovations	 related	 to	 the	development	 of	 derivative	 and	 more	 liquid	 secondary	 markets	 caused	 a	securitization	 trend	 that	changed	 the	structure	of	 financial	 systems	 throughout	the	world	in	a	way	that	increasingly	blurred	the	distinction	between	short-	and	long-term	(debt)	securities5	and	resulted	in	a	short-termist	bias,	because	wealth	holders	 saw	 their	 financial	 applications	mainly	as	portfolio	 investments,	which	they	 instantly	 adjusted	 as	 soon	 as	 new	 opportunities	 emerged	 and	 their	expectations	changed	(F.	J.	C.	de	Carvalho	1997,	476ff.).	Not	only	the	demand	side	of	capital	markets,	but	also	the	supply	side	contributed	to	this	trend	(F.	 J.	C.	de	Carvalho	1997,	479):	
“The	placement	of	securities	as	an	alternative	to	borrowing	from	financial	
intermediaries	 has	 increasingly	 become	 a	 favored	 option	 both	 for	 those	
debtors	 that	 command	 the	 confidence	 of	 investors	 and	 for	 the	
intermediaries	 themselves	 that	may	minimize	 the	costs	 they	bear	and	 the	
risks	they	run	with	this	kind	of	deal.”	For	 a	 critical	 assessment	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 that	 is	 known	 as	 financialization	see,	for	example	Amato	and	Fantacci	(2014),	Hardie	(2012),	and	Epstein	(2005).	The	 literature	on	 finance	 and	politics,	 critically	 reviewed	by	Haber	 and	Perotti	(2008),	is	not	restricted	to	financial	sector	regulation	or	the	political	economy	of	the	financial	and	judicial	system	(Beck	and	Levine	2005),	but	also	encompasses	topics	such	as	subsidized	credit	programs,	public	development	banks	and	other	public	 finance	 for	 development	 institutions	 and	 schemes	 that	might	 be	 part	 of	developmentalist	 state	 policies,	 which	 are	 discussed	 in	 more	 detail	 in	 section	2.1.3.	Moreover,	 finance	 is	often	key	 to	political	power	 struggles,	 because	non-financial	 companies6 	depend	 on	 finance	 and	 funding	 for	 the	 realization	 of	investment	projects,	which	“makes	the	financial	sector	critical	in	the	attempt	of	ruling	 elites	 to	 entrench	 their	 socioeconomic	 dominance	 and	 prevent	 entry	 of	competitors”	 (Beck	 2012,	 4).	 The	 subject	 of	 distributional	 effects	 of	 financial	development	 has	 only	 recently	 gained	 more	 attention	 from	 researchers	 and	policy-makers	 (see	 for	 example	 Naceur	 and	 Zhang	 2016).	 Subsequent	 to	 the	recent	 global	 financial	 crisis,	 a	 large	 body	 of	 literature	 has	 emerged	 that	discusses	 possible	 reforms	 of	 financial	 regulation,	 mostly	 related	 to	 advanced	and	 emerging	 market	 economies	 (see	 for	 example	 IMF	 2012a;	 Griffith-Jones,	Ocampo,	and	Stiglitz	2010).	
																																																								5	Securities	are	tradable	financial	assets	and	might	refer	to	equity	or	debt.	Here,	the	term	“(debt)	 securities“	 will	 be	 used,	 to	 accentuate	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 thesis	 on	 bonds.	 The	conceptual	differences	between	equity	and	debt	 funding	are	discussed	 in	Hicks	 (1967,	47)	and	Davidson	(1978,	410–13).	6	Here,	the	terms	“companies“,	“firms”	and	“entrepreneurs“	are	used	interchangeably.	
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Closely	related	to	the	finance	and	politics	literature	and	equally	important	in	the	finance	 and	 development	 debate	 is	 the	 literature	 on	 institutions	 and	development	 (Acemoglu,	 Johnson,	 and	 Robinson	 2005).	 Pertaining	 to	 this	literature	 strand,	 the	 contributions	 to	 the	 book	 edited	 by	 Haber,	 North,	 and	Weingast	 (2008)	 questioned	 the	 literature	 strand	 that	 attributes	 the	development	of	financial	markets	to	the	legal	origins	of	a	country,	i.e.	whether	it	is	a	common	law	or	a	civil	law	country	(for	a	quick	overview	of	the	literature	on	the	legal	origins	view,	see	the	introduction	in	Rajan	and	Zingales	2003).	The	legal	origin	of	a	country	and	its	type	of	legal	system	apparently	does	not	predetermine	whether	it	has	investor-friendly	laws,	because	the	empirical	evidence	shown	by	Porta	et	al.	 (1997,	1996)	 in	 favor	of	 common	 law	countries,	was	challenged	by	Rajan	 and	 Zingales	 (2003),	who	 found	 evidence	 in	 favor	 of	 civil	 law	 countries	and	 by	 Musacchio	 (2008a),	 who	 showed	 that	 domestic	 capital	 market	development	in	Brazil	varied	too	much	to	be	solely	explained	based	on	its	legal	origin.	In	 a	 recent	 contribution	 to	 the	 finance	 and	 development	 debate,	 Beck	 (2012)	critically	 analyzed	 three	 literature	 strands,	 namely	 the	 finance	 and	 growth	literature,	 the	 literature	 on	 financial	 fragility,	 and	 the	 finance	 and	 politics	literature.	Due	 to	 their	relevance	 for	 this	 thesis,	a	more	profound	discussion	of	these	three	important	strands	of	the	finance	and	development	debate	is	provided	in	the	following	sections:	Section	2.1.1	examines	the	finance	and	growth	nexus,	section	 2.1.2	 relates	 to	 the	 financial	 fragility	 literature	with	 a	 focus	 on	models	explaining	 financial	and	currency	crises	 together	with	the	 literature	on	balance	sheet	 effects	 and	 original	 sin,	 and	 section	 2.1.3	 gives	 a	 quick	 overview	 of	 the	literature	 on	developmentalist	 state	 policies	with	 a	 focus	 on	public	 finance	 for	development	institutions.	Before	turning	to	these	topics,	a	few	basic	terms	are	defined.	Following	Schmidt,	Hackethal,	 and	 Tyrell’s	 (2001,	 3–4)	 distinction	 of	 the	 terms	 financial	 system,	sector,	and	market,	the	financial	system	encompasses	everything	from	financial	institutions	 and	 markets,	 including	 financial	 instruments,	 to	 the	 regulatory	framework,	while	the	financial	sector	is	understood	relative	to	the	other	sectors	of	the	economy	by	offering	financing	solutions,	investment	opportunities,	as	well	as	related	advisory	and	intermediation	services;	and	the	financial	market	is	the	place	where	the	demand	and	supply	side	of	 the	 financial	sector	meet	 to	realize	financial	 intermediation,	 either	 institutionally	 based,	 e.g.	 through	 banks,	 or	market	 based,	 e.g.	 through	 securities	 exchanges.	 Additionally,	 the	 informal	financial	sector	and	self-financing	are	both	relevant	forms	of	finance	in	emerging	market	and	developing	economies.	Commonly	financial	markets	are	classified	according	to	the	maturity	structure	of	the	assets	traded,	distinguishing	the	short-term	money	market	from	the	mid-	to	long-term	capital	markets,	the	latter	including	both	the	equity	(or	stock)	market	and	 the	 debt	 (or	 bond)	 market	 (Mishkin	 and	 Eakins	 2012,	 254ff.).	 Financial	market	 development	 can	 be	 conceived	 in	 terms	 of	 increases	 in	 market	 size,	liquidity,	and	capitalization.	The	market	size	 is	usually	measured	as	the	market	capitalization	 to	 GDP	 ratio	 and	 indicates	 the	 sophistication	 of	 market	infrastructure	 as	 well	 as	 the	 number	 of	 trading	 partners,	 so	 that	 the	 larger	 a	financial	market,	 the	more	opportunities	 to	 finance	and	hedge	exist	 for	market	
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participants	 (financial	 and	 non-financial	 institutions	 alike)	 at	 lower	 set-up,	settlement,	 and	 clearing	 costs	 (Demirgüç-Kunt	 and	 Levine	 2001b).	 Market	liquidity	 is	 usually	 measured	 by	 the	 turnover	 ratios	 of	 traded	 securities,	 but	there	are	other	common	measures,	too,	including	price	measures	such	as	bid-ask	spreads	 or	 covered	 and	 uncovered	 interest	 rate	 parities	 (for	 an	 overview,	 see	Sarr	 and	 Lybek	 2002).	 The	 market	 liquidity	 indicates	 the	 development	 of	secondary	markets,	where	the	securities	are	traded	that	had	been	issued	before	on	the	primary	markets.	Moreover,	market	liquidity	is	an	important	determinant	of	the	liquidity	of	an	asset,	which	reflects	the	ease	of	being	converted	into	money:	“Therefore	 we	 may	 say	 that	 an	 asset	 is	 as	 liquid	 as	 the	 time	 required	 for	 its	convertibility	 is	 short	and	 the	expected	change	 in	 its	value	 is	 small”	 (F.	 J.	C.	de	Carvalho	1992,	86).	Market	capitalization	is	usually	measured	by	multiplying	the	number	of	securities	issued	by	their	respective	values	and	serves	as	an	indicator	for	the	capacity	to	realize	financing	operations	and	to	diversify	risks,	which	also	shows	how	accessible	the	market	is	(McCauley	and	Remolona	2000;	Eichengreen,	Hausmann,	and	Panizza	2005).	By	definition,	low	market	capitalization	coincides	with	small	market	size.	
2.1.1 The	finance	and	growth	nexus	The	 literature	on	 the	 finance	and	growth	nexus	 corresponds	 to	 the	 core	of	 the	finance	 and	 development	 debate.	 Levine	 (2005,	 1997)	 analyzed	 in	much	 cited	literature	 reviews	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 studies	 about	 the	 connections	between	 financial	 and	 economic	 development.	 The	 evidence	 gathered	 by	 him	suggests	 a	 causal	 relationship	 between	 finance	 and	 growth,	 though	 subject	 to	qualifications,	and	a	need	for	 further	research.	By	first	outlining	the	theoretical	appraisals	of	 the	 finance-growth	nexus,	Levine	 (2005)	gathered	 the	knowledge	on	 the	 subject	 at	 that	 time.	 In	 theory,	 financial	 markets,	 instruments,	 and	institutions	lower	information	and	transaction	costs,	that	way	altering	incentives	and	restrictions	on	decisions	to	invest	and	to	undertake	innovative	enterprises,	and	 thus	 eventually	 also	 raise	 long-run	 growth	 rates.	 While	 he	 found	 few	theoretical	models	 that	 analyze	 the	 dynamic	 interactions	 between	 finance	 and	growth,	he	records	a	vast	theoretical	literature	that	compares	different	types	of	financial	 systems,	 i.e.	 bank-based	 vs.	 market-based	 systems,	 to	 which	 we’ll	return	in	section	2.2.1.	According	to	Levine	(2005),	finance	may	be	conducive	to	economic	development	mostly	 through	 (i)	 risk	diversification	and	 risk	management	by	mobilizing	and	pooling	 of	 savings	 (cf.	 Bagehot	 1873);	 (ii)	 facilitation	 of	 exchange	 by	 reducing	transaction	costs,	e.g.	through	the	provision	of	a	payment	system;	(iii)	improved	capital	allocation	by	producing	ex	ante	information	about	investment	projects,	i.e.	spreading	 fixed	costs	of	 collecting	 information	 (cf.	Levine	1997;	Merton	1992);	and	 (iv)	 increased	 willingness	 of	 wealth	 holders	 to	 invest	 and	 finance	 new	projects	by	ensuring	ex	post	monitoring	and	corporate	governance.	By	providing	these	 four	 mechanisms	 financial	 systems	 become	 functionally	 efficient	 and	promote	 economic	 growth,	 in	 contrast	 to	 inefficient	 financial	 systems,	 which	might	 lower	economic	growth	 rates	by	misallocating	 resources	and	 raising	 the	
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probability	 of	 costly	 financial	 crises	 (Panizza	 2013,	 6).	 We	 will	 return	 to	 the	subject	of	financial	system	efficiency	and	functionality	in	sub-section	2.3.1.4.	Empirical	research	on	the	link	between	finance	and	growth	has	also	produced	an	extensive	literature,	ranging	from	broad	cross-country	growth	regressions,	time	series	 analyses,	 and	 panel	 techniques,	 to	 detailed	 country	 studies	 as	 well	 as	analyses	 that	 were	 based	 on	 more	 microeconomic	 approaches	 (Levine	 2005,	868).	The	first	to	provide	empirical	evidence	for	the	positive	correlation	between	financial	 development	 and	 growth	 was	 Goldsmith	 (1969).	 However,	 such	 a	correlation	 neither	 controls	 for	 other	 factors	 associated	 with	 the	 observed	variables,	 nor	 can	 it	 tell	 anything	 about	 the	 direction	 of	 causality.	 In	 order	 to	control	 for	other	 factors,	 i.e.	country	characteristics	associated	with	differences	in	 growth	 rates	 across	 countries,	 the	 early	 empirical	 literature	 on	 finance	 and	growth	 (King	 and	 Levine	 1993a,	 1993b)	 used	 ordinary	 least	 squares	 (OLS)	regressions	and	showed	that	financial	development	robustly	predicts	growth	of	per	capita	GDP,	and	that	this	result	holds	for	banking	sector	as	well	as	for	equity	market	 development	 (Levine	 and	 Zervos	 1998).	 Later,	 time	 series	 and	instrumental	 variable	 techniques	 were	 applied	 to	 rule	 out	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	reverse	 causation	 or	 omitted	 variable	 bias	 (Beck	 2012,	 11–12).	 For	 example,	Beck,	Levine,	and	Loayza	(2000)	and	Levine,	Loayza,	and	Beck	(2000)	confirmed	the	 positive	 relationship	 between	 finance	 and	 growth	 by	 using	 dynamic	 panel	techniques	 with	 lagged	 values	 of	 financial	 sector	 indicators	 and	 the	 legal	traditions	of	 countries	as	historic	 country	characteristics	 to	explain	differences	in	financial	development	across	countries.	In	a	similar	way,	Bekaert,	Harvey	and	Lundblad	 (2005)	 and	 Henry	 (2003)	 analyzed	 the	 impact	 of	 financial	liberalization	on	growth.	An	alternative	method	to	show	the	finance	and	growth	nexus	is	based	on	a	better	understanding	of	 the	mechanisms	at	work	 that	 cause	 financial	 development	 to	accelerate	economic	growth,	which	implies	testing	for	varying	effects	of	financial	development	 on	 diverse	 industries	 or	 sectors	 (Beck	 2012,	 12–13).	 Rajan	 and	Zingales	 (1996)	 applied	 this	 differences-in-differences	 technique	 in	 a	 seminal	paper	 to	 show	 that	 industries	with	 a	 higher	 dependency	 on	 external	 financing	expand	faster	 in	 financially	more	developed	countries.	Several	studies	 followed	using	 the	 same	 technique	 to	 find	 evidence	 for	 the	 impact	 of	 financial	development	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 growth	 of	 industries	 that	 have	 more	opportunities	 to	 expand,	 that	 rely	 more	 on	 intangible	 assets,	 and	 that	 are	comprised	of	relatively	more	small	companies	(see	for	example	Beck	et	al.	2008;	Raddatz	2006;	Braun	and	Larrain	2005;	Beck	2003;	Fisman	and	Love	2003;	Beck	and	Levine	2002).	In	addition	to	reviewing	the	empirical	results,	Levine	(2005)	critically	observes	shortcomings	in	the	empirical	methods,	namely	the	econometric	models7	as	well	as	 the	 proxies,	 which	 fail	 to	 measure	 financial	 development.	 More	 recently,	 a	consensus	 has	 emerged	 that	 the	 most	 appropriate	 indicator	 of	 financial	development	in	terms	of	activity,	efficiency,	and	transaction	costs	is	the	ratio	of	credit	to	the	private	sector	as	a	share	of	GDP,	purposely	leaving	out	public	sector																																																									7	Beck	 (2009)	 also	 reviewed	 the	 econometric	methodologies	 underlying	 the	 empirical	finance	and	growth	literature.	
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lending	 as	 its	 correlation	 with	 important	 functions	 of	 an	 efficient	 financial	system	 such	 as	 credit	 allocation,	 risk	 management,	 and	 corporate	 control	 is	probably	 low	 (Panizza	 2013,	 6;	 Demirgüç-Kunt	 and	 Levine	 2001a,	 195ff.).	Svirydzenka	 (2016)	 introduced	 a	 financial	 development	 index	 that	 takes	 into	account	 a	 variety	 of	 measures,	 in	 order	 to	 better	 reflect	 the	 complex	multidimensional	 nature	 of	 financial	 development.	 Levine	 (2005)	 arrived	 at	three	main	results,	which	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	(i)	growth	depends	on	a	well-functioning	 financial	 system,	 yet	 there	 is	 not	 much	 difference	 between	bank-based	and	market-based	economies;	 (ii)	 the	 first	result	 is	not	driven	by	a	simultaneity	 bias;	 and	 (iii)	 by	 alleviating	 external	 financing	 constraints,	 well-functioning	 financial	 systems	 facilitate	 the	 expansion	 of	 companies,	 which	appears	 to	 be	 one	 mechanism	 through	 which	 financial	 development	 spurs	growth.	
2.1.2 Financial	fragility	literature	Emerging	market	and	developing	economies	usually	suffer	from	a	large	burden	of	 foreign	 currency	denominated	obligations	 and	 even	 though	underdeveloped	financial	markets	are	identified	as	a	major	cause	of	financial	vulnerabilities,	the	relationship	between	exchange	rate	volatility	and	financial	market	development	is	not	well	studied	(Mühlich	2014,	4–5;	cf.	Bordo	and	Flandreau	2003).	Moreover,	most	of	these	countries	are	characterized	by	financial	market	fragility,	expressed	by	few	possibilities	to	hedge	against	fluctuations	in	net	wealth	(Eichengreen	and	Hausmann	 1999).	 The	 development	 of	 a	 financial	 market	 is	 reflected	 in	 its	diversity,	liquidity,	and	capitalization,	corresponding	with	more	options	to	hedge,	for	 public	 and	 private	 market	 participants	 alike.	 Due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 hedging	options,	 countries	with	underdeveloped	 financial	markets	 are	more	 vulnerable	to	exchange	rate	fluctuations	(P.	Aghion	et	al.	2009).	The	problem	is	aggravated	where	a	large	part	of	the	country’s	net	assets	or	net	liabilities	are	denominated	in	foreign	 currency,	 because	 the	 holding	 of	 foreign	 currency	 denominated	 net	assets	or	net	liabilities	results	in	net	wealth	fluctuations	according	to	movements	in	the	exchange	rate	(Hausmann	et	al.	1999).	Market	participants	in	a	less	developed	domestic	financial	system	are	exposed	to	a	higher	risk	of	wealth	loss	(Mühlich	2014,	5–6).	In	case	of	a	sudden	reversal	of	financial	 flows,	 for	 example,	 the	 financial	 crisis	 might	 be	 accelerated	 by	 the	underdevelopment	 of	 the	 domestic	 financial	 markets,	 because	 they	 lack	 the	necessary	insurance	mechanisms	against	such	a	reversal	of	financial	flows.	This	shows	that	the	more	solid	and	developed	domestic	financial	markets	are,	the	less	a	 country	will	 suffer	 from	 economic	 and	monetary	 shocks.	 Correspondingly,	 a	less	 developed	 financial	 system	 hampers	 monetary	 policy	 in	 its	 attempts	 to	ameliorate	adverse	effects,	because	 its	 implementation	 is	based	on	 the	 interest	rate	 in	 the	 money	 market,	 on	 open	 market	 operations,	 or	 the	 exchange	 rate	(Dullien	2009).	More	specifically,	the	monetary	policy	space	can	be	restricted	in	the	 following	 ways:	 (i)	 the	 base	 rate	 needs	 to	 follow	 closely	 the	 international	interest	rate	level	in	order	to	avoid	strong	pressures	on	the	exchange	rate	due	to	international	 financial	 flows;	 (ii)	exchange	rate	 fluctuations	need	 to	be	avoided	to	 prevent	 repercussions	 on	 net	 wealth,	 depending	 on	 the	 currency	
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denomination	of	net	assets	and	liabilities;	and	(iii)	the	ability	of	the	central	bank	to	 act	 as	 a	 lender	 of	 last	 resort	 in	 its	 own	 currency	 is	weakened	 to	 the	 extent	financial	 instruments	 prevail	 that	 are	 denominated	 in	 a	 foreign	 currency.	Domestic	financial	market	development	can	thus	be	an	important	contribution	to	a	 more	 stable	 macroeconomic	 environment	 that	 is	 conducive	 to	 economic	development.	The	important	connection	between	monetary	policy	and	financial	development	in	general,	and	CBMD,	in	particular,	is	a	recurrent	issue	throughout	this	thesis.	The	following	paragraphs	explore	the	link	between	domestic	financial	development	and	the	prevention	of	financial	and/or	currency	crises	further.	There	are	three	generations	of	models	to	explain	currency	crises,	each	evolving	after	the	experience	of	a	new	surge	in	currency	and	financial	crises	(Setser	et	al.	2002,	 10–11;	Mühlich	 2014,	 50).	While	 the	 first-generation	models,	 prevailing	until	 the	 mid-1990s,	 predicted	 currency	 crises	 based	 on	 the	 worsening	 of	macroeconomic	 indicators	 such	 as	 deteriorating	 fiscal	 accounts,	 rising	 debt	levels,	or	diminishing	foreign	exchange	reserves,	which	these	models	saw	at	the	root	of	 the	 crisis	 triggering	 them	rather	mechanically	 (see,	 e.g.	Krugman	1979;	Flood	and	Garber	1984),	 the	second-generation	models	explained	 the	outbreak	of	 a	 currency	 crisis	with	 self-fulfilling	market	 expectations	 causing	 speculative	attacks	on	the	exchange	rate	based	on	uncertainty	towards	the	monetary	policy	stance.	 Speculators	 react	 to	 news	 about	 possible	 future	 changes	 in	macroeconomic	 fundamentals	 before	 these	 changes	have	 actually	materialized,	that	way	contributing	to	the	unfolding	of	the	crisis	(see,	e.g.	Obstfeld	1986,	1994;	H.	 L.	 Cole	 and	 Kehoe	 1996).	 These	 tendencies	 are	 aggravated	 by	 intrinsic	features	of	international	capital	flows	that	are	related	to	the	institutional	setup	of	international	financial	markets,	e.g.	the	pro-cyclical	behavior	and	methodology	of	rating	agencies	(Reisen	2003;	Goodhart	2010),	giving	very	short-term	incentives	to	major	market	participants,	such	as	investment	banks	or	pension	funds	acting	on	an	 international	scale,	which	contributes	 to	herding	behavior	(Griffith-Jones	1998;	Devlin,	 Ffrench-Davis,	 and	Griffith-Jones	1995).	At	 the	 end	of	 the	1990s,	after	the	Asian	crisis,	 the	third-generation	models	evolved,	which	saw	currency	crises	as	a	 consequence	of	 financial	 system	 fragilities,	possibly	causing	balance	sheet	 effects,	 related	 to	net	debt	denominated	 in	 foreign	 currencies,	 failures	 in	prudential	 regulation,	 and	 the	 liberalization	 of	 the	 capital	 account	 (see,	 e.g.	Chang	and	Velasco	2000;	Dornbusch	2001).	In	the	face	of	currency	and/or	maturity	mismatches,	balance	sheet	effects	might	cause	 a	 currency	 crisis	 by	 deteriorating	 the	 net	 wealth	 and	 net	 income	 of	economic	 agents	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 changes	 in	 the	 exchange	 and/or	 the	interest	 rate,	 respectively	 (Mühlich	2014,	 40–42;	 Setser	 et	 al.	 2002,	 12ff.).	 The	concept	of	balance	sheet	effects	has	emerged	with	the	third-generation	literature	on	 currency	 crises.	 While	 standard	 economic	 analysis	 had	 almost	 exclusively	focused	on	flow	variables,	e.g.	the	GDP,	international	capital	flows,	or	the	balance	of	the	current	account,	the	new	view	analyzing	balance	sheets	shifted	the	focus	to	stock	variables,	i.e.	the	stock	of	assets	and	liabilities,	at	a	certain	point	in	time.	By	 emphasizing	 the	 importance	 of	 stock	 variables	 such	 as	 external	 debt	 or	foreign	 exchange	 reserves,	 balance	 sheet	 analyses	 actually	 broadened	 the	perspective,	 because	 it	made	 clear	 that	 stocks	 and	 flows	 are	 interrelated:	 The	value	of	the	stock	of	net	assets	(or	liabilities)	changes	according	to	movements	in	the	valuation,	 i.e.	 the	price,	of	 the	existing	stock	of	assets	and	 liabilities,	on	 the	
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one	hand,	 and	 the	 alterations	of	 the	 size	or	 volume	of	 the	 stock	 caused	by	net	flows	during	the	respective	antecedent	period,	on	the	other	hand.	Even	though	the	literature	on	balance	sheet	effects	distinguishes	various	types	of	mismatches	that	pose	a	credit	risk	in	the	event	of	an	external	shock	to	economic	agents	and,	at	the	aggregated	level,	to	the	country	as	a	whole,	this	thesis	focuses	on	the	maturity	and	the	currency	mismatch,	as	these	are	the	most	relevant	types	for	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	(Mühlich	2014,	40–42;	Setser	et	al.	2002,	12ff.).	The	maturity	mismatch	typically	refers	to	the	disparity	between	long-term	 assets	 and	 short-term	 liabilities,	 which	 elevates	 the	 risk	 of	 being	unable	to	service	one’s	debt	in	case	interest	rates	rise.	This	interest	rate	risk	can	also	arise	with	longer-term	liabilities	that	are	indexed	to	the	interest	rate.	While	these	 types	 of	 risks	 concern	 the	 debtor	 side,	 creditors	 holding	 long-term	 fixed	rate	debt	can	also	be	exposed	to	the	interest	rate	risk,	if	a	rise	in	the	interest	rate	reduces	 the	market	 value	of	 their	 debt.	 This	 is	 especially	 relevant	 for	 financial	institutions	 that	 hold	 long-term	 assets	 and	 usually	 finance	 themselves	 with	deposits,	 representing	 short-term	 liabilities.	 Maturity	mismatches	 furthermore	create	the	risk	of	maturing	liabilities	not	being	refinanced,	obliging	the	debtor	to	pay	the	debt	in	cash,	which	is	referred	to	as	the	rollover	risk.	The	 currency	 mismatch	 commonly	 describes	 the	 discrepancy	 between	 assets	denominated	 in	 domestic	 currency	 and	 liabilities	 that	 are	 denominated	 in	foreign	 currency,	 which	 raises	 the	 risk	 of	 suffering	 losses	 in	 net	 wealth	 from	exchange	 rate	 variations	 (Mühlich	 2014,	 40–42;	 Setser	 et	 al.	 2002,	 16–17).	Especially	 in	 emerging	market	 and	 developing	 economies,	market	 participants	from	the	private	as	well	as	 the	public	sector	are	prone	 to	suffer	 from	currency	mismatches	 in	 their	 balance	 sheets,	 because	 they	 are	 often	 unable	 to	 finance	their	 production	 or	 consumption	 and	 to	 fund	 their	 investment	 projects	 in	domestic	 currency	 and,	 thus,	 have	 to	 take	 on	 foreign	 currency	 debt,	 while	generating	 income	 in	 domestic	 currency.	 Even	 if	 one	 sector	 is	 able	 to	 hedge	against	 the	 currency	 risk,	 e.g.	 the	 banking	 sector	 by	 borrowing	 abroad	 and	lending	 to	 companies	 in	 the	 same	 foreign	 currency,	 this	 will	 only	 pass	 the	currency	mismatch	on	to	another	sector.	Yet,	there	are	some	sectors	that	have	a	natural	 hedge.	 For	 example,	 net	 exporting	 companies	 that	 hold	 liabilities	denominated	 in	 foreign	currencies	may	not	suffer	 from	balance	sheet	effects	 in	the	 event	 of	 exchange	 rate	 fluctuations.	When	 there	 are	 currency	mismatches,	exchange	 rate	 fluctuations	 might	 have	 far	 reaching	 consequences	 by	deteriorating	 the	 net	 worth	 and	 creditworthiness	 of	 the	 private	 sector,	 which	might	exert	adverse	effects	on	domestic	economic	activity	and	on	 international	capital	 flows,	 straining	 the	 foreign	 exchange	 reserve	 holdings	 of	 the	 country	(Jeanne	and	Wyplosz	2003),	and	eventually	leading	to	a	financial	crisis.	All	 types	 of	 mismatches	 are	 usually	 connected	 both	 within	 individual	 balance	sheets	and	across	sectors,	 therefore	may	reinforce	each	other,	which	raises	not	only	 uncertainties,	 but	 also	 the	 risk	 of	 a	 solvency	 crisis	 in	 a	 systemic	 way	(Mühlich	 2014,	 40–42;	 Setser	 et	 al.	 2002).	 The	 balance	 sheet	 approach	 points	towards	policies	 that	may	 foster	a	reduction	of	vulnerabilities,	 including	public	debt	 management,	 incentives	 for	 the	 private	 sector	 to	 avoid	 balance	 sheet	exposures,	 and	 the	 build-up	 of	 foreign	 exchange	 reserves.	 By	 emphasizing	 the	importance	of	such	policies,	authors	applying	the	balance	sheet	approach	relate	
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the	 problem	 of	 foreign	 currency	 and	 short-term	 borrowing	 mainly	 to	macroeconomic	 policy	 failures.	 The	 balance	 sheet	 approach	 together	 with	 the	third	 generation	 of	 literature	 on	 currency	 crises	were	 important	 for	 emerging	market	economies,	because	they	showed	monetary	policy	options	for	net	debtor	countries	 and	 emphasized	 the	 relevance	 of	 domestic	 financial	 market	development	 in	 diminishing	 their	 vulnerability	 to	 a	 volatile	 exchange	 rate	 (P.	Aghion	 et	 al.	 2009).	 Well-diversified	 domestic	 financial	 markets,	 including	domestic	 bond	 markets	 and	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 institutions,	contribute	 to	 lower	 net	 balance	 sheet	 exposures	 and	 offer	 more	 hedging	instruments.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 countries	 that	 successfully	 strengthened	 their	financial	 systems	 may	 be	 less	 exposed	 to	 financial	 and	 currency	 crisis	 risks	(Rojas-Suarez	2005).	The	original	sin	literature,	to	which	we	shall	return	shortly,	also	points	out	the	crucial	role	of	well-developed	financial	markets	(Eichengreen	and	Hausmann	2005).	This	underscores	not	only	the	significance	of	developing	a	domestic	market	for	corporate	bonds,	but	also	the	mutual	influence	of	CBMD	and	the	policy	 variables	public	 debt	management,	monetary	policy,	 and	 finance	 for	development.	Another	 merit	 of	 the	 balance	 sheet	 literature	 is	 that	 it	 has	 pointed	 out	 the	increased	risk	of	suffering	from	financial	and	currency	crises	by	opening	up	the	capital	account	and	engaging	in	financial	 integration	into	global	markets,	which	is	especially	true	for	those	countries	that	experience	high	exchange	rate	volatility	and	are	exposed	to	maturity	and/or	currency	mismatches	(Mühlich	2014,	39–40;	Stiglitz	 2000).	 This	 insight	 is	 particularly	 noteworthy,	 because	 until	 recently	mainstream	economists	considered	a	 liberalized	capital	account	as	an	essential	precondition	for	economic	development	(Fritz	and	Prates	2014;	Kose	et	al.	2009).	Meanwhile,	 most	 economists	 agree	 that	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	economies	 display	 certain	 financial	 fragilities,	 which	 cause	 these	 countries	 to	benefit	 when	 they	 abstain	 from	 further	 integrating	 financially	 by	 raising	 their	macroeconomic	 stability	 as	 well	 as	 gaining	 monetary	 autonomy	 (Ostry	 et	 al.	2012;	Crowe	et	al.	2009).	Among	the	lessons	learned	from	the	major	financial	and	currency	crises	during	the	 late	1990s	and	early	2000s	 in	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	was	an	increased	awareness	of	the	importance	of	transparency	and	prudent	risk	management	by	both,	private	financial	institutions	and	central	banks	(Klein	and	Shabbir	2007).	Financial	market	reforms	should	therefore	also	include	measures	that	 aim	 at	 improved	 corporate	 governance,	 more	 specifically	 protecting	minority	 shareholder	 rights,	 promoting	 full	 disclosure	 and	 transparency,	strengthening	 the	 role	 of	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 as	 independent	 overseers,	offering	 conflict	 of	 interest	 resolution	 mechanisms,	 and	 preventing	 the	 use	 of	insider	 information,	 apart	 from	 the	 already	 mentioned	 more	 cautious	 stance	towards	financial	liberalization,	including	the	implementation	of	an	appropriate	exchange	 rate	 policy	 allowing	 more	 flexibility	 with	 room	 for	 exchange	 rate	management;	as	well	as	the	promotion	of	financial	development	in	the	sense	of	completing	 the	 scope	 of	 capital	 market	 instruments	 and	 institutions,	 which	shows	 the	 relevance	 of	 domestic	 bond	 market	 development	 and	 its	 close	connection	to	monetary	policy.	
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The	 original	 sin	 literature	 differs	 from	 the	 balance	 sheet	 literature	 mainly	 by	emphasizing	the	inability	of	macroeconomic	policy	measures	alone	to	redeem	a	country	 tainted	by	original	 sin	 (Mühlich	2014,	42–44;	Eichengreen,	Hausmann,	and	 Panizza	 2005;	 Eichengreen	 and	 Hausmann	 2005,	 1999).	 Both	 approaches	are	 similar	 in	 discussing	 the	 adverse	 effects	 and	 negative	 consequences	 of	 net	external	 debt	 as	 well	 as	 their	 relevance	 for	 this	 thesis	 by	 emphasizing	 the	important	role	of	domestic	capital	market	development.	The	concept	of	original	sin	is	 in	the	first	place	merely	an	empirical	observation,	 from	which	theoretical	conclusions	 are	drawn.	 It	 describes	 the	 inability	 of	most	 emerging	market	 and	developing	economies	 to	borrow	abroad	 in	 their	own	currencies	 (international	component)	 and	 the	 inability	 to	 borrow	domestically	with	 long	maturities	 and	fixed	interest	rates	in	their	own	currencies	(domestic	component).	The	 empirical	 results	 of	 the	 original	 sin	 literature	 show	 that	 macroeconomic	fundamentals	of	a	country	are	far	less	important	for	the	currency	denomination	of	its	investment	and	financing	contracts	than	the	size	of	its	economy	as	a	whole	and	 of	 its	 financial	 markets.	 One	 important	 implication	 of	 original	 sin,	 i.e.	unhedged	net	 foreign	 currency	 liabilities,	 is	 that	 it	may	 stifle	 economic	growth	and	development	by	limiting	the	monetary	policy	space	with	respect	to	exchange	rate	 adjustments,	 leaving	 the	 main	 burden	 to	 the	 interest	 rate	 channel.	 As	 a	result,	 interest	 rates	 become	 more	 volatile,	 reacting	 pro-cyclically,	 that	 way	raising	 economic	 volatility.	 In	 periods	 of	 economic	 recession	 and	 when	 the	exchange	rate	depreciates,	monetary	policy	needs	to	elevate	the	interest	rate	in	order	 to	 attract	 net	 external	 capital	 inflows,	 despite	 the	 adverse	 effects	 on	investment	 and	 economic	 growth.	 During	 periods	 of	 economic	 expansion,	 the	interest	rates	fall,	which	is	problematic,	because	it	further	accelerates	the	boom	phase.	The	 recent	 trend	 of	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	 economies	 increasingly	issuing	 local	 currency	 debt	 on	 international	markets,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 on	their	domestic	 capital	markets,	 on	 the	other	hand,	 is	 less	 a	 sign	of	 redemption	from	 original	 sin,	 according	 to	 the	 authors,	 and	 more	 a	 sign	 of	 abstinence	(Hausmann	 and	 Panizza	 2011).	 In	 other	words,	 it	 is	mainly	 a	 reduction	 in	 net	debt	 that	 has	 caused	 a	 reduction	 of	 currency	 mismatches	 and	 the	 low	participation	 of	 foreign	 investors	 in	 domestic	 markets	 shows	 that	 these	countries	 are	 still	 tainted	 by	 original	 sin.	 Apparently,	 these	 countries	 avoid	financial	 integration,	because	external	debt	 is	associated	with	high	risks,	and	 it	seems	worthwhile	 to	 develop	 the	 domestic	 financial	 system,	 especially	 capital	markets.	In	Brazil,	the	presence	of	international	investors	in	the	sovereign	bond	market	has	been	much	higher	than	in	the	corporate	bond	market,	as	we	will	see	in	chapter	3.	The	presented	issues	are	fundamental	to	this	thesis	due	to	the	financial	fragility	mitigating	potential	of	CBMD.	For	that	reason,	we	will	return	to	address	the	topic	of	 financial	 fragilities	 throughout	 the	 theoretical	 chapter,	 in	 particular	 in	 the	course	 of	 presenting	 the	 analytical	 framework	 and,	 more	 specifically,	 in	 sub-section	2.3.1.3	on	 financial	 fragilities	 in	 the	process	of	 capital	 formation	and	 in	sub-section	2.3.3.4	on	the	concept	of	currency	premium.	
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2.1.3 Developmentalist	state	policies	All	approaches	in	the	finance	and	development	debate	are	based	on	two	essential	premises	 (cf.	 Hermann	 and	 Paula	 2011,	 1–2):	 That	 development	 depends	 on	investment,	 and	 that	 investment	 depends	 on	 the	 financing	 conditions.	 Public	finance	 for	 development	 tries	 to	 improve	 the	 financing	 conditions	 in	 order	 to	increase	 investment,	 and	 that	 way,	 promote	 development.	 While	 finance	 for	development	schemes	may	be	a	part	of	developmentalist	state	policies,	the	latter	are	characterized	by	a	broader	set	of	measures.	Developmentalist	state	policies	were	differentiated	by	Bresser-Pereira	and	Theuer	(2012,	813–14)	from	liberal	state	policies,	i.e.	from	a	state	that	tries	to	draw	back	from	the	(supposedly)	more	efficient	 market	 as	 far	 as	 possible,	 only	 safeguarding	 civil	 rights	 and	 contract	enforcement,	as	opposed	to	the	developmental	state8,	which	directly	intervenes	in	the	economy	with	the	aim	to	foster	economic	development.	Initially,	 developmentalist	 state	 policies	 had	 a	 nationalist	 component,	 which	didn’t	have	any	ethnic	aspect	and	was	only	to	be	understood	in	economic	terms	(Bresser-Pereira	 and	 Theuer	 2012,	 813–14).	 It	was	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 Post	Keynesian	and	structuralist	economic	analysis	of	a	subordinate	center-periphery	relationship	between	advanced	economies	on	the	one	side,	and	emerging	market	and	developing	economies,	on	the	other,	causing	the	latter	to	follow	an	import-substitution	industrialization	(ISI)	strategy,	in	some	countries	starting	as	early	as	the	1930s.	The	debt	 crisis	during	 the	1980s	brought	an	end	 to	Latin-American	developmentalist	state	policies,	which	were	replaced	by	the	liberal	state	policies	advocated	by	the	Washington	Consensus.	Yet,	after	the	failure	of	these	policies	to	revive	 the	 development	 process,	 developmentalist	 state	 policies	 returned	 to	many	countries	in	the	region.	These	policies	were	still	guided	by	Post	Keynesian	and	 structuralist	macroeconomic	 analysis	 that	were	mostly	 based	 on	 theoretic	models	 developed	 by	 economists	 like	 Celso	 Furtado,	 Albert	Hirschman,	 Arthur	Lewis,	 Gunnar	 Myrdal,	 Ragnar	 Nurkse,	 Raul	 Prebisch,	 Paul	 Rosenstein-Rodan,	and	Hans	Singer	during	the	1940s	and	1950s	(cf.	Bielschowsky	1988).	The	 concept	 of	 developmentalist	 state	 policies	 is	 closely	 related	 to	 East	 Asian	countries	 that	 have	 successfully	 completed	 a	 reorientation	 of	 the	 economy	towards	 high	 technology	 and	 value	 added	 manufacturing	 (Amsden	 1989;	Campos	 and	 Root	 2001;	 Johnson	 1982,	 1987).	 Although	 the	 Brazilian	developmentalist	 state	 policies	 have	 not	 rendered	 overall	 results	 that	 fare	 as	well	 as	 the	 East	 Asian	 benchmark	 cases,	 a	 disaggregated	 sectoral	 approach	reveals	 that	 these	 policies	 have	 contributed	 to	 several	 outstanding	 success	stories,	 although	 there	 are	 also	 examples	 of	 failures	 (Schneider	 2015).	 The	literature	 on	 developmentalist	 state	 policies	 has	 established	 that	 the	effectiveness	 of	 such	 policies	 depends	 mainly	 on	 four	 factors:	 Weberian	bureaucracy,	 political	 support,	 reciprocity,	 and	 what	 Evans	 (1995)	 termed	“embedded	 autonomy”,	 i.e.	 collaborative	 relations	 between	 the	 public	 and	 the	private	sectors	(Kohli	2004;	Amsden	2001).	Most	of	the	Brazilian	success	stories	involved	 state-owned	 enterprises	 and,	 therefore,	 it	 was	 not	 necessary	 to																																																									8	In	this	thesis,	the	term	most	frequently	used	is	developmentalist	state	policy	or	policies,	but	other	terms	such	as	developmental	state	are	used	in	the	same	spirit.	
		 26 	
elaborate	 refined	 schemes	 for	 reciprocity	 and	 collaboration	 between	 business	and	 government	 as	 a	 precondition	 for	 effectiveness,	 so	 that	 the	 first	 two	conditions,	 i.e.	 Weberian	 bureaucracy	 and	 political	 support,	 were	 more	important	 in	 these	 successful	 cases.	 Overall,	 the	 Brazilian	 developmental	 state	policies	 showed	 great	 variation	 across	 the	 four	 factors	 and	 across	 time	 (Kohli	2004;	Amsden	2001;	P.	Evans	and	Rauch	1999;	P.	B.	Evans	1995;	Haggard	1990).	Effective	developmentalist	state	policy	 intervention	 is	 facilitated	by	 institutions	that	are	capable	of	collecting	and	processing	 information,	which	are	crucial	 for	monitoring	the	implementation	of	the	selected	policies	and,	thus,	closely	related	to	 the	 issue	of	reciprocity	due	 to	 the	 implied	principal-agent	problem	of	public	finance	 for	development	 schemes	 (Schneider	2015,	118;	Rodrik	2004;	Amsden	2001,	1989).	Information	is	also	highly	relevant	for	the	functional	collaboration	between	 the	 public	 and	 private	 sectors	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 quality	 of	implementation,	on	 the	one	hand,	 and	 the	quality	of	policy,	 on	 the	other	hand.	Just	as	the	endorsement	of	a	policy	by	the	private	sector	leads	to	a	more	rigorous	application,	the	quality	of	a	policy	improves	with	the	feedback	of	its	beneficiaries.	In	practice,	 these	relations	of	embedded	autonomy	were	 found,	 for	example,	 in	deliberation	councils,	which	were	very	common	in	Asian	countries.	The	Brazilian	councils	 did	 not	 raise	 the	 collaboration	 between	 the	 private	 and	 the	 public	sectors,	mainly	because	of	membership	restrictions,	 refusing	access	 to	relevant	actors	 (Schneider	2015,	119;	Doctor	 and	Paula	2007;	 Schneider	2004;	Campos	and	Root	 2001;	 Schneider	 1992;	Vianna	1987).	Another	 example	 of	 embedded	autonomy	 is	 an	 institutional	 arrangement	where	 private	 business	 associations	are	 in	 charge	 of	 implementing	 the	 developmental	 state	 policies	 and	 become	“developmental	 associations”	 (Doner	 and	 Schneider	 2000;	 Maxfield	 and	Schneider	1997).	Even	though	developmental	associations	are	not	very	common,	such	 institutions	 have	 been	 involved	 in	 training	 programs	 in	 the	 Brazilian	manufacturing	sector	(Schneider	2004).	Public	 finance	 for	 development	 institutions	 may	 be	 key	 actors	 in	 a	developmentalist	state,	because	of	their	ability	to	generate	relevant	information	and	to	monitor	the	implementation	of	developmentalist	state	policies	(Schneider	2015,	 118–19,	 127–29).	 In	 Brazil,	 the	 public	 development	 bank9	BNDES	 has	played	 a	 very	 important	 role	 by	 exercising	 these	 functions	 in	 several	 sectors,	though	not	with	respect	to	a	comprehensive	evaluation	of	overall	programs.	The	BNDES	 made	 not	 only	 significant	 contributions	 to	 the	 success	 of	developmentalist	state	policies	through	acquiring	valuable	research	capabilities,	but	also	through	its	involvement	in	the	privatization	process,	mainly	during	the	1990s,	 so	 that	 even	 during	 the	 period	 when	 liberal	 state	 policies	 dominated,	which	 caused	 the	 privatization	 of	 several	 state-owned	 enterprises,	 Brazil	retained	 various	 mechanisms	 that	 would	 facilitate	 the	 return	 of	developmentalist	state	policies,	later.	First	of	all,	the	country	did	not	privatize	all	of	 its	state-owned	enterprises	and	maintained	(majority)	ownership	of	some	of	the	largest	and	most	strategic	companies,	such	as	the	oil	company	Petrobras	or	the	 development	 bank	 BNDES	 itself.	 This	 selective	 privatization	 process	 is	strongly	 related	 to	 the	 second	 of	 the	 four	 factors	 fostering	 effectiveness																																																									9	Aghion	 (1999,	 83)	 defines	 development	 banks	 as	 “government-sponsored	 financial	institutions	concerned	primarily	with	the	provision	of	long-term	capital	to	industry”.	
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mentioned	 above,	 political	 support,	 because	 it	 allowed	 politicians	 in	 favor	 of	developmental	state	policies	to	focus	their	efforts	on	specific	sectors,	while	other	politicians	more	inclined	towards	liberal	state	policies	continued	their	agenda	in	other	sectors.	Related	 to	 this,	 even	 in	 those	 state-owned	 enterprises	 that	 participated	 in	 the	privatization	 process,	 state	 influence	 has	 in	 most	 cases	 not	 terminated	(Schneider	2015,	128):	 In	order	to	 facilitate	and	finance	privatization	sales,	 the	development	 bank	 in	 charge	 of	 managing	 the	 privatization	 process	 acquired	minority	 participations.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 public	 finance	 for	 development	institution	ended	up	as	the	largest	institutional	investor	of	Brazil.	Furthermore,	the	 state	 kept	 what	 we	 know	 as	 “golden	 shares”	 in	 many	 of	 the	 privatized	companies,	granting	 it	veto	power	 in	strategic	decisions,	which	protected	these	companies	 from	 hostile	 takeovers,	 enabling	 their	 path	 to	 becoming,	 in	 some	cases,	multi-national	corporations	and	even	global	market	leaders.	As	part	of	the	privatization	 process,	 new	 regulatory	 agencies	 were	 created	 to	 monitor	 the	formerly	 state-owned	 companies.	 The	 regulatory	 agencies	were	 endowed	with	substantial	 authority	 as	 well	 as	 funding	 to	 fulfill	 this	 task	 without	 neglecting	developmentalist	state	policies,	which	was	 further	 facilitated	because	members	of	the	management	of	former	state-owned	enterprises	as	well	as	personnel	from	the	 competent	 authorities	 for	 supervision	 were	 readily	 employed	 by	 the	 new	agencies,	that	way	ensuring	embedded	autonomy.	In	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	 economies,	 the	 level	 of	 bureaucratic	competence	of	different	agencies	in	a	country	usually	varies	considerably	so	that	developmentalist	 state	 policies	 should	 be	 designed	 in	 a	 way	 that	 efforts	 are	focused	 within	 the	 more	 efficient	 agencies,	 which	 are	 known	 as	 “pockets	 of	bureaucratic	competence”	(Rodrik	2004,	23–24):	“If	the	development	bank	is	in	good	 shape	 but	 tax	 administration	 is	 a	mess,	 promotion	may	 need	 to	 be	 done	through	directed	credit	rather	than	tax	incentives.”	Although	it	is	important	that	developmentalist	state	policies	closely	target	the	market	failure,	it	might	be	more	efficient	to	deploy	an	instrument	related	to	a	highly	competent	agency	with	a	less	direct	 influence	 on	 the	market	 failure,	 in	 that	 sense	 a	 second-best	 instrument.	Economic	 development	 depends	 on	 the	 realization	 of	 investment	 projects	 by	entrepreneurs,	who	need	finance	and	funding	for	their	typically	risky	enterprises,	which	 is	 usually	 insufficient	 because	 private	 sector	 sources	 such	 as	 corporate	debt	markets,	 equity	markets,	 or	 venture	 capital	 funds	 are	 either	 inexistent	 or	underdeveloped	in	these	countries	(Rodrik	2004,	26–27).	Especially	in	emerging	market	 and	 developing	 economies,	 therefore,	 the	 supply	 of	 public	 finance	 for	development	 is	 crucial	 and	 the	 state	 can	 take	 advantage	 of	 a	 variety	 of	instruments,	 including	 public	 development	 banks,	 publicly	 funded	 venture	capital	funds,	public	guarantee	schemes	for	commercial	bank	lending	to	specific	sectors	or	for	longer	terms,	as	well	as	the	use	of	a	share	of	public	pension	fund	resources	for	the	acquisition	of	riskier	assets.	Public	 development	 banks	 have	 played	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 the	 rapid	industrialization	 process	 of	 Japan	 and	 most	 European	 countries,	 which	 was	documented	 and	 analyzed	 as	 early	 as	 the	 1950s	 (Yasuda	 1993;	 W.	 Diamond	1963;	Gerschenkron	1962;	Cameron	1953).	The	less	successful	public	finance	for	development	 institutions	 in	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	 countries	 only	
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received	 limited	 attention	 until	 the	 1980s	 (World	 Bank	 1989,	 1984;	 Gordon	1983).	 Criticism	 of	 development	 banks	 handing	 out	 loans	 with	 subsidized	interest	 rates	arose	 in	 the	1960s	and	1970s,	mainly	after	 the	seminal	works	of	McKinnon	(1973)	and	Shaw	(1973).	The	criticism	was	theoretically	based	on	the	concept	 of	 financial	 repression.	 Within	 this	 view,	 “the	 existence	 of	 public	financial	 institutions,	 such	as	development	banks,	was	–	 almost	by	definition	–	seen	as	negative”	(Cozzi	and	Griffith-Jones	2015,	9).	One	important	characteristic	of	financial	repression	is	the	fixation	of	low	interest	rates.	According	to	the	McKinnon-Shaw	models,	interest	rate	fixation	distorts	the	economy	in	the	following	ways	(Fry	1989,	16–17):	Deposit	rate	ceilings	not	only	bias	 the	 decision	 between	 current	 and	 future	 consumption,	 thus,	 impeding	saving	and	investment	to	reach	their	socially	desirable	levels,	but	also	encourage	potential	 depositors	 to	 prefer	 direct	 investment	 opportunities,	 even	 relatively	low-yielding	 ones,	 over	 bank	deposits,	which	 could	 enable	 the	 bank	 to	 finance	loans	 for	 the	 realization	of	higher-yielding	 investment	projects.	Furthermore,	a	cap	on	the	loan	rates	creates	a	bias	in	favor	of	more	capital-intensive	investment	projects.	 That	 is	 how,	 according	 to	 these	 models,	 lower	 than	 market	 clearing	interest	 rates	 for	 deposits	 and	 loans	 have	 a	 detrimental	 effect	 on	 both	 the	volume	and	the	quality	of	investment	activities.	In	 the	 1990s,	 the	 importance	 of	 financial	 institutions	 at	 early	 stages	 of	development	started	to	draw	the	attention	of	economists	and	while	most	focused	on	commercial	banks	(see	e.g.	Acemoglu	and	Zilibotti	1996),	a	few	authors	also	showed	interest	in	market	failures	and	the	role	of	public	finance	for	development	institutions	(B.	A.	de	Aghion	1999;	Dewatripont	and	Maskin	1995;	Bardhan	and	Roemer	1993).	Within	 a	decade,	 a	 large	 amount	 of	 literature	 examining	public	banks	 evolved	 with	 some	 studies	 focusing	 on	 state-owned	 commercial	 banks,	some	 on	 public	 development	 banks,	 and	 others	 on	 the	 influence	 on	 the	industrialization	process	(Lazzarini	et	al.	2015;	Ferraz,	Além,	and	Madeira	2013;	Dinç	 2005;	Mian	 and	 Khwaja	 2004;	 Rodrik	 2004;	 Porta,	 Lopez-de-Silanes,	 and	Shleifer	 2002;	 Amsden	 2001).	 Apart	 from	 theoretical	 analyses	 of	 the	 role	 of	public	banks	in	the	financial	system	(Hermann	2011;	Aronovich	and	Fernandes	2006;	B.	A.	de	Aghion	1999;	Bruck	1998a),	several	qualitative	case	studies	were	conducted	 (e.g.	 Hermann	 2010b;	 S.	 Cole	 2009;	 Amsden	 1989;	 Fordwor	 1981;	Ndongko	 1975).	 Recently,	 the	 first	 issue	 of	 a	 new	 World	 Bank	 series	 called	“Global	Financial	Development	Report”	 (GFD)	aimed	at	 “Rethinking	 the	Role	of	the	State	in	Finance”	(according	to	its	title)	(World	Bank	2013)	and	the	2015/16	issue	 of	 the	 GFD	 emphasized	 the	 importance	 of	 domestic	 bond	 markets	 for	development	(World	Bank	2015,	ch.	3).	Closing	 section	 2.1.3,	 which	 defined	 and	 discussed	 developmentalist	 state	policies,	 we	 can	 summarize	 the	 main	 arguments	 of	 this	 sub-chapter	 2.1	 as	follows.	 This	 section	 showed	 that	 especially	 public	 finance	 for	 development	institutions	 help	 the	 state	 to	 improve	 financing	 conditions,	 thus,	 facilitate	investment	 activities	 and,	 consequently,	 foster	 economic	 development.	 As	 we	learned	 in	 section	 2.1.1,	 financial	 system	development	 spurs	 economic	 growth	through	the	provision	of	adequate	finance	and	funding	for	expanding	companies	and	 their	 productive	 investment	 projects.	 The	 balance	 sheet	 as	 well	 as	 the	original	sin	literature	presented	in	section	2.1.2	point	to	financial	fragilities	that	
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are	common	in	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	and	usually	related	to	 maturity	 and	 currency	 mismatches.	 The	 integration	 of	 bond	 markets	 and	public	 finance	 for	 development	 institutions	 into	 the	 domestic	 financial	 system	raises	not	only	its	diversification,	but	also	its	functionality	and	stability.	One	 of	 the	 important	 findings	 of	 the	 finance	 and	 development	 debate	 is	 that	financial	 systems	 are	 prone	 to	 suffer	 from	market	 failures	 such	 as	 boom-bust	cycles	as	well	as	surges	and	reversals	of	financial	flows.	Generally	speaking,	the	adverse	effects	of	market	failures	in	the	financial	system	are	stronger	than	those	resulting	 from	 state	 interventions.	 On	 these	 grounds,	 government	 action	 to	promote	financial	development	 including	bond	markets	 is	warranted.	This	sub-chapter	2.1	introducing	the	finance	and	development	debate	already	highlighted	some	aspects	of	 the	pivotal	role	that	public	debt	management,	monetary	policy	and	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 play	 in	 this	 respect.	 After	 recapturing	 key	points	in	the	following	paragraphs,	the	remainder	of	the	chapter	will	continue	to	examine	the	link	between	these	policy	variables	and	CBMD.	The	 policy	 variable	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 was	 mainly	 analyzed	 in	section	 2.1.3.	 The	 basic	 insights	 are	 summarized	 in	 the	 following.	 On	 the	 one	hand,	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 institutions	 are	 criticized,	 for	 example,	based	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 financial	 repression,	 arguing	 that	 their	 market	distortions	 cause	 lower	 investment	 volume	 and	 quality.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	public	 finance	 for	 development	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 crucial	 complement	 to	 domestic	financial	 systems,	 among	 other	 things,	 due	 to	 the	 above	 mentioned	 market	failures.	 Especially	 in	 early	 development	 phases,	 countries	might	 benefit	 from	public	 finance	 for	development	 institutions	 that	are	particularly	apt	 to	monitor	developmentalist	 state	 policies	 and	 to	 support	 their	 implementation	 by	gathering	information.	Monetary	policy	is	another	central	policy	variable	of	this	thesis.	Among	the	key	challenges	 that	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	 face	 is	a	 restricted	monetary	 policy	 space.	 Due	 to	 the	 underdeveloped	 financial	 systems	 of	 these	countries,	 monetary	 policy	 does	 not	 dispose	 of	 well-functioning	 bond,	 money	and	foreign	exchange	markets	to	efficiently	conduct	open	market	operations	as	well	as	 interest	 rate	and	exchange	rate	policies.	As	a	 result,	monetary	policy	 is	forced	 to	 gear	 the	 domestic	 base	 rate	 towards	 the	 international	 interest	 rate	level	in	order	to	prevent	swings	in	financial	flows	that	cause	strong	fluctuations	of	the	exchange	rate.	In	case	of	currency	mismatches	the	monetary	policy	space	is	restricted,	because	it	is	required	to	aim	at	a	relatively	stable	exchange	rate	in	order	to	circumvent	balance	sheet	effects.	In	a	similar	vein,	all	three	generations	of	 currency	 crises	 models	 emphasize	 the	 relevance	 of	 exchange	 rate	 policy.	Original	 sin	 literature	 also	points	 out	 the	 restricted	 flexibility	 of	 exchange	 rate	policy,	which	 needs	 to	 consider	 unhedged	net	 foreign	 currency	 liabilities.	 As	 a	consequence,	 monetary	 policy	 has	 to	 almost	 exclusively	 resort	 to	 the	 interest	rate	 channel,	 increasing	 its	volatility	and	pro-cyclical	behavior.	Respectively,	 in	case	of	maturity	mismatches	the	monetary	policy	space	is	confined	by	the	need	to	 avoid	 strong	 changes	 in	 the	 interest	 rate,	 which	 would	 otherwise	 cause	balance	 sheet	 effects.	 Furthermore,	 a	 large	 fraction	 of	 foreign	 currency	denominated	financial	assets	might	hamper	the	central	bank	to	fulfill	its	function	as	a	lender	of	last	resort.	
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Not	only	does	 the	development	of	a	domestic	bond	market	help	 to	 lift	 some	of	the	limits	of	the	monetary	policy	space,	monetary	policy	is	also	one	of	the	main	policy	variables	 that	determine	CBMD.	A	domestic	market	 for	 corporate	bonds	depends	 on	 a	 stable	macroeconomic	 context	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 guaranteed	 by	 a	sound	 monetary	 policy	 stance.	 Inflation	 needs	 to	 be	 controlled,	 although	monetary	 policy	 must	 not	 be	 too	 tight,	 either,	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 depressed	economic	 activity	 in	 the	 short	 run	 and	 to	 facilitate	 developmentalist	 state	policies	in	the	long	run.	A	steady	and	predictable	interest	rate	path	also	serves	as	a	 signal	 for	 CBMD.	 Furthermore,	 monetary	 policy	 can	 contribute	 to	 the	development	of	a	corporate	bond	market	by	regulating	and	monitoring	financial	markets.	 The	 experience	 of	 several	 crises	 in	 emerging	market	 and	 developing	economies	around	the	turn	of	the	millennium	showed	the	importance	of	central	banks	insisting	on	transparency	and	prudent	risk	management.	The	exposure	of	these	 countries	 can	 also	 be	 reduced	 through	 less	 international	 financial	liberalization	 together	with	an	appropriate	exchange	rate	policy.	The	 literature	on	 balance	 sheets	 furthermore	mentions	 the	 vulnerability-alleviating	 policy	 of	building	 up	 foreign	 exchange	 reserves.	 These	 measures	 help	 the	 country	 to	elevate	 its	macroeconomic	 stability	 and	 to	 gain	monetary	 autonomy,	 implying	positive	effects	on	CBMD.	Another	 key	 challenge	 that	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	 economies	 face,	namely	 that	 their	 debt	 is	mostly	 denominated	 in	 a	 foreign	 currency	 and/or	 of	short-term	 nature,	 is	 strongly	 related	 to	 the	 policy	 variable	 public	 debt	management.	While	the	first	generation	of	crises	models	cites	rising	debt	levels	as	a	relevant	macroeconomic	indicator,	the	third	generation	of	crises	models	lays	the	 focus	on	 foreign	exchange	denominated	net	debt	 that	might	cause	 financial	fragilities.	 The	 debt	 problem	 is	 also	 referred	 to	 by	 the	 original	 sin	 literature,	which	states	that	these	countries	were	unable	to	borrow	in	their	own	currency	and/or	long-term	without	resorting	to	indexation.	Correspondingly,	the	balance	sheet	 approach	 focuses	 on	 currency	 and	 maturity	 mismatches,	 which	 are	commonly	 interconnected	 and	 mutually	 reinforcing,	 that	 way	 systemically	raising	 the	 risk	 of	 a	 solvency	 crisis.	 Since	 domestic	 bond	 markets	 lower	 the	dependency	of	a	country	from	external	capital	inflows	and	their	adverse	effects,	they	offer	a	solution	to	these	types	of	debt	problems.	In	addition,	as	public	bond	markets	pave	the	way,	public	debt	management	is	an	important	determinant	of	CBMD.	The	policy	variable	can	exert	its	influence	by	reducing	vulnerabilities,	as	advised	 by	 the	 balance	 sheet	 literature.	 Moreover,	 public	 debt	 management	determines	 the	 development	 of	 a	 corporate	 bond	market	 through	 its	 signaling	effect	and	by	installing	essential	elements	of	bond	market	infrastructure.	After	this	sub-chapter	2.1	gave	an	introduction	to	the	finance	and	development,	the	 following	 sub-chapter	 2.2	will	 describe	 the	 state	 of	 the	 art	 of	 literature	 on	domestic	bond	market	development.	 Some	aspects	of	 the	 relationship	between	CBMD	 and	 the	 policy	 variables	 public	 debt	management,	monetary	 policy,	 and	public	 finance	 for	 development	 were	 already	 touched	 upon	 and	 these	interrelations	will	be	examined	further	in	the	following.	
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2.2 Domestic	bond	market	development:	state	of	the	art	
A	 key	 subject	matter	 of	 this	 thesis,	 a	 domestic	market	 for	 corporate	 bonds,	 is	generally	 defined	 as	 a	 more	 or	 less	 organized	 market	 for	 long-term	 debt	securities	that	are	issued	by	public,	semi-public,	and/or	private	companies.	Most	commonly,	 bond	 markets	 are	 organized	 as	 over-the-counter	 (OTC)	 or	 as	securities	 exchange	 markets,	 not	 necessarily	 involving	 an	 electronic	 trading	platform,	 and	 distinguished	 according	 to	 the	 issuer	 between	 sovereign	 (or	public)	and	corporate	(or	private)	bond	markets,	albeit	in	this	thesis,	corporate	bonds	 are	 more	 specifically	 only	 those	 issued	 by	 non-financial	 corporations,	excluding	 issuers	 pertaining	 to	 the	 financial	 sector.	 Clearly	 differentiated	 from	bank	 lending	 as	 well	 as	 equity	 (or	 stock)	 markets,	 corporate	 bond	 markets	comprise	of	fixed	rate	and	floating	rate	debt	securities	with	a	minimum	term	to	maturity	of	at	 least	one	year	and	do	not	 include	collateralized	debt	obligations,	mortgage-backed	 or	 asset-backed	 securities.	 Since	 both	 government	 as	well	 as	private	 issuers	can	place	 their	bonds	either	on	 the	domestic	market	or	abroad,	the	 definition	 of	 a	 domestic	 bond	 market	 might	 seem	 straightforward.	Nevertheless,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 specified	 further	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 currency	denomination	of	the	bond	and	the	nationality	of	the	issuer.	This	thesis	considers	all	 bonds	 issued	on	 the	domestic	market	 as	part	of	 the	domestic	bond	market,	including	 those	 of	 foreign	 issuers	 and	 those	 denominated	 in	 or	 indexed	 to	 a	foreign	 currency,	 while	 explicitly	 excluding	 domestic	 currency	 denominated	bonds	issued	on	a	foreign	market.	In	 the	 specific	 context	 of	 emerging	market	 and	 developing	 economies	 that	 are	characterized	by	weak	currencies,	market	forces	might	not	work	in	favor	of	the	establishment	 of	 a	 local	 bond	 market.	 Apart	 from	 the	 difficulties	 of	 financial	development	 under	 the	 circumstances	 that	 are	 typical	 for	 these	 countries,	domestic	bond	market	development	is	generally	associated	with	high	fixed	costs	that	derive	from	the	build-up	of	the	required	market	infrastructure.	Although	the	development	of	a	domestic	market	for	corporate	bonds	is	far	from	being	an	easy	task,	 the	effort	may	be	worthwhile.	Among	 the	most	 important	 reasons	 for	 the	creation	of	a	 local	market	 for	debt	securities	are	 the	possibilities	 to	strengthen	the	 country’s	 currency,	 its	 financial	 and	macroeconomic	 stability,	 as	well	 as	 its	growth	potential.	 Considering	 the	 adverse	 contextual	 factors	 together	with	 the	beneficial	 opportunities	 of	 domestic	 bond	 market	 development	 in	 emerging	market	 and	 developing	 economies,	 an	 active	 developmentalist	 state	 policy	 to	support	the	development	of	local	bond	markets	appears	justified.	In	the	following,	the	literature	on	the	development	of	a	local	market	for	bonds	in	contrast	 to	 equity	 and	 banking	 markets	 is	 discussed,	 before	 examining	 the	advantages	 of	 and	 preconditions	 for	 domestic	 bond	market	 development.	 The	sub-chapter	 closes	with	 a	 review	of	 the	 literature	 on	 (corporate)	 bond	market	development	in	Latin	America,	and	more	specifically,	in	Brazil.	
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2.2.1 Financial	structure:	banks,	markets,	and	economic	development	An	important	strand	of	the	finance	and	development	debate	has	been	committed	to	 find	 out	 whether	 bank-based	 or	 market-based	 financial	 systems	 are	 more	conducive	 to	 economic	 growth	 and	development,	which	 is	 also	 highly	 relevant	for	 this	 thesis.	Levine	(2002)	and	Stulz	(2001)	offered	excellent	surveys	on	the	subject	and	Allen	and	Gale	(2000)	designed	a	comparison	framework	for	the	two	types	 of	 financial	 systems.	 A	 central	 finding	 in	 the	 literature	 is	 that	 neither	market-based	nor	bank-based	 systems	are	 able	 to	 generate	better	 results	 than	the	 other	 in	 terms	 of	 long-term	 growth	 rates	 and	 economic	 development	(Demirgüç-Kunt	and	Maksimovic	2002;	Levine	2002;	Beck	et	al.	2001;	Demirgüç-Kunt	and	Levine	2001a).	On	the	contrary,	both	markets	and	banks	have	a	role	to	play	in	providing	access	to	finance	and	fostering	economic	growth.	For	example,	when	banks	hand	out	 loans	to	finance	business	enterprises	and	pool	savings	 in	the	 form	 of	 sight-deposits,	 they	 transform	 short-term	 liabilities	 into	 long-term	assets,	which	reduces	the	savers’	liquidity	risk	and	enables	long-term	investment	projects	 (cf.	D.	W.	Diamond	and	Dybvig	1983).	 Liquid	 capital	markets	 function	similarly	by	pooling	financial	resources	in	exchange	for	securities,	thus	providing	finance	and	funding	to	realize	long-term	investment	projects,	while	allowing	the	securities	 holders	 to	 liquidate	 their	 financial	 assets	 at	 short-term	 notice	 (cf.	Levine	1991).	With	respect	to	the	different	roles	markets	and	banks	take	on	in	the	finance	and	growth	 nexus,	 the	 leading	 view	 in	 the	 literature	 establishes	 that	 bank-based	lending	 is	 usually	more	 adept	 to	 finance	 smaller	 companies,	 while	 equity	 and	bond	markets	hold	a	comparative	advantage	in	efficiently	providing	finance	and	funding	 sources	 for	 larger	 and	more	 established	 companies	 (Borensztein	 et	 al.	2008a;	 de	 la	Torre,	Gozzi,	 and	 Schmukler	2008;	Eichengreen,	Borensztein,	 and	Panizza	2006;	C.	O.	Arteta	2005;	Levine	2002).	As	a	 consequence,	banking	and	capital	 markets	 incorporate	 different	 risks	 and	 the	 diversification	 of	 funding	sources	not	only	leads	to	more	efficient	capital	allocation,	but	also	improves	risk	sharing	with	beneficial	effects	on	economic	development.	While	this	thesis	pays	special	 attention	 to	 the	 development	 of	 domestic	 bond	 markets	 due	 to	 their	ability	 to	 reduce	 vulnerabilities	 related	 to	 balance	 sheet	 effects	 caused	 by	maturity	and/or	currency	mismatches,	equity	and	banking	markets	are	not	less	significant	for	the	stability	and	economic	development	of	a	country10.	In	general,	bank	and	equity	markets	evolve	jointly	with	bond	markets,	even	though	one	can	observe	 that	 economies	 reaching	 higher	 levels	 of	 income	 undergo	 a	 change	towards	 increasingly	 more	 market-based	 financial	 systems	 (Demirgüç-Kunt,	Feyen,	and	Levine	2012).	Empirically,	the	issuance	of	bonds	on	domestic	markets	did	not	show	pro-cyclical	behavior	 in	advanced	economies	(Becker	and	Ivashina	2014;	Adrian,	Colla,	and	Shin	 2012;	 Kashyap,	 Stein,	 and	 Wilcox	 1993),	 while	 bank	 lending	 as	 well	 as	private	 bond	 issuance	 on	 international	 markets	 was	 subject	 to	 strong	 cyclical																																																									10	In	 fact,	 net	 balance	 sheet	 exposure	 might	 be	 significantly	 reduced	 through	 equity	issuance,	because	equity	contracts	don’t	imply	any	mandatory	payments	as	opposed	to	debt	contracts	(de	la	Torre	and	Schmukler	2007;	Eichengreen	2006b).	
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fluctuations	 (Francis,	 Aykut,	 and	 Tereanu	 2014).	 In	 response	 to	 the	 Asian	financial	 crisis,	 Greenspan	 (1999)	 among	others	 suggested	 the	development	 of	local	bond	markets	 as	 “spare	 tires”	 that	borrowers	 can	 rely	on	when	access	 to	international	 markets	 and	 bank	 loans	 becomes	 unavailable.	 However,	 while	companies	might	substitute	bank	finance	for	bond	issuance	through	the	business	cycle	 in	 advanced	 economies,	 empirical	 evidence	 showed	 that	 this	 channel	 did	not	 work	 as	 well	 in	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	 economies	 and	 became	especially	 weak	 in	 strongly	 disruptive	 conditions,	 i.e.	 when	 most	 needed.	Eichengreen	(2007)	questioned	whether	domestic	bond	markets	 could	operate	properly	 in	 the	 face	 of	 a	 full-blown	 banking	 crisis.	 Indeed,	 Allen,	 Gu	 and	Kowalewski	 (2012)	 found	 that	 bond	 and	 banking	markets	 reacted	 to	 banking	crises	 as	 complements	 rather	 than	 substitutes.	 In	 the	 aftermath	 of	 sovereign	crises,	similarly,	companies	received	less	financing	resources	both	through	bank	loans	 as	well	 as	 through	bond	 issues	 (C.	 Arteta	 and	Hale	 2008).	 Resuming	 the	argument:	While	bond	markets	might	neither	be	able	to	prevent	financial	crises	nor	 offer	 a	 readily	 available	 tool	 for	 crisis	 solution,	 they	 can	 help	 to	 reduce	vulnerabilities	 and	 thus	 avoid	 the	 emergence	 of	 crisis	 situations	 by	 providing	long-term	financial	instruments	denominated	in	local	currency.	Relatively	 early	 on,	 studies	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	economies	 were	 conducted	 that	 took	 on	 a	 corporate	 finance	 perspective	 (e.g.	Singh	1994).	Glen	and	Pinto	(1994)	analyzed	how	corporate	finance	changed	in	these	 countries	 due	 to	 greater	 financial	 liberalization	 efforts	 and	 the	 growing	importance	 of	 capital	 markets.	 They	 found	 that	 costs	 and	 ownership	 control	were	 the	 two	most	 important	 determinants	 of	 financing	 choices	 of	 companies.	Booth	 et	 al.	 (2006)	 showed	 in	 a	 cross-country	 study	with	10	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	that,	even	though	specific	country	factors	also	had	an	influence	on	 capital	 structure	 choices,	 the	principal	 theoretic	models	 of	 capital	structure11	held	 in	 these	 countries	 as	 well	 as	 in	 industrial	 countries.	 Pagano,	Panetta,	 and	Zingales	 (1995)	discussed	 the	main	benefits	 and	 costs	 of	 publicly	listing	a	company	in	the	sense	of	an	initial	public	offering	(IPO)	of	equity	shares.	The	 benefits	 strongly	 depend	 on	 the	 liquidity	 of	 the	 company	 shares,	 i.e.	 the	possibility	of	 a	negotiation	of	 large	volumes	of	 the	 shares	without	 significantly	affecting	its	price.	Shares	with	low	liquidity	need	to	offer	a	premium	to	investors,	in	form	of	a	low	price,	which	is	equivalent	to	high	capital	costs	for	the	company.	High	liquidity	additionally	draws	the	attention	of	analysts,	who	will	disseminate	more	information	about	the	company,	among	other	advantages.	The	benefits	of	an	IPO	include:	(i)	easier	access	to	funding:	Companies	in	need	of	large	 funding	 volumes	 might	 be	 subject	 to	 high	 interest	 rates	 or	 credit	restrictions,	which	might	be	alleviated	by	issuing	stocks;	(ii)	 liquidity:	Stocks	of	publicly	owned	companies	can	be	traded	in	stock	exchanges,	which	is	possible	at	low	cost	for	small	shareholders	who	want	to	make	transactions	within	short	time	periods.	 This	 advantage	 for	 the	 shareholders	 reflects	 in	 higher	 prices	 of	 the	company	 shares,	 and	 consequently,	 lower	 capital	 costs;	 (iii)	 more	 bargaining																																																									11 	Booth	 et	 al.	 (2006,	 99)	 refer	 to	 the	 static	 trade-off	 model,	 the	 pecking-order	hypothesis,	 and	 the	 agency	 theoretic	 framework	 as	 the	 conventional	 capital	 structure	models,	in	all	of	which	the	choice	of	a	company	between	debt	and	equity	is	influenced	by	institutional	as	well	as	firm-specific	determinants.	
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power	with	 banks:	 A	 company,	 as	 a	 client	 of	 a	 bank,	might	 be	 faced	with	 the	problem	that	the	bank	tries	to	take	advantage	of	its	privileged	information	about	the	 credit	 quality	 of	 the	 company	 and	 charge	 increased	 interest	 rates.	Disseminating	 the	 information	 across	 the	 market	 creates	 competition	 for	 its	lenders,	that	way	guaranteeing	lower	capital	costs	and	higher	funding	volumes;	(iv)	 portfolio	 diversification:	 With	 the	 decision	 of	 going	 public,	 the	 initial	shareholders	 of	 a	 company	 will	 be	 able	 to	 diversify	 their	 portfolio,	 which	 is	usually	highly	concentrated	in	the	company	that	they	own.	Either	the	shares	are	directly	 sold	 or	 the	 capital	 raised	 through	 the	 IPO	 is	 used	 by	 the	 company	 to	diversify	its	risks	by	buying	shares	of	other	companies;	(v)	change	of	control:	An	IPO	might	represent	the	first	step	of	a	greater	strategy	to	sell	the	company.	The	sale	 of	 an	 initial	 tranche	 of	 the	 company	 shares	 can	 raise	 the	 value	 of	 the	remaining	shares.	The	first	three	benefits	also	apply	correspondingly	to	the	issuance	of	corporate	bonds,	 which	 is	 also	 true	 for	 the	 costs	 of	 going	 public	 that	 are	 related	 to:	 (i)	underpricing:	 One	 of	 the	most	 serious	 obstacles	 of	 going	 public	 is	 that	 shares	usually	 need	 to	 be	 sold	 with	 a	 discount	 at	 the	 IPO.	 Theory	 suggests	 that	 this	commonly	 termed	 underpricing	 is	 related	 to	 the	 information	 asymmetry	between	the	underwriters	selling	the	shares	and	the	 investors	buying	them.	As	such,	the	underpricing	can	be	seen	as	a	premium	claimed	by	investors	with	less	information.	Underpricing	is	related	to	the	initial	distribution	of	the	shares	and,	therefore,	 depends	 on	 the	 efficiency	 of	 the	 underwriters	 and	 on	 the	 level	 of	uncertainty	regarding	the	issuing	company;	(ii)	administrative	costs:	Apart	from	the	initial	underpricing,	an	IPO	implies	various	direct	costs,	such	as:	commission	of	 the	 underwriter,	 registration	 fees	 etc.	 Additionally,	 one	 has	 to	 consider	regularly	occurring	costs	related	to	auditing,	publication	of	financial	statements,	fees	 for	 the	 stock	exchange	or	monitoring	entities.	A	 lot	of	 these	expenses	will	not	 rise	 proportionally	 with	 the	 size	 of	 the	 issue	 and,	 therefore,	 weigh	 more	heavily	on	small	companies;	(iii)	 loss	of	confidentiality:	The	status	of	a	publicly	owned	 company	 requires	 disclosure	 of	 information,	 which	 might	 cause	 an	important	 competitive	 disadvantage.	 To	 adhere	 to	 this	 information	 standard	implies	also	that	the	companies	are	under	a	closer	watch	of	the	fiscal	authorities,	narrowing	down	the	space	for	tax	avoidance.	
2.2.2 Advantages	of	developing	domestic	bond	markets	The	initial	driving	force	behind	the	efforts	of	governments	to	develop	local	bond	markets	often	was	the	urgent	need	to	finance	their	fiscal	deficits	(Turner	2002).	Bordo,	Meissner	 and	Redish	 (2003)	 found	 that	 several	 former	 British	 colonies	had	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 were	 cut	 off	 from	 access	 to	 international	capital	markets	as	a	consequence	of	external	events	such	as	World	War	II,	which	provoked	these	countries	to	develop	domestic	bond	markets.	Borensztein	et	al.	(2008b,	8–9)	gave	various	examples	of	Latin	American	countries,	where	a	crisis	served	 as	 a	 catalyst	 for	 domestic	 bond	 market	 development	 and	 the	 Asian	financial	 crisis	 triggered	 the	 Asian	 Bond	 Markets	 Initiative	 (ABMI).	 A	 country	may	 benefit	 from	 local	 capital	 markets,	 and	 in	 particular	 from	 domestic	 bond	markets,	not	only	because	they	improve	risk	sharing	as	well	as	capital	allocation,	
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but	 also	 because	 they	 help	 to	 implement	 fiscal,	 monetary,	 and	 exchange	 rate	policies	(Laeven	2014,	4–5).	There	 are	 several	 complementary	 advantages	 of	 developing	 domestic	 bond	markets	that	reinforce	each	other.	To	begin	with,	domestic	bond	markets	allow	governments	 to	 finance	 large	 fiscal	 deficits	without	 the	 need	 to	 incur	 external	debt,	which	would	imply	exchange	rate	risks,	or	to	force	sovereign	debt	upon	the	banking	 sector,	 which	 would	 cause	 financial	 repression.	 Moreover,	 domestic	money	and	bond	markets	facilitate	the	conduct	of	monetary	policy	by	producing	valuable	 information	 about	 economic	 agents’	 expectations	 and	 by	 providing	necessary	 instruments	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 monetary	 policy,	 that	 way	strengthening	 the	 monetary	 transmission	 channels	 (IMF	 2004),	 and	 for	 the	sterilization	of	external	capital	 inflows.	Also,	 the	 formation	of	a	yield	curve12	in	the	public	bond	market	serves	as	a	benchmark	for	the	private	market,	allowing	investors	and	savers	to	identify	the	opportunity	costs	of	different	assets	(Paula	et	al.	2009,	6).	The	deficiency	of	a	yield	curve,	i.e.	a	term	structure	of	interest	rates	determined	by	market	forces,	might	lead	to	inadequacies	in	the	internal	discount	rate	 of	 companies	 and	 over-	 or	 under-investment,	 cause	mispricing	 on	 capital	markets,	and	raise	hedging	costs	so	that	market	participants	take	on	higher	than	efficient	 financial	 and/or	 foreign	exchange	 risks,	which	also	 increases	 financial	crisis	vulnerability	(Herring	and	Chatusripitak	2000).	Furthermore,	without	any	competition,	banks	can	become	“too	big”	and	contract	mostly	short-term	credit,	which	 in	 turn	 hampers	 the	 realization	 of	 long-term	 investment	 projects,	while	making	the	financial	system	more	vulnerable	to	liquidity	shocks.	The	 development	 of	 domestic	 bond	 markets	 is	 also	 advantageous	 by	 making	long-term	 funding	 instruments	 available,	 which	 allows	 economic	 agents	 to	improve	 their	 interest	 rate	 and	 maturity	 risk	 management	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	balance	sheet	effects	(Stallings	and	Studart	2006).	Similarly,	the	development	of	domestic	 bond	 markets	 provides	 instruments	 denominated	 in	 local	 currency,	which	helps	economic	agents	to	manage	inflation	and	exchange	rate	risks,	again,	lowering	 the	 chances	 to	 suffer	 from	 adverse	 balance	 sheet	 effects	 (Ocampo,	Kregel,	and	Griffith-Jones	2007,	156).	What	is	more,	domestic	bond	markets	offer	an	 alternative	 funding	 source	 for	 companies	 and,	 thus,	 provide	 a	 healthy	competition	 to	 the	 banking	 sector.	 Additionally,	 domestic	 capital	 market	development	 can	 help	 to	 increase	 financial	 stability	 by	 improving	 risk	 sharing	and	by	complementing	the	financial	system,	providing	an	expedient	addition	to	banking	markets.	The	development	of	domestic	bond	markets	helps	to	mitigate	financial	 instabilities,	 including	 currency	 and	 maturity	 mismatches,	 but	 might	also	create	new	risks	associated	with	lower	market	liquidity,	a	smaller	investor	base,	and	indexation	(Jeanneau	and	Tovar	2008b).	The	liberalization	of	domestic	capital	markets	is	ambiguous	because,	on	the	one	hand,	it	might	expand	the	investor	base	by	creating	access	for	foreign	investors,	which	 could	 lower	 capital	 costs,	 relieve	 credit	 constraints,	 and	 foster	international	 risk	 sharing,	 among	 other	 things,	 but	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 could	also	 hamper	 the	 development	 of	 domestic	 markets	 by	 facilitating	 access	 to																																																									12	A	yield	curve	displays	different	yields	corresponding	to	different	maturities	of	similar	debt	securities,	in	this	case	sovereign	bonds.	
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international	 financial	 markets,	 where	 trading	 could	 migrate	 to,	 which	 would	have	adverse	effects	on	domestic	market	liquidity,	possibly	lowering	the	quality	of	 issues	 on	 the	 domestic	 market,	 because	 the	 best	 credits	 tap	 international	markets	 (see,	 for	example,	de	 la	Torre,	Gozzi,	and	Schmukler	2008)	or	because	the	 requirements	 on	 the	 domestic	 markets	 are	 relaxed	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	primary	market	 activity	 to	move	 abroad.	 Furthermore,	 opening	 up	 the	 capital	account	would	actually	work	against	the	initial	intent	of	stabilizing	the	financial	system	(Eichengreen	2006a).	Governments	that	want	to	accelerate	the	process	of	building	 up	 a	 domestic	 bond	 market	 this	 way	 should	 aim	 at	 building	 up	 the	necessary	 market	 infrastructure	 first,	 before	 they	 engage	 in	 financial	liberalization.	 Related	 to	 this	 point	 is	 the	 dilemma	 that	 countries	 face	 with	respect	 to	 the	 choice	 of	 their	 exchange	 rate	 regime.	 The	 European	 experience	showed	 that	 a	 stable	 exchange	 rate	 has	 a	 very	 strong	 and	 positive	 effect	 on	corporate	 bond	 market	 development,	 however,	 the	 Asian	 crisis	 showed	 that	more	 flexible	 exchange	 rate	 regimes	 are	helpful	 in	 tailoring	 exchange	 rate	 and	monetary	policy	according	to	domestic	needs.	“Hence,	the	exchange	rate	regime	consistent	with	financial	stability	in	the	short	run	may	not	be	conducive	to	bond	market	 development	 in	 the	 longer	 run”	 (Eichengreen	 2006a,	 6).	 The	 empirical	evidence	 is	 not	 conclusive,	 though,	 and	 domestic	 bond	 market	 development	might,	 depending	 on	 the	 specific	 country	 context,	 not	 be	 hampered	 by	 a	more	flexible	exchange	rate	regime.	In	the	absence	of	a	well-functioning	domestic	corporate	bond	market,	companies	might	seek	finance	through	bond	issuance	in	the	world’s	major	financial	centers,	where	they	encounter	a	more	extensive	and	efficient	bond	market	infrastructure	(Borensztein	et	al.	2008b,	2).	Bond	market	development,	hence,	might	not	only	refer	 to	 domestic	 markets	 (de	 la	 Torre	 and	 Schmukler	 2007),	 but	 could	 also	include	 bonds	 denominated	 in	 local	 currency	 that	 are	 issued	 abroad	 (cf.	Borensztein	et	al.	2008a).	Different	arguments	 favoring	each	option	were	 lined	out	by	Eichengreen,	Borensztein	and	Panizza	(2006,	5ff.).	To	set-up	a	domestic	bond	market	is	a	major	investment	and	it	might	not	be	clear	from	the	outset	that	it	 will	 ever	 reach	 the	 necessary	 scale	 to	 operate	 efficiently,	 which	 turns	 the	alternative,	i.e.	to	use	international	capital	markets	that	are	well	established	and	offer	successfully	tested	processes	with	standardized	information,	into	the	easier	option.	However,	international	funding	sources	may	dry	up	very	quickly	as	soon	as	market	sentiment	towards	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	turns	negative.	 Moreover,	 small	 and	 medium	 enterprises	 (SMEs)	 as	 well	 as	 less-established	 companies	 may	 particularly	 benefit	 from	 the	 development	 of	domestic	 bond	 markets,	 because	 the	 local	 market	 gives	 them	 easier	 market	access	compared	to	an	international	bond	issuance.	
2.2.3 Bond	market	development:	preconditions	and	determinants	Emerging	market	and	developing	economies	can	benefit	 from	the	development	of	 domestic	 bond	 markets,	 because	 of	 their	 growth	 enhancing	 and	 financial	vulnerabilities	 mitigating	 properties,	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 the	 previous	 section.	However,	literature	points	to	various	preconditions	in	order	for	a	domestic	bond	market	 to	 function	 well,	 so	 that	 its	 development	 usually	 requires	 the	
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intervention	of	the	state	and	even	then	it	won’t	easily	be	achieved	–	if	the	build-up	 of	 a	well-functioning	 bond	market	 in	 a	 particular	 country	 is	 possible	 at	 all	(Laeven	2014,	7–17;	Borensztein	et	al.	2008b,	1–7).	Some	countries	might	simply	be	 too	 small,	 because	 bond	markets	 require	 a	 large	 investor	 base,	 sufficiently	large	companies	that	are	able	to	bear	the	issuance	costs	of	a	bond	placement,	and	extensive	 financial	market	 infrastructure	 in	order	 to	 function.	 Since	 the	 size	of	the	economy	is	clearly	not	an	issue	in	the	case	of	the	G-20	member	state	Brazil,	this	 section	will	 focus	on	other	 important	determinants	and	preconditions	 that	need	 to	be	 fulfilled	 for	 the	development	of	domestic	bond	markets,	 including	a	stable	 macroeconomic	 as	 well	 as	 strong	 legal	 and	 institutional	 environment.	Since	these	preconditions	cannot	suddenly	arise,	but	evolve	over	time	as	part	of	the	general	economic	and	financial	development,	this	case	study	of	the	Brazilian	bond	 market	 development	 is	 embedded	 in	 a	 historical	 contextualization	 (see	section	3.1.1).	The	 relevant	 financial	 market	 infrastructure	 mainly	 refers	 to	 the	 necessary	installations	 of	 a	 securities	 exchange,	 consisting	 of	 a	 physical	 or	 electronic	trading	platform	including	payments	and	settlements	systems	and	regulatory	as	well	as	 financial	 institutions	 to	ensure	 that	 the	 information	produced	and	used	by	 the	market	 is	 efficiently	 processed,	 evaluated,	 and	 validated	 (Laeven	 2014,	15–16).	 The	 financial	market	 regulator	 together	with	 self-regulatory	measures	and	 institutions	 form	 the	 regulatory	 apparatus.	 Rating	 agencies	 and	 credit	guarantors	are	in	charge	of	generating	and	supporting	the	rating	process.	Direct	access	to	capital	markets	is	usually	barred	for	SMEs	and	small	investors,	because	it	 is	 associated	 with	 high	 fixed	 costs	 that	 stem	 from	 listing	 requirements,	transaction	 fees,	 and	 elevated	 auditing	 costs.	 Since	 the	 build-up	 of	 a	 well-functioning	 infrastructure	 is	 a	 time-consuming	 and	 difficult	 task,	 domestic	capital	 markets	 are	 usually	 developed	 in	 stages,	 with	 the	 establishment	 of	markets	 for	 equity	 and	 public	 bonds	 generally	 preceding	 the	 development	 of	domestic	 currency	 or	 corporate	 bond	markets13	(cf.	 Paula	 et	 al.	 2009,	 6).	 The	latter	not	only	require	a	more	developed	infrastructure	and	legal	framework,	but	also	 a	 strong	private	 (or	 semi-public)	 sector	with	 a	 critical	mass	 of	 companies	that	are	large	enough	to	issue	a	corporate	bond	(cf.	Borensztein	et	al.	2008b,	1–2).	The	 establishment	 of	 the	 necessary	 infrastructure	 of	 a	 public	 bond	 market,	ranging	 from	 an	 adequate	 payment	 system	 and	 a	 clearing	 mechanism	 to	brokerage	firms,	rating	agencies,	primary	dealers,	etc.,	facilitates	the	build-up	of	a	private	bond	market,	because	a	large	part	of	the	existing	infrastructure	may	be	used	and	adapted	to	the	needs	of	a	corporate	bond	market.	In	contrast	to	public	bond	markets,	which	the	government	usually	creates	as	a	way	to	finance	its	fiscal	deficit,	 the	 development	 of	 equity	 and	 corporate	 bond	 markets	 are	 often	 the	result	of	private	sector	initiatives	and	the	government	exerts	its	influence	on	the																																																									13	The	development	of	 equity	markets	depends	 less	on	 strong	 financial	 infrastructures	and	 investor	 rights	 than	 that	 of	 bond	markets,	 because	 an	 equity	 contract	 implies	 an	unlimited	potential	upside	return,	which	can	more	easily	compensate	for	the	perceived	risks	of	weak	 financial	 infrastructures	and	 investor	 rights	 than	 the	 limited	 return	of	 a	bond,	whose	yield	is	capped	by	the	promised	interest	rate	(cf.	Herring	and	Chatusripitak	2000).	
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process	through	supervision	and	legislation	as	well	as	by	setting	standards	and	providing	financial	infrastructure	(Schinasi	and	Smith	1998).	The	existence	of	a	domestic	market	for	public	bonds	denominated	in	local	currency,	which	provides	market	 liquidity	 and	 a	 yield	 curve	benchmark	 to	price	bonds	 against,	 can	be	 a	catalyst	for	the	development	of	a	corporate	bond	market,	as	empirical	evidence	suggests	 that	 shows	 the	 tendency	 of	more	 developed	 private	 bond	markets	 in	countries	with	deeper	sovereign	bond	markets	 (Laeven	2014,	17).	This	market	creation	effect,	which	subsumes	 the	positive	 influences	of	 the	sovereign	on	 the	corporate	bond	market,	 is	closely	related	to	 the	signaling	effect,	which	a	public	bond	market	sends	out	(cf.	Paula	et	al.	2009).	The	public	bond	market	serves	as	a	point	 of	 reference	 to	 market	 participants	 by	 setting	 benchmarks,	 such	 as	 the	yield	 curve.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 there	 is	 competition	between	public	and	private	bonds,	which	are	 just	 like	 any	other	 financial	 asset	 looking	 to	win	 the	 favor	of	wealth	 holders.	 That	 is	why	 public	 debt	management	 is	 one	 of	 the	 three	main	policy	variables	directed	at	the	promotion	of	CBMD.	How	this	policy	variable	and	the	signaling	effect	works,	will	be	explained	in	more	detail	in	section	2.3.2	below.	Many	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	don’t	have	a	sufficiently	large	investor	base	that	is	necessary	to	ensure	depth	and	liquidity	of	domestic	capital	markets	(cf.	Eichengreen,	Borensztein,	and	Panizza	2006).	This	restriction	might	be	 loosened	by	opening	up	 to	 foreign	 investors	 through	 international	 financial	integration,	which	 is	 not	without	 risks,	 or	 by	 establishing	 local	 pension	 funds,	which	 the	 government	 might	 promote	 by	 launching	 a	 funded	 pension	 system	(see,	for	the	case	of	Sweden,	Giannetti	and	Laeven	2009;	and	for	the	case	of	Chile,	Cifuentes,	Desormeaux,	 and	Gonzalez	2002).	 Pension	 reforms	 in	 the	 sense	of	 a	transition	from	a	pay-as-you-go	to	a	fully	funded	private	pension	system	have	an	ambiguous	 effect	 on	 bond	market	 development	 (Borensztein	 et	 al.	 2008b,	 11).	On	the	one	hand,	the	shift	to	a	fully	funded	private	pension	system	automatically	increases	the	demand	for	domestic	bonds	by	private	pension	funds,	whose	asset-liability	management	requires	them	to	 invest	 in	 long-term	(debt)	securities.	On	the	 other	 hand,	 most	 of	 these	 institutional	 investors	 follow	 a	 buy-and-hold	strategy,	 which	 is	 counterproductive	 for	 the	 liquidity	 and	 price-signaling	function	of	the	market.	The	existence	of	organized	secondary	markets	is	another	crucial	factor	in	the	development	of	corporate	bond	markets	(Paula	et	al.	2009,	5–6).	 The	 liquidity	 of	 a	 long-term	 bond	 will	 increase	 if	 it	 can	 be	 traded	 in	 a	secondary	market.	That	is	why	the	demand	for	such	assets	will	be	stimulated	by	the	existence	of	a	secondary	market	and	discouraged	by	the	lack	of	it.	Domestic	 capital	 market	 development	 can	 furthermore	 benefit	 from	 pension	funds	 and	 other	 institutional	 investors,	 because	 these	 investors	 push	 for	improved	 accounting	 and	 auditing	 standards,	 request	 accurate	 and	 timely	disclosure	 of	 relevant	 information,	 encourage	 improvements	 in	 broking	 and	trading	 arrangements	 and	 contribute	 to	 higher	 efficiency	 and	 reliability	 of	 the	clearing	 and	 settlement	 system	 (Laeven	 2014,	 16–17).	 According	 to	 Vittas	(1992),	 institutional	 investors	 can	 foster	 private	 sector	 performance,	 because	they	 promote	 sound	 corporate	 governance,	 contribute	 to	 corporate	 ownership	dispersion,	and	make	procedures	during	privatizations	easier.	Although	private	pension	 funds	 did	 not	 contribute	 much	 to	 capital	 market	 development	 in	emerging	 market	 and	 developing	 economies	 in	 the	 past	 (with	 the	 notable	exception	of	Chile),	this	can	mainly	be	attributed	to	legal	restrictions	that	favored	
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the	 acquisition	 of	 public	 bonds,	 and	 because	 these	 regulations	 have	 lately	changed	towards	a	more	liberal	legislation,	the	role	of	private	pension	funds	has	become	more	important	in	these	countries.	Macroeconomic	 stability	 is	 a	 necessary	 precondition	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 a	corporate	 bond	 market,	 with	 the	 control	 over	 inflation	 being	 particularly	important	(Borensztein	et	al.	2008b,	13;	Burger	and	Warnock	2007;	Braun	and	Briones	2006).	When	 investors	are	 reluctant	 to	hold	 long-term	debt	 securities,	bank	 credit	 might	 be	 the	 more	 feasible	 financing	 option	 because	 bonds	 only	become	cost-effective	when	the	high	fixed	costs	of	issuing	a	bond	can	be	spread	both	 over	 a	 large	 issuance	 volume	 and	 a	 long	 maturity.	 The	 sound	macroeconomic	 framework	 comprises	 not	 only	 of	 a	 stable	 monetary	 policy	stance,	 ensuring	 price	 stability	 as	 well	 as	 avoiding	 excessive	 interest	 rate	 and	exchange	 rate	 volatility,	 but	 also	 a	 reasonable	 public	 debt	 management	 that	follows	and	communicates	a	clear	issuance	strategy.	The	close	link	between	domestic	bond	market	development	and	monetary	policy	will	 be	 analyzed	 in	 further	 detail	 below,	 but	 a	 few	 aspects	 are	 worth	 noting	already.	 Since	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 1990s,	 the	 transmission	 mechanisms	 of	monetary	 policy	 in	 emerging	market	 and	 developing	 economies	 have	 changed	drastically	(Mohanty	and	Turner	2008),	moving	away	from	direct	monetary	tools,	such	 as	 credit	 ceilings	 or	 interest	 rate	 controls,	 to	 more	 market-based	instruments.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 monetary	 policy	 depends	increasingly	 on	 well-developed	 and	 efficient	 capital	 and	 money	 markets,	 and	conversely,	 the	development	of	domestic	bond	markets	also	depends	on	sound	monetary	policy	 (Jeanneau	 and	Tovar	2008a).	By	 creating	 reference	points	 for	the	medium-	 and	 long-term	 ends	 of	 a	 domestic	 yield	 curve,	 bond	markets	 are	particularly	 important	 and	help	 to	 strengthen	 the	 interest	 rate	 channel.	A	well	developed	 money	 market,	 in	 turn,	 is	 an	 important	 precondition	 for	 a	 smooth	functioning	 of	 monetary	 policy	 by	 guaranteeing	 that	 its	 actions	 don’t	 cause	excessive	 interest	 rate	 volatility,	 which	would	 hamper	 corporate	 bond	market	development	(Laeven	2014,	17).	Debt	in	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	tends	to	be	foreign	currency	denominated,	short-term	and	floating	rate,	i.e.	not	fixed	rate.	This	debt	structure	is	 problematic,	 because	 it	 makes	 financial	 instabilities	 more	 likely.	 Since	 a	sudden	 change	 of	 the	 debt	 structure	 towards	 domestic	 currency	 denominated,	long-term	 fixed	 rate	 debt	 is	 not	 realistic,	 a	 sequencing	 approach	 seems	 more	promising	(Turner	2002,	4–5).	For	countries	with	a	history	of	high	and	volatile	inflation	 rates	 that	 issue	most	of	 their	debt	 in	a	 foreign	 currency,	 some	sort	of	floating	rate	debt	(i.e.	debt	with	an	indexation,	most	commonly	to	the	exchange	rate	or	the	inflation	rate)	might	be	an	improvement,	even	more	so	if	it	turns	out	to	be	an	intermediate	stage	leading	to	fixed	rate	debt	in	local	currency.	Inflation	indexed	debt	is	seen	as	more	safe	than	exchange	rate	indexed	debt,	because	the	inflation	rate	usually	suffers	less	abrupt	changes	compared	to	the	exchange	rate.	Country	 risk	 is	 the	key	macroeconomic	 variable	 that	best	 explains	 variation	 in	corporate	 financing	 choices	 between	 bonds	 and	 syndicated	 loans	 in	 emerging	market	 and	 developing	 economies,	 according	 to	 Hale	 (2007).	 Comparing	 the	larger	bond	markets	of	advanced	economies	to	those	of	Asia	and	Latin	America,	
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Eichengreen	and	Luengnaruemitchai	(2006)	showed	that	macro	policies	to	some	extent	and,	more	clearly,	institutional	impediments	help	to	explain	the	difference	in	 size.	 Goldstein	 and	 Turner	 (2004)	 suggested	 that	 in	 emerging	 market	 and	developing	 economies,	 bond	market	 development	 is	mainly	determined	by	 the	economic	 policies	 and	 institutions	 of	 the	 country.	 The	 build-up	 of	 strong	institutions	and	a	reliable	 legal	system	are	 important	 in	order	to	guarantee	the	protection	of	creditor	and	 investor	rights,	 in	particular	with	regard	to	minority	interests	 (cf.	Burger,	Warnock,	 and	Warnock	2010;	Burger	and	Warnock	2007;	Eichengreen	and	Luengnaruemitchai	2008;	Porta,	Lopez-de-Silanes,	and	Shleifer	1999;	Porta	et	al.	1997,	1996).	The	 literature	has	established	that	regulation	of	capital	markets	 is	of	crucial	 importance	and	should	aim	at	empowering	market	forces	 by	 establishing	mandatory	 standards	 of	 disclosure	 and	 liability	 (Laeven	2014,	 11).	 Furthermore,	 domestic	 capital	 market	 development,	 in	 particular	equity	 and	 bond	 markets,	 can	 be	 promoted	 by	 strengthening	 corporate	governance	as	well	as	by	avoiding	a	strong	concentration	of	corporate	ownership,	e.g.	through	legislation	that	facilitates	takeovers.	The	 development	 of	 banking	 and	 bond	 markets	 can	 complement	 each	 other	(Laeven	 2014,	 12):	 Policies	 and	 regulations	 that	 aim	 at	 the	 protection	 of	investors	and	the	development	of	domestic	bond	markets	also	promote	creditor	rights	and	the	banking	sector;	the	growth	of	the	bond	and	of	the	banking	markets	mutually	 reinforce	 each	 other,	 because	 banks	 are	 commonly	 large	 holders	 of	bonds,	especially	public	bonds	(Hawkins	2002);	and	empirical	results	show	that	domestic	 bond	 markets	 are	 often	 more	 developed	 in	 countries	 with	 a	 more	developed	 (Burger	 and	Warnock	2007)	or	more	 competitive	 (Eichengreen	 and	Luengnaruemitchai	2006)	banking	sector.	There	might	also	be	a	downside	to	the	close	connection	between	banking	and	bond	markets,	when	it	becomes	excessive	and	 turns	 into	a	 form	of	 financial	 repression,	 reflected	 in	directed	government	lending	 by	 banks	 through	 the	 acquisition	 of	 sovereign	 bonds	 (Reinhart	 and	Sbrancia	 2011),	 whose	 undesirable	 consequences	 were	 recently	 observable	 in	the	euro	area	(Gennaioli,	Martin,	and	Rossi	2014).	
2.2.4 Reviewing	the	literature	on	the	subject	and	the	region	As	the	previous	sub-chapters	have	shown,	there	is	a	vast	literature	contributing	to	the	finance	and	development	debate	and	various	strands	of	this	literature	are	related	 to	 the	 subject	 of	 this	 thesis,	 i.e.	 the	 development	 of	 domestic	 bond	markets	 in	 emerging	market	 and	developing	 economies.	Apart	 from	 the	works	cited	above,	there	are	several	more	recent	contributions	to	the	debate	analyzing	different	aspects	of	financial	development	with	a	regional	focus	(see	for	example	Heng	 et	 al.	 2016;	 Barajas,	 Chami,	 and	 Yousefi	 2013),	 or	 even	 with	 a	 specific	reference	to	Brazil	(see	for	example	Garcia-Escribano	and	Han	2015;	Claessens,	Klingebiel,	 and	 Lubrano	 2000).	 Yet,	 most	 of	 the	 literature	 in	 the	 finance	 and	development	 debate	 focuses	 on	 the	 banking	 sector,	 especially	 those	 studies	related	to	emerging	market	and	developing	economies,	which	are	often	countries	that	rely	heavily	on	bank	finance.	Hence,	it	is	not	surprising	that	Beck	(2012,	25–38)	narrowed	his	survey	on	financial	fragility	down	to	the	fragility	of	banks	and	that	 Panizza	 (2013)	 stated	 in	 a	 footnote	 that	 his	 account	 of	 “Financial	
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Development	 and	 Economic	 Growth:	 Known	 Knowns,	 Known	 Unknowns,	 and	Unknown	Unknowns”	only	covers	the	banking	sector.	Furthermore,	even	the	part	of	the	debate	on	finance	and	development	that	isn’t	limited	to	the	analysis	of	banks,	usually	leaves	out	the	study	of	bond	markets,	or	in	 the	 words	 of	 Herring	 and	 Chatusripitak	 (2000,	 1):	 “Although	 the	 literature	addresses	 ‘capital	markets’,	on	closer	 inspection	the	main	 focus	 is	really	equity	markets.	 Bond	markets	 are	 almost	 completely	 overlooked.”	 Gozzi	 et	 al.	 (2015)	confirm	 that	 most	 literature	 focuses	 on	 equity	 markets	 when	 looking	 at	corporate	funding	on	capital	markets	and	emphasize	that	this	way,	it	disregards	the	 major	 volume	 of	 funding	 in	 domestic	 and	 international	 capital	 markets,	which	is	 in	corporate	bond	markets14.	The	omission	of	corporate	bond	markets	might	be	justified	by	three	main	factors	(cf.	Herring	and	Chatusripitak	2000,	1):	(i)	 domestic	 corporate	 bond	 markets	 play	 a	 minor	 role	 in	 most	 countries,	compared	 to	 the	banking	 system	and	 the	equity	market;	 (ii)	 therefore,	data	on	bond	markets	 is	 less	readily	available;	and	(iii)	 theoretical	results	are	obtained	from	a	comparison	of	equity	and	debt	contracts	and	since	bank	lending	might,	on	a	high	level	of	abstraction,	serve	as	a	proxy	for	any	kind	of	debt,	 ignoring	bond	markets	could	be	justifiable	for	certain	theoretical	considerations.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	majority	of	the	finance	and	development	literature	is	on	banking	and	equity	markets,	there	is	also	a	large	amount	of	specific	literature	on	bond	 markets.	 Most	 of	 the	 studies	 on	 bond	 market	 development	 in	 emerging	market	 and	 developing	 economies,	 implicitly	 or	 explicitly,	 focus	 on	 sovereign	bonds,	 i.e.	 “on	 the	 questions	 of	 why	 and	 how	 governments	 should	 establish	 a	domestic	 bond	 market	 to	 finance	 their	 debt”	 (Borensztein	 et	 al.	 2008b,	 6),	discussing	 the	 benefits	 and	 determinants	 of	 domestic	 bond	 markets	 in	 these	countries	 (see	 for	 example	 Felman	 et	 al.	 2014;	 Panizza	 2008;	 Abbas	 and	Christensen	2007;	Claessens,	Klingebiel,	and	Schmukler	2007;	IMF	2007,	chapter	3;	de	la	Torre	and	Schmukler	2005;	IMF	2002,	chapter	4;	Mihaljek,	Scatigna,	and	Villar	2002;	Turner	2002;	Harwood	2000).	Blommestein	and	Santiso	(2007),	for	example,	 showed	 that	 risk-based	public	 debt	management	 and	 liquid	domestic	sovereign	bond	markets	are	important	and	mutually	reinforcing	factors	to	raise	financial	 stability	while	 benefitting	 from	 global	 financial	 integration.	While	 the	IMF	working	 paper	 series	 published	 lately	 several	 studies	 discussing	 different	aspects	 of	 public	 bonds	 in	 emerging	 economies	 (see	 for	 example	 Ebeke	 and	Kyobe	 2015;	 Arslanalp	 and	 Tsuda	 2014;	 Ebeke	 and	 Lu	 2014;	 Jaramillo	 and	Weber	 2013,	 2012),	 earlier	 studies	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 Latin	 American	 bond	market	 development	 analyzed	 both	 the	 establishment	 of	 domestic	 markets	(Jeanneau	 and	 Tovar	 2006)	 and	 the	 issuance	 of	 local	 currency	 denominated	bonds	on	international	markets	(Tovar	2005).	In	 line	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 public	 bond	 markets	 evolve	 first	 and	 private	 bond	markets	 follow,	companies	 in	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	only	recently	started	to	 issue	corporate	bonds	with	a	significantly	 larger	volume	(cf.																																																									14	Bond	 issues	 accounted	 for	 almost	 80%	 of	 the	 total	 volume	 raised	 worldwide	 by	companies	through	bond	and	equity	 issues	between	1991	and	2013	(Gozzi	et	al.	2015,	532–33).	However,	most	countries	registered	lower	corporate	funding	volumes	in	their	domestic	markets	for	bonds	than	in	their	local	banking	and	equity	markets.	
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Ayala,	 Nedeljkovic,	 and	 Saborowski	 2015,	 4)	 and	 the	 body	 of	 literature	 is	relatively	small,	including	a	chapter	in	the	September	2005	issue	(IMF	2005b)	of	the	Global	Financial	Stability	Report	(GFSR)	on	“Development	of	Corporate	Bond	Markets	in	Emerging	Market	Countries”.	The	April	2005	issue	(IMF	2005a)	of	the	GFSR	 included	 a	 chapter	 on	 “Corporate	 Finance	 in	 Emerging	Markets”	 and	 the	Bank	for	International	Settlements	(BIS)	Paper	36,	resulting	from	a	meeting	held	in	Mexico	City	in	May	2007,	contained	various	studies	on	the	subject	with	a	focus	on	 Latin	 America	 (see	 for	 example	 Jeanneau	 and	 Tovar	 2008b).	 In	 the	introductory	 chapter,	 Tovar	 and	 Quispe-Agnoli	 (2008,	 4)	 emphasized	 that	sovereign	 bond	 markets	 in	 the	 region	 increased	 remarkably,	 yet	 the	development	 of	 corporate	 bond	 markets	 disappointed.	 While	 the	 chapter	 by	Ananchotikul	 and	 Eichengreen	 (2008)	 detected	 corporate	 governance	 as	 a	reason,	 participants	 at	 the	meeting	named	a	number	of	 other	possible	 reasons	for	low	corporate	bond	market	development,	including	market	segmentation,	i.e.	only	large	and	creditworthy	companies	had	market	access,	tax	regimes,	e.g.	tax-emption	 only	 for	 yields	 on	 public	 bonds,	 liquidity	 enhancing	measures	 aiming	exclusively	on	public	bond	markets,	and	the	lack	of	international	investors.	Leal	and	Carvalhal-da-Silva’s	affirmation	that	“[t]here	is	a	vast	literature	on	bond	market	development	providing	 cross-country	 evidence	but	not	much	 is	 known	about	the	specific	case	of	the	Brazilian	bond	market”	(Leal	and	Carvalhal-da-Silva	2006,	6)	 is	 less	 true	now,	 a	decade	 later,	 due	 to	various	 research	projects	 that	have	 been	 undertaken	 since.	 Among	 the	work	 that	 Leal	 and	Carvalhal-da-Silva	could	 already	 build	 upon	was	 Zervos’	 (2004)	 account	 of	 issuance	 costs	 in	 the	Brazilian,	 Chilean	 and	 Mexican	 capital	 markets	 as	 well	 as	 Anderson’s	 (1999)	analysis	 of	 the	 design	 of	 financial	 contracts	 in	 the	 Brazilian	 corporate	 bond	market.	 Furthermore,	Moreira	 and	 Puga	 (2000)	 found	 that	 smaller	 companies	relied	more	heavily	on	 internal	 financing	(63%	of	 total	 financing	sources)	 than	larger	 companies	 (44%).	 Beck	 (1999)	 showed	 that	 debt	 financing	 in	 Brazil,	including	 the	 issuance	 of	 bonds,	 was	 predominantly	 short-term.	 According	 to	Pereira	(2000)	companies	were	able	 to	 increase	 their	value	 to	shareholders	by	making	use	of	debt	as	a	 form	of	external	 finance,	which	 is	 in	 line	with	 the	 idea	that	 debt	 exerts	 a	 positive	 influence	 on	 the	 conflicts	 of	 interest	 between	controlling	and	other	shareholders.	Subsequent	 research	mainly	 focused	either	entirely	on	 the	public	bond	market	(see	 for	 example	 Amante,	 Araujo,	 and	 Jeanneau	 2007)	 or	 on	 the	 private	 bond	market,	including	studies	that	analyzed	the	impact	of	macroeconomic	factors	on	corporate	bond	issues	(see	for	example	Eid	Jr.	and	Matsuo	2009;	Krauter	2007).	Several	 studies	 with	 a	 corporate	 finance	 perspective	 analyzed	 the	 capital	structure	of	Brazilian	companies.	Brito,	Corrar,	and	Batistella	(2007)	found	that	risk,	 firm	size,	 fixed	assets	and	growth	were	determining	factors	 for	the	capital	structure	of	the	largest	companies	in	Brazil,	while	profitability	had	no	significant	influence.	 Furthermore,	 the	 leverage	 ratio	 was	 not	 affected	 by	 the	 status	 of	 a	company	 as	 publicly	 owned	 or	 privately	 held.	 Crisóstomo,	 Iturriaga,	 and	González	 (2014)	 analyzed	 a	 panel	 data	 set	 of	 199	 Brazilian	 non-financial	companies	 for	 the	 period	 from	 1995	 to	 2006	 and	 found	 that	 these	 companies	were	 faced	with	 financial	constraints	so	 that	 they	mainly	depended	on	 internal	funds	 (in	 line	with	 the	 findings	 of	Moreira	 and	 Puga	 2000	 cited	 above).	 Paiva	(2011)	 analyzed	 the	 influence	 of	 company	 ratings	 on	 corporate	 bond	 spreads	
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and	 found	 a	 significant	 relationship,	 yet	 the	 rating	 only	 explained	 10%	 of	 the	variability	of	the	spread.	Other	significant	variables	included	the	maturity	of	the	bond,	 the	 issuance	 volume	 relative	 to	 the	 market	 size,	 and	 the	 current	 GDP	growth	 rate.	 Martins,	 Santos,	 and	 Hillbrecht	 (2015)	 used	 the	 corporate	 bond	market	as	a	proxy	for	long-term	credit	in	Brazil	and	ran	into	difficulties	by	trying	to	estimate	a	 five-year	 forecast	of	 credit	 risk,	 reflecting	 the	 lack	of	 a	 long-term	horizon.	Moreover,	the	book	edited	by	Haber,	North,	and	Weingast	(2008)	on	finance	and	institutions,	 challenging	 the	 legal	 origins	 view,	 contained	 two	 chapters	 that	analyzed	the	bond	markets	in	Brazil	from	a	historic	perspective	with	a	focus	on	political	 institutions	 and	 creditor	 rights	 (Musacchio	 2008b;	 Summerhill	 2008).	Leal	and	Carvalhal-da-Silva	(2006)	conducted	their	study	on	the	Brazilian	bond	market	 development	 as	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 research	 project	 that	 led	 to	 the	publication	of	 the	book	 “Bond	markets	 in	 Latin	America:	 on	 the	 verge	of	 a	 big	bang?”	by	Borensztein	et	al.	 (2008a).	Their	results	suggested	 that	 the	Brazilian	corporate	 bond	market	 development	 was	 hampered	mainly	 by	 low	 secondary	market	 liquidity	 and	 market	 capitalization	 as	 well	 as	 judicial	 uncertainty.	Furthermore,	they	also	pointed	towards	the	problems	of	high	interest	rates	and	short	maturities.	 They	 listed	 various	 factors	 that	 fostered	 CBMD	 including	 the	stabilization	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 economy,	 capital	 market	 regulation,	 investors’	demand	 for	 fixed	 income	 securities	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 sufficient	 long-term	 credit	provided	by	the	banking	sector.	At	the	same	time,	they	found	major	impediments	to	 the	development	of	a	corporate	bond	market	 in	Brazil	 including	 factors	 that	raised	 the	 cost	of	 credits	 such	as	 large	 interest	 rate	 spreads	and	 credit	default	rates	as	well	as	the	increasing	public	bond	issues	exerting	a	crowding-out	effect	on	 corporate	 bonds	 due	 to	 their	 attractive	 monetary	 returns	 and	 “favorable	prudential	rules	treatment	of	government	debt	relative	to	corporate	debt”	(Leal	and	Carvalhal-da-Silva	2006,	7).	As	part	of	a	research	project	on	the	role	of	public	banks	 in	 the	development	of	the	 Brazilian	 financial	 markets,	 Paula	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 analyzed	 important	determinants	of	the	development	of	the	bond	markets	in	Brazil.	The	authors	laid	a	 focus	on	the	macroeconomic	context	and	the	relationship	between	the	public	and	the	private	bond	markets,	which	they	found	to	be	more	of	a	competitive	and	less	of	a	complementary	nature.	 In	other	words,	their	findings	pointed	towards	difficulties	of	 corporate	bonds	 to	prevail	 against	 the	 competitive	advantages	of	the	Brazilian	sovereign	bonds	and	showed	few	signs	of	a	market	creation	effect.	One	important	conclusion	was	that	large	macroeconomic	instabilities	caused	the	Brazilian	 debt	 structure,	 including	 private	 as	 well	 as	 public	 bonds,	 to	 remain	stuck	in	the	short-term.	Finally,	the	study	of	Torres	Filho	and	Macahyba	(2012)	took	stock	of	recent	efforts	of	the	government	to	foster	the	development	of	the	corporate	 bond	 market	 in	 Brazil	 and	 included	 policy	 advice	 as	 to	 how	 the	measures	 might	 be	 improved,	 based	 on	 the	 insight	 that	 most	 of	 the	 relevant	market	 participants	 were	 either	 unaware	 of	 the	 benefits	 granted	 by	 the	government	or	did	not	fully	understand	the	regulatory	changes.	At	this	point,	we	can	take	the	conducted	literature	review	as	a	basis	to	 identify	the	main	research	gaps	with	respect	 to	 the	development	of	 the	corporate	bond	market	 in	Brazil.	 First,	due	 to	 the	date	of	publication	 the	 latest	evolvements	of	
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the	public	debt	structure	and	the	monetary	policy	stance	could	not	be	analyzed	by	 the	above	cited,	 relevant	 studies.	Although	 the	most	 recent	 study	by	Torres	Filho	and	Macahyba	(2012)	took	most	of	these	developments	into	account,	they	were	 not	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 study,	 which	 concentrated	 on	 discussing	 recent	regulatory	 adjustments	 by	 the	 government	 to	 foster	 the	 market	 expansion.	Second,	 the	 important	 role	 of	 the	 state,	 in	 general,	 and	 the	 public	 finance	 for	development	 schemes,	 in	 particular,	 were	 not	 explored	 in	 detail.	 Neither	 Leal	and	 Carvalhal-da-Silva	 (2006),	 who	 emphasized	 institutional	 and	 legal	 short-comings	together	with	macroeconomic	instabilities,	nor	Paula	et	al.	(2009),	who	also	pointed	 to	 the	 relevance	of	 the	macroeconomic	 environment,	 exposed	 the	crucial	 role	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 state	 in	 the	 build-up	 of	 a	 domestic	 market	 for	corporate	 bonds.	 Although	 the	 latter	 study	 undertook	 a	 more	 complete	investigation	of	the	relationship	between	the	public	and	the	private	bond	market,	it	didn’t	 inquire	 further	on	 the	 influence	of	 the	public	 finance	 for	development	system	 –	 despite	 it	 being	 part	 of	 a	 research	 project	 that	 explored	 the	 role	 of	public	 banks	 in	 the	 Brazilian	 financial	 system.	 This	 thesis	 aims	 at	 filling	 these	research	gaps	by	providing	a	deep	and	up-to-date	analysis	of	the	role	of	the	state	in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 corporate	 bond	 market.	 To	 examine	 the	responsibilities	of	the	state,	three	policy	variables	are	used,	whose	relevance	was	clarified	 also	 in	 this	 sub-chapter.	 The	 following	 paragraphs	 will	 briefly	recapitulate	 the	 main	 points	 concerning	 the	 policy	 variables	 public	 debt	management,	monetary	policy,	and	public	finance	for	development	and	their	link	to	CBMD,	as	displayed	in	this	sub-chapter.	The	primary	concern	of	public	debt	management,	to	find	safe	and	cheap	ways	to	fund	 the	existing	public	debt	and	 to	 finance	 the	 fiscal	deficit,	was	presented	as	the	 initial	 driving	 force	 to	 develop	 public	 bond	markets.	 By	 establishing	 these	markets,	 public	 debt	management	 can	 furthermore	 reduce	 vulnerabilities	 that	are	related	to	balance	sheet	effects.	In	order	to	build	up	a	domestic	bond	market,	public	debt	management	might	help	to	install	financial	market	infrastructure,	to	strengthen	 institutions	 and	 to	 expand	 the	 investor	 base.	 That	way,	 it	 not	 only	sets	up	a	domestic	market	 for	public	bonds,	but	also	promotes	corporate	bond	market	 development.	 Apart	 from	 its	 contribution	 to	 CBMD	 as	 part	 of	 a	 sound	macroeconomic	 framework,	 public	 debt	management	 exerts	 a	market	 creation	effect,	 as	 shown	 in	 this	 sub-chapter:	 The	 benchmark	 setting	 yield	 curve	 of	sovereign	bonds	serves	as	point	of	reference	and	important	characteristics	of	the	public	 debt	 structure	 exert	 signaling	 effects	 on	 CBMD.	 Finally,	 the	 literature	review	indicated	that	an	abolishment	of	preferential	rules	for	and	favorable	tax	treatment	of	public	bonds	could	additionally	advance	CBMD,	implying	a	conflict	of	interest	for	public	debt	management.	The	main	arguments	 for	 the	promotion	of	domestic	bond	market	development	that	 are	 interesting	 from	 a	 monetary	 policy	 perspective	 include	 the	strengthening	of	the	currency	and	growth	potential	of	the	country	as	well	as	its	financial	and	macroeconomic	stability.	A	public	bond	market	allows	a	country	to	finance	 large	 fiscal	 deficits	 without	 the	 need	 to	 cause	 exchange	 rate	 risks	 or	financial	 repression	 by	 taking	 on	 external	 debt	 or	 obliging	 banks	 to	 contract	sovereign	 debt.	 A	 corporate	 bond	 market	 improves	 risk	 sharing	 and	 capital	allocation	by	offering	an	additional	 funding	source	and	by	creating	competition	to	banks.	Furthermore,	the	implementation	of	fiscal,	monetary	and	exchange	rate	
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policies	 is	 facilitated,	 because	bond	markets	 provide	 instruments	 that	 enhance	the	monetary	policy	transmission	channels	as	well	as	the	sterilization	of	external	capital	 inflows,	 generate	 information	 on	 market	 expectations,	 and	 create	reference	points	 for	the	medium	to	 long-term	end	of	 the	yield	curve.	The	more	complete	the	yield	curve,	the	stronger	the	interest	rate	channel	and	the	easier	to	identify	 the	 opportunity	 costs	 of	 different	 assets,	 which	 has	 important	implications	 for	 the	 internal	 discount	 rate	 of	 companies,	 lowers	 hedging	 costs	and	helps	to	avoid	mispricing	on	capital	markets.	Since	the	mid-1990s,	emerging	market	 and	 developing	 economies	 experienced	 a	 significant	 shift	 in	 their	monetary	 transmission	 channels	 from	 direct	 monetary	 tools	 to	 more	 market-based	instruments.	Not	 only	 does	 monetary	 effectiveness	 depend	 on	 well-developed	 money	 and	capital	 (including	 bond)	 markets,	 bond	 market	 development	 also	 depends	 on	sound	 monetary	 policy.	 More	 specifically,	 monetary	 policy	 can	 promote	 the	development	 of	 domestic	 bond	markets	 by	 contributing	 to	 the	 capital	 market	infrastructure	 in	 terms	 of	 supervision	 and	monitoring	 of	 the	 financial	 system,	ensuring	 efficient	 payment	 and	 settlement	 systems	 and	 providing	 for	 strong	regulatory	institutions.	Empirical	evidence	cited	above	shows	that	differences	in	legal	and	institutional	environments	explain	the	relatively	small	size	of	the	Latin	American	bond	markets	compared	to	advanced	economies.	Related	to	this	issue,	bank	 and	 bond	 market	 development	 are	 complementary	 in	 many	 respects:	investors	 and	 creditor	 rights	 are	 protected	 by	 the	 same	 rules	 and	 regulations;	banks	 commonly	hold	 large	 volumes	of	 bonds	 in	 their	 portfolio;	 and	 countries	with	a	more	developed	as	well	as	a	more	competitive	banking	sector	empirically	have	more	developed	bond	markets.	Another	 prerequisite	 of	 bond	 market	 development,	 a	 large	 investor	 base	 that	guarantees	market	depth	and	liquidity,	is	linked	to	monetary	policy	in	its	roles	as	market	 regulator	and	supervisor	as	well	 as	participant	 in	 the	 foreign	exchange	market:	 The	 investor	 base	might	 be	 enlarged	 by	 financially	 integrating	 further	internationally,	 implying	 risks	 of	 external	 shocks	 and	 repercussions	 for	 the	exchange	 rate	 regime,	 and	 by	 establishing	 local	 pension	 funds,	 who	 have	 an	ambiguous	 effect	 on	 bond	 market	 development	 due	 to	 their	 buy-and-hold	strategies.	 Apart	 from	 their	 additional	 demand	 for	 long-term	 (debt)	 securities,	institutional	 investors	 might	 foster	 CBMD	 by	 encouraging	 more	 transparency	and	elevated	standards;	corporate	governance	efforts;	improvements	in	broking	and	 trading	 arrangements;	 dispersion	 of	 corporate	 ownership;	 and	 simplified	privatization	procedures.	The	main	contribution	of	monetary	policy	to	promote	bond	 market	 development	 is	 to	 provide	 for	 a	 stable	 macroeconomic	environment,	 in	particular	price	stability.	A	steady	monetary	stance	that	avoids	excessive	volatility	of	the	exchange	rate	as	well	as	the	interest	rate	enhances	the	demand	for	long-term	debt	securities.	This	is	in	accordance	with	key	findings	of	two	 of	 the	 most	 relevant	 studies	 for	 this	 thesis	 (Paula	 et	 al.	 2009;	 Leal	 and	Carvalhal-da-Silva	2006),	namely	that	economic	stability	fosters	CBMD	in	Brazil	and	that	elevated	interest	rate	levels	as	well	as	short	maturities	hamper	it.	Finally,	this	sub-chapter	reviewing	the	literature	on	the	thesis	subject	pointed	to	several	 requirements	 of	 CBMD	 that	 might	 be	 improved	 by	 public	 finance	 for	development.	Domestic	bond	markets	not	only	depend	on	a	large	investor	base,	
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Many	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	such	as	Brazil	are	marked	by	structural	heterogeneity.	In	a	market	economy	that	is	characterized	by	structural	heterogeneity,	 different	 modes	 of	 production	 coexist	 and	 are	 articulated	 with	each	other.	Under	these	circumstances,	the	promotion	of	corporate	bond	market	development	(CBMD)	helps	the	monetary	economy	(translated	from	the	German	term	 “Geldwirtschaft”	 that	 was	 coined	 by	 Monetary	 Keynesians)	 to	 gradually	advance	 while	 driving	 back	 other	 modes	 of	 production,	 including	 the	 state	economy,	 the	 semi-feudal	 Coronelismo	 as	 well	 as	 the	 family-led	 economy.	 In	Brazil,	the	domestic	corporate	bond	market	develops	from	the	remaining	modes	of	production	towards	a	functional	monetary	economy,	with	initial	financing	for	the	 Schumpeterian	 entrepreneurial	 activities	 and	 long-term	 funding,	 inter	 alia,	through	corporate	bonds.	Before	discussing	the	credit-driven	monetary	economy	in	more	 detail	 throughout	 this	 sub-chapter,	 the	 logic	 of	 behavior	 of	 the	 other	modes	of	production	is	briefly	spelled	out.	The	 semi-feudal	 Coronelismo	 describes	 a	 system	 of	 patrimonial	 and	 oligarchic	nature,	where	the	control	of	patronage	is	centralized	in	the	hands	of	a	few	rich	and	 powerful	 families,	 who	 hand	 out	 favors	 in	 return	 for	 loyalty.	 As	 the	development	 of	 a	 domestic	 corporate	 bond	market	 progresses,	 issuing	 a	 bond	might	 become	 a	 viable	 option	 for	 the	 companies	 of	 these	 families,	 that	 way	contributing	 to	 the	 progressive	 implementation	 of	 the	 monetary	 economy.	 In	contrast	to	the	rich	families’	businesses,	which	are	referred	to	under	the	heading	of	 semi-feudal	Coronelismo,	 the	 family-led	 economy	 is	 comprised	 of	 SMEs	 and	poor	families’	businesses.	In	the	family-led	economy,	the	work	is	carried	out	by	family	members	(possibly	with	the	help	of	a	few	workers)	and	the	business	logic	is	 precariously	 balanced	 with	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 household.	 There	 is	 no	 social	division	of	 labor	between	wealth	holder,	entrepreneur,	and	worker/	consumer,	and	 hence,	 the	 social	 division	 of	 labor	 is	 not	 organized	 according	 to	 creditor-debtor-relationships	 (Nitsch	1999).	The	decisive	 factor	distinguishing	a	 family-led	 economy	 from	 a	 monetary	 economy	 is	 related	 to	 the	 reversal	 of	 the	dominance	 cascade.	 In	 a	 family-led	 economy,	 the	 wealth	 holder	 is	 not	 the	sovereign,	but	the	family’s	needs	of	consumption,	which	determine	and	dominate	its	 business	 activities.	 One	 important	 implication,	 explaining	 self-exploitative	phenomena,	 is	 that	 the	 family-led	 economy	 continues	 to	 produce,	 as	 long	 as	manpower	 cannot	 be	 used	 for	 a	 more	 rewarding	 task.	 From	 this	 perspective,	labor	 is	 not	 a	 cost	 factor,	 but	 a	 productive	 force.	 As	 opposed	 to	 the	monetary	economy,	the	valorization	of	resources	does	not	take	place	through	reallocation	via	the	financial	sector,	and	money	serves	primarily	not	as	means	of	payment	to	meet	 financial	 obligations,	 but	 as	 means	 of	 exchange.	 As	 such,	 the	 family-led	economy	 is	 actually	 quite	 well	 described	 by	 models	 of	 economic	 classics	 like	Adam	Smith.	The	 state	 economy	 encompasses	 not	 only	 corporatist	 public/	 private	partnerships	 in	 the	 traditional	 style,	 including	 entanglements	 of	 the	 state	with	trade	unions,	business	associations	and	chambers	as	well	as	private	companies	
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(entanglements	 that	 are	 characterized	by	mandatory	membership,	 trade	union	duties,	 and	 other	 taxes	 and	 charges),	 but	 also	 state-owned	 companies,	 which	might	 issue	 corporate	 bonds,	 and	 the	 treasury,	 here	 especially	 relevant	 as	 the	issuer	of	sovereign	bonds.	The	state	acts	as	a	market	participant,	either	directly	as	an	operator	of	state-owned	companies,	public	development	banks,	and	social	security	 funds,	or	 less	directly,	as	an	assistant	to	private	companies.	 If	workers	compulsorily	 acquire	 pension	 entitlements,	 which	 are	 pooled	 in	 funds,	remunerated	below	market	rates	and	then	made	available	to	the	state,	the	state	is	 able	 to	 provide	 business	 owners	with	 off-market	 profits	 (Nitsch	1999).	 This	set-up	 is	 not	 a	 consequence	 of	 a	 “fragile	 state”	 or	 “corrupt	 elites”,	 but	 in	 the	context	of	low	currency	premium	countries,	rather	a	functional	necessity,	which	should	 not	 be	 removed,	 but	 molded,	 in	 order	 not	 to	 risk	 general	 investment	reluctance.	Related	to	this	role	of	the	state	are	discussions	about	economic	rents,	stemming	 from	 state-owned	 companies,	 and	 their	 distribution	 among	 the	political	 and	 the	 economic	 sovereign,	 as	 well	 as	 fundamental	 mismanagement	risks.	 Apart	 from	 its	 role	 as	 market	 participant,	 the	 state	 acts	 as	 a	 regulator,	mainly	 guaranteeing	 property	 rights	 and	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 (Riese	 1995).	 The	central	bank,	for	example,	competes	with	its	domestic	currency	on	international	markets	 with	 other	 central	 banks	 and	 their	 currencies	 for	 wealth	 holders’	preferences.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 sets	 the	 discount	 rate,	 at	 which	 commercial	banks	are	able	to	go	in	debt	with	the	central	bank,	in	order	to	finance	investment	projects	 of	 entrepreneurs.	 “Economic	 policy	 means	 to	 safeguard	 a	 market	situation	by	sending	out	price	signals,	yet	leaving	the	adjustment	of	quantities	to	the	market”	(Riese	1995,	10	[my	own	translation]).	After	sub-chapter	2.1	gave	an	overview	of	important	strands	of	literature	in	the	finance	 and	 development	 debate	 and	 sub-chapter	 2.2	 provided	 for	 deeper	knowledge	 about	 research	 on	 domestic	 bond	 market	 development,	 this	 sub-chapter	 2.3	 sets	 out	 to	 develop	 a	 Post	 Keynesian	 framework	 that	 will	 help	 to	analyze,	 in	 the	 subsequent	 chapter	 3,	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 state	 on	 the	development	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 corporate	 bond	 market.	 While	 the	 analytical	framework	is	drawn	up	throughout	this	sub-chapter,	influences	and	interactions	with	the	three	main	policy	variables,	namely	public	debt	management,	monetary	policy,	 and	 public	 finance	 for	 development,	 are	 emphasized.	 Based	 on	 the	insights	 gained	 from	 the	 sections	 that	 discuss	 the	 capital	 formation	 process	(2.3.1)	 and	 the	 liquidity	 preference	 theory	 (2.3.2),	 we	 will	 see	 how	 economic	agents	exercise	choice	over	different	financial	assets	(2.3.3),	which	will	help	us	to	understand	how	the	three	policy	variables	can	influence	CBMD.	More	specifically,	public	 debt	management	 and	monetary	policy	 together	with	public	 finance	 for	development	might	work	 as	 instruments	 of	 the	developmentalist	 state	policies	aiming	at	the	stimulation	of	CBMD	in	the	following	way:	Taking	the	economic	situation	of	a	country	including	its	institutional,	structural,	and	macroeconomic	context	variables	as	a	point	of	departure,	 the	development	of	a	corporate	bond	market	might	be	encouraged	by	target-oriented	policies	that	affect	 the	parameters,	which	 are	 relevant	 for	 the	 economic	 agents’	 expectation	formation	 process.	 In	 this	way,	 developmentalist	 state	 policies	may	 be	 able	 to	exert	an	influence	on	economic	agents’	expectations,	which	will	translate	into	an	improved	 development	 of	 the	 (corporate)	 bond	 market.	 The	 expectations	 of	wealth	 holders,	 together	 with	 their	 preference	 for	 liquidity	 determine	 their	
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portfolio	decisions,	 i.e.	which	 financial	assets	wealth	holders	want	 to	buy,	hold,	or	 sell.	 Together	 with	 the	 expectations	 and	 liquidity	 preferences	 of	 other	economic	agents,	e.g.	companies	that	decide	to	issue	a	debt	security,	the	demand	and	supply	of	financial	assets	are	established.	In	this	way,	the	respective	markets	for	public	and	private	bonds	evolve,	resulting	in	a	specific	public	debt	structure	as	well	 as	 a	 further	 development	 of	 the	 corporate	 bond	market.	 These	market	outcomes,	in	turn,	are	part	of	a	new	economic	situation,	which	may	serve	as	yet	another	point	of	departure	in	this	theoretical	framework.	If	 the	 government	 aims	 at	 deploying	 developmentalist	 state	 policies,	 the	measures	 that	 are	 outlined	 below	 can	 easily	 be	 integrated.	 But	 even	 if	 the	government	 does	 not	 commit	 itself	 as	 clearly	 to	 interventionist	 policies,	 the	impact	 vectors	 presented	 in	 this	 framework	 point	 clearly	 towards	 the	advantages	of	active	policies	in	support	of	CBMD.	This	relates	to	a	key	finding	of	the	 finance	 and	 development	 debate,	 namely	 that	 financial	 development	contributes	to	economic	growth	and	development	(see	section	2.1.1).	However,	one	must	be	aware	of	financial	fragilities	(see	section	2.1.2),	to	which	we	return	in	 this	 sub-chapter	 in	 sub-sections	 2.3.1.3	 and	 2.3.3.4.	 In	 the	 former,	 we	understand	 how	 financial	 instabilities	 emerge	 in	 the	 capital	 formation	 process	and	in	the	latter,	we	learn	about	the	interconnections	between	financial	fragility	and	 the	 instability	 of	 the	 currency	 of	 a	 country.	 A	 country	 will	 best	 reap	 the	benefits	of	 a	well-functioning	market	 for	 local	 corporate	debt	 securities,	 if	 it	 is	able	 to	 carefully	 adjust	 its	 public	 debt	 management,	 monetary	 policy,	 and	 its	policies	 directed	 at	 providing	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 according	 to	 the	workings	 of	 the	 impact	 vectors	 delineated	 in	 this	 framework.	 Sub-chapter	 2.3	presents	the	most	important	factors	determining	CBMD	and	their	relationship	to	the	 three	 main	 policy	 variables,	 through	 which	 the	 state	 is	 able	 to	 foster	 the	development	of	a	market	for	corporate	debt	securities.	
2.3.1 The	role	of	bonds	in	the	Post	Keynesian	capital	formation	
process	Keynes	 (1939,	 570)	 summarized	 the	 orthodox	 notion	 of	 the	 capital	 formation	process	as	a	sequence	of	three	phases:	“The	first	consists	in	the	setting	aside	of	savings	out	of	current	 income;	 the	second	stage	 in	streams	of	 ‘funds’	becoming	‘available	 for	 investment’;	and	the	 third	stage	 in	 the	actual	outlay	of	money	 for	the	acquisition	of	capital	goods”,	in	opposition	to	the	(Post)	Keynesian	approach,	where	 capital	 formation	 is	 a	 twofold	 process.	 Keynes	 described	 the	 financial	requirements	of	this	process	as	follows:	
“The	 entrepreneur	 when	 he	 decides	 to	 invest	 has	 to	 be	 satisfied	 on	 two	
points:	 firstly,	 that	he	 can	obtain	 sufficient	 short-term	 finance	during	 the	
period	 of	 producing	 the	 investment;	 and	 secondly,	 that	 he	 can	 eventually	
fund	 his	 short-term	 obligations	 by	 a	 long-term	 issue	 on	 satisfactory	
conditions.	Occasionally	he	may	be	in	a	position	to	use	his	own	resources	or	
to	 make	 his	 long-term	 issue	 at	 once;	 but	 this	 make	 no	 difference	 to	 the	





twofold	process	as	the	characteristic	one”	(Keynes	1937,	664).	In	 order	 for	 an	 investment	 project	 to	 be	 realized,	 the	 entrepreneur15	not	 only	needs	 to	 convince	 the	 bank	 to	 finance	 him	 through	 short-term	 borrowing,	 he	must	 also	 carry	 the	 risk	 of	 not	 being	 able	 to	 (re-)fund	 the	 debt	 (F.	 J.	 C.	 de	Carvalho	1997,	473).	The	entrepreneur	will	only	accept	 to	carry	 this	 risk,	 if	he	expects	to	become,	in	a	later	stage,	capable	of	settling	his	debt	with	the	bank	by	issuing	 longer-term	 (debt)	 securities	 in	 the	market	 (cf.	 sub-section	 2.3.1.3).	 In	analogy,	the	same	is	true	for	the	bank,	which	shares	the	risk	of	not	being	able	to	fund	 the	 debt	 with	 the	 entrepreneur	 and	 also	 needs	 to	 be	 convinced	 that	 the	short-term	obligations	will	be	funded.	In	other	words,	ideally,	the	bank	provides	short-term	 finance	 for	 the	 entrepreneurial	 activities	 (see	 sub-section	 2.3.1.1),	which	 are	 later	 funded	 through	 a	 long-term	 issue,	 e.g.	 of	 corporate	bonds	 (see	sub-section	2.3.1.2).	This	shows	the	importance	of	both,	expectations	and	a	well-functioning	 and	diversified	 financial	 system	 (cf.	 sub-section	 2.3.1.4),	which	 are	two	 basic	 factors	 of	 the	 framework	 that	 explains	 the	 main	 impact	 vectors	 of	policies	aiming	at	the	development	of	corporate	bond	markets.	
2.3.1.1 Finance	The	first	stage	of	the	process	of	capital	formation,	finance,	typically	involves	the	entrepreneur	and	the	banker.	Schumpeter	(1912)	focuses	on	their	relationship,	as	 it	 is	 crucial	 for	 economic	 development.	 Ideally,	 the	 entrepreneur	 has	 an	innovative	business	idea,	yet	lacks	any	real	assets,	which	leaves	him	with	nothing	to	 loose	 but	 his	 reputation	 (Nitsch	 and	 Diebel	 2008,	 80ff.).	 In	 case	 the	entrepreneur	 convinces	 the	 banker	 of	 his	 idea,	 the	 banker	 finances	 the	entrepreneur’s	 investment	 project.	 The	 act	 of	 granting	 the	 loan,	 overdraft	 or	credit	 implies	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 discoveries	 of	 Schumpeter’s	 theory:	There	are	(in	contrast	to	neoclassical	theory)	no	prior	savings	needed	–	a	point	also	 stressed	 by	 Keynes16	(1936,	 1937,	 1939)	 –	 because	 the	 banker	 and	 the	entrepreneur	together	create	the	credit	ex	nihilo	(Schumpeter	1912,	109),	and	as	long	 as	 sight	 deposits	 at	 this	 bank	 are	 considered	 equivalents	 to	 central	 bank	money,	 the	 bank	 creates	 “bank	 money”,	 which	 does	 not	 involve	 any	 real	resources,	 i.e.	 savings,	yet	depends	on	 the	refinancing	conditions	of	 the	central	bank17.	The	alteration	of	 conditions	according	 to	which	commercial	banks	may	
																																																								15	A	functional	separation	of	economic	agents	into	entrepreneur,	wealth	holder,	financial	intermediary,	consumer,	and	worker	facilitates	the	theoretical	analysis	(see	also	Nitsch	1999).	16	For	a	more	recent	critique	of	the	prior-savings	approach,	see	Studart	(1995a).	17	Schumpeter	grasped	with	his	discovery	that	credit	is	created	ex	nihilo,	how	capitalism	let	the	genie	out	of	the	bottle	(including	all	of	its	diabolic	sides),	because	the	unlimited	creation	of	credit	ex	nihilo	among	banks	 is	also	possible	–	as	well	as	 its	corresponding	destruction.	 Here,	 the	 development	 and	 deepening	 of	 monetary	 structures	 through	corporate	bonds	are	being	analyzed	and	 interpreted,	but	not	 automatically	 advocated.	The	normative	dimension	would	require	a	separate	chapter.	
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refinance	 their	 activities	 by	 the	 central	 bank	 is	 an	 important	 instrument	 of	monetary	policy	to	influence	the	economic	development	of	a	country.	While	outlining	his	perspective	on	the	capital	formation	process,	Keynes	was	less	concerned	 about	questions	 related	 to	 economic	 growth	 (cf.	 F.	 J.	 C.	 de	Carvalho	1997,	 472),	 and	 primarily	 exposed	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 orthodox	 view	and	 his	 approach,	 which	 is	 mainly	 given	 by	 its	 monetary	 character.	 Keynes	recognized	 that	 banks	 “hold	 a	 key	 position	 in	 the	 transition	 from	 a	 lower	 to	 a	higher	scale	of	activity”	(Keynes	1937,	668),	because	aggregate	expenditures	can	only	 increase,	 if	 new	 (bank)	 money	 is	 created.	 As	 long	 as	 economic	 agents’	liquidity	preferences	remain	unchanged	(impeding	any	dishoarding),	new	money	creation	 is	 only	 possible	 through	 credit	 expansion	 by	 banks.	 If	 aggregate	expenditures	remain	constant	(and	given	a	constant	velocity	of	money),	finance	is	a	revolving	 fund,	nourished	by	 the	existing	stock	of	money,	which	circulates.	Whether	the	economy	grows	or	not,	investment	expenditures	always	need	to	be	financed	through	the	provision	of	money,	which	is	provided	independent	of	prior	savings18.	According	to	neoclassical	theory,	increased	savings	are	a	precondition	for	 a	 rise	 in	 investment,	 but	 in	 Keynesian	 theory,	 saving	 cannot	 precede	investment,	 because	 the	 impact	 of	 an	 act	 of	 saving	 does	 not	 reach	 beyond	 its	reduction	of	current	demand:	
“An	act	of	 individual	 saving	means	–	 so	 to	speak	–	a	decision	not	 to	have	
dinner	today.	But	it	does	not	necessitate	a	decision	to	have	dinner	or	to	buy	
a	 pair	 of	 boots	 a	 week	 hence	 or	 to	 consume	 any	 specified	 thing	 at	 any	
specific	 date.	 Thus	 it	 depresses	 the	 business	 of	 preparing	 today’s	 dinner	
without	 stimulating	 the	 business	 of	making	 ready	 for	 some	 future	 act	 of	
consumption.	 It	 is	 not	 a	 substitution	 of	 future	 consumption-demand	 for	
present-consumption	 demand,	 -	 it	 is	 a	 net	 diminution	 of	 such	 demand”	
(Keynes	1936,	210).	In	 another	 quote,	 Keynes	 states	 the	 no-prior-savings	 approach	 even	 more	clearly:	
“The	investment	market	can	become	congested	through	shortage	of	cash.	It	
can	never	become	congested	 through	shortage	of	 saving.	This	 is	 the	most	






is	 the	 parent,	 not	 the	 twin	 of	 increased	 saving”	 (Keynes	 1939,	 572,	
emphasis	in	original).	As	a	consequence,	the	development	of	a	domestic	corporate	bond	market	cannot	be	 hampered	 by	 the	 lack	 of	 savings,	 in	 a	 Post	 Keynesian	 world.	 One	 of	 the	implications	 of	 this	 important	 finding	 is	 also	 relevant	 with	 respect	 to	 the	crowding-out	 effect,	which	 is	 discussed	 early	 on	 in	 the	 following	 section	2.3.2.	Despite	 the	 sufficient	 volume	 of	 savings,	 market	 development	 can	 still	 be	hampered,	because	the	owner	of	 the	savings	might	want	 to	keep	them	in	more	liquid	 assets	 instead	 of	 acquiring	 corporate	 bonds.	 For	 that	 reason,	 corporate	bond	market	development	can	be	impeded	by	the	lack	of	demand	for	long-term	debt	securities,	as	the	following	sub-section	on	funding	explains.	
2.3.1.2 Funding	Money	 creation	 is	 not	 all	 that	 is	 necessary	 for	 a	 sustained	 investment	process,	due	 to	 the	 maturity	 mismatch	 in	 the	 balance	 sheets	 of	 banks	 and	 companies	involved,	which	needs	to	be	dissolved	by	transforming	short-term	debt	into	long-term	 liabilities	 such	 as	 corporate	 bonds	 (F.	 J.	 C.	 de	 Carvalho	 1992,	 150–51).	Therefore,	 it	 is	 in	 the	 second	 stage	 of	 the	 (Post)	 Keynesian	 capital	 formation	process,	i.e.	funding,	where	the	development	of	a	corporate	bond	market	comes	into	play.	By	offering	a	 long-term	financial	 instrument,	CBMD	may	 fulfill	a	vital	role	in	the	investment	process,	and	thus,	in	economic	development,	in	general.	In	short,	 the	 ideal-typical	 capital	 formation	 process	 is	 divided	 into	 initial	 finance	through	bank	lending	and	long-term	funding	through	corporate	bonds.	The	 fact	 that	 investment	expenditure	purchases	 long-lived	assets,	distinguishes	it	from	other	classes	of	spending	and	raises	the	problem	of	how	to	fund	the	loans,	which	were	incurred	in	order	to	acquire	the	assets.	As	savings	increase	together	with	investment,	the	necessary	amounts	(of	savings)	to	fund	the	entrepreneurs’	debt	 are	 created	 simultaneously	 with	 investment	 expenditures.	 The	 fact	 that	savings	 are	 created	 automatically	 by	 the	 implementation	 of	 an	 investment	project,	 does	 not	 mean	 though,	 that	 savings	 are	 automatically	 available	 for	funding	 (F.	 J.	 C.	 de	 Carvalho	 1997,	 469).	 Savings	will	 only	 fund	 investments,	 if	they	 translate	 into	 demand	 and	 supply	 for	 long-term	 assets.	 It	 is	 not	 clear,	however,	whether	the	additional	savings	as	a	whole,	or	even	a	fraction,	will	ever	become	 available	 to	 fund	 the	 entrepreneurs’	 debt.	 This	 will	 depend	 on	 the	liquidity	 preferences	 of	 the	 wealth	 holders,	 who	 dispose	 over	 the	 additional	savings.	 In	 the	 next	 section,	 there	will	 be	 a	more	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 liquidity	preferences	 and	 of	 the	 central	 role	 of	 wealth	 holders	 as	 well	 as	 their	 asset	choices.	For	now,	it	should	suffice	to	know,	that	it	is	reasonable	to	expect	–	in	a	monetary	 economy	marked	 by	Knightian	 uncertainty	 –	 that	 part	 of	 the	wealth	increase	 is	 always	 destined	 to	 liquid	 assets	 and	 that	 savings	will	 not	 turn	 into	funding	immediately.	Rather,	it	will	take	some	time,	before	the	newly	generated	savings	will	induce	an	additional	demand	for	long-lived	financial	assets.	The	 time	 lag	 between	 the	 creation	 of	 savings	 and	 the	 application	 to	 fund	investments	may	be	due	 to	 a	decision	making	process,	 during	which	 the	 saver	formulates	accumulation	strategies,	in	order	to	best	apply	the	additional	savings	
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(F.	J.	C.	de	Carvalho	1997,	469–70).	Uncertainties	concerning	the	future	value	of	(debt)	securities,	which	depend	on	the	future	path	of	the	monetary	interest	rate,	influence	 the	 formulation	 of	 these	 strategies.	 Once	 such	 uncertainties	disseminate	 a	 bearish	 sentiment	 in	 the	 (debt)	 securities	 market,	 savers	 are	encouraged	to	remain	liquid.	For	that	and	other	reasons,	monetary	policy	should	commit	to	maintain	interest	rates	low,	in	order	to	induce	savers	to	demand	long-term	(debt)	securities.	Such	a	commitment	of	the	central	bank	is	essential	for	the	reduction	 of	 uncertainties	 and,	 hence,	 the	 funding	 of	 investment	 projects.	 A	convincing	commitment	of	monetary	policy	to	low	and	stable	interest	rates	is	not	only	 important	 for	 the	 reduction	 of	 uncertainties,	 which	 will	 prolong	 the	investment	horizon	of	wealth	holders,	but	also	for	the	increase	of	the	demand	for	fixed	rate	bonds.	The	demand	for	fixed	rate	bonds	depends	on	the	expected	path	of	the	monetary	policy	interest	rate,	because	an	elevation	of	the	base	rate	would	render	a	bond	whose	yield	was	set	at	the	former	base	rate	 level	 less	attractive.	The	monetary	policy	stance	 is	also	an	 important	 factor	 for	planned	 investment	expenditures,	because	 it	directly	 influences	economic	agents’	 expectations.	The	entrepreneur	will	only	realize	an	investment	project,	if	he	expects	–	among	other	things	–	that	monetary	policy	will	not	significantly	raise	the	base	rate.	
2.3.1.3 Financial	fragilities	in	the	capital	formation	process	This	 sub-section	 builds	 on	 the	 concepts	 and	 models	 of	 the	 financial	 fragility	literature	presented	in	section	2.1.2	and	shows	how	financial	fragilities	evolve	in	the	capital	formation	process.	The	focus	here	lies	on	the	inevitable	emergence	of	financial	 instability	 as	 part	 of	 the	 normal	 workings	 of	 a	 monetary	 economy,	highlighting	the	need	for	greater	financial	diversification,	which	can	be	achieved	through	 the	 promotion	 of	 CBMD.	 The	 problem	 of	 external	 debt	 only	 plays	 a	minor	 part	 in	 this	 sub-section,	 but	 during	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 currency	premium	in	sub-section	2.3.3.4	the	issue	will	be	raised	again.	When	a	bank	grants	a	credit	 to	an	entrepreneur,	both	agents	 incur	a	 long-term	commitment	to	the	 investment	project,	 leaving	them	with	a	maturity	mismatch	in	 their	 balance	 sheets	 and	 a	 dependency	 on	 the	 success	 of	 the	 investment	project.	 From	 a	 microeconomic	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 bank	 and	 the	 entrepreneur	share	 the	 interest	 of	 funding	 the	 commitment	 on	 a	 stable	 basis,	 in	 order	 to	dispose	 of	 the	 uncertainties	 associated	 with	 the	 rolling-over	 of	 short-term	liabilities,	 which	 depends	 on	 future	 interest	 rate	 levels	 and	 credit	 conditions	(Studart	 1995a,	 58–59).	 From	 a	macroeconomic	 perspective,	 funding	 plays	 an	important	role,	 too,	by	mitigating	growing	 financial	 fragilities	 that	are	 inherent	to	 the	 growth	process	 in	 a	monetary	 economy.	According	 to	Minsky’s	 (1977b)	financial	 instability	 hypothesis,	 the	 mechanisms	 of	 a	 monetary	 economy,	including	 an	 increase	 in	 asset	 prices	 as	 well	 as	 leverage	 during	 boom	 phases,	contribute	 to	 a	 deterioration	 of	 its	 financial	 stability.	 Capital	 markets	 play	 an	ambiguous	 role	 in	 the	 process	 of	 sustained	 growth,	 as	 they	may	 be	 a	 remedy	against,	but	also	a	source	of	instability	(Hermann	and	Paula	2011,	6).	
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There	are	different	explanations	 for	 the	destabilizing	effects	of	 capital	markets	that	are	related	to	speculation,	leverage	and	opacity.	Speculators19	are	important	participants	in	the	capital	markets,	as	they	supply	the	markets	with	liquidity,	but	they	also	contribute	to	the	prevalence	of	a	short-term	view.	Most	speculators	and	professional	investors	in	capital	markets	are	
“largely	 concerned,	 not	 with	 making	 superior	 long-term	 forecasts	 of	 the	
probable	 yield	 of	 an	 investment	 over	 its	 whole	 life,	 but	 with	 foreseeing	
changes	 in	 the	 conventional	 basis	 of	 valuation	 a	 short	 time	 ahead	 of	 the	
general	public.	They	are	concerned,	not	with	what	an	investment	is	worth	
to	a	man	who	buys	it	‘for	keeps’,	but	with	what	the	market	will	value	it	at,	
under	 the	 influence	 of	 mass	 psychology,	 three	 months	 or	 a	 year	 hence”	
(Keynes	1936,	154–55).	As	short-termism	prevails,	pro-cyclical	behavior	may	lead	to	boom-bust-phases,	the	 build-up	 of	 asset	 price	 bubbles,	 and	 eventually	 financial	 crises.	 During	periods	 that	 are	 marked	 by	 general	 economic	 optimism,	 entrepreneurs	 and	speculators	will	tend	to	raise	their	level	of	indebtedness,	and	banks,	sharing	this	optimism,	will	try	to	lend	more	by	reducing	safety	margins	(Studart	1995a,	54).	Highly	 sophisticated	 financial	 markets	 might	 exacerbate	 the	 problem	 of	increasingly	leveraged	positions	of	economic	agents	by	facilitating	the	access	to	finance,	e.g.	through	securitization,	at	the	cost	of	transparency.	The	construction,	issuance	 and	 negotiation	 of	 ever	more	 complex	 financial	 instruments	makes	 it	increasingly	difficult	to	disentangle	connections	between	the	involved	economic	agents,	as	well	as	their	responsibilities	(Amato	and	Fantacci	2014).	Even	though	capital	markets	may	contribute	to	financial	fragilities,	they	serve,	at	the	 same	 time,	 as	 a	 useful	 instrument	 to	 combat	 financial	 instability.	 In	 a	monetary	 economy,	 the	 growth	 process	 is	 typically	 accompanied	 by	 greater	financial	 fragility,	 because	 entrepreneurs	 usually	 face	 the	 problem	 of	 how	 to	match	 their	 long-lived	 investment	 assets	 with	 their	 liability	 structure	 (cf.	Hermann	 and	 Paula	 2011,	 6;	 Studart	 1995a,	 60–61).	 That	 is	why	 funding,	 and	capital	 markets	 as	 the	 loci	where	 funding	most	 conveniently	 takes	 place,	 play	such	an	important	role	in	mitigating	the	increase	of	financial	fragility	during	the	process	 of	 growth	 and	 development,	 and	 hence,	 the	 relevance	 of	 developing	 a	domestic	 bond	 market	 for	 corporate	 issues.	 The	 transformation	 of	 debt	maturities	 is	 necessary	 for	 the	 reduction	 of	 financial	 fragilities	 in	 the	 balance	sheets	of	companies	and	banks	alike.	Capital	markets	can	help	to	reduce	financial	instabilities	 by	 mediating	 between	 wealth	 holders	 with	 a	 demand	 for	 (debt)	securities	and	companies	that	want	to	fund	their	short-term	liabilities	with	long-term	issues.	A	successful	financial	intermediation	will	not	only	ease	the	maturity	mismatch	in	the	 balance	 sheets	 of	 entrepreneurs	 and	 banks,	 but	 also	 achieve	 a	 more	appropriate	 application	 of	 financial	 assets	 for	 institutional	 investors,	 such	 as																																																									19	A	 speculator	 is	 someone,	who	 buys	 and	 sells	 assets	 “in	 the	 hope	 of	making	 a	 large	profit,	 but	 with	 the	 risk	 of	 a	 large	 loss”	 (cited	 from	 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/speculation,	date	accessed:	2016/03/28).	According	to	Minsky,	an	 entrepreneur	 assumes	 a	 speculative	 financial	 posture	 in	 case	 the	 maturity	 of	 his	liabilities	is	shorter	than	that	of	his	assets	(cf.	F.	J.	C.	de	Carvalho	1992,	154).	
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pension	funds.	Institutional	investors	that	collect	individual	savings	and	promise	a	 stable	 return	 over	 long	 time	 horizons,	 have	 a	 natural	 interest	 in	 long-term	(debt)	securities.	Keynes	description	of	the	twofold	process	of	capital	formation	with	 the	 distinction	 between	 finance	 and	 funding	 corresponds	with	 the	 classic	institutional	 setting	 in	 the	 USA	 as	 described	 by	 Davidson	 (1986),	 where	commercial	banks	finance	investment	projects	with	short-term	loans,	which	are	then	 funded	 through	 security	 issues	 in	 long-term	 capital	 markets,	 where	institutional	investors	such	as	pension	funds	or	security	companies	acquire	these	(debt)	securities.	The	lack	of	organized	and	well	developed	capital	markets,	i.e.	the	lack	of	funding	mechanisms,	 can	 result	 in	 growth	 enhancing	 finance	 that	 is	 marked	 by	 short	maturities,	the	possible	occurrence	of	credit	rationing,	and	an	increasing	fragility	of	the	financial	positions	of	both	companies	and	banks	(Studart	1995b,	283–84).	Especially	 in	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	 economies,	 the	 general	assumption	might	not	be	met,	that	there	is	a	diversified	financial	infrastructure,	enabling	 companies	 to	 assess	 different	 possibilities	 in	 the	 capital	markets	 and	opt	for	a	satisfactory	combination	of	equity	and	debt,	in	order	to	fund	its	short-term	 liabilities	 (Hermann	 and	 Paula	 2011,	 7–8).	 For	 a	 sustained	 growth	 and	development	 process,	 there	 is	 a	 need	 to	 establish	 and	 maintain	 a	 favorable	environment	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 diversified	 financial	 system	 with	 private,	public,	and	regulatory	 institutions	as	well	as	competing	and/or	complementing	instruments,	like	corporate	debt	securities,	that	offer	different	sources	of	finance	and	 funding	 to	 firms	and	risk	protection	 to	savers.	Public	debt	management	as	well	 as	 monetary	 policy	 are	 two	 essential	 determinants	 of	 such	 a	 favorable	environment.	Historically,	both	market-based	and	credit-based	financial	systems	have	enabled	economic	development,	but	there	are	only	few	countries	that	have	developed	financially	and	economically	in	a	synchronized	way	without	recurring	to	 a	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 system,	 that	was	 in	 charge	 of	 large	 public	banks	 and/or	 development	 agencies	 (Zysman	 1983).	 In	 emerging	 market	 and	developing	 economies,	 foreign	 debt	 was	 also	 an	 important	 component	 of	 the	financing	structure	of	economic	development.	Usually,	capital	markets	operate	under	conditions	that	make	them	systematically	incomplete	 and	 dysfunctional,	which	 is	 especially	 true	 in	 the	 case	 of	 emerging	market	 and	 developing	 economies	 and	 their	 underdeveloped	 capital	 markets	(Hermann	and	Paula	2011,	9–10):	 In	periods	marked	by	pessimistic	 ‘long-term	expectations’	(Keynes	1936	ch.	12),	any	progress	 in	the	economic	development	process	tends	to	be	prevented	by	limited	spontaneous	investment	and	the	lack	of	available	financing	sources,	except	for	public	finance	for	development.	In	periods	marked	by	optimistic	expectations,	given	the	scarcity	of	appropriate	sources	for	finance	 in	 these	 economies,	 planned	 investment	 projects	 may	 be	 financed	 by	some	 combination	 of	 equity,	 short-term	 credit,	 and,	 if	 available,	 foreign	 loans.	This	 financing	 structure	 is	 inappropriate	 for	 investment	 projects	 due	 to	 its	inherent	maturity	and	currency	mismatches,	resulting	in	higher	default	risks.	In	other	 words,	 increased	 investment	 is	 accompanied	 by	 augmented	 financial	and/or	 external	 fragility,	 when	 the	 financial	 system	 fails	 to	 meet	 the	requirements	 of	 the	 economic	 development	 process,	 aggravating	 the	 risk	 of	 a	banking	and/or	currency	crisis	(cf.	Minsky	1986;	Paula	and	Alves	Junior	2000).	
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Therefore,	 the	 development	 of	 a	 corporate	 bond	 market	 is	 very	 important,	especially	in	emerging	market	and	developing	economies.	
2.3.1.4 Functionality	and	efficiency	of	financial	systems	The	 notion	 that	 a	 financial	 system	 should	 support	 economic	 development	 by	supplying	 the	 necessary	 financial	 resources	 for	 the	 realization	 of	 investment	projects,	on	the	one	side,	and	by	offering	funding	mechanisms	to	avoid	financial	instabilities,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 concept	 of	 financial	functionality.	
“Functionality	 is	defined	as	 follows:	a	 financial	system	is	 functional	to	the	
process	 of	 economic	 development	 when	 it	 expands	 the	 use	 of	 existing	
resources	 in	 the	 process	 of	 economic	 development	 with	 the	 minimum	
possible	increase	in	financial	fragility	and	other	imbalances,	that	may	halt	
the	process	of	growth	for	purely	financial	reasons”	(Studart	1995a,	64).	The	concept	recognizes	that	even	though	investment	projects	generate	their	own	aggregate	 savings,	 sustainable	 economic	 growth	 depends	 on	 financial	 system	development,	not	only	to	avoid	financial	constraints,	which	may	halt	investment	decisions,	but	also	to	better	channel	ex-post	savings,	so	that	companies	may	fund	their	 liabilities	under	improved	conditions.	As	Hermann	and	Paula	rightly	note:	“One	cannot	expect	 that	 such	 financial	 tools	 [promoting	 financial	 functionality]	are	created	spontaneously	by	the	private	financial	markets,	especially	in	case	of	developing	 countries”	 (Hermann	 and	 Paula	 2011,	 10–11),	 emphasizing	 the	requirement	 of	 some	 form	 of	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 and	developmentalist	state	policies.	Related	to	the	concept	of	financial	functionality	is	the	notion	of	financial	system	efficiency,	 understood	 as	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 financial	 system	 socializes	uncertainty	 (F.	 J.	 C.	 de	 Carvalho	 1992,	 153ff.).	 Since	 uncertainty	 is	 part	 of	 a	monetary	economy	and	nothing,	not	even	the	most	efficient	financial	system,	will	eliminate	it,	the	question	is	how	to	distribute	financial	uncertainties	inherent	to	investment	projects.	
“An	efficient	financial	system	socializes	uncertainty,	reducing	its	burden	on	
the	entrepreneur	and	sharing	it	with	savers	and	financial	institutions”	(F.	J.	
C.	de	Carvalho	1992,	157).	Part	of	the	investment	decision	is	the	choice	of	financial	means	to	support	it,	i.e.	finance	 and	 funding.	 Minsky’s	 model	 of	 financial	 fragilities	 helps	 us	 to	 better	understand	how	financial	uncertainties	are	shifted,	by	outlining	three	prototype	financial	postures:	hedge,	speculative,	and	Ponzi.	Minsky	showed	the	unlikeliness	of	all	agents	obtaining	sufficient	funding	to	operate	with	fully	compatible	balance	sheets	 and	 by	 explicitly	 analyzing	 different	 choices	 of	 financial	 postures,	 his	approach	 facilitates	 the	 search	 for	 possible	 ways	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 financial	fragilities	 identified.	 While	 a	 “hedger”	 is	 assured	 that	 he	 will	 not	 suffer	 from	changes	 in	 financial	 market	 conditions	 during	 the	 relevant	 period,	 an	entrepreneur	 embarking	 on	 a	 “speculative”	 investment	 project	 might	 become	
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insolvent,	 even	 if	 the	 expected	 yields	 are	 confirmed,	 in	 case	 financial	 market	conditions	change	in	a	way	that	impedes	him	to	roll-over	his	debt	or	to	acquire	the	 necessary	 funding.	 A	 Ponzi	 posture	 is	 even	more	 dependent	 on	 beneficial	conditions	 over	 a	 long	 period	 in	 the	 financial	markets.	 Development	 banks	 or	other	schemes	of	public	finance	for	development	are	usually	created	to	increase	the	 efficiency	 of	 the	 financial	 system	 (F.	 J.	 C.	 de	 Carvalho	 1992,	 154–55).	 By	allowing	more	hedgers	to	emerge,	such	public	financial	schemes	turn	investment	projects	feasible	that	would	otherwise	only	be	implemented,	if	the	entrepreneurs	were	animated	by	exceptionally	high	‘animal	spirits’.	In	the	end,	both	concepts	–	financial	system	functionality	as	well	as	efficiency	–	express	the	relevance	of	funding	mechanisms	for	the	economic	development	of	a	country.	 Yet,	 since	 the	 concept	 of	 financial	 system	 functionality	 points	 out	 the	ambivalence	 of	 financial	 development,	 this	 term	will	 preferably	 be	 used	 in	 the	following.	 Furthermore,	 both	 concepts	 have	 revealed,	 that	 public	 finance	 for	development	contributes	to	the	efficiency	and	functionality	of	financial	systems	by	increasing	the	funding	potential.	In	this	manner,	more	investment	projects	are	undertaken,	and	hence	the	economic	development	of	the	country	is	propelled.	At	the	 same	 time,	 financial	 fragilities	 are	 reduced,	 because	 public	 finance	 for	development	is	usually	offering	long-term	loans.	Consequently,	public	finance	for	development	institutions	form	a	sensible	complement	to	the	financial	system	of	a	country	and	may	be	designed	to	support	financial	development,	and	in	particular	the	 build-up	 of	 corporate	 bond	 markets.	 For,	 notwithstanding	 the	 increase	 in	financial	 fragility	 inherent	 to	 private	 financial	 market	 development,	 the	 sole	reliance	on	public	finance	for	development	would	incur	severe	problems,	as	well.	Among	 the	 various	problems	associated	with	public	 banks	 granting	 subsidized	credits	 are	 corruption,	 rent-seeking	 behavior,	 “amigo-banking”,	 and	 the	misallocation	of	resources.	This	 section	 described	 the	 Post	 Keynesian	 two-fold	 capital	 formation	 process	that	 is	 composed	 of	 finance	 (see	 sub-section	 2.3.1.1)	 and	 funding	 (see	 sub-section	 2.3.1.2).	 Short-term	 bank	 finance	 allows	 entrepreneurs	 to	 realize	 their	investment	 projects	 and	 the	 no-prior-savings	 approach	 implies	 that	 CBMD	cannot	 be	 hampered	 by	 the	 lack	 of	 savings.	 The	 second	 step	 of	 the	 capital	formation	 process,	 funding,	 dissolves	 maturity	 mismatches.	 It	 depends	 on	economic	agents’	expectations	of	a	stable	monetary	policy	stance	and	reflects	the	central	 role	 of	 bond	markets	 for	 the	 development	 process.	 Sub-section	 2.3.1.3	emphasized	that	capital	markets	play	an	ambiguous	role	in	a	monetary	economy	as	 they	 might	 create	 financial	 instabilities,	 but	 can	 also	 alleviate	 them.	 The	stabilizing	 effect	 of	 capital	 markets,	 including	 bond	 markets,	 is	 important	 for	sustained	 economic	 growth	 and	 the	 development	 process	 of	 a	 country.	 The	concept	of	 financial	 functionality,	presented	 in	sub-section	2.3.1.4,	captures	 the	notion	 that	 a	 financial	 system	 works	 best	 in	 terms	 of	 supporting	 economic	growth	and	development,	when	it	is	able	to	do	both:	offer	financial	resources	for	finance	and	funding,	while	mitigating	financial	fragilities	at	the	same	time.	While	CBMD	is	an	important	contribution	to	the	diversification	of	the	financial	system,	especially	 in	 emerging	market	 and	developing	 economies,	 incorporating	public	finance	 for	 development	 might	 be	 necessary	 to	 achieve	 financial	 system	functionality.	
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The	 following	section	will	 show	how	CBMD	 is	determined	by	economic	agents’	(portfolio)	decisions,	which	are	based	on	their	expectations	together	with	their	liquidity	 preferences	 and	 influenced	 by	 the	 policy	 variables	 public	 debt	management,	monetary	policy	and	public	finance	for	development.	
2.3.2 Economic	agents’	decision	making	as	a	determinant	of	corporate	
bond	market	development	The	determinants	of	CBMD	are	well	captured	by	the	liquidity	preference	theory,	which	 provides	 a	 useful	 tool	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 economic	 agents’	 (portfolio)	decisions,	by	explaining	the	expectation	formation	process	of	economic	agents	in	a	world	reigned	by	uncertainty.	While	the	existence	of	entrepreneurs	that	realize	investment	 projects	 is	 indispensible	 for	 the	 development	 of	 a	 corporate	 bond	market,	Monetary	Keynesians	 (cf.	Nitsch	1995,	61–62,	1999,	186ff.;	Nitsch	 and	Diebel	2008,	83)	clarify	the	pivotal	role	of	wealth	holders	in	a	monetary	economy	(see	sub-section	2.3.2.1),	who	would	need	 to	be	convinced	 to	acquire	domestic	financial	 instruments,	 be	 they	 shares	 or	 bonds,	 issued	 by	 the	 state	 or	 private	companies	(cf.	sub-section	2.3.2.2).	Wealth	holders	evaluate	the	net	return	of	an	asset	by	considering	expected	values	of	its	yield,	carrying	costs,	appreciation,	and	liquidity	 premium	 (as	 will	 be	 outlined	 in	 the	 upcoming	 section	 2.3.3).	 The	liquidity	 of	 an	 asset,	 in	 turn,	 depends	 largely	 on	 the	 currency,	 in	 which	 it	 is	denominated,	as	well	as	the	market,	where	it	is	traded.	Economic	agents	take	this	large	 range	 of	 various	 parameters	 into	 consideration	 when	 forming	 their	expectations	(cf.	sub-section	2.3.2.3),	which	serve	as	a	basis	together	with	their	liquidity	 preferences	 (cf.	 sub-section	 2.3.2.4)	 for	 their	 portfolio	 decisions.	 The	state	 is	 able	 to	 promote	 CBMD	 by	 purposefully	 exerting	 an	 influence	 on	 these	relevant	 parameters	 through	 public	 debt	 management,	 monetary	 policy,	 and	public	finance	for	development.	
2.3.2.1 Wealth	holder	as	sovereign	of	monetary	economy	According	 to	 his	 liquidity	 preference	 and	 risk	 propensity,	 the	 wealth	 holder	disposes	over	his	portfolio	and	that	way	determines	inter	alia	whether	money	is	held	or	spent,	 loans	are	redeemed	and	financial	 instruments	are	traded.	That	is	why,	in	a	monetary	economy,	the	wealth	holder	is	the	sovereign,	as	opposed	to	a	neoclassical	 economy,	 which	 is	 ultimately	 governed	 by	 the	 decisions	 of	 its	consumers.	Since	he	holds	property	rights	to	(real)	assets,	the	wealth	holder	is	in	a	position,	where	he	can	decide	whether	to	keep	the	real	assets,	or	to	sell	them	in	exchange	 for	 any	 type	 of	 financial	 asset,	 including	money.	 The	 financial	 assets	can	 be	 categorized	 into	 money,	 understood	 here	 as	 a	 non-interest	 bearing	financial	asset,	bank	deposits,	as	well	as	debt	and	equity	securities.	The	wealth	holder’s	 decisions	 ultimately	 determine	 the	 production	 and	 employment	 of	companies,	and	thus,	the	economic	development	of	the	country	–	provided	that	a	large	or	even	dominant	part	of	its	structurally	heterogeneous	economy	functions	as	a	monetary	economy.	
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During	the	capital	formation	process,	the	wealth	holder	can	interfere	to	facilitate,	re-direct,	 or	 hamper	 the	 development	 path	 of	 the	 country.	 For	 instance,	 the	entrepreneur	depends	on	the	willingness	of	the	wealth	holder	to	dispose	of	his	real	 assets,	 in	 order	 to	 realize	 the	 investment	 project.	 Through	 his	 portfolio	decisions,	the	wealth	holder	exerts	the	most	important	influence,	yet	not	always	directly,	 but	 more	 commonly	 jointly	 with	 financial	 institutions.	 By	 including	financial	 institutions	 in	 the	 process,	 the	 wealth	 holder	 delegates	 part	 of	 his	sovereignty.	 Additionally,	 the	 power	 of	 the	 wealth	 holder	 is	 restricted	 by	 the	central	 bank	 as	 the	 money	 issuing	 institution	 and	 provider	 of	 liquidity	 to	 the	banking	 system,	 according	 to	 its	 refinancing	 conditions.	A	 rather	direct	way	of	influencing	 the	 capital	 formation	 process	 is	 given	 by	 the	 net	 wealth	 holder	granting	 a	 credit	 to	 a	 specific	 company	 or	 directly	 acquiring	 a	 share	 of	 the	company.	 Usually,	 financial	 institutions	 are	 involved	 in	 the	 process	 of	 capital	formation,	and	due	to	their	autonomy	in	disposing	over	financial	assets,	they	can	be	 considered	 to	 act	 not	 only	 as	 financial	 intermediaries,	 but	 also	 as	 wealth	holders,	depending	on	their	net	asset	positions.	A	commercial	bank,	for	example,	might	 follow	 the	 rationale	 of	 a	 wealth	 holder,	 if	 it	 grants	 a	 credit	 to	 an	entrepreneur.	 Another	 example	 could	 be	 the	 underwriting	 of	 a	 debt	 security	issuance	 by	 an	 investment	 bank.	 When	 a	 pension	 fund	 buys	 or	 sells	 (debt)	securities	 in	 the	 financial	markets,	 it	 also	 illustrates	how	a	 financial	 institution	might	 act	 as	 a	 wealth	 holder.	 These	 portfolio	 decisions	 depend	 on	 the	wealth	holder’s	liquidity	preference	and	determine	the	financing	and	funding	conditions	for	entrepreneurs.	Since	uncertainty	is	a	fundamental	ingredient	of	the	monetary	economy,	wealth	holders,	when	taking	decisions,	are	also	subject	to	it.	Due	to	the	uncertain	future,	the	 function	 of	 money	 as	 a	 medium	 of	 exchange	 in	 spot	 markets	 is	 of	 less	relevance	 compared	 to	 its	 function	 as	 a	 store	 of	 value	 between	 today	 and	 the	unforeseeable	 future.	 Hence,	 interest	 is	 paid	 as	 a	 “reward	 for	 parting	 with	liquidity	 [and	 not	 as]	 a	 return	 to	 saving	 or	 waiting	 as	 such.	 […]	 For	 if	 a	 man	hoards	his	savings	in	cash,	he	earns	no	interest,	though	he	saves	just	as	much	as	before”	 (Keynes	 1936,	 167).	 To	 highlight	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 financial	 sector	 to	channel	 these	 “hoardings”	 towards	 productive	 investment	 projects,	 as	 long	 as	the	 granting	 of	 the	 credit	 appears	 justified	 in	 accordance	 with	 collaterals	 and	expected	yields,	is	the	main	contribution	of	Monetary	Keynesianism,	and	of	Post	Keynesians	in	general,	as	we	have	seen	in	the	concept	of	financial	functionality.	However,	 ex-post	 savings	 are	 not	 necessarily	 channeled	 towards	 long-term	financial	assets,	and	could	 just	as	well	be	hoarded	or	channeled	towards	short-term	financial	assets.	How	ex-post	savings	are	used,	depends	on	the	availability	of	 adequate	 financial	 assets,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 on	 the	 savers’	 liquidity	preferences,	on	the	other	hand.	
2.3.2.2 Public	vs.	private	bonds:	the	competitiveness	effect	The	 portfolio	 decisions	 of	 wealth	 holders	 are	 also	 relevant	 for	 this	 thesis,	because	they	imply	that	public	and	private	bonds	compete	for	the	favor	of	wealth	holders.	This	competition	might	cause	a	result	that	is	similar	to	one	that,	from	an	orthodox	 point	 of	 view,	 follows	 from	 the	 crowding-out	 effect:	 a	much	 smaller	
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corporate	 bond	 market	 compared	 to	 the	 sovereign	 bond	 market.	 Since	 the	mechanisms	at	work	are	very	distinct,	 this	 thesis	prefers	 to	 establish	 the	 term	“competitiveness	effect”	instead	of	using	the	term	“crowding-out	effect”.	In	order	to	 avoid	 misunderstandings,	 two	 different	 terms	 are	 used	 to	 describe	 two	different	 phenomena.	 The	 crowding-out	 effect	 is	 inherently	 related	 to	 the	loanable	funds	theory	and	explains	the	rise	in	interest	rates	after	an	increase	of	government	spending.	According	to	 this	 theory,	 there	 is	only	a	 fixed	amount	of	loanable	 funds,	 represented	by	 the	supply	curve	 in	 the	money	market.	 Interest	rates	rise	then,	because	the	demand	curve	shifts	to	the	right,	resulting	in	a	new	equilibrium	with	higher	 interest	rates.	As	a	result,	public	bonds	are	“crowding-out”	private	bonds.	From	a	Post	Keynesian	viewpoint,	the	mechanism	works	differently:	There	is	no	crowding-out	 due	 to	 increased	 government	 spending,	 which	 can	 always	 be	financed	 through	 credit	 creation	 ex	 nihilo	 by	 banks20.	 Thus,	 in	 a	 monetary	economy,	 when	 public	 bonds	 drive	 back	 corporate	 bonds,	 it	 is	 the	 result	 of	 a	competitiveness	effect.	 In	other	words,	the	competitiveness	effect	describes	the	effect	of	 the	 inferior	competitiveness	of	corporate	compared	to	public	bonds	 in	winning	 over	 the	 favor	 of	 wealth	 holders.	 The	 term	 refers	 both	 to	 the	competitiveness	of	the	bond	and	of	the	company	issuing	it,	which	faces	a	trade-off	 between	 the	 two21.	 Since	 the	 wealth	 holders,	 as	 the	 sovereigns	 of	 the	monetary	economy,	can	decide	what	to	do	with	their	wealth,	and	if	they	decide	to	invest,	 are	 free	 to	 choose	 between	 various	 financial	 and	 real	 assets,	entrepreneurs	will	only	be	able	to	“attract	the	financial	means	necessary	for	real	investment,	 […]	 if	 they	 can	 offer	 a	 return	 on	 investment	 which	 can	 compete	favorably	with	the	alternatives”	(Nitsch	1995,	63),	 i.e.	all	other	options	open	to	the	wealth	owner.	Due	 to	 this	 competition	 among	 the	 (financial)	 assets,	 public	bonds	offering	a	higher	 interest	 rate,	 relative	 to	 their	 liquidity	premium,	might	drive	back	corporate	bonds	as	a	result	of	the	competitiveness	effect;	and	because	wealth	 holders	 evaluate	 more	 than	 the	 pecuniary	 return	 of	 financial	 assets,	public	bonds	might	also	push	back	corporate	bonds	due	to	characteristics	other	than	 the	higher	 interest	 rate,	 such	 as	 shorter	maturities	 or	 greater	 liquidity	 in	secondary	 markets,	 etc.	 The	 dominating	 position	 of	 public	 bonds	 and	 their	commanding	 competitiveness	 can	 thus	 be	 explained	 by	 their	 perceived	superiority	by	wealth	holders.	As	 a	 consequence,	 there	 are	 only	 three	 circumstances	 (from	 a	 Post	 Keynesian	perspective)	 under	 which	 an	 increase	 in	 government	 spending	 that	 is	 funded	through	an	increase	in	public	debt	on	the	domestic	bond	market	could	lead	to	an	increase	 of	 the	 interest	 rate	 and	 a	 competitiveness	 effect	 on	 corporate	 bonds	(Hermann	and	Gentil	 2014):	 First,	 if	 there	was	 a	 lack	 of	 coordination	between																																																									20	Increased	public	borrowing,	which	in	the	orthodox	view	causes	crowding-out,	actually	may	 lead	 to	 a	 crowding-in	 from	a	Keynesian	perspective,	 depending	on	 the	multiplier	process	and	on	what	it	is	spent.	21	For	 example,	 if	 a	 company	 decided	 to	 issue	 its	 corporate	 bond	 with	 a	 higher	 than	initially	 planned	 monetary	 return,	 this	 would	 render	 the	 bond	 more	 attractive	 for	investors,	raising	its	competitiveness,	but	at	the	same	time,	 it	would	raise	the	financial	obligations	 of	 the	 company,	 limiting	 its	 financial	 scope	 and,	 thus,	 potentially	 reducing	the	competitiveness	of	the	company.	
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monetary	 and	 fiscal	 policy;	 second,	 if	 sovereign	 bonds	 were	 rejected	 by	 the	market;	 and	 third,	 if	 there	 was	 a	 high	 preference	 for	 liquidity,	 which	 is	 the	money-market	 reflection	 of	 an	 unfavorable	 macroeconomic	 environment.	 The	first	point	can	and	should	be	avoided,	and	 the	second	point	 is	an	extreme	case	related	to	a	crisis	situation.	The	third	point	is	the	most	interesting,	because	it	is	related	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 loanable	 funds:	 In	 an	 unfavorable	 macroeconomic	environment,	 there	 is	 a	 high	 preference	 for	 liquidity	 in	 the	 money	 market,	creating	a	situation	similar	to	that	described	by	the	loanable	funds	theory.	If	the	government	decides	to	increase	public	spending	in	such	a	situation	and	wants	to	finance	it	by	issuing	government	debt	securities,	this	might	cause	interest	rates	to	 rise.	Due	 to	 the	 high	 liquidity	 preference,	 participants	 in	 the	money	market	will	only	accept	to	alter	their	current	portfolio	position	and	exchange	cash	(most	liquid	 assets)	 for	 public	 bonds	 (less	 liquid	 assets),	 if	 they	 are	 compensated	 by	higher	 interest	 rates.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 competitiveness	 effect	 also,	 just	 like	 the	crowding-out	 effect,	 results	 in	 an	 increase	of	 interest	 rates	 and	 a	push-back	of	corporate	bonds	by	public	bonds.	Nevertheless,	as	already	indicated,	the	causal	relations	are	very	distinct.	Notwithstanding	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 competitiveness	 effect,	 public	 and	 private	bond	markets	can	also	have	a	complementary	relationship,	as	already	discussed	above	(cf.	section	2.2.3).	Sovereign	bond	markets	might	exert	a	market	creation	effect	 on	 private	 bond	 markets	 by	 building-up	 a	 trading	 infrastructure	 and	 a	broad	 investor	 base,	 supplying	 better	 information	 about	 the	 future	 path	 of	interest	rates,	and	providing	a	benchmark	yield	curve	(McCauley	and	Remolona	2000).	Furthermore,	public	debt	management	is	able	to	support	(or	hamper)	the	development	 of	 a	 corporate	 bond	 market	 by	 improving	 (or	 worsening)	 the	structure	of	the	public	debt.	This	impact	vector	works	mainly	through	a	signaling	effect,	where	the	public	debt	structure	 is	related	to	the	yield	curve	and	reflects	current	 market	 sentiments,	 and	 through	 the	 competition	 of	 different	 debt	securities,	 where	 the	 public	 bonds’	 characteristics	 determine	 corporate	 bond	market	development.	A	panel	study	of	41	countries	has	shown	that	the	size	of	the	public	bond	market	had	 no	 impact	 on	 the	 private	 bond	 market	 growth	 (Eichengreen	 and	Luengnaruemitchai	2006).	The	authors	interpreted	their	finding	as	the	result	of	two	offsetting	effects:	On	the	one	hand,	(what	they	call)	the	“crowding-out	effect”	and	on	the	other	hand,	better	market	infrastructure	and	higher	liquidity.	Trying	to	figure	out	this	puzzle,	Eichengreen	et	al.	(Borensztein	et	al.	2008a	chapter	9)	conducted	a	study	where	they	differentiated	between	the	effect	of	an	increase	in	public	debt	and	an	increase	in	the	stock	of	public	bonds	on	the	corporate	bond	market,	 proving	 that	 there	 was	 a	 market	 creation	 effect.	 Two	 case	 studies	(Borensztein	 et	 al.	 2008a	 chapter	 5	 and	 6)	 presented	 evidence	 in	 favor	 of	 the	crowding-out	effect:	In	Colombia,	slow	growth	of	the	corporate	bond	market	was	explained	(at	least	in	part)	by	the	continued	rise	in	government	debt,	and	in	Chile,	the	 cut	 in	 public	 domestic	 debt	 helped	 to	 stimulate	 private	 bond	 market	performance.	The	mixed	picture	of	whether	the	dominant	effect	was	the	market	creation	or	the	crowding-out	 effect	 could	 also	 be	 found	 in	 the	 answers	 given	 by	 institutional	investors	 to	 opinion	 surveys	 (Borensztein	 et	 al.	 2008b,	 22–23).	 In	 Brazil,	 one	
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might	 even	 get	 the	 impression	 that	 the	 Brazilian	 investors’	 answers	 were	contradictory.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 majority	 of	 respondents	 supported	 two	affirmations	in	favor	of	the	market	creation	argument	and	against	the	crowding-out	 argument:	More	 than	70%	of	Brazilian	 investors	 in	 the	 survey	 agreed	 that	“the	yield	curve	provided	by	public	bonds	is	crucial	for	pricing	corporate	bonds”	and	more	than	60%	did	not	see	government	and	corporate	bonds	as	substitutes	in	their	portfolio	(Borensztein	et	al.	2008b,	23).	On	the	other	hand,	most	of	the	Brazilian	investors	disagreed	with	one	statement	that	would	be	in	line	with	the	market	creation	argument:	Only	about	30%	of	 the	surveyed	 investors	 in	Brazil	confirmed	 that	 “a	 large	 stock	 of	 public	 sector	 bonds	 is	 important	 for	 the	development	of	the	corporate	bond	market”	(Borensztein	et	al.	2008b,	23).	The	apparent	 contradiction	 might	 be	 resolved	 by	 taking	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	statement	last	referred	to	and	its	possible	interpretations	in	the	context	of	Brazil.	In	a	country	where	the	financial	system	was	lacking	any	kind	of	bond	market,	the	build-up	of	 a	 certain	volume	of	 government	bonds	might	 really	be	a	necessary	precondition	 for	 the	 development	 of	 a	 private	 bond	 market.	 In	 Brazil,	 there	already	existed	a	very	large	stock	of	public	bonds	at	the	time	of	the	survey,	while	the	private	bond	market	was	at	a	very	incipient	stage.	In	this	context,	the	result	might	rather	be	interpreted	as	reflecting	the	respondents’	experience,	than	as	a	widespread	belief	 in	 the	crowding-out	hypothesis	among	Brazilian	 institutional	investors.	 Apparently,	 the	 respondents	 had	 the	 impression,	 that	 other	 factors	than	 the	 size	 of	 the	 government	 bond	 market	 were	 more	 important	 for	 the	development	of	the	Brazilian	corporate	bond	market.	This	 sub-section	 established	 that	 there	 is	 a	 general	 competition	 between	financial	assets,	which	is	also	true	for	public	and	corporate	bonds.	As	any	other	financial	 asset,	 these	 debt	 securities	 compete	 for	 the	 wealth	 holders	 to	 be	invested	 in,	 offering	 different	 liquidity	 premia.	 If	 a	 public	 deficit	 needs	 to	 be	funded	through	the	issuance	of	sovereign	bonds,	these	bonds	will	have	to	offer	a	net	return	that	is	high	enough	for	wealth	holders	and	their	liquidity	preferences.	In	 certain	 moments,	 when	 a	 high	 volume	 of	 public	 bonds	 clutters	 primary	markets	 and,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 available	 funds	are	 scarce	due	 to	high	 liquidity	preferences	of	wealth	holders,	there	might	be	a	competitiveness	effect.	Therefore,	the	competitiveness	effect	might	be	more	relevant	in	times	of	financial	distress,	when	the	public	borrowing	requirements	need	to	be	met	at	any	cost,	hardening	competition	to	a	point	where	private	bond	issuance	becomes	unviable.	But	here	comes	another	argument	into	play:	In	times	of	crisis,	private	bond	issuance	will	decline	 anyhow,	 because	 investment	 projects	 will	 be	 postponed	 and	 funding	needs	will	 be	 lower.	 For	 these	 reasons,	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 study	 lies	 less	 on	 the	sheer	size	of	the	public	debt	and	public	bond	market,	but	more	on	the	structure	of	the	public	debt	and	the	characteristics	of	the	public	bonds	as	determinants	of	the	development	of	the	corporate	bond	market.	
2.3.2.3 Central	role	of	uncertainty	and	expectations	After	 discussing	 the	 important	 role	 of	 wealth	 holders	 and	 their	 portfolio	decisions	 (including	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 competitiveness	 effect)	 for	 the	development	 of	 corporate	 bond	 markets,	 we	 can	 now	 turn	 to	 the	 theoretical	
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concept	of	liquidity	preferences:	A	notion	of	time	preference	is	common	to	both	classical	 and	 Keynesian	 theory,	 but	 only	 as	 far	 as	 it	 determines	 how	much	 of	current	income	is	spent	on	currently	produced	consumption	goods	and	services	(Davidson	 2005,	 457).	 Both	 theories	 differ	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 what	 the	 other	fraction	of	current	income	is	spent	on,	based	on	this	time	preference.	In	classical	theory,	 all	 income	 earned	 in	 any	 accounting	 period	 is	 spent	 on	 the	 current	production	and	time	preference	determines	how	it	is	divided	between	spending	income	on	consumption	goods	and	services,	which	are	currently	produced,	and	spending	 income	 on	 currently	 produced	 capital	 goods,	 which	 will	 help	 to	produce	 future	 consumption	 goods.	 (Post)	 Keynesian	 theory,	 in	 contrast,	emphasizes	 that	 economic	 agents	 use	 the	 remaining	 part	 of	 current	 income,	which	–	according	to	time	preference	–	is	not	designated	to	current	consumption,	to	save	by	purchasing	liquid	assets.	As	a	consequence,	
“there	 is	 a	 second	 decision	 step,	 liquidity	 preference,	 where	 the	 income	
earner	 determines	 in	 what	 liquid	 assets	 should	 his/her	 saved	 income	 be	
stored	 in	 order	 to	 be	 used	 to	 transfer	 purchasing	 power	 of	 saving	 to	 a	
future	time	period”	(Davidson	2005,	457,	emphasis	in	original).	In	short,	the	economic	agent	does	not	only	have	to	decide	how	much	to	save,	but	also	how	 to	 store	 these	 savings.	The	 latter	decision	 is	 guided	by	 “the	extent	 to	which	the	saver	prefers	safety	to	enrichment”	(F.	J.	C.	de	Carvalho	1992,	147),	or	in	other	words,	his	 liquidity	preference.	Given	a	certain	set	of	economic	agents’	current	 liquidity	 preferences,	 the	 state	might	 be	 able	 to	 foster	 or	 hamper	 the	development	 of	 corporate	 bond	 markets	 through	 its	 activities	 in	 public	 debt	management,	 monetary	 policy,	 and	 public	 finance	 for	 development.	 The	following	(sub-)sections	will	elaborate	further	on	the	framework	to	analyze	the	role	of	the	state	in	determining	CBMD.	In	 the	previous	 section,	 the	 central	 role	of	uncertainty	 in	a	monetary	economy	was	already	emphasized.	Due	to	uncertainty,	the	hoarding	of	real	assets	as	well	as	 holding	 on	 to	 liquidity	 in	 the	 form	 of	 non-interest	 bearing	 financial	 assets,	such	as	money,	may	be	a	rational	strategy	for	a	wealth	holder	(Nitsch	1999,	190).	Accordingly,	 full	 employment	 is	 only	 attained	 by	 chance,	 instead	 of	 being	 a	standard	equilibrium	outcome.	Since	the	future	 is	unknown	both	to	the	finance	and	 funding	 seeking	 entrepreneur	 as	well	 as	 to	 the	 potentially	 lending	wealth	holder,	 optimistic	 expectations	 become	 crucial	 for	 the	 initiation	 of	 the	investment	process,	and	thus,	economic	development	(Hermann	and	Paula	2011,	4ff.).	 In	 addition,	 uncertainty	 impedes	 that	 any	 coordination	 mechanism	 for	investment	financing,	even	deliberate	development	policies,	achieves	the	goal	of	eliminating	 excess	 demand	 for	 finance.	 The	 development	 process	 is	 further	complicated	 by	 the	 heterogeneous	 and	 partly	 incipient	 nature	 of	 investment	projects,	increasing	the	difficulty	of	assessing	and	forecasting	the	risks	involved	(Hermann	2011,	9).	Increased	risk	premia,	in	turn,	inhibit	potential	borrowers	to	ask	 for	 funds.	 Eventually,	 the	 higher	 degree	 of	 uncertainty	 increases	 risks	 for	creditors	and	debtors	alike	(Minsky	1986).	In	emerging	market	and	developing	economies,	the	process	of	capital	formation	and	hence,	economic	development,	is	moreover	aggravated	by	the	low	currency	premium	of	these	countries,	which	is	the	subject	of	sub-section	2.3.3.4.	Since	the	
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wealth	holder	is	free	in	his	decision,	as	to	how	he	wishes	to	keep	his	wealth,	he	can	choose	between	different	asset	types	and	classes,	between	real	and	financial	assets,	 including	 various	 options	 as	 to	 the	 currency	 denomination	 and	 the	corresponding	currency	premium	(Nitsch	1995,	63).	The	 development	 process	 might	 be	 complicated,	 because	 the	 wealth	 holder	needs	to	take	his	decision	under	uncertainty,	so	that	he	cannot	base	his	decision	on	 factual	 information,	 but	 needs	 to	 rely	 on	 his	 expectations.	 Since	 these	autonomous	 expectations	 ultimately	 shape	market	 results,	 the	 analysis	 of	 how	expectations	 are	 formed	 becomes	 crucial,	 as	 has	 been	 pointed	 out	 by	 Post	Keynesians	 (cf.	 Chick	 1983;	 Keynes	 1936,	 ch.5;	 Harvey	 2001;	 Dow	 2002).	 By	emphasizing	 that	 there	 is	 a	 fundamental	 difference	 between	 uncertainty,	reflecting	 an	unknown	 future,	 and	 risk,	 understood	 as	 a	 calculable	 probability,	Davidson	 (1978,	 2002)	 became	 one	 of	 the	 founders	 of	 a	 research	 strand	 that	elaborated	further	on	Keynes’	statement,	that	the	information	for	mathematical	calculations	to	base	one’s	decision	on,	 is	 lacking.	For	Keynes,	 “human	decisions	affecting	the	future,	whether	personal	or	political	or	economic,	cannot	depend	on	strict	 mathematical	 expectations,	 since	 the	 basis	 for	 making	 such	 calculations	does	not	exist”	(Keynes	1936,	162–63).	On	another	occasion,	he	wrote:	“There	is	no	 scientific	 basis	 on	 which	 to	 form	 any	 calculable	 probability	 whatever.	 We	simply	do	not	know”	(Keynes	1973,	114).	If	 there	 is	 nothing	 to	 be	 known	 about	 the	 future,	 how	 do	 economic	 agents	behave?	Faced	with	fundamental	uncertainty	in	a	monetary	economy,	economic	agents	 are	 governed	 in	 their	 investment	 behavior	 by	 convention	 and	 the	confidence	 with	 which	 they	 hold	 this	 convention	 (Keynes	 1936,	 152).	Consequently,	 the	 wealth	 holder	 is	 concerned	 about	 forming	 the	 right	expectations	with	regard	to	future	conventions,	in	order	to	maintain	the	value	of	his	portfolio.	If	a	wealth	holder	anticipates	changes	in	conventions,	he	will	trade	his	financial	assets	accordingly.	That	is	how	Keynes	explains	the	price	formation	process	 in	 capital	 markets.	 Harvey	 (2010)	 as	 well	 as	 Kaltenbrunner	 (2011)	applied	 this	 approach	 to	 the	 foreign	 exchange	 market	 and	 Alves,	 Ferrari,	 and	Paula	 (1999)	 applied	 it	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 financial	 and	 currency	 crises.	 This	dissertation	shares	this	view	of	expectation	formation	being	crucial	in	explaining	(changes	 in)	 prices	 of	 financial	 assets	 in	 capital	 markets.	 Accordingly,	 this	analysis	 of	 CBMD	 will	 use	 insights	 from	 these	 earlier	 studies	 about	 the	expectation	formation	process.	It	is	justified	to	apply	the	analysis	of	money	and	different	 currencies	 as	 financial	 assets	 to	 debt	 securities	 such	 as	 (corporate)	bonds,	 since	 Keynes	 himself	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 line	 between	 “money”	 and	“debts”	 can	 be	 drawn	 “at	 whatever	 point	 is	 most	 convenient	 for	 handling	 a	particular	 problem”	 (Keynes	 1936,	 167).	Moreover,	Keynes’	 formulation	 of	 the	liquidity	preference	applies	to	financial	assets	in	general,	and	not	only	to	money	(Paula,	Fritz,	and	Prates	2015).	In	the	presence	of	fundamental	uncertainty,	expectations	are	mainly	anchored	by	social	 conventions	and	 the	 confidence	with	which	 they	are	held.	Consequently,	expectation	formation	is	always	context	and	time	specific	(Kaltenbrunner	2011,	90–91).	 The	 specific	 structure	 of	 the	 market,	 as	 well	 as	 its	 institutions,	 its	dominant	actors	and	various	other	 factors,	 e.g.	 the	dissemination	of	 indexation	clauses	 in	 contractual	 agreements,	 shape	 social	 conventions,	 which	 might	 be	
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subject	to	sudden	changes.	Such	alterations	might	be	triggered	by	psychological	processes,	 similar	 to	 Keynes’	 famous	 beauty	 contest	 and	 animal	 spirits,	 and	might	 lead	 to	 what	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 herding,	 momentum,	 or	 simple	 feedback	trading	behavior	(Tversky	and	Kahneman	1974;	Harvey	2010).	Newly	available	information	 is	 filtered	by	measuring	 it	 against	 a	 variable	 called	 “medium	 term	expectations”	 (following	 Schulmeister	 1988)	 that	 changes	 according	 to	 the	current	state	of	the	market,	which	can	be	either	bullish,	bearish,	or	neutral.	Some	 critical	 points	 about	 Harvey’s	 (2010)	 approach	 are	 discussed	 by	Kaltenbrunner	(2011,	71–72),	e.g.	that	the	model	falsely	assumes	financial	flows	as	 a	 uniform	 category	 with	 a	 homogenous	 expectation	 formation	 process.	Instead,	one	needs	to	recognize,	that	expectation	formation	must	be	a	necessarily	institutionally	 and	 historically	 contingent	 process	 (e.g.	 Lawson	 1985;	 Crotty	1994;	 Chick	 and	 Dow	 2005).	 Furthermore,	 by	 stressing	 the	 central	 role	 of	economic	 agents’	 expectations,	 this	 approach	 might	 run	 the	 risk	 of	 becoming	indeterminate.	 Yet,	 this	 risk	 is	 minimized	 by	 introducing	 social	 conventions,	which	 ensure	 orderliness	 and	 uniformity	 in	 expectations	 (F.	 J.	 C.	 de	 Carvalho	1983).	 Integrating	 social	 factors	 into	 the	model	 as	 if	 these	were	 an	 exogenous	guideline,	which	agents	may	choose	to	follow,	brings	about	two	problems.	First,	this	would	presuppose	that	 individuals	have	the	power	to	choose,	which	might	not	 actually	 be	 the	 case	 (Lawson	 1985,	 919).	 Second,	 the	 relational	 aspect	 of	institutions,	 which	 dynamically	 links	 and	 constraints	 agents’	 expectations	 and	actions	 over	 time,	 would	 be	 lost.	 The	 most	 prominent	 Post	 Keynesian	 to	underline	 this	 relational	aspect	 is	Minsky,	who	pointed	out	 the	debtor-creditor	relationship	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 financial	 commitments	 in	 shaping	 agents’	expectations	and	behaviors.	(Post)	 Keynesian	 analysis	 of	 the	 behavior	 of	 economic	 agents	 in	 a	 monetary	economy	 marked	 by	 uncertainty	 goes	 beyond	 the	 explanation	 of	 how	 agents	form	their	expectations,	by	stressing	the	structural	and	institutional	implications	of	this	uncertainty	(Kaltenbrunner	2011,	73).	
“Although	individuals’	values,	preferences,	modes	of	understanding,	and	so	
forth	 are	 socially	 constructed,	 through	 individual	 and	 collective	 action	
people	transform	their	decision-making	environment	over	time	by,	among	
other	 things,	 creating	 new	 institutions	 and	 adopting	 new	 practices	
designed	to	reduce	the	harmful	effects	of	uncertainty”	(Crotty	1994,	13).	The	emergence	of	money	is	one	of	the	most	important	institutional	inventions	in	this	 context	 and	 exemplifies	 how	 institutions	 are	 established	 to	 manage	 and	disperse	uncertainties.	
“The	 system	 reacts	 to	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 information	 the	market	 cannot	
provide	by	creating	uncertainty-reducing	institutions:	wage	contracts,	debt	
contracts,	 supply	 agreements,	 administered	 prices,	 trading	 agreements.	
Since	all	are	meant	to	reduce	uncertainty	over	time,	it	is	natural	that	their	
value	 be	 denominated	 in	 the	unit	whose	 value	 is	most	 stable	 over	 time	–	
money	(…)”(Kregel	1980,	46).	The	elevated	level	of	uncertainty	in	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	turns	 uncertainty-reducing	 institutions	 all	 the	 more	 relevant	 and	 may	 lead	 to	
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peculiar	 manifestations	 in	 the	 institutional	 setup	 of	 the	 domestic	 financial	system,	for	example	the	indexation	of	debt	contracts.	An	active	role	of	the	state	in	the	 creation	 of	 a	 more	 stable	 outlook	 might	 be	 necessary	 in	 these	 countries,	which	 would	 also	 foster	 corporate	 bond	 market	 development.	 In	 particular,	reassuring	measures	 in	 the	 fields	of	public	debt	management,	monetary	policy,	and	public	finance	for	development	can	contribute	to	the	promotion	of	CBMD.	Keynes	acknowledged	that	the	existence	of	time	had	important	implications	for	economic	activity,	because	its	passing	creates	uncertainty	between	the	past	and	the	future.	Uncertainty	reigning	in	a	monetary	economy	explains	why	economic	agents	have	a	preference	for	liquidity.	Keynes	defined	liquidity	preference	as	an	individual’s	“schedule	of	the	amounts	of	his	resources,	valued	in	terms	of	money	or	of	wage-units,	which	he	will	wish	to	retain	in	the	form	of	money	in	different	set	of	circumstances”	(Keynes	1936,	166).	Actually,	he	laid	out	more	specifically,	why	an	economic	actor	might	want	to	hold	money,	even	though	it	 is	a	financial	asset	offering	no	yield.	Keynes	spelled	out	three	reasons	that	became	famous	as	the	transaction,	the	precautionary,	and	the	speculative	motives.	
2.3.2.4 Preference	for	liquidity	The	first	of	the	motives	for	holding	money,	the	transaction	motive,	reflects	“the	need	 of	 cash	 for	 the	 current	 transaction	 of	 personal	 and	 business	 exchanges”	(Keynes	1936,	170)	and	resembles	what	money	represents	in	neoclassical	theory,	i.e.	 a	 medium	 of	 exchange	 (Kaltenbrunner	 2011,	 83–84).	 The	 innovative	perspective	of	(Post)	Keynesian	theory	on	money	is	articulated	in	the	other	two	motives,	 which	 display	 reasons	 why	 money	 is	 held	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 other	assets.	 These	 motives	 for	 liquidity	 preference	 are	 connected	 to	 the	 financial	circulation	of	money:	
“(ii)	 the	 precautionary-motive,	 i.e.	 the	 desire	 for	 security	 as	 to	 the	 future	
cash	 equivalent	 of	 a	 certain	 proportion	 of	 total	 resources;	 and	 (iii)	 the	
speculative-motive,	 i.e.	 the	 object	 of	 securing	 profit	 from	 knowing	 better	
than	the	market	what	the	future	will	bring	forth”	(Keynes	1936,	170).	Even	 though	 some	 authors	 have	 interpreted	 the	 precautionary	 motive	 as	 a	subsumable	 concept	 of	 the	 transaction	 motive	 (Chick	 1983),	 the	 focus	 of	 this	dissertation	on	the	analysis	of	(corporate)	debt	securities	 justifies	accentuating	the	demand	for	liquidity	to	meet	outstanding	liabilities.	This	power	of	money	to	discharge	contractual	obligations	is	not	only	one	of	the	most	important	reasons	to	demand	liquidity,	but	also	closely	related	to	the	functional	roles	of	money	as	unit	of	account	and	as	store	of	value.	According	to	Carvalho	(1992)	the	primary	function	of	money	is	to	serve	as	the	unit,	in	which	contracts	are	denominated.	All	of	its	other	properties	are	derived	from	this	function.	Due	to	its	function	as	unit	of	 account,	 the	 liquidity	 premium	 of	money	 is	 the	 highest.	 In	 Keynes’	 General	Theory,	the	precautionary	motive	had	received	relatively	little	attention,	which	is	surprising,	 since	 it	 directly	 concerns	 uncertainty,	 one	 of	 the	 pillars	 of	 Keynes’	revolutionary	 approach.	 Given	 its	 great	 importance	 in	 determining	 the	preference	 for	 liquidity,	 the	 precautionary	 motive	 will	 be	 analyzed	 more	thoroughly	in	this	dissertation,	after	discussing	the	speculative	motive.	
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The	 third	 motive,	 commonly	 named	 speculative	 motive,	 is	 considered	 more	extensively	 in	 the	 General	 Theory,	 where	 speculation	 and	 the	 speculator	 are	essential	and	recurrent	topics.	In	chapter	12	of	the	General	Theory	on	the	state	of	long-term	expectations,	Keynes	defines	his	understanding	of	speculation,	i.e.	the	purchase	of	 securities	 in	 order	 to	profit	 from	 their	 sale	 at	 a	 higher	price	 later,	which	 he	 differentiates	 from	 the	 motive	 to	 acquire	 securities	 for	 long-term	income	 generation	 (Toporowski	 2005).	 Within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 liquidity	preference	 theory,	 spelled	out	 in	 chapters	13	 and	15,	 speculation	 about	 future	interest	 rates	 and	 thus	 bond	 prices	 makes	 the	 important	 connection	 between	liquidity	 and	 the	 interest	 rate.	 There	 is	 a	 demand	 for	money,	 because	 holding	money	promises	liquidity,	which	is	necessary	to	profit	from	changes	in	expected	interest	rates.	When	interest	rate	expectations	deviate	from	what	the	economic	agent	subjectively	perceives	as	a	 “normal”	 interest	 rate,	he	reacts	by	buying	or	selling	financial	assets,	because	the	changed	interest	rate	expectations	are	going	to	be	reflected	in	the	price	expectations	of	financial	assets.	As	we	have	seen	in	sub-section	2.3.1.2,	the	funding	mechanism	crucially	depends	on	low	and	stable	monetary	policy	rates.	Savings	are	not	automatically	available	to	fund	investments,	only	if	they	translate	into	demand	for	long-term	assets.	This	decision	 of	 the	 wealth	 owner	 depends	 on	 his	 expectations	 about	 the	 future	course	of	 the	base	rate:	 If	he	expects	 the	base	rate	 to	stay	 low,	his	demand	 for	money	due	 to	 the	 speculative	motive	will	 be	 low	as	well.	He	parts	more	easily	with	liquidity,	and	consequently,	his	demand	for	long-term	assets	will	rise.	If	the	wealth	owner	expects	an	 increase	of	 the	base	rate,	his	 liquidity	preference	will	be	higher	due	to	the	speculative	motive	and	he	will	prefer	to	wait	and	purchase	fixed	 rate	 bonds	 later,	 when	 they	 are	 issued	 with	 higher	 interest	 rate	 in	 the	primary	market	or	have	become	cheaper	in	the	secondary	market.	The	findings	obtained	from	Keynes’	analysis	of	speculation	in	the	context	of	bond	and	money	markets	on	the	one	hand	and	securities	markets	on	the	other	hand,	can	equally	well	be	applied	to	any	other	kind	of	asset,	as	Chick	notes	(1983,	209):	“there	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 limit	 one‘s	 speculation	 to	 this	 kind	 of	 asset.	 Speculation	needs	only	two	things:	a	lively	market	and	sufficient	variation	in	prices	to	make	the	game	worth	playing.”	This	point	is	very	important	in	the	context	of	this	thesis,	because	 of	 its	 consequences	 for	 bonds	 that	 are	 indexed	 to	 the	 base	 rate:	 This	type	 of	 indexation	 prevents	 that	 the	 price	 of	 the	 bond	 adjusts	 in	 response	 to	expected	 or	 actual	 interest	 rate	 changes,	 stripping	 it	 off	 the	 main	 reason	 to	acquire	 a	 bond	 for	 speculative	 motives,	 with	 adverse	 effects	 on	 its	 liquidity.	Similar	 to	Chick’s	observation,	Kaldor	(1939)	mentions	 in	his	general	 theory	of	speculative	asset	demand	two	conditions	for	speculation,	where	he	also	alludes	to,	 alongside	 low	 carrying	 costs	 of	 the	 asset,	 the	 market,	 which	 needs	 to	 be	perfect	or	at	least	semi-perfect.	This	feature	of	the	market	is	to	be	understood	in	the	 sense	 of	 “perfect	marketability”,	 and	 as	 such	 similar	 to	 Keynes’	 concept	 of	liquidity	 and	 also	 very	 close	 to	 the	 “institutional”	 liquidity	 that	 is	 discussed	 in	sub-section	2.3.3.3.	According	to	Kaldor’s	analysis,	these	conditions	are	best	met	by	 future	 claims	or	 titles	 to	property,	 bonds	and	 shares.	That	 is	why	 their	 low	carrying	 costs	and	 their	 liquid	markets	make	 financial	 assets	perfectly	 suitable	for	speculation.	
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In	 Minsky’s	 (1975)	 analyses,	 speculation	 and	 the	 speculative	 motive	 play	 an	important	 role,	 too,	 but	 he	 lays	 the	 focus	more	 on	 the	 liability	 side	 of	 balance	sheets	 by	 emphasizing	 the	 relevance	 of	 future	 price	 developments	 for	 the	generation	of	sufficient	cash	flows	to	meet	outstanding	obligations.	By	focusing	more	 on	 the	 liability	 side,	 this	 approach	 also	 shows	 the	 close	 relation	 to	 the	precautionary	motive,	when	 it	 comes	 to	 determining	 the	money	demand.	 That	the	 demand	 for	 money	 does	 not	 only	 depend	 on	 short-term	 speculative	expectations,	 reigned	 by	 animal	 spirits,	 is	 a	 position	 taken	 up	 by	 Monetary	Keynesians	 after	 Riese	 (1986b,	 2001),	 such	 as	 Herr	 (1992),	 Lüken-Klaßen	(1993)	 or	 Herr	 and	 Hübner	 (2005).	 At	 least	 as	 important	 in	 determining	 the	demand	 for	 money,	 and	 consequently	 also	 for	 currencies,	 is	 the	 investor’s	medium-term	evaluation	of	the	currency	premium,	which	will	be	explained	later	in	more	detail	(in	sub-section	2.3.3.4).	The	currency	premium,	in	turn,	shows	to	what	 extent	 a	 currency	 is	 able	 to	 preserve	 wealth	 and	 to	 meet	 outstanding	liabilities,	 when	 compared	 to	 other	 currencies.	 The	 Monetary	 Keynesian	approach	stresses	the	competition	between	the	leading	currencies	and	the	other	convertible	currencies	(Paula,	Fritz,	and	Prates	2015;	Lüken-Klaßen	1993;	Herr	1992;	Riese	and	Spahn	1989;	Stadermann	1988).	Based	on	the	view	that	investors	assess	the	currency	premium	of	a	country,	Herr	(1992)	 detects	 “Keynesian	 fundamentals”,	 which	 refer	 to	 the	 economic	 policy	stance	of	a	country	and	to	what	degree	the	country	guarantees	the	stability	of	its	currency.	 More	 concretely,	 the	 Keynesian	 fundamentals	 deal	 with	 the	assessment	to	what	extent	the	country	is	able	and	also	willing,	to	fight	inflation,	conquer	 currency	 crises,	 and	defend	 the	present	 currency	 regime.	By	 referring	both	 to	 ability	 and	 willingness,	 the	 concept	 stresses	 the	 confinedness	 of	emerging	 market	 and	 developing	 economies	 due	 to	 their	 currency	 premium,	while	 revealing	 possibilities	 of	 policy	 measures	 that	 might	 raise	 the	 currency	premium	(see	also	Paula,	Fritz,	and	Prates	2015).	In	this	context,	the	public	debt	management,	 the	 monetary	 policy	 stance,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 public	 finance	 for	development	system,	preferably	coordinated	by	developmentalist	state	policies,	are	 of	 key	 importance.	 In	 order	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 impact	 of	 these	measures	on	the	development	of	corporate	bond	markets,	 the	next	section	will	outline	a	model	of	general	asset	choice,	which	will	serve	as	a	key	component	to	the	analytical	framework	outlined	in	this	sub-chapter.	Before	we	turn	to	the	detailed	analysis	of	the	components	of	the	model	of	asset	choice,	a	few	points	of	the	debate	about	the	role	of	Keynes’	liquidity	preference	theory	for	the	level	of	the	interest	rate	are	presented.	In	the	mentioned	debate,	the	“Horizontalists”,	like	Marc	Lavoie,	who	take	the	view	that	the	interest	rate	is	exogenously	 determined	 by	 the	 central	 bank,	 stand	 against	 those	 Post	Keynesians,	who	 indeed	 attribute	 some	 role	 to	 the	 liquidity	preference	 theory.	The	 last-mentioned	 include	Minsky	 (1975),	 Kregel	 (1980,	 1982),	 Dow	 (1996),	Chick	 and	 Dow	 (2002),	 as	 well	 as	 Bibow	 (2009).	 These	 authors	 argue	 that	interest	 rates	 are	 at	 least	 partly	 set	 endogenously	 in	 the	 banking	 sector	 and	therefore	 reflect	market	 expectations	 according	 to	 the	 liquidity	 preferences	 of	banks.	When	banks,	 following	 this	 line	of	 reasoning,	 not	 only	passively	 service	money	demands	 from	 the	 real	 sector,	 but	 instead	 raise	 the	 price	 for	 giving	 up	liquidity,	 i.e.	 money,	 in	 other	 words,	 when	 banks	 adjust	 interest	 rates	 in	accordance	 with	 their	 liquidity	 preferences	 and	 their	 balance	 sheets,	 then	
		 69 	
monetary	 policy	 is	 incapable	 of	 completely	 controlling	 domestic	 interest	 rates,	even	if	it	ensures	a	totally	accommodative	money	supply.	Lavoie	 (1996)	 holds	 that	 the	 divergent	 views	 in	 the	 debate	 presented	 above	differ	only	very	slightly,	in	the	end,	and	are	essentially	reducible	to	the	treatment	of	different	interest	rates.	Accordingly,	Post	Keynesians	might	be	divided	on	the	level	of	the	spread	between	lending	rate	and	base	rate,	and	in	this	respect	on	the	role	of	the	liquidity	preference	schedule	of	banks,	but	most	would	agree	that	the	central	bank	exogenously	sets	the	monetary	policy	rate.	 It	 is	 important	to	note,	however,	that	Lavoie’s	argument	depends	crucially	on	the	assumed	capability	of	the	 central	 bank	 to	 accommodate	 any	 increase	 in	 the	 money	 demand.	 This	assumption	must	be	scrutinized	in	a	world	of	hierarchically	ordered	currencies.	Actually,	 it	might	 only	hold	 in	 one	 special	 case:	 the	 country,	where	 the	 central	bank	issues	the	currency	with	the	highest	liquidity	premium.	This	special	central	bank	may	be	capable	of	completely	accommodating	a	rising	demand	for	money,	but	 all	 other	 central	 banks	might	 eventually	 reach	a	point,	where	 their	 limited	foreign	 exchange	 reserves	 constrain	 their	 ability	 to	 supply	 the	 demanded	liquidity.	That	is	why	any	secondary	central	bank	may	be	forced	to	increase	the	base	 rate	 due	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 international	 liquidity	 preferences	 or	 due	 to	 a	decline	of	the	liquidity	premium	of	the	currency.	Therefore,	the	monetary	policy	interest	 rate	 is	 not	 generally	 exogenously	 set	 by	 the	 central	 bank,	 but	endogenously	determined,	as	liquidity	preference	theory	suggests.	Section	2.3.2	described	how	economic	agents	make	their	decisions	and	that	these	decisions	 determine	 the	 development	 of	 corporate	 bond	 markets.	 Sub-section	2.3.2.1	showed	that	 the	wealth	holder	as	 the	sovereign	 is	 the	ultimate	decision	maker.	 Economic	 agents	 come	 to	 a	 decision	 based	 on	 their	 expectations	 and	liquidity	 preference.	 The	 expectation	 formation	 process	 is	 explained	 in	 sub-section	 2.3.2.3	 and	 the	 motives	 for	 preferring	 liquidity	 as	 well	 as	 liquidity	preference	itself	are	discussed	in	sub-section	2.3.2.4.	How	the	decision-making	of	economic	agents	determines	CBMD	 is	exemplified	 in	sub-section	2.3.2.2,	where	the	 competitiveness	 effect	 is	 introduced.	 More	 generally,	 the	 state	 determines	CBMD	 through	 the	 influence	 of	 three	 main	 policy	 variables	 on	 the	 decision	making	 process.	 Public	 debt	 management	 affects	 the	 decisions	 of	 economic	agents	 through	 adjustments	 in	 the	 public	 debt	 structure	 that	 might	 cause	 a	competitiveness	 effect	 or	 a	 signaling	 effect	 and/or	 a	 market	 creation	 effect.	Among	the	 institutional	 inventions	to	reduce	uncertainties	 is	 the	establishment	of	 indexed	 bonds.	 The	 indexation	 to	 the	 monetary	 interest	 rate	 has	 adverse	effects	on	liquidity	and	should	therefore	be	avoided	by	public	debt	management.	Monetary	policy	can	foster	CBMD	through	the	provision	of	a	low	and	stable	base	rate	 that	 induces	 less	 preference	 for	 liquidity	 and,	 consequently,	 raises	 the	demand	 for	 bonds.	 The	 power	 of	 the	 central	 bank	 in	 emerging	 market	 and	developing	 economies	 is	 restrained	 by	 its	 foreign	 exchange	 reserves,	 which	reflects	in	the	currency	premium	of	the	country.	The	lower	currency	premium	of	these	countries	can	be	compensated	by	public	finance	for	development	schemes.	However,	 there	 is	 always	 excess	 demand	 for	 finance	 in	 a	 monetary	 economy	reigned	by	uncertainty.	Uncertainty	 raises	 risks	 for	both	debtors	 and	 creditors	and	public	 finance	 for	development	 institutions	can	help	 to	 socialize	 risks.	The	institutional	 context	 determines	 economic	 agents’	 expectations,	 so	 that	 public	
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debt	 management,	 monetary	 policy,	 and	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 can	work	 together	 to	 create	 a	 more	 stable	 outlook	 and	 contribute	 to	 optimistic	expectations	 that	 are	 crucial	 for	 the	 development	 of	 domestic	 bond	 markets.	After	we	understood,	how	economic	agents	form	their	context	and	time	specific	expectations	 together	 with	 their	 liquidity	 preference	 that	 serve	 as	 a	 basis	 for	their	(portfolio)	decisions,	we	can	next	discover	a	general	model	of	asset	choice,	the	 composition	 of	 the	 total	 yield	 of	 an	 asset	 and	 how	 it	 is	 influenced	 by	 the	policy	variables.	
2.3.3 The	influence	of	public	debt	management,	monetary	policy	and	
public	finance	for	development	on	asset	choices	Keynes’	liquidity	preference	theory	in	combination	with	his	analysis	of	the	own-rates	of	 interest	 forms	a	model	of	general	asset	choice	 in	a	monetary	economy	characterized	 by	 uncertainty	 (F.	 J.	 C.	 de	 Carvalho	 1992,	 81ff.).	 This	 model	 of	general	 asset	 choice	 will	 allow	 us	 to	 analyze	 under	 what	 circumstances	 the	wealth	holders	are	increasing	their	demand	for	corporate	bonds	and	how	public	debt	management,	monetary	 policy,	 and	 public	 finance	 for	 development	might	impact	these	choices.	To	capture	the	total	yield	of	an	asset,	Keynes	developed	a	concept,	which	would	allow	him	to	include	non-monetary	rewards,	and	which	he	called	the	own-rate	of	interest.	By	integrating	non-monetary	returns,	this	model	allows	one	to	consider	money	as	an	asset.	
“In	 a	 nutshell,	 the	 theory	 says	 that,	 for	 any	 given	 durable	 good,	 the	
divergence	between	its	spot	and	forward	prices,	that	is	between	the	current	
price	 for	 current	 delivery	 and	 the	 current	 price	 for	 delivery	 at	 specified	
future	date,	will	reflect	the	expectation	of	the	market	as	to	the	gains	to	be	
derived	from	its	possession	between	the	present	moment	and	the	specified	
future	date”	(F.	J.	C.	de	Carvalho	1992,	79).	This	 spot/	 forward	price	model	 renders	an	own-rate	of	 interest	 for	each	asset.	Those	 assets	with	 the	 highest	 returns	 are	 the	most	wanted	 by	wealth	 holders	who	are,	by	competing	amongst	each	other	for	the	best	assets,	setting	the	asset	prices.	The	net	 return	of	an	asset,	 its	own-rate	of	 interest,	 is	determined	by	 its	yield	(q),	understood	as	the	additional	income	expected	to	be	gained	through	its	possession,	minus	its	expected	carrying	costs	(c),	plus	its	expected	appreciation	(a),	 i.e.	 the	 expected	 price	 difference	 between	 purchase	 and	 sale,	 and	 the	liquidity	premium	(l),	measuring	the	tradability	of	an	asset	(cf.	F.	J.	C.	de	Carvalho	1992,	83f.;	Chick	1983,	298):	
net	return	=	q	–	c	+	a	+	l	These	 four	 attributes	 embrace	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 assets	 for	 wealth	 holders	 to	choose	from,	including	capital	assets,	which	offer	a	high	yield	combined	with	low	liquidity	and	high	carrying	costs,	and	 financial	assets	 like	corporate	bonds	 that	combine	low	carrying	cost	with	relatively	high	yield	and	liquidity	premium,	but	also	money,	which	is	the	financial	asset	offering	the	highest	liquidity	premium	at	no	carrying	cost,	yet	 lacking	any	yield	(Kaltenbrunner	2011,	82).	Various	other	combinations	of	the	attributes	are	possible	as	long	as	those	assets	with	a	lower	
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liquidity	 premium	 compensate	 their	 relative	 difficulty	 to	 be	 traded	 for	 the	reference	asset,	i.e.	money,	with	monetary	returns.	Since	the	interest	rate	is	the	reward	for	parting	with	liquidity,	i.e.	money,	the	liquidity	preference	theory	is	a	theory	of	the	determination	of	the	interest	rate.	In	other	words,	the	interest	rate	measures	 the	 “premium”	 the	 market	 is	 willing	 to	 pay	 for	 its	 preference	 for	liquidity.	 Given	 the	 existing	 state	 of	 liquidity	 preferences,	 the	 model	 will	determine	 current	 asset	 prices,	 because	 the	 trading	 of	 assets	 will	 equilibrate	returns	 across	 markets,	 as	 long	 as	 there	 is	 perfect	 competition	 and	 no	segmentation	in	asset	markets	(F.	J.	C.	de	Carvalho	1992,	90ff.).	There	are	two	conditions	that	allowed	Keynes	to	formally	develop	this	model	of	general	asset	choice,	which	are	both	noteworthy	(F.	J.	C.	de	Carvalho	1992,	81ff.).	The	first	is	related	to	the	fact	that	the	comparability	of	assets	is	usually	achieved	by	discounting	expected	returns	(using	a	discount	rate),	a	method	inappropriate	in	this	case,	as	 it	would	 lead	to	circular	reasoning	in	a	model,	whose	aim	is	the	determination	of	the	nature	of	interest	rates.	Keynes’	 ingenious	solution	was	to	assume	a	hypothetical	retention	period	that	is	identical	for	all	assets,	allowing	a	direct	comparison	of	returns,	while	capturing	the	time	dimension	in	the	liquidity	premium.	The	second	condition	is	related	to	the	nature	of	the	model,	being	one	of	asset	choice,	and	as	such	determining	the	decision	making	process	of	wealth	holders.	 Consequently,	 all	 values	 considered	 are	 necessarily	 expected	 values,	while	current	or	past	values	only	enter	indirectly.	Wealth	holders	might	consider	realized	 values	 when	 forming	 their	 expectations	 about	 future	 yields,	 but	especially	 long-term	 expectations	 may	 not	 be	 very	 sensitive	 to	 current	realizations.	An	expectation	counting	more	than	actual	figures	is	also	in	line	with	the	notion	of	fundamental	uncertainty	reigning	the	monetary	economy	and	brings	about	two	important	 consequences	 (Kaltenbrunner	 2011,	 85–89).	 First,	 the	 real	determinants	of	asset	demand	can	only	be	deduced	from	asset	prices,	which	are	representations	of	the	expectations	and	positions	of	economic	actors.	The	actual	manifestations	of	these	factors	may	be	completely	untraceable,	and	if	they	can	be	observed,	 they	 depend	 on	 the	 specific	 context	 and	 are	 prone	 to	 changes	 over	time.	This	is	accounted	for	in	the	analytical	framework	by	considering	more	than	financial	market	data	and	also	 including	structural	as	well	as	context	variables,	underpinned	 by	 information	 extracted	 from	 the	 expert	 interviews.	 Second,	 the	concept	of	the	own-rate	of	interest	represents	an	equilibrium	theory,	which	does	not	 necessarily	 lead	 to	 equilibrium.	 The	 apparent	 contradiction	 is	 resolved	 by	drawing	 attention	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 only	 the	 expected	 values	 are	 in	 equilibrium.	However,	expectations	are	not	always	met,	especially	in	a	monetary	economy.	In	the	following	sub-sections,	the	four	attributes	that	determine	the	total	yield	of	an	 asset	 are	 analyzed	 in	 more	 detail.	 Implications	 for	 the	 development	 of	corporate	bond	markets	are	derived	and,	in	particular,	the	impact	of	public	debt	management,	 monetary	 policy,	 and	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 on	 each	attribute	is	explained.	While	sub-section	2.3.3.1	examines	three	factors	(q,	c,	and	
a)	 that	 define	 the	 pecuniary	 return	 of	 an	 asset,	 the	 remaining	 sub-sections	discuss	 elements	 of	 the	 liquidity	 premium	 of	 an	 asset.	 Sub-section	 2.3.3.2	analyzes	 key	 aspects	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 liquidity	 premium.	 Sub-sections	 2.3.3.3	and	 2.3.3.4	 additionally	 consider	 two	 components	 that	 influence	 the	 liquidity	
		 72 	
premium	 of	 an	 asset:	 the	 institutional	 liquidity	 of	 its	 market	 and	 its	 currency	premium,	respectively.	
2.3.3.1 Pecuniary	return	of	an	asset	Even	though	other	features	of	a	bond,	such	as	the	price,	maturity	and	issuer,	are	also	important,	the	yield	of	a	bond	(q)	is	its	most	salient	feature,	as	it	resumes	its	defining	set	of	non-monetary	characteristics	in	a	pecuniary	return,	expressed	as	an	interest	rate.	Inversely	related	to	the	non-monetary	characteristics	of	a	bond,	the	interest	rate	needs	to	be	high	enough	to	add	up	to	a	competitive	net	return:	The	 lower	 the	 liquidity	 premium	 of	 a	 bond,	 the	 higher	 its	 interest	 rate.	 For	analytical	reasons,	the	interest	rate	paid	by	a	debt	security	can	be	divided	into	a	basis,	given	by	the	level	of	the	monetary	policy	interest	rate,	and	a	spread,	which	depends	among	other	things	on	the	liquidity	premium	and	is	commonly	referred	to	as	the	risk	premium.	The	perceived	risk	of	holding	a	bond	may	be	reduced	by	indexation,	 which	 is	 an	 institution	 that	 has	 been	 introduced	 to	 lower	 the	 risk	premium	by	 transferring	 the	burden	of	a	 specific	 risk	 to	 the	 issuer	and	will	be	discussed	 below,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 role	 of	 public	 debt	 management	 with	respect	 to	 the	 yield	 of	 a	 bond.	 In	 the	 following,	 the	 impact	 of	 public	 debt	management,	 monetary	 policy,	 and	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 on	 the	expected	yield	of	a	bond	is	discussed.	A	yield	curve	of	sovereign	bonds	can	serve	as	a	benchmark	for	the	private	bond	market,	 allowing	wealth	holders	and	entrepreneurs	 to	 identify	 the	opportunity	costs	 of	 different	 assets	 (Paula	 et	 al.	 2009,	 6).	 Public	 debt	 management	 can	facilitate	CBMD	by	improving	the	structure	of	the	public	debt	and	by	creating	and	extending	 the	 sovereign	bond	yield	 curve,	which	would	exert	a	 signaling	effect	on	 the	 corporate	 bond	 market.	 The	 signaling	 effect	 influences	 long-term	expectations,	 which	 in	 turn	 guide	 the	 decision	 of	 entrepreneurs	 to	 realize	 an	investment	project,	on	the	one	hand,	raising	the	supply	of	corporate	bonds,	and,	channel	 the	 desire	 of	wealth	 holders	 to	 acquire	 long-term	 assets,	 on	 the	 other	hand,	 increasing	 the	 demand	 for	 corporate	 bonds.	 The	 rate	 of	 return	 that	 is	expected	 from	 an	 investment	 project	 competes,	 from	 the	 entrepreneur’s	perspective,	 with	 the	 market	 interest	 rate	 that	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 financing	 or	opportunity	cost.	From	a	wealth	holder’s	point	of	view,	the	yield	of	a	corporate	bond	usually	needs	to	compensate	for	its	lower	liquidity	premium	compared	to	a	public	bond.	Among	 securities	 denominated	 in	 a	 specific	 currency,	 sovereign	 bonds	 are	 the	least	 risky	 asset	 class,	 obliging	 a	 corporate	 issuer	 to	 offer	 some	 kind	 of	 risk	premium.	That	means	 that	 investors	 comparing	a	public	with	a	 corporate	debt	security	 with	 otherwise	 equal	 characteristics	 would	 always	 prefer	 the	 public	debt	 security,	 because	 of	 the	 lower	 perceived	 risk.	 The	 development	 of	 a	domestic	corporate	bond	market	depends	largely	on	the	conduct	of	public	debt	management,	not	only	because	of	its	signaling	effects,	but	also	because	the	public	debt	 structure,	 which	 is	 defined	 by	 the	 characteristics	 of	 all	 public	 issues,	dictates	the	terms	under	which	corporate	bonds	need	to	compete	for	investors.	If	public	 bonds	 offer	 certain	 characteristics,	 investors	 might	 require	 corporate	bonds	to	offer	the	same.	
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As	 bonds	 in	 developing	 countries	 and	 emerging	 markets	 are	 associated	 with	specific	 risks,	 bondholders	 may	 prefer	 to	 buy	 an	 indexed	 bond	 in	 order	 to	transfer	part	 of	 the	 risk	 to	 the	bond	 issuer.	 Inversely,	 a	 country	 that	 is	 able	 to	issue	most	of	its	debt	with	a	fixed	interest	rate	would	send	out	a	signal	of	strong	reputation	 and	 a	 positive	 state	 of	 confidence.	 The	 degree	 to	 which	 the	 public	debt	 structure	 is	 marked	 by	 indexation	 gives	 an	 indication	 as	 to	 how	 far	 the	country	is	exposed	to	certain	risks,	which	in	turn	has	important	implications	for	the	establishment	of	a	corporate	bond	market.	With	 respect	 to	 the	 yield	 of	 a	 bond,	 one	 can	 distinguish	 between	 fixed	 and	floating	rate	bonds.	In	case	of	a	fixed	rate	bond,	the	interest	rate	is	set	at	the	time	of	 issuance	 and	 will	 remain	 the	 same	 for	 the	 whole	 duration	 of	 the	 bond.	 A	floating	rate	bond,	in	contrast,	has	an	interest	rate,	that	is	adjusted	according	to	the	terms	defined	at	issuance.	The	adjustment	usually	follows	an	indicator,	such	as	 the	 inflation	 or	 exchange	 rate,	 hence	 their	 name	 “indexed	 bonds”.	 The	indexation	of	debt	securities	transfers	the	related	risk	(e.g.	of	increased	inflation	in	 case	 of	 an	 inflation	 indexed	 bond)	 from	 the	 creditor	 to	 the	 debtor.	 It	 is	 not	clear	 from	 the	 outset	 that	 the	 creditor	 will	 profit	 from	 this	 transfer	 of	 risk,	because	 the	perceived	 risk	 of	 –	 to	 stick	with	 the	 example	 –	 increased	 inflation	might	not	actually	materialize	and	the	holder	of	an	inflation	indexed	bond	might	end	up	earning	less	than	expected,	if	the	inflation	rate	turns	out	to	be	lower	than	expected.	 It	 becomes	 clear	 that	 risks	 are	 always	 associated	 with	 chances	 and	opportunities,	a	fact	that	may	be	well	exemplified	by	GDP-indexed	public	bonds	(similar	 reasoning	 would	 apply	 to	 corporate	 bonds	 that	 are	 indexed	 to	 the	profitability	of	the	company).	The	issuance	of	GDP-indexed	bonds	might	be	in	the	interest	 of	 both	 issuers	 and	 holders,	 because	 it	 reduces	 the	 likelihood	 of	 the	debtor	defaulting	(Borensztein	and	Mauro	2004).	Additionally,	 investors	would	profit	 from	an	equity-like	exposure	and	the	issuing	country	would	benefit	 from	the	 stabilizing	 factor	 such	 a	 bond	 issue	 would	 have	 on	 government	 spending.	Other	types	of	indexation	could	also	improve	the	repayment	capacity	of	debtors,	e.g.	indexing	to	commodity	prices	(Ocampo	and	Vos	2008,	43).	If	 a	 significant	 fraction	 of	 the	 public	 debt	 is	made	 up	 of	 floating	 rate	 bonds,	 it	might	 be	 difficult	 for	 the	 private	 sector	 to	 issue	 fixed	 rate	 bonds.	 Any	 type	 of	indexation	 in	 the	 public	 bond	 market	 calls	 the	 attention	 of	 wealth	 holders,	raising	their	awareness	of	the	respective	risk	and	making	it	more	likely	that	they	request	 the	 same	 type	 of	 indexation	 from	 corporate	 issuers,	 as	 well.	 In	 the	following,	 different	 types	 of	 indexation	 will	 be	 analyzed	 with	 respect	 to	 their	influence	 on	 the	 public	 debt	 structure	 and,	 thus,	 on	 the	 development	 of	 the	corporate	bond	market.	From	the	public	debt	manager’s	perspective	some	types	of	indexation	are	more	desirable	than	others.	For	example,	this	is	true	for	inflation	indexed	bonds	when	compared	to	exchange	rate	 indexed	bonds,	because	 the	 inflation	rate	 is	usually	more	stable	 than	 the	exchange	rate.	Additionally,	 issuing	public	bonds	 that	are	linked	 to	 inflation	 can	be	 seen	 as	 a	 commitment	 by	 the	 government	 to	 pursue	price	stability.	Yet,	the	interpretation	could	also	point	in	the	opposite	direction,	because	a	high	fraction	of	this	type	of	bond	in	the	public	debt	structure	could	be	seen	 as	 reflecting	 high	 inflation	 expectations,	macroeconomic	 instability	 and	 a	poor	economic	outlook,	which	would	have	an	adverse	impact	on	CBMD.	
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If	a	company	issues	a	corporate	bond	indexed	to	the	inflation	rate,	it	depends	on	its	 business	whether	 it	will	 suffer	 from	 the	 exposure	 to	 the	 inflation	 risk.	 The	company	may	be	able	to	raise	its	prices	along	with	the	general	price	increase	and,	hence,	 it	won’t	 suffer	 from	 balance	 sheet	 effects.	 Yet,	 if	 the	 company	 can	 only	adjust	its	prices	slower	than	the	inflation	rate,	it	carries	the	risk	of	an	increasing	debt	 service,	 which	 it	 might	 not	 be	 able	 to	 compensate	 through	 increased	revenues.	As	 has	 been	 pointed	 out	 above,	 due	 to	 the	 relatively	 high	 volatility	 of	 the	exchange	 rate,	 indexation	 to	 this	 variable	 is	 among	 the	 least	 desired	 by	 public	debt	management.	Additionally,	 exchange	 rate	 indexed	bonds	exert	 an	adverse	signaling	effect,	which	is	related	to	the	uncertainty	about	the	currency’s	quality	and	 exchange	 rate	 stability	 that	 is	 reflected	 in	 this	 indexation.	 A	 positive	signaling	 effect	 might	 exist,	 if	 the	 country	 issues	 this	 type	 of	 bond	 in	 a	 fixed	exchange	 rate	 regime.	 Then,	 it	 can	 be	 perceived	 as	 a	 commitment	 by	 the	government	to	defend	exchange	rate	parity.	When	 a	 company	 issues	 exchange	 rate	 indexed	 debt,	 it	 incurs	 the	 risk	 of	 a	currency	mismatch	 in	 its	 balance	 sheet.	 If	 the	 company	mostly	operates	 in	 the	local	 market	 and	 receives	 revenues	 predominantly	 in	 domestic	 currency,	 any	change	in	the	exchange	rate	will	cause	an	adjustment	of	 its	net	wealth	position	due	to	the	indexation	of	the	issued	debt	security.	Depending	on	the	outstanding	volume	of	 its	 debt	 linked	 to	 the	 foreign	 currency	 together	with	 the	 size	 of	 the	exchange	rate	adjustment,	the	company	can	quickly	run	the	risk	of	insolvency.	In	case	 the	company’s	business	 is	 international	and	 it	has	direct	access	 to	 foreign	currency	revenue	streams,	it	might	be	in	the	interest	of	the	firm	to	issue	part	of	its	debt	with	an	exchange	rate	indexation.	Otherwise	the	company	would	have	to	hedge	against	exchange	rate	fluctuations	in	order	to	guarantee	a	steady	flow	of	local	 currency	 income.	 Even	 though	 there	 is	 a	 rationale	 for	 such	 companies	 to	issue	 exchange	 rate	 indexed	 debt,	 most	 of	 these	 companies	 would	 probably	prefer	 to	 tap	 international	 markets	 due	 to	 lower	 issuing	 costs	 and	 better	financing	 conditions	 in	 the	 international	 financial	 centers.	 The	 regular	 income	stream	 in	 foreign	 currency	 may	 facilitate	 access	 to	 international	 financial	markets.	The	 last	 variable	 to	 be	 discussed	 here	 in	 the	 context	 of	 indexation	 is	 the	monetary	policy	 interest	rate.	The	 issuance	of	public	bonds	that	are	 indexed	to	the	base	rate	 is	problematic	 in	many	aspects	 that	are	all	 interrelated.	 In	Brazil,	the	 issue	 of	 base	 rate	 indexed	 sovereign	 bonds	 is	 closely	 related	 to	 the	 large	dissemination	of	corporate	bonds	that	are	 indexed	to	the	interbank	rate,	which	strongly	correlates	with	the	base	rate.	First,	this	type	of	indexation	interferes	in	one	of	the	channels,	through	which	monetary	policy	normally	works:	the	wealth	effect.	Holders	of	fixed	rate-bonds	see	their	net	wealth	reduced	by	an	increase	of	the	 monetary	 policy	 interest	 rate,	 because	 the	 price	 of	 their	 bonds	 falls	 as	 a	consequence	of	the	adjustment	in	the	base	rate.	The	lower	wealth	translates	into	an	 inferior	 overall	 demand,	 leading	 to	 the	 desired	 result,	 i.e.	 less	 inflationary	pressures.	Interest-rate	indexed	bonds	impede	the	wealth	effect	and	hence	also	the	normal	workings	of	one	of	the	monetary	policy	channels.	
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Second,	 by	 automatically	 adjusting	 the	 yield	 of	 the	 bond	 to	 the	 central	 bank’s	decisions	to	raise	or	lower	the	interest	rate,	this	type	of	indexation	impedes	price	reactions	 of	 the	 respective	 bonds	 and	 therefore	 diminishes	 the	 incentive	 to	speculate	on	 changing	prices	of	 these	bonds,	which	markedly	 lowers	 the	 trade	volume	 in	secondary	markets.	This	might	be	 less	problematic	 for	public	bonds,	but	 may	 constitute	 a	 barrier	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 secondary	 market	 for	corporate	bonds,	because	a	bond	that	is	not	traded	frequently	lacks	liquidity.	Third,	interbank	rate	indexation	causes	a	maturity	mismatch	in	the	balance	sheet	of	the	issuing	company.	Even	if	the	issued	bond	has	a	long	maturity,	by	directly	linking	 it	 to	 the	 interbank	 rate,	 the	 company	 is	 faced	 with	 similar	 risks	 of	unexpectedly	rising	financing	costs	as	if	it	had	taken	on	short-term	debt:	As	soon	as	 interest	 rates	 rise,	 financing	 costs	 for	 the	 longer-term	 investment	 project	increase.	In	one	case	automatically	through	the	indexation	and	in	the	other	case	as	 soon	 as	 the	 short	 term	 debt	 needs	 to	 be	 rolled-over.	 However,	 this	 type	 of	indexation,	as	any	other	type	of	floating	rate	bond,	can	also	be	advantageous	for	the	company,	here,	if	interest	rates	were	unexpectedly	lowered	in	the	future.	A	 fourth	 aspect	 is	 closely	 related	 to	how	 the	 indexation	of	public	bonds	 to	 the	interest	rate	is	interpreted.	Even	though	it	could	be	seen	as	a	commitment	to	low	and	stable	interest	rates	by	monetary	policy	authorities,	another	interpretation,	especially	 in	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	 economies,	 might	 be	 more	appropriate:	If	the	wealth	holders	ask	for	this	type	of	floating	rate	bond,	because	they	 feel	unable	 to	predict	 the	 future	course	of	monetary	policy	and,	 therefore,	want	to	hand	over	the	risk	of	unexpected	interest	rate	adjustments	to	the	debtor,	this	would	be	a	sign	of	increased	macroeconomic	instability,	driving	up	the	level	of	uncertainty	and	 liquidity	preferences.	Thus,	economic	agents	may	see	 in	 the	existence	of	base	rate	indexed	bonds	a	low	state	of	confidence,	pointing	to	weak	economic	prospects.	In	this	sense,	a	public	debt	structure	marked	by	this	type	of	indexation	 exerts	 an	 adverse	 signaling	 effect	 on	 the	 development	 of	 corporate	bond	markets.	A	fifth	aspect	of	this	particular	institution,	i.e.	the	indexation	to	the	base	rate	of	public	bonds,	is	connected	to	the	three	motives	of	holding	money	and	the	degree	to	which	interest	rate	indexed	bonds	might	satisfy	these	motives.	The	speculative	motive	 states	 that	 liquidity	 is	 demanded	 to	 be	 able	 to	 profit	 from	 changes	 in	expected	 interest	 rates.	 These	 floating	 rate	 bonds	 take	 the	 speculation	 about	future	 interest	 rates	 out	 of	 the	 equation,	 because	 they	 are	 indexed	 to	 the	base	rate.	They	are	similar	to	money	in	that	their	nominal	value,	i.e.	their	price,	is	not	altered	 by	 interest	 rate	 adjustments.	 In	 other	words,	 these	 bonds	 neither	 gain	nor	loose	with	changes	in	the	base	rate	and,	hence,	offer	an	alternative	asset	to	money.	 The	 precautionary	motive	 resembles	 the	 demand	 for	 liquidity	 to	meet	outstanding	 liabilities,	which	 is	 closely	 related	 to	 the	 functions	of	money	 in	 its	roles	 as	 unit	 of	 account	 and	 as	 store	 of	 value.	 Interest	 rate	 indexed	bonds	 can	perform	the	role	of	money	as	a	store	of	value	better	than	money	itself,	because	they	offer	a	positive	yield.	Even	though	these	bonds	are	neither	directly	serving	as	 unit	 of	 account,	 nor	 as	 medium	 of	 exchange	 (necessary	 to	 fulfill	 the	transaction	 motive),	 they	 are	 easily	 convertible	 into	 money,	 because	 they	 are	traded	in	highly	liquid	markets.	
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Due	to	the	ease	with	which	they	can	be	converted	into	the	unit	of	account,	they	offer	 an	 attractive	 alternative	 to	 money,	 the	 asset	 with	 the	 highest	 liquidity	premium.	 The	 problem	with	 a	 high-yielding	 (emerging	market	 and	 developing	economies	usually	have	an	elevated	 interest	rate	 level)	sovereign	(i.e.	with	 low	default	risk)	bond,	which	is	indexed	to	the	base	rate	(i.e.	stripped-off	the	market	risk,	as	any	change	of	the	market	interest	rate	is	automatically	incorporated),	lies	in	the	discouragement	of	wealth	holders	to	 invest	 in	productive	and	innovative	enterprises	as	 they	have	a	practically	risk-free	and	high-yielding	alternative.	 In	this	 line	 of	 reasoning,	 such	 a	 public	 bond	 could	 even	 be	 interpreted	 as	 the	manifestation	of	a	rentier	economy.	The	monetary	policy	interest	rate	of	a	country,	often	called	the	base	rate,	serves	as	a	lower	bound	to	the	interest	rate	level	in	a	monetary	economy,	as	it	defines	the	price	at	which	commercial	banks	are	able	to	refinance	with	the	central	bank.	The	base	rate	also	commonly	reflects	 the	yield	of	a	short-term	sovereign	bond,	which	can	be	interpreted	as	the	least	risky	debt	security	of	a	country.	The	central	bank	might	use	open	market	operations	to	keep	the	base	rate	at	 its	designated	level,	i.e.	the	central	bank	buys	and	sells	public	bonds	in	the	secondary	market,	in	order	to	adjust	public	bond	prices	until	their	yield	matches	the	monetary	policy	interest	rate.	The	interest	rate	level	in	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	is	usually	relatively	high	 compared	with	more	 advanced	economies,	 not	 only	 in	nominal,	but	 also	 in	 real	 terms	 (UNCTAD	2015a,	V,	2008,	109–12).	A	generally	 elevated	level	of	the	interest	rate	discourages	demand	for	finance	in	productive	activities,	because	 the	 expected	 profit	 of	 the	 activity	 to	 be	 financed,	 i.e.	 the	 investment	project,	 needs	 to	 exceed	 the	 cost	of	 financing.	The	higher	 the	 interest	 rate	 and	therefore	the	financing	costs,	the	lower	the	supply	of	corporate	bonds	due	to	less	demand	 for	 finance.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 a	 company	willing	 to	 issue	 a	 corporate	bond	 is	 confronted	 with	 the	 competition	 of	 other	 securities	 in	 the	 financial	markets	and	the	need	to	consider	especially	the	benchmark-setting	public	bonds	(this	point	is	related	to	the	competitiveness	effect	discussed	above).	On	the	other	hand,	this	company	has	to	weigh	the	costs	of	a	bond	issue,	including	subsequent	obligations	inherent	in	its	characteristics	and	conditions,	against	the	benefits	of	the	investment	project,	which	it	wants	to	finance	with	the	bond	issue.	If	the	costs	are	 too	 high,	 the	 investment	 project	 cannot	 be	 realized22.	 It	 is	 important	 to	remember	 that	 the	 state	 generally	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 such	 a	 comparison	 when	issuing	a	public	debt	security23.	A	 tight	monetary	 policy	 stance,	 including	 a	 high	 interest	 rate	 level,	 is	 not	 only	discouraging	bond	issuance,	because	of	 the	 increase	 in	 financing	costs,	but	also	because	it	suppresses	economic	growth	prospects	and	leads	to	a	low	propensity	to	 realize	 investment	 projects	 by	 companies.	 A	 company	 issuing	 a	 corporate	bond	 considers	 economic	 growth	perspectives	 as	 an	 indicator	 for	 its	 sales	 and																																																									22	This	might	help	to	explain	why	the	investment	rate	in	Brazil	was	relatively	low	during	the	analyzed	period,	as	will	be	discussed	in	chapter	3.	23	Nevertheless,	 countries	 issuing	 sovereign	 bonds	 are	 also	 evaluated	 by	 investors	regarding	 their	 debt	 sustainability,	 even	 though	 the	 state	 is	 usually	 not	 directly	confronted	with	calculations	of	risk	and	return	when	issuing	a	public	bond.	
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profits,	which	allow	the	company	to	generate	the	necessary	income	to	pay	for	its	financial	obligations.	The	company	will	furthermore	make	predictions	about	the	future	 course	of	monetary	policy,	 because	 the	 level	of	 the	 interest	 rate	defines	the	opportunity	cost	of	capital	and	the	cost	of	a	bank	credit.	In	order	to	support	the	establishment	of	a	corporate	bond	market,	monetary	policy	can	always	take	an	investment-friendly	stance	by	reducing	the	policy	rate	and	hence	the	cost	of	finance.	While	a	 tight	monetary	policy	would	hamper	CBMD,	 it	 should	not	be	 too	 loose	either,	 for	 two	 main	 reasons.	 First,	 a	 base	 rate	 that	 is	 perceived	 by	 wealth	holders	as	 too	 low	may	 induce	capital	 flight	 (UNCTAD	2008,	124).	Second,	 low	inflation	is	an	important	precondition	for	the	development	of	a	local	market	for	debt	securities.	Mihaljek	et	al.	(2002)	show	that	low	inflation	rates	are	associated	with	 longer	 average	maturities	 of	 public	 bonds.	 Thus,	monetary	 policy	 should	focus	 on	 maintaining	 the	 base	 rate	 at	 a	 relatively	 low	 level	 together	 with	safeguarding	macroeconomic	 stability,	 in	order	 to	 avoid	 rising	uncertainty	 and	poor	 economic	 prospects,	 which	would	 have	 adverse	 effects	 on	 CBMD.	 In	 this	way,	monetary	policy	could	help	to	improve	the	state	of	confidence	and	build	up	a	 reputation	 of	 the	 domestic	 currency	 as	 a	 stable	 store	 of	 value	 and	 widely	accepted	 unit	 of	 account	 without	 the	 need	 to	 offer	 prohibitively	 high	 interest	rates,	in	order	to	induce	wealth	owners	to	maintain	demand	for	domestic	assets.	The	expectations	of	economic	agents	determine	the	demand	for	financial	assets	together	 with	 the	 conditions,	 under	 which	 risk-adjusted	 yields	 as	 well	 as	 the	liquidity	 of	 these	 assets	 are	 evaluated	 (Paula	 et	 al.	 2009,	 5).	 An	 increase	 in	perceived	uncertainty	would	cause	a	shift	 in	wealth	holders’	appreciation	 from	the	profitability	to	the	liquidity	of	an	asset,	which	would	cause	the	risk	premium	of	bonds	with	longer	maturities	and	lower	liquidity	premia	to	rise.	Accordingly,	a	lower	 perceived	 uncertainty	 would	 elevate	 the	 risk	 propensity	 of	 investors,	rendering	 profitability	 the	 more	 important	 attribute	 of	 a	 financial	 asset	compared	 to	 liquidity.	 Therefore,	 the	 liquidity	 preferences	 of	 investors	determine	their	portfolio	composition	as	well	as	the	risk	premium	charged.	As	a	consequence,	 investors’	 perceptions	 of	 risk	 and	 return	 determine	 to	 a	 large	extend	 the	conditions	 for	 the	supply	of	 corporate	bonds,	 too.	More	specifically,	macroeconomic	 context	 variables,	 such	 as	 economic	 growth,	 inflation,	 and	exchange	rate	movements,	together	with	economic	policies,	especially	monetary	policy,	play	a	 fundamental	 role	 in	defining	 the	 terms	 for	 issuing	bonds	such	as	the	volume	issued,	the	yield,	the	maturity,	etc.	Despite	the	relatively	high	level	of	the	interest	rate,	demand	for	corporate	bonds	is	not	necessarily	strong	in	emerging	market	and	developing	economies,	because	of	two	main	reasons.	First,	wealth	holders	presumably,	although	not	necessarily,	avoid	 high	 risks,	 especially	 in	 scenarios	 with	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 uncertainty,	because	they	are	aware	that	the	increased	uncertainty	raises	either	lender	risks	by	making	 forecasts	 even	more	 difficult	 or	 borrower	 risks	 by	making	 funding	even	 more	 costly	 (Minsky,	 1996).	 Second,	 the	 risk-return	 tradeoff24	in	 such																																																									24	The	 risk-return	 tradeoff	 describes	 the	 principle	 that	 potential	 return	 rises	 with	 an	increase	 in	risk	(source:	http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/riskreturntradeoff.asp	accessed:	 06.02.2015).	 Low	 levels	 of	 uncertainty	 (low-risk)	 are	 associated	 with	 low	
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circumstances	usually	favors	public	bonds.	 If	circumstances	were	different,	and	the	policy	 interest	 rate	at	a	very	 low	 level,	 signaling	a	 low	 level	of	uncertainty,	investments	might	 be	 pushed	 towards	 riskier	 asset	 classes,	 such	 as	 corporate	bonds,	 in	 search	 for	 higher	 yields.	 But	 at	 such	 an	 elevated	 level	 of	 the	 basic	interest	rate,	the	public	bond	is	already	offering	a	sufficiently	attractive	yield	in	a	context	of	elevated	uncertainty,	so	that	most	likely	only	few	investors	are	willing	to	buy	a	riskier	asset.	Furthermore,	a	corporate	bond	would	have	to	offer	an	even	higher	interest	rate	than	the	elevated	base	rate,	which	might	suggest	that	it	is	an	extremely	risky	asset.	That	way,	the	increased	interest	rate	level	might	exert	an	adverse	effect	on	 the	development	of	 corporate	bond	markets	on	both	sides	of	the	 market:	 A	 high	 interest	 rate	 level	 not	 only	 impedes	 companies	 from	supplying	bonds,	it	also	suppresses	the	demand	for	corporate	bonds.	Public	finance	for	development	also	plays	an	important	role	in	the	development	of	 a	 corporate	 bond	 market	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 yield	 of	 these	 debt	 securities,	because	 it	 offers	 finance	 and	 funding	 at	 subsidized	 rates.	 Depending	 on	 the	design	 of	 the	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 policies,	 i.e.	 whether	 they	 are	structurally	 competing	 with	 or	 complementing	 other	 funding	 sources	 such	 as	corporate	bonds,	they	may	either	hamper	or	facilitate	CBMD.	If	public	finance	for	development	hands	out	 long-term	credits	at	subsidized	rates	to	the	 investment	projects	with	 the	best	 risk-return	potential,	 it	will	 hamper	 the	development	 of	the	 corporate	 bond	market.	 The	most	 attractive	 companies	will	 choose	 not	 to	issue	 a	 corporate	 bond	 and	 pay	 the	 market	 interest	 rate,	 if	 they	 have	 the	possibility	 to	 achieve	 funding	 at	 a	 subsidized	 rate.	 If,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 public	finance	 for	 development	 purposely	 aims	 at	 the	 promotion	 of	 corporate	 bond	market	development,	 e.g.	 by	 co-funding	 companies	 that	 issue	 corporate	bonds,	this	might	have	positive	effects	on	CBMD	in	general	and	on	the	expected	yield	of	the	bonds	of	 the	 co-funded	companies,	 in	particular.	The	expected	yield	would	rise,	because	 the	 issuing	companies	would	benefit	either	 from	reduced	 funding	costs	or	from	a	higher	funding	volume,	or	a	combination	of	both.	Apart	 from	 supporting	 the	 bond	 issuing	 companies	 directly,	 the	 public	 finance	for	 development	 institutions	 can	 foster	 CBMD	 by	 issuing	 corporate	 bonds	themselves.	 These	 placements	 could	 set	 benchmarks	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 expected	yield	 by	 establishing	 safer	 forms	 of	 indexation	 or	 fixed	 rate	 bonds	 with	 long	maturities.	 Similar	 to	 the	 yield	 curve	 of	 sovereign	 bonds,	 the	 benchmark	placements	 in	 the	 corporate	 bond	market	would	 serve	 as	 reference	 points	 for	private	companies.	At	the	same	time,	 it	would	help	to	build	an	 investor	base	 in	the	 corporate	bond	market	by	attracting	wealth	holders	 to	 this	 segment	of	 the	financial	markets	with	attractive	yields	together	with	high	liquidity	premia.	The	 expected	 appreciation	of	 a	 corporate	bond	 can	 take	on	positive	 as	well	 as	negative	values,	because	a	wealth	holder	might	expect	a	bond	to	appreciate	or	to	depreciate,	i.e.	the	price	of	the	bond	to	go	up	or	down,	respectively.	There	is	an	inverse	 relationship	of	 the	price	of	 a	bond	and	 its	 yield:	The	price	of	 the	bond	increases,	 if	 the	 base	 rate	 falls	 (and	 vice	 versa),	 because	 the	 (fixed	 rate)	 bond	continues	 to	 pay	 the	 “old”	 interest	 rate;	 but	 due	 to	 the	 increased	 demand,	 the																																																																																																																																																															potential	returns,	whereas	high	levels	of	uncertainty	(high-risk)	are	associated	with	high	potential	returns.	
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bond	price	rises,	causing	 its	yield	to	decrease	accordingly.	The	net	return	of	an	asset	 and	 its	 expected	 appreciation	 are	 positively	 related.	 Wealth	 holders’	demand	 for	 bonds	 will	 rise,	 if	 the	 net	 return	 of	 bonds	 increases.	 Therefore,	 a	monetary	policy	stance	that	is	aiming	at	a	stable	or	decreasing	interest	rate	level	fosters	the	promotion	of	CBMD	by	creating	expectations	of	stable	or	rising	bond	prices.	Public	 debt	 management	 can	 exert	 a	 positive	 influence	 on	 the	 expected	appreciation	of	 corporate	bonds	by	 improving	 the	 structure	of	 the	public	debt,	which	 would	 raise	 the	 currency	 premium	 and	 therefore	 also	 the	 expected	appreciation	of	any	asset	denominated	in	this	currency.	By	prolonging	terms	in	the	public	bond	market,	 the	 impact	of	public	debt	management	 is	more	direct,	because	it	would	make	room	for	corporate	bonds	in	the	shorter-term	segment	of	capital	markets,	 increasing	their	demand	and,	hence,	appreciation	expectations.	Coordinated	actions	by	monetary	policy	together	with	public	debt	management	can	raise	expectations	of	appreciating	corporate	bond	prices	by	jointly	lowering	the	base	rate	and	reducing	the	yield	on	public	bonds,	which	would	increase	the	demand	 for	 higher	 yielding	 and	 riskier	 asset	 types	 such	 as	 corporate	 bonds.	Public	finance	for	development	institutions	could	also	engage	in	the	acquisition	of	corporate	bonds	in	order	to	create	expectations	of	appreciating	prices.	It	 lies	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 financial	 assets,	 that	 their	 carrying	 costs,	 i.e.	 their	transaction	costs,	are	relatively	low.	The	main	difference	in	the	cost	of	carrying	a	corporate	bond	compared	to	other	financial	assets	might	be	due	to	regulatory	or	tributary	reasons.	A	 frequent	 feature	of	public	bonds	 is,	 for	example,	 that	 their	holders	 benefit	 from	 tax	 exemptions,	 which	 lowers	 their	 transaction	 costs	compared	 to	 other	 financial	 assets,	 most	 notably	 relative	 to	 corporate	 bonds.	While	such	a	measure	intensifies	the	competitiveness	effect	and,	thus,	makes	the	development	 of	 a	 corporate	 bond	 market	 more	 difficult,	 it	 also	 promotes	 the	development	 of	 the	 public	 bond	market,	 which	might	 exert	 a	market	 creation	effect	 on	 the	 corporate	 bond	 market.	 This	 market	 creation	 effect	 can	 be	significant	with	 respect	 to	 lowering	 the	 carrying	 costs	 of	 corporate	 bonds.	 For	instance,	 the	 fees	 charged	 by	 brokers	 in	 the	 corporate	 bond	market	might	 be	reduced	 markedly	 after	 the	 installation	 of	 an	 electronic	 trading	 platform.	Typically,	 such	 an	 electronic	 trading	 platform	 is	 installed	 first	 by	 public	 debt	management	 for	 the	 sovereign	 bond	 market,	 and	 later,	 the	 corporate	 bond	market	 can	 either	 directly	 use	 the	 same	 platform	 or	 copy	 the	 functioning	structure	of	the	existing	platform	when	creating	its	own	platform.	The	public	issue	of	a	corporate	bond	usually	requires	a	credit	rating	as	well	as	an	annual	 audit	 and	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 institutions,	 due	 to	 their	expertise	 in	 evaluating	 the	 economic	 prospects	 of	 companies	 and	 their	 credit	worthiness,	could	offer	this	kind	of	service	at	lower	than	market	prices	in	order	to	 reduce	 the	 expected	 carrying	 costs	 of	 corporate	 bonds	 and,	 thus,	 promote	CBMD.	
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2.3.3.2 Liquidity	premium	of	an	asset	Out	of	the	four	characteristics	–	yield	(q),	carrying	costs	(c),	appreciation	(a),	and	liquidity	premium	(l)	–	defining	the	net	return	of	an	asset,	“the	most	original	of	the	 attributes	 identified	 by	 Keynes	 is	 the	 liquidity	 premium,	 a	 concept	 that	became	a	cornerstone	of	Post	Keynesian	monetary	and	financial	theory”	(F.	J.	C.	de	 Carvalho	 1992,	 85).	 Keynes	 emphasized	 the	 peculiarity	 and	 non-monetary	character	of	the	liquidity	premium	by	noting	that	(1936,	226):	
“There	 is,	so	to	speak,	nothing	to	show	for	this	at	the	end	of	the	period	in	
the	shape	of	output;	yet	it	 is	something	for	which	people	are	ready	to	pay	
something.”	The	previous	section	already	discussed	some	motivations	for	this	willingness	to	pay,	 and	 before	 we	 turn	 to	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 determinants	 of	 the	 liquidity	premium	of	an	asset,	which	include	not	only	its	own	characteristics,	but	also	the	institutional	market	structure	(see	sub-section	2.3.3.3)	as	well	as	the	micro-	and	macroeconomic	 financial	 structure	 in	 place,	 which	 in	 turn	 determines	 the	currency	premium	(see	sub-section	2.3.3.4),	 the	concept	of	 liquidity	(premium)	is	explained	in	more	detail.	Keynes	defined	the	liquidity	premium	of	an	asset	as	the	rate	of	monetary	returns	that	a	wealth	holder	was	willing	to	abstain	from,	when	he	received	instead	“the	power	 of	 disposal	 over	 an	 asset	 during	 a	 period	 [which]	may	 offer	 a	 potential	convenience	 or	 security”	 to	 its	 owner	 (Keynes	 1936,	 226;	 F.	 J.	 C.	 de	 Carvalho	1999).	The	power	of	disposal	is	not	only	measured	in	terms	of	how	quickly	and	easily	one	can	sell	a	given	asset,	but	also	in	terms	of	how	large	the	risk	of	capital	losses	are,	in	the	sense	of	deviations	between	the	observed	price	on	spot	markets	and	the	actually	realized	price.	In	other	words,	the	liquidity	premium	measures	how	 quickly	 and	 easily	 the	 owner	 of	 the	 asset	 is	 able	 to	 dispose	 of	 this	 asset	without	incurring	large	capital	losses,	considering	the	degree	of	capital	loss	with	respect	to	current	market	prices.	The	liquidity	premium	reflects	the	opportunity	cost	 a	 wealth	 holder	 is	 willing	 to	 pay	 for	 keeping	 the	more	 liquid	 asset,	 even	though	 he	 could	 reach	 higher	 monetary	 yields	 with	 other	 assets.	 Taking	 the	example	 of	money	 as	 the	 asset	with	 the	 highest	 liquidity	 premium,	 in	 Keynes’	simple	model	the	bond	gives	the	reference	interest	rate	that	the	wealth	holder	is	willing	to	waive	by	receiving	instead	the	power	of	disposal	over	money,	because	owning	money	gives	 the	wealth	holder	a	potential	 convenience	or	 security	 (by	offering	liquidity).	The	liquidity	premium	of	a	car,	for	example,	 is	not	very	high,	as	it	might	not	be	possible	 to	 sell	 it	 quickly	 without	 being	 obliged	 to	 accept	 a	much	 lower	 price	than	 listed.	 Financial	 assets	 are	 usually	 marked	 by	 higher	 liquidity,	 yet	 to	different	degrees,	expressed	in	varying	liquidity	premia.	To	measure	the	liquidity	premium	of	 a	 corporate	 bond,	whose	 liquidity	 in	 the	market	 is	 usually	 limited	due	to	a	relatively	small	investor	base,	difficulty	of	comparing	it	to	other	financial	assets	etc.,	one	could	imagine	a	fictitious	bond	with	exactly	the	same	properties	except	 that	 it	would	have	perfect	 tradability,	 i.e.	 the	highest	 liquidity	premium	possible.	A	wealth	holder	could	be	compensated	with	a	monetary	amount	so	that	he	 would	 be	 indifferent	 between	 the	 two	 bonds	 and	 this	 monetary	 amount	
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reflects	the	 liquidity	premium	of	the	bond.	 In	that	sense,	 the	 liquidity	premium	takes	on	a	similar	 function	as	 the	risk	premium	that	 is	common	in	mainstream	economics25.	A	precondition	for	the	issuance	of	securities	such	as	corporate	bonds,	or	in	other	words,	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 primary	 markets,	 is	 the	 smooth	 functioning	 of	secondary	 markets	 (Studart	 1995b,	 280–81).	 Smoothly	 functioning	 secondary	markets,	 in	 turn,	 depend	 on	 the	 continuous	 trading	 of	 assets,	 through	 which	liquidity	 is	 provided.	 The	 provision	 of	 liquidity	 turns	 long-term	 securities	 into	attractive	assets	for	savers,	who	are	looking	for	safe	liquidity	time	machines	and	rarely	want	to	be	locked	in	a	position,	where	they	need	to	hold	on	to	an	asset	for	a	long	time	(Davidson	1986).	The	liquidity	of	secondary	markets	is	also	related	to	 another	 function	of	 these	markets:	The	provision	of	 valuable	 information	 to	economic	actors,	e.g.	companies	issuing	securities,	underwriters	involved	in	the	process	of	placing	an	issue,	and	wealth	holders	forming	a	demand	for	securities.	The	 relevance	 of	 secondary	 markets	 as	 providers	 of	 information	 can	 be	summarized	 in	 three	main	points	 (cf.	Bain	1981,	61):	First,	 secondary	markets	send	out	price	signals	that	serve	as	benchmarks	for	new	security	issues;	second,	the	 business	 of	 financial	 institutions	 specialized	 in	 underwriting	 becomes	 less	risky;	and	third,	investors’	capabilities	of	evaluating	newly	issued	securities	with	regard	to	their	prospective	profitability	are	improved.	The	introduction	of	the	liquidity	premium	is	not	simply	an	ad-hoc	auxiliary	in	a	Post	Keynesian	model	of	uncertainty,	but	enables	us	to	carry	out	a	theoretically	sound	analysis	of	its	determining	factors.	Several	aspects	of	the	corporate	bond,	apart	 from	 its	 (expected)	 yield,	 carrying	 costs	 and	 appreciation,	 determine	 its	liquidity	premium,	including	the	unit	size	of	denomination,	terms	of	repayment,	and	whether	it	is	a	fixed	rate	or	floating	rate	bond,	and	if	applicable	which	type	of	indexation.	 For	 example,	 an	 indexation	 to	 the	 interbank	 rate	 negatively	 affects	the	 liquidity	 by	 eliminating	 price	 fluctuations	 according	 to	 movements	 in	 the	market.	 Furthermore,	 relevant	 factors	 of	 the	 issuing	 company,	 e.g.	 its	 capital	market	 track	 record,	 rating,	 reputation,	 financial	 situation	 etc.	 are	 important	determinants	of	the	liquidity	premium	of	corporate	bonds.	Finally,	 the	maturity	 of	 a	 bond	has	 a	 decisive	 impact	 on	 its	 liquidity	 premium.	The	 shorter	 the	maturity	 of	 an	 asset,	 the	 higher	will	 be	 its	 liquidity	 premium.	Especially	 in	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	 economies,	 wealth	 holders’	liquidity	 preferences	 might	 require	 such	 an	 elevated	 level	 of	 the	 liquidity	premium,	 that	 it	 becomes	 impossible	 to	 issue	 debt	 securities	 with	 longer	maturities,	 even	 for	 public	 bonds.	 The	 short	 maturities	 of	 sovereign	 bonds	mirror	macroeconomic	instabilities	and	the	expectation	of	an	unstable	future.	In	a	situation	marked	by	uncertainties,	wealth	holders’	demand	for	long-term	debt	securities	 will	 be	 low,	 due	 to	 high	 liquidity	 preferences.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	companies	postpone	long-term	investment	projects,	so	that	there	is	less	demand	for	 finance	 and	 funding.	 A	 public	 debt	 structure	 that	 is	 marked	 by	 short	maturities	 could	 also	 hamper	 CBMD,	 because	 of	 its	 impact	 on	 the	 corporate																																																									25	There	is	an	inverse	relationship:	A	financial	asset	with	a	high	liquidity	premium	would	have	 to	 offer	 a	 relatively	 smaller	 risk	 premium	 than	 a	 financial	 asset	 with	 a	 lower	liquidity	premium.	
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financing	choice:	Companies	more	likely	opt	for	bank	credits,	as	short	maturities	make	 bond	 issues	 relatively	 more	 expensive,	 compared	 to	 bank	 credits	(Borensztein	 et	 al.	 2008a,	 13).	 A	 company	 needs	 to	 incur	 large	 issuing	 costs	when	placing	a	debt	security,	which	might	only	become	cost-effective,	if	it	is	able	to	 spread	 the	 costs	both	over	a	 large	 issuance	volume	and	over	 relatively	 long	maturities.	Therefore,	developmentalist	state	policies	should	employ	measures,	which	allow	companies	 to	 issue	 more	 medium-	 and	 long-term	 bonds.	 While	 the	 corporate	bond	market	 is	 still	 developing,	 most	 companies	 are	 only	 able	 to	 issue	 short-term	 debt.	 In	 such	 a	 situation,	 issues	 in	 the	 market	 for	 short-term	 (debt)	securities	might	actually	exceed	the	underlying	demand,	if	public	bonds	are	not	moved	 to	 longer	 maturities	 (Mihaljek,	 Scatigna,	 and	 Villar	 2002,	 40).	 Hence,	public	debt	management	fosters	corporate	BMD	by	expanding	the	term	structure.	Additionally,	 public	 bonds	with	 long	maturities	 reflect	 a	 long-term	view	 in	 the	economy,	a	 stable	outlook	and	a	 confident	perspective	 for	 the	economy.	Public	debt	 management	 can	 exert	 a	 signaling	 effect	 by	 creating	 and	 extending	 the	sovereign	 yield	 curve	 and	 by	 reflecting	 improved	 market	 sentiments	 in	 the	structure	of	the	public	debt,	which	would	foster	the	development	of	a	domestic	debt	securities	market.	As	 emerging	market	 and	 developing	 economies	 are	 usually	 tainted	 by	 original	sin,	they	often	lack	a	normal	yield	curve.	The	inability	to	issue	sovereign	bonds	domestically	with	long	durations	leads	to	a	cut-off	yield	curve	that	has	no	values	for	longer	maturities.	In	other	words,	when	public	bonds	are	all	concentrated	in	the	 short-term,	 the	 public	 bond	market	 cannot	 supply	 a	 yield	 curve.	However,	without	 a	 yield	 curve,	 corporate	bonds	 lack	 a	 benchmark.	 “In	 the	 absence	of	 a	secondary	market	in	risk-free	debt	of	a	comparable	maturity,	it	will	be	difficult	to	identify	the	appropriate	opportunity	cost	of	funds”	(Mihaljek,	Scatigna,	and	Villar	2002,	25).	Basically,	that	is	the	reason	why	public	debt	management	should	try	to	build	a	yield	curve	for	sovereign	bonds.	The	importance	of	a	regular	yield	curve	for	the	development	of	a	corporate	bond	market	 is	 underlined	 by	 considering	 the	 role	 of	 pension	 funds.	 These	institutional	 investors	 need	 to	 apply	 their	 funds	 in	 secure,	 long-term	 debt	securities	(Turner	2002,	5).	But	even	pension	funds	would	prefer	to	hold	short-term	debt	securities	if	the	yield	curve	became	inverted	or	markets	for	long-term	issues	were	illiquid.	In	case	of	an	inverted	yield	curve,	pension	funds	would	hold	short-term	paper	due	 to	profitability.	 If	 pension	 funds	 cannot	be	 sure	whether	they	will	be	able	to	trade	long-term	bonds,	they	will	stick	to	more	easily	tradable	short-term	debt	securities.	In	order	to	create	a	yield	curve,	the	maturities	of	the	public	debt	securities	need	to	 be	 managed.	 There	 should	 be	 several	 benchmark	 issues	 with	 different	maturities	in	the	market.	If	there	are	no	long-term	issues,	the	yield	curve	cannot	be	 expanded.	 Public	 debt	management	 can	 avoid	 a	 confused	debt	 structure	 by	organizing	the	debt	issues	along	the	lines	of	maturity	dates	instead	of	durations	(Turner	2003,	16).	As	developing	countries	and	emerging	markets	generally	face	difficulties	in	financing	the	public	debt	and	rolling-over	debt	close	to	its	due	date,	these	countries	need	to	take	advantage	of	windows	of	opportunity.	That	means	
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that	the	issuance	of	public	debt	securities	cannot	always	be	planned	ahead	and	often	has	to	be	adjusted.	The	wrong	way	to	manage	the	public	debt	would	be	to	issue	 bonds	 with	 certain	 durations	 (e.g.	 a	 10-year	 bond)	 whenever	 such	 a	window	of	opportunity	opens.	Instead,	such	advantageous	circumstances	should	be	 used	 to	 issue	 bonds	 with	 certain	 maturity	 dates	 (e.g.	 August	 15th	 2027),	including	the	option	to	re-open	and	expand	these	bond	issues.	Then	public	debt	management	will	find	it	much	easier	to	maintain	an	organized	debt	structure	as	well	as	a	flexible	reaction	towards	changes	in	market	sentiment.	Liquidity	 is	also	crucial	 in	creating	a	yield	curve,	since	benchmarks	can	only	be	established,	 if	 these	 bonds	 are	 actually	 traded.	 Without	 regular	 transactions	there	 are	 no	market	 prices	 defining	 the	 shape	 of	 the	 yield	 curve.	When	public	debt	management	is	allowed	to	repurchase	less	demanded	issues,	the	remaining	fewer	issues	might	enjoy	higher	turnover	ratios.	That	way	it	might	be	possible	to	improve	liquidity	and	smoothen	the	yield	curve.	
2.3.3.3 Institutional	liquidity	of	a	market	The	liquidity	of	an	asset	directly	correlates	with	the	way	in	which	the	market	of	that	 asset	 is	 designed.	 Among	 the	 attributes	 that	 constitute	 the	 “institutional	liquidity	 of	 a	 market”	 rank	 in	 particular	 the	 density,	 permanence,	 and	organization	 of	 a	 market	 (cf.	 F.	 J.	 C.	 de	 Carvalho	 1992,	 86–87;	 Kaltenbrunner	2011,	 85).	 Market	 density	 is	 determined	 mainly	 by	 the	 number	 of	 potential	buyers,	 because	 the	 larger	 that	 number,	 the	 easier	 the	 market	 will	 absorb	additional	supply.	Hence,	density	describes	how	deep	and	tight	a	market	 is,	 i.e.	how	often	assets	are	traded,	how	substitutable	an	asset	is,	how	transparent	the	stream	 of	 information	 is,	 how	 costly	 transactions	 are,	 etc.	 (Orléan	 1999).	Permanence	is	the	most	intuitive	of	the	three	attributes	and	refers	simply	to	the	operating	 time	 of	 a	 market.	 The	 longer	 a	 market	 operates,	 i.e.	 the	 more	permanent	 it	 is,	 the	 more	 liquid	 the	 asset	 becomes	 due	 to	 the	 increased	probability	 of	 potential	 trades	 being	 realized,	 e.g.	 the	 present	 holder,	 who	 is	looking	for	a	buyer,	actually	finding	one.	The	third	and	perhaps	most	important	attribute	 concerns	 the	organization	of	 the	market,	which	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 also	predetermines	 the	 density	 and	 permanence	 of	 the	 market.	 Since	 markets	 are	institutions,	 they	 are	 created	 and	 structured	 through	 the	 setting	 of	 rules,	definition	 of	 standards	 and	 establishment	 of	 acceptable	 behaviors	 and	procedures.	 The	 clearer	 the	 institutional	 setting,	 i.e.	 “[t]he	 better	 organized	 a	market	 is,	 the	more	orderly	the	manner	 in	which	we	can	expect	the	day-to-day	transactions	to	develop”	(F.	J.	C.	de	Carvalho	1992,	87),	which	in	turn	makes	the	liquidity	of	an	asset	more	predictable.	Clear	 market	 structures	 help	 economic	 agents	 to	 form	 expectations,	 and	 an	organized	 market	 additionally	 provides	 mechanisms	 so	 that	 expectations	 are	less	likely	frustrated,	because	excessive	and	potentially	disruptive	fluctuations	of	asset	prices	might	lead	to	solvency	crises	and	should	therefore	be	avoided	(cf.	F.	J.	C.	 de	 Carvalho	 1992,	 87–88;	 Kaltenbrunner	 2011,	 85).	 One	 such	 mechanism,	containing	excessive	asset	price	fluctuations,	is	the	institution	of	a	market	maker,	whose	existence	 is	 a	 crucial	 element	of	 a	well-organized	market	 and,	hence,	 of	the	liquidity	of	an	asset	(e.g.	Davidson	2002).	The	more	resources	market	makers	
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possess,	 the	 more	 efficient	 they	 are,	 because	 they	 need	 to	 be	 able	 to	 execute	operations	in	the	market	in	order	to	regulate	prices.	A	market	maker	might	need	to	 possess	 substantial	 resources	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 effectively	 “fight”	 the	market,	 although	 he	 might	 actually	 only	 act	 on	 the	 margin,	 under	 normal	conditions.	 This	 shows,	 once	 again,	 the	 relevance	 of	 economic	 agents’	expectations.	The	 efficacy	 of	 market	 makers	 is,	 apart	 from	 their	 available	 resources,	conditioned	by	the	extent	to	which	price	fluctuations	are	considered	desirable	in	a	given	market,	in	order	to	signal	changes	in	expectations	(cf.	F.	J.	C.	de	Carvalho	1992,	87–88;	Kaltenbrunner	2011,	85).	When	asset	prices	move,	this	reflects	at	least	 partly	 alterations	 in	 economic	 agents’	 expectations,	 but	 of	 course,	 there	may	 also	 be	 a	 speculative	 element	 involved.	 Practically,	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	identify	the	speculative	nature	of	changes	in	asset	prices,	and	as	a	consequence,	the	 acceptance	 of	 some	 speculative	 activity	 is	 evidently	 necessary	 in	 order	 for	financial	 markets	 to	 convey	 relevant	 information	 about	 changes	 in	 the	prospective	 profitability	 of	 companies.	 The	 problematic	 role	 of	 speculation	 in	highly	 sophisticated	 financial	 markets,	 is	 also	 emphasized	 by	 Keynes	 (1936,	170):	
“(...)	 [T]he	 question	 of	 the	 desirability	 of	 having	 a	 highly	 organised	 [sic]	
market	 for	 dealing	 with	 debts	 presents	 us	 with	 a	 dilemma.	 For,	 in	 the	
absence	 of	 an	 organised	 [sic]	 market,	 liquidity	 preference	 due	 to	 the	
precautionary	motive	would	be	greatly	increased;	whereas	the	existence	of	
an	 organised	 [sic]	 market	 gives	 an	 opportunity	 for	 wide	 fluctuations	 in	
liquidity	preference	due	to	the	speculative	motive.”	In	 Brazil,	 the	 central	 bank	 has	 functioned	 as	 a	 market	 maker	 in	 the	 money	market	to	keep	the	base	rate	Selic	close	to	its	target	and	in	the	foreign	exchange	market	in	order	to	avoid	strong	volatility	of	the	exchange	rate.	The	central	bank	can	 increase	 liquidity	 in	 the	 secondary	market	 of	 sovereign	 bonds	 through	 its	open	market	 operations	 or	 by	 using	 public	 bonds	 as	 collateral	 for	 its	 lending	operations	 (Turner	 2003,	 15).	 Similarly,	 it	 could	 stimulate	 CBMD	 by	 also	accepting	corporate	debt	securities	as	collateral.	Public	finance	for	development	institutions	 could	 also	provide	 liquidity	 and	 the	 function	of	 a	market	maker	 in	the	corporate	bond	market,	for	example	through	the	establishment	of	a	liquidity	fund	that	would	buy	and	sell	corporate	bonds	according	to	market	participants’	needs.	If	transactions	are	low	because	the	investor	base	of	the	incipient	market	is	too	 small,	public	 finance	 for	development	 institutions	 can	play	 the	 counterpart	for	those	market	participants	willing	to	trade.	Public	 debt	 management	 plays	 an	 important	 part	 in	 raising	 the	 institutional	liquidity	of	a	 corporate	bond	market	by	exerting	an	already	mentioned	market	creation	 effect,	 e.g.	 through	 the	 installation	 of	 an	 electronic	 trading	 platform.	Keeping	 a	 repurchase	 window	 for	 sovereign	 bonds	 open	 ensures	 public	 bond	holders	that	they	will	be	able	to	liquidate	their	debt	security	any	time	before	the	maturity	date.	Public	debt	management	needs	to	provide	a	minimum	degree	of	liquidity	in	the	public	bond	market	as	a	precondition	for	CBMD,	by	providing	the	necessary	 infrastructure	 and	 assuring	 the	 existence	 of	 an	 investor	 base.	 Yet,	 a	very	high	liquidity	in	the	public	bond	market	makes	it	hard	for	corporate	bonds	
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to	 compete,	 because	 at	 least	 initially	 corporate	 bond	markets	will	 normally	 be	less	 liquid,	 since	 liquidity	 is	 correlated	 with	 market	 capitalization,	 size	 of	 the	issues,	and	the	investor	base.	If	liquidity	in	sovereign	bond	markets	is	artificially	increased	 through	 some	 form	 of	 state	 intervention,	 it	 will	 be	 even	 harder	 for	corporate	issues	to	compete	and,	thus,	the	competitiveness	effect	is	enhanced.	Since	 the	 existence	 of	 organized	 secondary	 markets	 is	 a	 crucial	 factor	 in	 the	development	of	 corporate	bond	markets	 and	 secondary	market	 activity	 can	be	increased	through	the	standardization	of	issues	as	well	as	through	the	expansion	of	the	investor	base,	expanding	the	investor	base	not	only	in	terms	of	the	number	of	potential	buyers,	but	also	in	terms	of	the	heterogeneity	of	investors,	including	retail	 investors	 as	well	 as	 institutional	 investors	 such	 as	 pension	 funds	with	 a	longer	 investment	 horizon,	 is	 one	 of	 the	 main	 challenges	 in	 fostering	 CBMD	(Paula	et	al.	2009,	5–6).	However,	developmentalist	state	policies	aiming	at	the	promotion	of	a	domestic	market	for	corporate	long-term	debt	securities	have	to	take	 into	 consideration	 that,	 although	 institutional	 investors	 with	 a	 long-term	investment	horizon	can	help	to	raise	the	demand	for	long-term	corporate	bonds,	their	participation	in	these	markets	might	also	have	adverse	effects	on	liquidity,	because	they	usually	follow	a	buy-and-hold	investment	strategy.	Public	 debt	 management	 needs	 to	 support	 the	 emergence	 of	 institutional	investors	 so	 that	 once	 installed,	 their	 size	 strengthens	 their	 growth	 and	 they	might	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 the	 development	 of	 a	 corporate	 bond	 market	 by	raising	 its	 institutional	 liquidity:	 “By	 pooling	 resources	 to	 a	 significant	 extent,	they	allow	these	investors	to	hire	professional	managers,	to	reduce	transactions	costs,	to	spread	risks,	and	to	enjoy	better	terms	for	their	placement,	operating	in	more	sophisticated	and	diversified	markets”	(F.	J.	C.	de	Carvalho	1997,	482).	Monetary	policy	also	plays	an	important	role	in	determining	and	improving	the	institutional	liquidity	of	bond	markets	and	exerts	its	influence	in	different	ways.	By	 monitoring,	 regulating,	 and	 supervising	 the	 financial	 system,	 it	 shapes	institutional	 as	 well	 as	 micro-	 and	 macroeconomic	 financial	 structures.	 While	monetary	policy	can	opt	for	institutional	and	structural	adjustments	specifically	designed	to	promote	CBMD,	it	may	also	contribute	to	a	general	effort	aiming	at	confidence	building	and	political	stability	by	trying	to	lower	the	transaction	costs	of	banks	through	 improved	banking	supervision,	banking	reforms,	and	training	measures;	as	well	as	by	trying	to	develop	central	bank	credibility	through	statute	and	personnel	appointment	while	keeping	 the	discount	window	open,	 in	order	not	to	unnecessarily	raise	reserve	holding	costs	of	commercial	banks.	Especially	in	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	 economies,	 the	 financial	 system	 is	 often	marked	by	low	competition	in	the	banking	sector	and,	as	a	consequence,	a	large	spread	between	the	base	rate	and	the	lending	rate.	Such	a	situation,	with	highly	profitable	 banks	 charging	 elevated	 real	 lending	 rates,	 even	 in	 the	 face	 of	relatively	 low	 monetary	 policy	 rates,	 might	 actually	 encourage	 companies	 to	issue	debt	securities	and	therefore	stimulate	CBMD.	With	respect	 to	CBMD,	development	banks	are	both	drivers	and	barriers.	They	provide	 long-term	 funding,	 that	 way	 complementing	 the	 financial	 system	 and	promoting	 growth	 and	 development	 in	 adverse	 contexts.	 By	 improving	 the	economic	situation	in	general,	they	function	as	drivers	of	CBMD.	Yet,	by	financing	
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and	funding	companies,	they	are	also	competing	with	corporate	bond	markets	as	a	source	of	funding.	Public	banks	offering	subsidized	credits	are	more	attractive	to	 companies	 seeking	 funding	 than	 corporate	 bond	 markets	 offering	 the	possibility	to	issue	a	debt	security	at	market	conditions.	So,	they	can	be	seen	as	a	barrier	to	CBMD	by	exerting	competitive	pressure,	but	not	only	on	the	demand	side:	Public	banks	might	also	hamper	CBMD,	because	they	compete	on	the	supply	side	 of	 the	 corporate	 bond	 market,	 by	 issuing	 debt	 securities.	 In	 Brazil,	 the	development	bank	issues	debt	securities	directly	via	its	subsidiary	and	indirectly	via	 the	 treasury,	when	 it	 receives	 capital	 transactions.	As	we	have	 seen	above,	the	 effect	 of	 sovereign	 bond	 issuance	 on	 CBMD	 is	 not	 clear:	 It	 could	 have	 a	market	creation	effect	or	a	competitiveness	effect.	The	same	is	also	true	for	the	issuance	 of	 a	 corporate	 bond	 by	 a	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 institution.	While	a	benchmark	placement	might	foster	CBMD,	an	increasing	supply	of	bonds	with	 high	 liquidity	 premia	 from	 issuers	 belonging	 to	 the	 public	 finance	 for	development	 institutions	 might	 have	 an	 adverse	 effect	 on	 (potential)	 private	issuers	 in	 the	 corporate	 bond	market,	 which	 can	 only	 offer	 assets	 with	 lower	liquidity	premia.	The	 (re-)financing	 needs	 of	 public	 banks	 represent	 a	 fiscal	 cost	 and	 as	 such	increase	 the	public	debt,	which	 in	 turn	might	 lead	 to	 the	 issuance	of	 sovereign	bonds.	 This	 shows	 the	 close	 connection	 between	 the	 public	 finance	 for	development	 institutions	 and	 the	 capital	 markets,	 and	 the	 bond	 markets	 in	particular.	 A	 public	 development	 bank	 directly	 funding	 its	 activities	 on	 the	domestic	capital	markets	would	bring	the	public	and	the	private	segments	of	the	financial	system	even	closer	together.	As	public	development	banks	spend	their	resources	on	investment	projects,	these	public	expenditures	most	likely	generate	a	 crowding-in	 effect,	 because	 this	 effect	 depends	 on	 the	 allocation	 of	 public	spending.	To	 include	 corporate	 bonds	 as	 a	 complementary	 funding	 source	 into	 public	finance	 for	 development	 schemes	 might	 improve	 these	 programs	 and	 foster	CBMD.	The	government	could	 install	a	program	of	combined	granting	of	public	credit	and	corporate	bond	issuing,	through	which	companies	that	are	eligible	for	a	public	bank’s	credit	could	choose	to	 increase	the	amount	 funded	by	 issuing	a	corporate	 debt	 security	 in	 the	 domestic	 bond	market.	 The	 public	 bank	 would	split	the	credit	granted	and	release	part	of	the	amount	directly	through	the	credit	and	another	part	only	if	there	was	not	enough	demand	for	the	corporate	bond	in	the	primary	market.	In	this	case,	the	public	bank	acquires	a	guaranteed	amount	of	the	corporate	bond	issue.	Additionally,	public	finance	for	development	institutions	can	help	to	establish	the	necessary	 corporate	 bond	market	 infrastructure	 and	 improve	 the	 institutional	and	structural	determinants	of	CBMD.	Since	the	liquidity	of	corporate	bonds	is,	at	least	 initially,	 expected	 to	 be	 low,	 there	 will	 be	 few,	 if	 any,	 transactions	 and,	therefore,	 negotiations	 are	 further	 complicated	by	 the	 lack	 of	 observable	 price	trends.	Public	finance	for	development	institutions	could	employ	their	expertise	in	order	to	provide	for	an	index	or	other	type	of	price	signal,	which	might	guide	private	 market	 participants	 in	 their	 evaluation	 of	 corporate	 debt	 securities	available	in	secondary	markets.	Furthermore,	they	could	offer	company	ratings.	
		 87 	
It	is	very	common	for	public	banks	to	provide	specially	designed	credit	lines	for	companies	 that	 face	 a	 funding	 gap	 during	 the	 early	 phases	 of	 their	 innovative	business	 (UNCTAD	 2008,	 95).	 These	 highly	 innovative	 startup	 companies	combine	 a	 promising	 business	 case	 with	 a	 very	 high	 risk	 to	 fail.	 Public	 banks	should	 not	 only	 install	 mechanisms	 to	 contain	 losses	 from	 disappointing	companies,	but	also	develop	structures	 for	 follow-up	 funding	 for	 the	successful	cases.	These	structures	need	to	 involve	venture	capitalists	as	well	as	stock	and	bond	 markets.	 Public	 banks	 might	 push	 the	 development	 of	 corporate	 bond	markets	 by	 establishing	 mechanisms	 that	 allow	 innovative	 companies,	 which	receive	early	financing	from	public	banks,	to	become	bond	issuers	in	later	stages.	In	 general,	 the	 set	 up	 of	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 schemes	 in	 a	 country,	especially	 the	 role	 of	 its	 public	 banks	 and	 public	 companies,	 shapes	 to	 a	 large	degree	the	country	specific	context,	which	is	one	of	the	“Keynesian	fundamentals”	(Herr	1992),	on	which	economic	agents	form	their	expectations.	
2.3.3.4 Currency	premium	The	 liquidity	 premium	 of	 an	 asset	 is	 strongly	 determined	 by	 the	 currency,	 in	which	 the	 asset	 is	 denominated.	 The	 endogenous	 nature	 of	 the	 main	determinants	in	liquidity	preference	theory	and	the	important	role	of	economic	agents’	 expectations,	 actions,	 and	 positions	 does	 not	 only	 allow	 a	 political	interference	 in	 the	 development	 path,	 but	 it	 also	 indicates	 at	 what	 economic	policy	 and	 the	 development	 strategy	 should	 aim:	 improving	 the	 “state	 of	confidence”,	which	 is	 not	 for	 nothing	 one	 of	 the	 key	 terms	 in	 Keynes’	 General	Theory	 (Keynes	 1936,	 ch.12).	 By	 improving	 economic	 agents’	 “state	 of	confidence”	 with	 respect	 to	 their	 expectations	 towards	 a	 certain	 country,	 its	economic	 policy	 strengthens	 the	 currency	 of	 that	 country,	 which	 also	 exerts	positive	 effects	 on	 corporate	 bond	 market	 development.	 The	 expectation	formation	 process	 builds	 on	 social	 conventions	 and	 depends	 on	 the	 country-specific	institutional	and	socio-economic	context.	In	this	sub-chapter,	we	already	learned	how	to	determine	the	liquidity	premium	and	the	net	return	of	an	asset.	For	this	purpose	we	took	a	closer	look	at	the	three	motives	for	holding	money	and	found,	that	different	currencies	are	expected	to	differ	in	their	ability	to	store	wealth,	on	the	one	hand,	and	on	their	ability	to	meet	outstanding	 liabilities,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 which	 is	 expressed	 in	 the	 currency	premium.	 Accordingly,	 an	 international	 monetary	 hierarchy	 evolves,	 with	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	situated	in	the	lower	ranks,	due	to	their	 lower	 currency	 premia.	 The	 currency	 premium	 reflects	 the	 liquidity	premium	 of	 a	 currency	 and	 as	 such	 affects	 all	 assets	 denominated	 in	 this	currency,	which	has	important	implications,	especially	for	emerging	market	and	developing	 economies	 and	 their	 financial	 system	 development.	 Additional	factors,	qualifying	divergent	liquidity	premia	and,	hence,	the	rank	of	a	country	in	the	 international	monetary	 hierarchy,	 are	 the	 size	 of	 its	 financial	markets,	 the	operational	 area,	where	 its	 currency	 is	 used,	 as	well	 as	 sufficient	 political	 and	economic	power	 to	underpin	 its	 financial	 and	monetary	 stance	 (Kaltenbrunner	2011,	95–96).	
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While	the	asset	side	of	international	balance	sheets,	i.e.	the	ability	of	a	currency	to	store	wealth,	is	important,	the	emphasis	of	this	thesis	lies	on	the	liability	side,	i.e.	 the	 ability	 of	 a	 currency	 to	 meet	 outstanding	 liabilities,	 for	 three	 main	reasons:	 First,	 this	 thesis	 analyses	 the	 development	 of	 local	 debt	 securities	markets,	 which	 is	 obviously	 strongly	 interrelated	 with	 this	 latter	 ability	 of	 a	currency.	Second,	since	wealth	holders	are	free	to	choose	in	which	currency	they	want	 to	 hold	 their	 assets,	 the	 existence	 of	 one	 currency	 on	 the	 top	 of	 the	currency	hierarchy	is	better	explained	by	the	liability	side:	Economic	agents	can	be	 forced	 to	contract	debt	 in	a	certain	currency.	The	 third	and	most	 important	reason	is	that	otherwise	relevant	structural	and	relational	aspects	would	be	left	out	of	 the	analysis.	Minsky	has	drawn	the	attention	to	this	point	by	noting	that	(1975,	 70):	 “(...)	 a	 portfolio	 decision	 has	 two	 interdependent	 facets.	 The	 first	relates	to	what	assets	are	to	be	held,	controlled,	or	acquired;	the	second	relates	to	how	 the	position	 in	 these	 assets	 –	 i.e.,	 their	 ownership	or	 control	 –	 is	 to	be	financed.”	The	main	funding	currency	is	on	top	of	the	international	monetary	hierarchy	and	therefore	offers	the	highest	liquidity	premium,	which	serves	as	a	reference	to	all	other	 currencies.	 The	diminution	of	 the	 respective	 currency	premium	depends	on	the	potential	 funding	needs	of	the	country	in	question.	The	less	a	country	is	expected	 to	 be	 able	 to	 meet	 its	 external	 obligations,	 the	 lower	 its	 currency	premium.	 Kaltenbrunner	 (2011,	 98–105)	 detects	 three	 structural	 factors	 that	define	 the	 currency	 premium,	 i.e.	 the	 ability	 to	 meet	 external	 obligations:	 a	country’s	net	external	debt,	the	cash	flow	to	meet	these	foreign	liabilities,	and	the	institutional	 market	 liquidity.	 Hereafter,	 each	 of	 the	 three	 factors	 will	 be	examined	 in	 more	 detail	 as	 well	 as	 the	 impact	 of	 public	 debt	 management,	monetary	 policy,	 and	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 policies	 on	 these	 factors.	Since	 the	 analysis	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 expectations	 of	 investors	 regarding	solvency,	 a	 broad	 definition	 of	 net	 external	 debt	 seems	 appropriate,	incorporating	 any	 type	of	net	 (short-term)	 external	 liabilities.	That	means	 that	the	 currency	 premium	 may	 not	 only	 be	 compromised	 by	 foreign	 debt,	 i.e.	 in	foreign	 currency	 denominated	 debt,	 but	 also	 by	 (short-term)	 domestic	 assets	that	 are	 held	 by	 foreign	 wealth	 holders.	 The	 impairment	 is	 not	 only	 a	consequence	 of	 the	 emergence	 of	 currency	 requirements,	 but	 also	 due	 to	 the	possibility	 of	 strong	 and	 sudden	 exchange	 rate	 reversals,	 in	 case	 foreign	investors	sell	their	domestic	assets.	The	fact	that	any	external	liability	position,	even	foreign	investment	in	domestic	currency	 assets,	 implies	 possible	 exchange	 rate	 disturbances,	 and	 hence	potentially	 lowers	 the	 currency	 premium,	 deserves	 special	 attention	 in	 the	course	of	this	thesis,	because	the	analysis	of	domestic	bond	market	development	departed	from	the	assumption,	that	there	would	be	a	stabilizing	influence	on	the	financial	 system	 and	 hence	 also	 on	 the	 currency	 (see	 also	 section	 2.1.2	 on	 the	financial	 fragility	 literature).	 Therefore,	 it	 should	 be	 stressed	 that	 the	impairment	of	the	currency	premium	cannot	be	attributed	to	the	domestic	assets,	but	 to	 the	 foreign	 investors,	 who	 –	 despite	 playing	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	development	of	domestic	bond	markets	–	might	cause	large	and	abrupt	exchange	rate	 movements,	 because	 every	 time	 they	 are	 funding	 their	 investments	 in	domestic	currency	assets	on	international	 financial	markets,	 they	exert	a	direct	influence	 on	 the	 exchange	 rate,	 by	 exchanging	 foreign	 into	 domestic	 currency,	
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and	vice	versa26.	The	occurrence	of	currency	mismatches	in	the	balance	sheets	of	foreign	 investors	 might	 exacerbate	 exchange	 rate	 volatility.	 Furthermore,	 the	presence	of	foreign	investors	in	domestic	markets	might	aggravate	exchange	rate	volatility,	 since	 they	 completely	 assume	 the	 currency	 risk	 by	 holding	 domestic	assets,	 and	 as	 a	 consequence,	 they	 possibly	 react	 very	 sensitively	 to	 expected	exchange	rate	deviations.	On	the	whole,	this	interferes	in	the	monetary	function	of	a	currency	as	a	stable	unit	of	account,	which	is	why,	ultimately,	the	sustainable	development	of	domestic	bond	markets	depends	on	the	participation	of	domestic	investors.	Hence,	the	focus	of	this	thesis	lies	on	domestic	bond	markets,	and	not	on	bonds	denominated	in	domestic	currency,	independently	of	whether	they	are	issued	on	domestic	or	international	markets.	The	 findings	 of	 the	 previous	 sections	 on	 financial	 fragilities	 (section	 2.1.2	 and	sub-section	2.3.1.3)	serve	as	a	basis	for	the	following	discussion	of	the	concept	of	currency	 premium	 and	 its	main	 determinants:	 As	 the	maturity	 of	 net	 external	debt	decreases,	the	pressure	on	the	currency	premium	rises,	due	to	the	increased	risk	 of	 an	 immediate	 reversal	 of	 these	 liabilities.	 This	 direct	 depreciation	pressure	 is	 augmented	 by	 payment	 obligations	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 external	 debt,	which	 maintain	 a	 continuous	 demand	 for	 foreign	 currency.	 Apart	 from	 debt	service	payments,	dividends	and	profit	repatriations	are	included,	which	should	actually	have	a	countercyclical	effect,	as	they	depend	on	the	economic	situation	of	the	country,	in	theory.	Such	dividend	and	profit	generating	commitments	are	also	 expected	 to	 be	 less	 damaging	 for	 the	 currency	 premium	 as	 compared	 to	other	 forms	 of	 external	 liabilities,	 because	 at	 least	 part	 of	 the	 generated	resources	 are	 expected	 to	 be	 reinvested	 domestically.	 These	 commitments,	however,	ultimately	 create	 foreign	 currency	obligations,	 too,	which	will	 sooner	or	 later	 increase	 the	 pressure	 on	 the	 balance	 of	 payments	 of	 the	 country	 in	question	(e.g.	Lehmann	2002;	Paulani	2008)	27.	Empirical	data	from	the	Brazilian	balance	 of	 payments,	 for	 example,	 shows	 that	 profits	 and	 dividends	 stemming	from	previous	equity	investments	did	not	act	countercyclical	during	the	crisis	in	2007	 and	 2008.	 Another	 argument	 against	 the	 desirability	 of	 a	 strong	involvement	 of	 international	 investors	 in	 domestic	 capital	 markets	 is	 that	 it	detaches	 domestic	 asset	 price	 movements	 from	 local	 economic	 conditions,	because	 any	 change	 in	 international	 market	 conditions	 might	 provoke	 an	immediate	 sell-off	 of	 domestic	 assets,	 completely	 unrelated	 to	 the	 economic	situation	of	the	country.	Despite	the	negative	effects	of	(short-term)	capital	inflows,	the	development	of	a	domestic	 corporate	 bond	 market	 can	 also	 benefit	 from	 the	 participation	 of	foreign	 investors,	 by	 expanding	 the	 investor	 base.	 Apart	 from	 the	 additional																																																									26	The	same	applies	to	domestic	actors,	who	borrow	abroad,	to	invest	in	domestic	assets.	27	In	line	with	this	argument,	the	common	advice	to	follow	a	growth	cum	debt	strategy	is	criticized	(Nitsch	1999):	The	savings	gap,	which	supposedly	must	be	filled	with	external	savings	 is	 –	 based	 on	 the	 reformulation	 of	 the	 S=I+X-M	 equation	 to	 I=S+M-X	 –	mathematically	 correct,	 yet	 economically	 misleading.	 In	 order	 to	 move	 up	 the	international	monetary	hierarchy,	a	country	needs	to	increase	investments	and	exports,	not	 savings	 and	 imports.	 Thus,	 the	 government	might	 be	 able	 to	 improve	 the	 state	 of	confidence	by	implementing	confidence	building	measures	and	political	stability	and	by	trying	to	leave	the	debtor	position	and	to	achieve	current	account	surpluses.	
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funding	resources	 raising	 the	demand	 for	 corporate	bonds,	which	nevertheless	have	 adverse	 effects	 on	 the	 currency	premium	as	we	have	 seen	 above,	 foreign	investors	 can	 foster	 CBMD	 by	 prolonging	 the	 maturity	 structure	 of	 corporate	bonds,	 because	 these	 investors	 usually	 have	 longer	 investment	 horizons	 than	domestic	wealth	holders,	who	are	accustomed	to	very	short	terms.	Furthermore,	foreign	 investors	contribute	 to	 the	 improvement	of	 the	corporate	bond	market	because	 of	 their	 expectations	with	 respect	 to	 certain	 characteristics	 of	 quality	such	 as	 transparency,	 supervision,	 regulation,	 etc.,	 lifting	 these	 factors	 up	 to	international	 standards.	 Additionally,	 foreign	 capital	 flows	 to	 long-term	 debt	securities,	 such	 as	 corporate	 bonds,	 have	 the	 advantage	 that	 the	 impact	 of	 a	temporary	 waning	 on	 the	 financial	 situation	 of	 the	 issuing	 companies	 is	 less	severe,	because	the	company	would	not	be	threatened	with	default	immediately,	as	would	it	be	the	case	if	it	had	only	short-term	debt	and	would	be	unable	to	roll-over	its	debt	due	to	the	slowdown	of	external	capital	flows.	The	development	of	a	domestic	bond	market	can	help	to	 improve	the	currency	premium	 through	 a	 reduction	 of	 net	 external	 debt	 by	 giving	 companies	 an	additional	 option	 to	 exchange	 foreign	 for	 domestic	 debt.	 Furthermore,	 CBMD	improves	 the	 funding	 options	 for	 companies	 that	 would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 tap	international	markets,	 because	domestic	wealth	holders	might	 appreciate	non-pecuniary	rewards	stemming	from	nationalist	appeals	(Nitsch	1995,	65).	Foreign	exchange	controls	that	increase	transaction	costs	of	international	financial	assets	can	be	another	reason	why	domestic	wealth	holders	prefer	domestic	corporate	bonds.	The	acceptance	and	stability	of	 the	 local	currency	are	not	only	essential	preconditions	 for	 the	 development	 of	 domestic	 bond	 markets,	 but	 for	 the	financial	system	as	a	whole	(Priewe	and	Herr	2005,	158).	If	not	even	public	debt	can	be	issued	in	local	currency,	even	less	so	corporate	debt.	That	is	why	a	certain	amount	of	sovereign	debt	denominated	in	domestic	currency	issued	in	the	local	market,	 in	 a	 regional	 context	 or	 at	 an	 international	 financial	 center	 is	 an	important	prerequisite	for	the	development	of	a	domestic	market	for	corporate	debt	securities.	In	emerging	market	and	developing	economies,	the	reduction	of	their	net	debtor	status	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 contributions	 to	 an	 expansion	 of	 their	monetary	policy	space,	i.e.	to	lower	the	interest	rate	level	and	employ	monetary	policy	according	 to	domestic	economic	needs	 (Smithin	2002;	Kam	and	Smithin	2004).	 The	 political	 effort	 to	 reduce	 the	 net	 debtor	 status	 implies	 a	 cautious	stance	towards	financial	 liberalization	efforts.	More	specifically,	these	countries	should	 avoid	 the	 destabilizing	 effects	 of	 short-term	 financial	 flows.	 National	treasuries	 and	 financial	 institutions	 of	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	economies	 have	 tried	 to	 induce	 wealth	 holders	 to	 acquire	 assets	 in	 domestic	currency	by	introducing	indexed	bonds	and	other	financial	 instruments	(Nitsch	1995,	63–65).	Although	these	instruments	might	attract	funds,	which	would	have	otherwise	fled	abroad,	there	is	the	downside	of	shifting	the	risk	bearing	from	the	investor	to	the	issuer,	that	way	turning	this	form	of	funding	more	expensive	for	public	 and	 private	 issuer	 alike.	 This	 shows	 that	 not	 only	 external,	 but	 also	internal	 debt	might	weigh	 heavily	 on	 the	 currency	 premium	 of	 a	 country,	 and	especially	 indexed	 sovereign	 bonds	 increase	 the	 probability	 of	 a	 fiscal	 crisis	(Nitsch	1995,	64–65).	Therefore,	public	debt	management	should	try	to	keep	the	fraction	of	indexed	public	debt	low.	
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After	the	examination	of	the	first	factor	that	determines	the	currency	premium,	i.e.	net	external	liabilities,	we	now	turn	to	the	other	two	factors	that	are	decisive	for	 the	ability	of	a	 country	 to	meet	 its	outstanding	 liabilities	by	 “forcing	a	cash	flow	in	its	favour”	(Minsky	1975,	1986).	The	second	structural	factor	is	related	to	the	 country’s	 generation	 of	 income	 to	 pay	 for	 the	 external	 obligations	 and	has	been	termed	“foreign	exchange	productivity”	by	Minsky	(1993)	and	Herr	(1992).	Both	 authors	 analyze	 these	 flows	 in	 terms	of	 the	 balance	 of	 payments.	Minsky	identifies	 four	 tiers	 representing	 the	 balance	 of	 payments	 flows	 according	 to	their	ex-ante	specification,	distinguishing	payment	commitments	on	debt	(tier	1),	the	trade	balance	(tier	2),	as	well	as	long-term	capital	movements	(tier	3).	Short-term	capital	movements	(tier	4)	are	mainly	introduced	as	a	regulating	factor	to	equilibrate	 the	 balance	 of	 payments,	 not	 denying	 the	 possible	 impact	 on	 the	exchange	rate	of	short-term	capital	flows,	sometimes	driven	by	speculation.	This	scheme	allows	the	interpretation	of	a	debtor	country	as	having	a	chronic	deficit	in	 tier	 1.	 If	 tier	 2	 flows	 don’t	 cover	 this	 deficit,	 in	 other	 words,	 if	 the	 current	account	 is	 in	 deficit,	 (short-term)	 capital	 flows	 will	 have	 to	 supply	 foreign	exchange.	These	capital	flows,	however,	would	not	only	increase	the	net	foreign	debt	 of	 that	 country,	 but	 also	 its	 tier	 1	 payments,	 and	 consequently	 wear	 the	currency	 premium	down.	 This	 illustrates	why	 a	 large	 enough	 trade	 surplus	 to	meet	external	obligations	serves	well	as	an	 indicator	of	 the	currency	premium.	The	 current	 account	 in	 equilibrium	 or	 with	 a	 positive	 balance	 serves	 as	 an	autonomous	 source	of	 foreign	exchange,	 but	 the	 country	might	 also	 receive	 an	equivalent	 cash	 flow	 through	 profit	 and	 remittances	 from	 previous	 long-term	capital	outflows	and	labor	abroad.	By	promoting	investments	in	the	local	economy,	especially	in	innovative	areas,	in	research	 and	 development,	 or	 infrastructure,	 public	 finance	 for	 development	schemes	contribute	 to	 the	quality	of	 the	domestic	currency	by	 improving	 long-term	 expectations.	 Since	 the	 private	 sector	 might	 hesitate	 to	 invest	 due	 to	increased	uncertainty,	 the	state	can	 try	 to	give	 incentives,	 send-out	stimulating	signals,	 delineate	 clearly	 the	 economic	 policy	 stance,	 and	 in	 this	way,	 improve	the	 state	 of	 confidence.	 In	 order	 to	 increase	 the	 state	 of	 confidence,	 economic	policy	 should	 employ	 a	 development	 strategy,	which	 strengthens	 the	 domestic	currency.	 That	 means,	 that	 economic	 policy	 should	 aim	 at	 an	 undervalued	currency,	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 exports.	 Apart	 from	 currency	 undervaluation,	measures	to	promote	high-technology	exports	and	even	protectionism	should	be	considered	 to	 raise	 the	 foreign	 exchange	 productivity	 (Nitsch	 1995,	 67–68).	Development	 policies	 are	 export-	 as	 well	 as	 investment-oriented	 and	 can	 be	supported	 by	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 schemes.	 For	 example,	 a	 public	development	bank	could	directly	finance	investment	projects	realized	abroad	by	domestic	 companies.	 Similarly,	 a	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 institution	could	grant	 a	 guarantee	 for	 such	an	 investment	project.	Other	measures	might	include	privileges	for	companies	in	the	export	sector,	which	could	be	combined	with	 incentives	 to	 issue	 corporate	 bonds,	 in	 order	 to	 support	 CBMD	 more	directly.	
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The	exchange	rate	policy	should	also	aim	at	an	undervalued	currency	in	order	to	increase	exports	and	demand	for	 local	currency	(UNCTAD	2008,	70,	113–14)28.	As	income	from	export	revenues	rises,	domestic	liquidity	increases,	which	might	foster	CBMD.	However,	 in	many	cases,	the	easy	option	for	policy-makers	seems	to	be	the	 incurrence	of	deficits	 in	the	budget	and	on	the	current	account	of	 the	balance	 of	 payments,	 and	 hence	 an	 overvaluation	 of	 the	 currency.	 In	 line	with	this,	monetary	policy,	especially	 in	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	where	the	credit	channel	is	dysfunctional	due	to	a	low	credit-to-GDP	ratio,	might	employ	 a	 tight	 policy	 stance	 by	 raising	 the	 interest	 rate,	 in	 order	 to	maintain	demand	 for	 the	 currency	on	 foreign	exchange	markets29.	That	way,	 the	 central	bank	 mostly	 controls	 inflation	 via	 the	 exchange	 rate	 (E.	 C.	 de	 Araújo	 and	Modenesi	2010).	In	other	words,	the	overvalued	currency	helps	to	tame	inflation	by	 making	 imported	 products	 cheap,	 which	 then	 compete	 with	 domestic	products,	whose	producers	 are	 forced	 to	keep	prices	 low,	 as	well.	Under	 these	circumstances,	 the	 interest	 rate	 is	 not	 the	 appropriate	 instrument	 to	 lower	inflation	and,	thus,	needs	to	be	overused	with	adverse	effects	on	CBMD.	Not	only	companies	in	the	domestic	market	suffer	from	the	competition	of	cheap	imports,	the	 overvalued	 currency	 adds	 difficulties	 in	 the	 exporting	 sector,	 too,	 since	 it	turns	domestic	products	on	 international	markets	more	expensive.	 In	 this	way,	overvaluation	 further	 undermines	 the	 currency	 premium.	 Consequently,	monetary	 policy	 in	 emerging	market	 and	developing	 economies	 is	 constrained	by	 their	 low	 currency	 premium	 and	 changes	 in	 the	 international	 liquidity	preferences	 have	 repercussions	 above	 all	 on	 currencies	 with	 low	 liquidity	premia,	 possibly	 causing	 exchange	 rate	 fluctuations	 that	 are	 completely	independent	of	domestic	factors	(cf.	Dow	1999).	While	Monetary	Keynesian	analysis	shows	that	the	situation	of	emerging	market	and	 developing	 economies	 leaves	 not	 much	 room	 for	 hope	 to	 improvement30,	there	exist	possibilities	to	climb	up	the	hierarchy,	usually	with	the	help	of	some	sort	of	public	finance	for	development	scheme	(Nitsch	1999).	Yet,	this	will	only	be	possible	for	individual	countries	(Lüken-Klaßen	and	Betz	1989,	263).	In	a	way,	this	 guarantees	 the	 stability	 of	 the	 international	monetary	 hierarchical	 system	(Nitsch	 1995,	 68–69),	 in	 which	 the	 lower	 ranked	 countries,	 “in	 view	 of	 their	limited	 monetary	 and	 productive	 potential”	 (Riese	 1989,	 196),	 are	 unable	 to	counter	 the	 undervaluation	 strategies	 of	 leading	 industrial	 countries.	Nevertheless,	the	government	should	try	to	improve	the	state	of	confidence	and	lower	the	interest	surcharge	by	trying	to	leave	the	debtor	position	and	to	achieve	a	current	account	surplus.	
																																																								28	If	the	central	bank	succeeds	in	creating	the	expectation	of	appreciation	among	wealth	holders,	it	would	be	able	to	lower	the	monetary	policy	rate.	29	The	high	level	of	the	interest	rate	in	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	is	an	expression	 of	 their	 weak	 currencies.	 Therefore,	 these	 countries	 often	 need	 to	 offer	prohibitively	high	 interest,	 in	order	 to	maintain	 the	demand	of	wealth	holders	 for	 the	domestic	currency	(Herr	1992).	30	The	lower	currency	premium	makes	it	difficult	to	acquire	a	more	appropriate	funding	and	move	towards	a	safer	debt	structure,	 in	order	to	 leave	this	kind	of	vicious	cycle	of	inappropriate	financial	commitments	undermining	the	currency	premium,	which	in	turn	impedes	a	more	appropriate	liability	structure.	
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The	 third	 structural	 factor	 defining	 the	 currency	 premium	 of	 a	 country	 is	 the	institutional	 liquidity	 of	 its	 financial	 markets	 and	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 the	ability	to	“make	positions”	by	liquidating	assets	or	refinancing	existing	debt,	in	a	situation	 where	 current	 cash	 flows	 are	 insufficient	 to	 meet	 outstanding	obligations	 (Minsky	 1986;	 Tymoigne	 2006).	 In	 the	 international	 context,	 the	institutional	market	liquidity	of	a	domestic	asset	is	given	by	the	ease	to	convert	it	into	the	main	funding	currency,	quickly	and	at	a	low	cost.	As	already	discussed,	there	 are	 various	 factors	 that	determine	 the	 institutional	 liquidity	of	 a	market,	ranging	 from	 the	 properties	 of	 the	 asset	 itself,	 to	 structural	 and	 institutional	factors	of	the	market.	An	important	element	consists	 in	the	agents	operating	in	this	 market,	 including	 the	 existence	 of	 an	 efficient	 market	 maker.	 The	 central	bank	 constitutes	 such	 a	 market	 maker,	 providing	 liquidity	 and	 avoiding	excessive	price	movements	in	the	money	and	foreign	exchange	markets.	Yet,	the	central	bank	 is	only	able	 to	act	 as	a	 lender	of	 last	 resort	 in	domestic	 currency,	while	 being	 restricted	with	 respect	 to	 other	 currencies	 by	 its	 stock	 of	 foreign	exchange	reserves	as	well	as	the	existing	exchange	rate	regime.	The	central	bank	can	try	to	expand	its	policy	space	further	by	engaging	in	foreign	exchange	swap	agreements	 with	 other	 central	 banks.	 Developing	 countries	 and	 emerging	markets	 often	 try	 to	 harden	 their	 currency	 through	 the	 build-up	 of	 foreign	exchange	 reserves	 by	 their	 central	 banks.	 However,	 public	 finance	 for	development	schemes	might	offer	a	more	cost-effective	alternative	by	applying	financial	assets	abroad,	that	way	creating	a	stream	of	future	capital	inflows.	The	expectation	formation	process	implies	that	economic	agents	create	a	notion	of	an	exchange	rate	value	that	they	perceive	as	being	sustainable	or	reasonable	in	 the	medium-term,	 based	 on	 the	 determining	 factors	 of	 a	 currency	 premium	outlined	above.	It	 is	important	to	remember	that	this	concept	does	not	define	a	long-run	equilibrium,	but	allows	one	to	evaluate	the	stability	or	sustainability	of	an	economic	situation.	According	to	Minsky,	a	“critical	element	in	explaining	why	financial	 instability	 occurs	 is	 the	 development	 over	 historical	 time	 of	 liability	structures	 that	 cannot	 be	 validated	 by	market	 determined	 cash	 flows	 or	 asset	values”	 (Minsky	 1982,	 13).	 As	 discussed	 above	 (see	 sub-sections	 2.3.1.3	 and	2.3.1.4),	fragility	increases	with	the	dependence	on	portfolio	operations	instead	of	 cash	 flows	 to	 pay	 for	 outstanding	 obligations.	 The	 situation	 would	 be	aggravated	by	maturity	mismatches,	such	as	the	main	dependence	on	short-term	financing	 (Minsky	 1992).	 That	 is	why	 corporate	 finance	 as	well	 as	 public	 debt	management	should	aim	at	reducing	foreign	currency	 liabilities	and	prolonging	debt	maturities,	in	order	to	maintain	a	sustainable	debt	structure.	Furthermore,	the	 fraction	 of	 indexed	 debt	 securities	 should	 be	 lowered	 and	 exchanged	 for	fixed	rate	bonds.	Even	though	current	prices	might	differ	from	perceived	sustainable	values,	 this	perception	 only	 exerts	 an	 indirect	 impact	 on	 current	 prices	 through	 long-run	expectations,	which	are	an	anticipation	of	future	values	in	the	present.	Therefore,	short-run	 positions	 might	 be	 influenced	 by	 perceived	 deviations	 from	 the	sustainable	 values,	 but	 there	 is	 no	 definitive	 tendency	 to	 reach	 these	 values,	 a	process	 impeded	by	 the	underlying	uncertainty	 as	well	 as	 individually	 varying	perceptions	of	what	 the	correct	value	might	be.	For	example,	 it	 is	possible	 that	the	 policy	 maker’s	 idea	 of	 an	 appropriate	 level	 of	 the	 exchange	 rate	 varies	significantly	from	the	exchange	rate	values	that	market	participants	expect	over	
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the	 long	 run.	 Keynes	 and	 those	 Post	 Keynesian	 authors,	 who	 stress	 the	importance	of	 economic	agents’	 expectations	 formed	under	uncertainty,	 “could	not	 recognize	 any	 role	 for	 long	 run	 positions	 which	 could	 be	 established	 as	gravity	centres.	The	economy	does	not	tend	to	anything	over	calendar	time”	(F.	J.	C.	 de	 Carvalho	 1984,	 224).	 As	 a	 consequence,	 economic	 agents’	 expectations,	together	 with	 their	 perception	 of	 the	 appropriateness	 regarding	 financial	structures	 as	well	 as	 financial	 commitments	might	 vary	 substantially	 over	 the	business	cycle	(Minsky	1986).	As	we	have	seen	before	(e.g.	 in	section	2.1.2),	 the	currency	premia	of	emerging	market	 and	 developing	 economies	 are	 very	 difficult	 to	 improve	 because	 of	structural	 hindrances,	 and	 one	 of	 the	 advantages	 of	 the	 theoretical	 approach	presented	here,	is	that	it	allows	studying	the	associated	reasons	and	implications.	In	 general,	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	 countries	 are	 marked	 by	 their	history	as	debtor	countries	in	the	international	context	and	their	currencies	are	placed	among	the	lower	ranks	of	the	international	monetary	hierarchy.	There	are	a	few	exceptional	cases	of	countries	that	were	able	to	issue	debt	denominated	in	domestic	 currency	and	others	 that	have	 increasingly	 succeeded	 in	 raising	non-debt	 generating	 capital	 inflows,	 for	 example	 flows	 entering	 the	 domestic	 stock	market.	 Yet,	 even	 those	 countries	 could	 usually	 not	 recover	 their	 currency	premium,	due	to	their	high	 level	of	short-term	net	 foreign	debt	(Kaltenbrunner	2011,	104).	This	characteristic	is	due	to	the	fact	that	the	low	currency	premium	may	be	offset	by	(apart	from	offering	higher	monetary	returns,	i.e.	an	increased	interest	 rate)	 raising	 the	 institutional	 market	 liquidity,	 i.e.	 by	 adjusting	 the	nature	of	 the	respective	 flows,	or	 in	other	words,	by	shortening	 their	maturity.	Financial	flows	with	short	maturities	increase	the	institutional	liquidity,	as	they	are	 more	 easily	 reversed	 and,	 thus,	 converted	 into	 the	 international	 funding	currency.	Hence,	the	lower	currency	premia	of	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	 lead	 to	 financial	 flows	 that	are	predominantly	of	 short-term	nature,	which	 in	 turn	 causes	 a	 perpetuation	 of	 the	 lower	 currency	 premia	 due	 to	 the	increased	 risk	 of	 unexpected	 and	 large	 exchange	 rate	 fluctuations.	 The	development	 of	 a	 domestic	 corporate	 bond	market	might	 help	 to	 improve	 this	tendency	by	offering	long-term	assets.	The	 vulnerabilities	 lying	 at	 the	 root	 of	 strong	 exchange	 rate	 fluctuations	 are	created	 by	 the	 endogenous	 nature	 of	 financial	 flows	 and	 are	 ultimately	 a	consequence	 of	 the	 financial	 integration	 of	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	economies	 in	 international	 capital	 markets	 (Kaltenbrunner	 2011,	 104).	 The	financial	structure	of	an	economy	is	endogenously	changed	by	decisions	taken	by	the	 economic	 agents	 participating	 in	 its	 financial	 markets,	 that	 way	 creating	fragilities.	 Measures	 aiming	 at	 the	 reduction	 of	 exchange	 rate	 volatility	 might	actually	 prove	 futile,	 because	 a	 developing	 or	 emerging	 market	 country	 with	good	 macroeconomic	 fundamentals,	 such	 as	 low	 inflation,	 a	 balanced	 fiscal	situation	etc.,	might	attract	an	increasing	stream	of	(short-term)	capital	inflows,	therefore	 raise	 its	 stock	 of	 (short-term)	 net	 external	 liabilities,	 which	 in	 turn	increases	 the	 volatility	 of	 the	 exchange	 rate.	 Hence,	 these	 path-dependent	 and	self-feeding	 processes	 maintain	 the	 currency	 premia	 of	 emerging	 market	 and	developing	economies	structurally	weakened.	
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Despite	the	adverse	influence	of	the	structural	elements	outlined	in	the	past	few	paragraphs	 on	 economic	 prospects	 of	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	economies,	 including	 the	 dependence	 of	 exchange	 rate	 dynamics	 on	 the	 main	funding	 currency	 just	 as	 the	 dependence	 of	 monetary	 configurations	 on	 the	monetary	policy	of	the	core	country,	there	is	room	for	economic	policy,	once	we	acknowledge	 that	 these	 adverse	 elements	 are	 the	 result	 of	 an	 endogenously	determined	 currency	 premium	 (Kaltenbrunner	 2011,	 105).	 To	 explain	 the	difficulty	 faced	 by	 these	 countries	 to	 issue	 domestic	 currency	 debt	 with	 their	position	 in	 the	 international	 currency	 hierarchy	 differs	 from	 the	 original	 sin	hypothesis	 (e.g.	 Eichengreen,	 Hausmann,	 and	 Panizza	 2003;	 R.	 McKinnon	 and	Schnabl	2004),	in	allowing	a	somewhat	deeper	theoretical	analysis	by	departing	from	a	theoretical	framework	instead	of	departing	from	an	empirical	observation	and	 in	 offering	 solutions	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 how	 to	move	 up	 the	 ladder	 in	 the	hierarchy.	The	appropriate	development	strategy	should	include	measures	to	improve	the	functionality	of	the	domestic	financial	system,	considering	the	specific	conditions	of	countries	with	a	low	currency	premium,	where	a	purely	economic	division	of	labor	between	banks,	 entrepreneurs,	workers,	 and	 a	merely	 regulating	 state	 is	not	 to	 be	 expected	 (Nitsch	 1999).	 Therefore,	 governance	 structures	 of	 public	finance	 for	 development	 institutions	 together	 with	 adequate	 regulatory	institutions	are	of	 crucial	 importance.	Because	 there	 is	 a	need	 to	establish	and	maintain	 a	 favorable	 environment	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 diversified	 financial	infrastructure,	 one	 cannot	 expect	 a	 spontaneous	 creation	 of	 financial	functionality	without	 the	 intervention	 of	 the	 state.	 The	 state	 can	 create	 such	 a	favorable	 environment	 by	 implementing	 public	 finance	 for	 development	mechanisms,	which	 can	be	 supported	by	monetary	policy.	 Their	 design	 should	take	into	account	that	small	family	economies	need	small	and	short-term	credits,	while	 bigger	 family	 economies	 benefit	 from	 operating	 and	 current	 account	credits,	 as	 well	 as	 an	 efficient	 payment	 system.	 The	 subsidized	 interest	 rate	spread	should	be	kept	 small,	 in	order	 to	 increase	 the	 likeliness	 that	only	 those	firms	 and	 entrepreneurs	 demand	 credit,	 which	 are	 really	 in	 need	 and	 have	profitable	 business	 ideas	 as	 well	 as	 investment	 projects.	 Furthermore,	 public	finance	 for	 development	 mechanisms	 promote	 better	 funding	 conditions	 and	should	 therefore	 include	 measures	 to	 improve	 bond	 market	 development.	 In	early	stages,	the	focus	should	lay	on	the	public	bond	market	 in	order	to	exploit	the	market	 creation	effect	 for	 the	development	of	 a	well-functioning	 corporate	bond	market.	The	 institutional	 liquidity	 of	 a	 market	 is	 also	 related	 to	 political	 questions	 of	international	 relations.	 The	 international	 integration	 of	 public	 finance	institutions	is	important	to	complement	the	monetary	and	financial	power	with	political	and	economic	dominance,	which	contributes	to	the	ability	of	a	currency	to	 store	 wealth.	 The	 cooperation	 of	 national	 development	 banks,	 for	 example,	with	international	institutions	or	foreign	public	banks	might	help	to	establish	the	domestic	 currency	 in	an	 international	 context.	Overall,	 this	 analysis	has	 shown	that	public	finance	for	development	institutions	are	neither	drivers	nor	barriers	
per	 se	with	 respect	 to	 CBMD,	 but	 that	 it	 depends	 on	 how	 their	 activities	 are	designed	and	whether	the	development	of	a	market	for	corporate	debt	securities	
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is	a	priority	or	not.	Public	banks	can	foster	the	establishment	of	corporate	bond	markets	and	thus	contribute	to	a	well-functioning	financial	system.	This	 sub-section	 described	 an	 essential	 factor	 of	 the	 liquidity	 premium	 of	 an	asset,	 the	currency	premium,	which	expresses	the	ability	of	a	currency	to	store	wealth	 and	 to	meet	 outstanding	 liabilities.	 The	 net	 external	 debt	 of	 a	 country	together	with	its	foreign	exchange	productivity	and	the	institutional	liquidity	of	its	financial	markets	determine	its	currency	premium.	By	improving	the	“state	of	confidence”,	economic	policy	is	able	to	strengthen	the	currency	and,	thus,	foster	CBMD.	Especially	emerging	market	and	developing	economies	should	aim	at	an	undervalued	currency	to	generate	a	surplus	in	the	current	account	and	that	way	reduce	their	net	debtor	status.	The	Monetary	Keynesian	approach	explains	how	the	 low	 currency	 premium	 of	 these	 countries	 constrains	 public	 debt	management	 and	 monetary	 policy.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 these	 countries	 usually	don’t	advance	financially	without	the	support	of	public	finance	for	development	schemes.	 The	 currency	 premium,	 as	 an	 influencing	 factor	 of	 the	 liquidity	premium,	 is	 one	 of	 the	 determinants	 of	 the	 total	 yield	 of	 an	 asset	 that	 were	described	in	section	2.3.3.	This	section	presented	a	model	of	general	asset	choice	and	made	clear	how	the	influence	of	three	main	policy	variables	on	asset	choices	has	implications	for	the	development	of	a	domestic	market	for	corporate	bonds.	It	concludes	sub-chapter	2.3	that	outlined	the	analytical	 framework	to	examine	the	 impact	 of	 state	 policies	 on	 CBMD.	 The	 following	 sub-chapter	 will	 briefly	summarize	the	main	points	of	theory	chapter	2.	
2.4 Determinants	of	corporate	bond	market	development	
and	the	role	of	the	state	
This	 sub-chapter	 resumes	 the	 knowledge	 gained	 in	 the	 theoretical	 chapter,	focusing	 on	 aspects	 that	 are	 most	 relevant	 for	 the	 subsequent	 main	 chapter	analyzing	 the	 Brazilian	 case.	 In	 a	 first	 step,	 cornerstones	 of	 each	 section	 are	displayed	 in	 the	 chronological	 order	 of	 the	 outline.	 Secondly,	 a	 short	presentation	takes	up	key	points	related	to	the	three	policy	variables.	At	the	end	of	 sub-chapter	 2.4,	 the	 research	 question	 and	 hypothesis	 will	 be	 repeated	together	with	 the	methodological	 approach,	 in	 order	 to	prepare	 the	 reader	 for	the	ensuing	chapter	3.	Providing	 the	 theoretical	 background	 of	 the	 thesis,	 chapter	 2	 located	 the	development	of	domestic	bond	markets	in	the	finance	and	development	debate.	Sub-chapter	2.1	gave	an	overview	of	this	debate	and	emphasized	three	literature	strands,	because	of	their	relevance	for	this	study,	dedicating	a	separate	section	to	each.	 The	 first	 section,	 on	 the	 finance	 and	 growth	 nexus,	 showed	 that	 CBMD	contributes	to	economic	development.	Section	2.1.2	presented	financial	fragility	literature	 discussing	 major	 challenges	 of	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	
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economies	that	are	related	to	external	vulnerabilities	and	balance	sheet	effects.	The	 third	 section	 identified	defining	 features	of	developmentalist	 state	policies	and	 guaranteed	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 public	 finance	 for	 development	institutions,	including	their	potential	to	foster	as	well	as	to	hamper	CBMD.	The	 current	 state	 of	 research	 on	 domestic	 bond	 market	 development	 was	exposed	 in	 sub-chapter	2.2,	which	 started	with	a	 section	on	 financial	 structure	and	its	impact	on	economic	development.	The	main	findings	of	section	2.2.1	were	that	 capital	markets	 complement	 the	banking	 sector,	 that	CBMD	 is	particularly	beneficial	for	(financially)	more	developed	economies,	and	that	a	corporate	bond	market	 better	 serves	 larger	 companies.	 The	 most	 important	 advantages	 of	developing	domestic	bond	markets,	listed	in	section	2.2.2,	include	the	reduction	of	financial	vulnerabilities	that	are	related	to	balance	sheet	effects	together	with	maturity	 and	 currency	 mismatches.	 Furthermore,	 domestic	 bond	 markets	support	the	implementation	of	monetary	policy,	 including	exchange	rate	policy,	as	 well	 as	 fiscal	 policy	 and	 public	 debt	 management.	 Section	 2.2.3	 examined	several	 preconditions	 and	 determinants	 of	 bond	market	 development.	 For	 the	case	of	Brazil,	 among	 the	most	 relevant	are	a	strong	macroeconomic,	 legal	and	institutional	environment,	which	might	benefit	from	the	presence	of	institutional	and	foreign	investors;	a	sophisticated	financial	system,	including	sound	financial	infrastructure;	 and	 not	 only	 a	 large-sized	 economy,	 but	 also	 numerous	 major	companies	that	are	eligible	for	a	bond	placement.	The	state	of	the	art	sub-chapter	closes	with	 a	 literature	 review	of	 research	 that	 cast	 a	 spotlight	 on	 (corporate)	bond	market	development	and	the	Latin	American	region.	The	specific	literature	analysis	 of	 section	 2.2.4	 revealed	 research	 gaps	 and	 underlined	 the	 need	 to	better	understand	the	role	of	the	state	in	CBMD.	The	third	sub-chapter	laid	out	a	Post	Keynesian	framework	to	analyze	the	impact	of	 state	policies	on	 the	development	of	 a	 corporate	bond	market.	 Section	2.3.1	emphasized	the	crucial	role	of	 funding,	e.g.	 through	bonds,	 in	the	two-fold	Post	Keynesian	capital	formation	process:	Economic	development	depends	on	finance,	implying	 the	 creation	 of	 maturity	 mismatches,	 which	 cannot	 be	 dissolved,	 if	there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 long-term	 funding.	 However,	 capital	markets	might	 not	 only	dissolve	financial	instabilities,	but	can	also	create	them	(e.g.	through	speculation).	The	 concept	 of	 financial	 functionality	 captures	 this	 notion	 of	 opposing	 effects	that	need	to	be	balanced	out.	Moreover,	sub-chapter	2.3	showed	that	a	functional	financial	 system	 might	 require	 the	 participation	 of	 public	 finance	 for	development	 institutions,	 especially	 in	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	economies.	These	economies	are	usually	marked	by	structural	heterogeneity	and	the	development	of	a	domestic	market	for	corporate	bonds	works	in	favor	of	the	dissemination	of	the	monetary	economy.	The	wealth	holder	as	 the	ultimate	decision	maker	 in	a	monetary	economy	was	introduced	 in	 section	 2.3.2.	 In	 the	 analytical	 framework,	 the	 decisions	 of	economic	 agents	 (and	 in	 particular	 the	 wealth	 holders’	 portfolio	 decisions)	determine	 CBMD.	 Their	 decisions	 are	 taken	 under	 uncertainty	 and,	 as	 a	consequence,	 expectations	 are	 fundamental	 for	 decision	 making.	 Since	 the	formation	 of	 expectations	 is	 always	 context	 and	 time	 specific,	 the	 framework	takes	structures,	actors	and	institutions	such	as	uncertainty	reducing	indexation	into	 account.	 Economic	 agents’	 decisions	 are	 affected	 by	 alterations	 in	 the	
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structure	of	the	public	debt	that	are	prescribed	by	public	debt	management	and	possibly	provoke	three	effects	on	CBMD,	termed	competitiveness	effect,	signaling	effect,	and	market	creation	effect.	The	final	sub-section	explained	why	economic	agents	 have	 a	 preference	 for	 liquidity	 and	 choose	more	 liquid	 assets	 over	 less	liquid	assets,	ceteris	paribus.	The	third	section	of	sub-chapter	2.3	presented	a	general	model	of	asset	choice,	which	 defines	 the	 total	 yield	 of	 an	 asset	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 pecuniary	 return	 and	liquidity	premium.	This	premium,	in	turn,	depends	on	the	institutional	liquidity	and	currency	premium	of	the	asset	(market).	A	key	determinant	of	the	currency	premium	 is	 the	 net	 external	 debt,	 underlining	 the	 ambiguous	 role	 of	 foreign	investors.	The	 lack	of	 secondary	market	 liquidity	could	be	 remedied	by	raising	its	 institutional	 liquidity	 through	 the	 assignment	 of	 a	 market	 maker.	 An	important	precondition	for	the	establishment	of	a	corporate	bond	market	is	the	existence	of	a	 regular	yield	curve	 for	public	bonds,	which	not	only	depends	on	the	efforts	of	public	debt	management,	but	also	on	the	collaboration	of	monetary	policy.	Section	2.3.3	furthermore	emphasized	the	implications	of	different	types	of	 indexations	 for	 CBMD.	 In	 short,	 this	 section	 made	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 three	policy	 variables	 on	 the	 development	 of	 a	 corporate	 bond	 market	 explicit.	According	 to	 the	 framework,	 the	 policy	 variables	 influence	 the	 expectation	formation	of	economic	agents	and,	in	this	way,	determine	CBMD.	In	the	following,	the	 impact	 vectors	 of	 the	 policy	 variables	 are	 described	 again,	 emphasizing	features	that	are	most	significant	for	the	upcoming	chapter	3.	One	 of	 the	 key	 objectives	 of	 public	 debt	 management	 coincides	 with	 its	 main	modality	to	promote	CBMD:	to	improve	the	public	debt	structure	to	safer	forms.	By	 exchanging	 external	 for	 domestic	 debt,	 the	 treasury	 generates	 a	 market	creation	 effect;	 by	 extending	 the	maturities	 of	 sovereign	bonds	 and	by	moving	towards	 less	volatile	and	delicate	 types	of	 indexation,	public	debt	management	exerts	 a	 signaling	 effect	 and	 reduces	 the	 competitiveness	 effect.	 Similarly,	 the	creation	 of	 a	 regular	 yield	 curve	 fosters	 the	 development	 of	 a	 corporate	 bond	market.	 Furthermore,	 public	 debt	 management	 might	 be	 interested	 in	diversifying	 the	 investor	 base	 of	 sovereign	 bonds	 by	 opening	 up	 to	 foreign	investors	 and/or	 by	 incentivizing	 the	 development	 of	 institutional	 investors.	These	 types	 of	 investors	 can	 provide	 valuable	 contributions,	 for	 example,	 by	adding	demand	to	the	long-term	end	of	the	market	or	by	pushing	for	institutional	market	 liquidity	 improvements.	 However,	 the	 broad	 definition	 of	 net	 external	debt	chosen	here	implies	that	foreign	investors,	who	hold	bonds,	even	if	it	is	on	the	 domestic	 market,	 raise	 the	 volume	 of	 external	 obligations	 with	 negative	consequences	 for	 the	 financial	 as	 well	 as	 the	 exchange	 rate	 stability	 of	 the	country.	In	addition,	institutional	investors	such	as	pension	funds	usually	follow	a	buy-and-hold	strategy,	which	reduces	secondary	market	liquidity.	With	respect	to	 another	 measure	 public	 debt	 management	 faces	 a	 dilemma,	 if	 it	 wants	 to	promote	 both	 public	 and	 corporate	 bond	market	 development:	 In	 an	 effort	 to	establish	 the	domestic	market	 for	 sovereign	bonds,	 investors	might	be	granted	preferential	 tax	and	regulatory	 treatment,	which	enhances	 the	competitiveness	effect.	One	way	to	resolve	the	dilemma	might	be	to	extend	the	exceptional	rules	to	the	holders	of	corporate	bonds.	
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At	a	first	glance,	Brazil	appears	to	hold	all	qualifications	for	a	domestic	corporate	bond	market	and	one	might	be	wondering,	why	the	country	has	apparently	faced	difficulties	 to	 develop	 a	 market	 for	 securities,	 which	 could	 have	 served	 as	 an	additional	source	of	funding	for	private	companies.	One	important	reason	for	the	lack	of	such	a	market	in	several	countries	could	be	ruled	out	in	Brazil:	the	small	size	 of	 the	 economy.	 Brazil	 has	 continuously	 belonged	 to	 the	 ten	 largest	economies	 of	 the	world	 for	more	 than	 two	 decades31	and	 has	 been	 one	 of	 the	major	emerging	market	economies,	the	so-called	BRICS32,	since	the	term	has	first	been	used	by	an	 investment	manager	(O’Neill	2001),	who	didn’t	only	point	out	the	 outstanding	 regional	 position	 and	 political	 relevance	 for	 global	 issues	 of	these	 countries,	 but	 in	 particular	 their	 growing	 economic	 importance.	 As	 a	consequence	 of	 this	 investment	 recommendation,	 high	 capital	 inflows	 were	observed.	Since	Brazil	has	belonged	to	the	top-10	economies,	the	BRICS,	as	well	as	 the	G-20,	neither	 the	size	of	 the	country,	nor	 its	domestic	market	have	been	lacking	sufficient	potential	for	the	development	of	a	corporate	bond	market.	Further	important	premises	for	the	existence	of	a	domestic	market	for	corporate	long-term	debt	securities	have	been	met,	such	as	a	highly	sophisticated	financial	system,	not	only	regarding	the	banking	sector,	but	also	with	respect	to	the	capital	markets,	as	well	as	the	presence	of	large	companies	that	would	be	able	to	issue	these	bonds.	The	Brazilian	payment	system	has	been	classified	as	very	efficient,	which	 can	 be	mainly	 traced	 back	 to	 the	 high	 inflation	 period,	when	 it	 became	important	 to	 be	 able	 to	 perform	 bank	 transfers	 in	 real	 time	 (Listfield	 and	Montes-Negret	 1999).	 Moreover,	 the	 Brazilian	 banks	 have	 proven	 to	 be	 very	innovative	by	developing	and	 implementing	state-of-the-art	 technology	such	as	biometric	identification	at	ATMs	(A.	Schmidt	2013).	Not	only	the	banking	sector,	but	 also	 the	 capital	 markets	 have	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 Brazilian	financial	 system	 and	 have	 created	 very	 sophisticated	 financial	 instruments,	including	various	types	of	derivatives.	According	to	its	website33,	the	securities,	commodities	and	futures	exchange	BM&FBovespa,	which	resulted	from	a	merger	of	the	Brazilian	Mercantile	&	Futures	Exchange	(BM&F)	and	the	São	Paulo	Stock	Exchange	(Bovespa)	in	2008,	“is	now	one	of	the	largest	exchanges	in	the	world	in	terms	 of	 market	 capitalization,	 the	 second	 largest	 exchange	 in	 the	 Western	hemisphere,	and	the	leading	exchange	in	Latin	America”.	The	third	point	touched	upon,	 the	 existence	 of	 sufficiently	 large	 companies	 in	 appropriate	 number	 to	ensure	the	supply	of	corporate	bonds,	has	been	satisfied	as	well,	because	there																																																									31	Measuring	annual	GDP	in	PPP,	according	to	World	Bank	data.	According	to	IMF	data,	measuring	 annual	GDP	 in	US$,	Brazil	was	 among	 the	15	 largest	 economies	during	 the	same	period.	32	The	 term	BRICS	 stands	 for	 the	 initials	 of	 the	 five	 emerging	market	 countries	Brazil,	Russia,	India,	China,	and	South	Africa.	33 See:	 http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/en-us/bmfbovespa/sustainability/about-us/management.aspx?idioma=en-us	(date	accessed:	2016/03/11).	
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annual	disbursements	as	well	as	in	terms	of	total	assets.	For	example,	the	BNDES	disbursements	in	2014	amounted	to	US$	69.9	billion	compared	to	US$	7.4	billion	disbursed	by	the	Asian	Development	Bank	(ADB),	US$	10.0	billion	by	the	Inter-American	Development	Bank	(IDB),	US$	18.8	billion	by	the	World	Bank,	US$	78.1	billion	 by	 the	 European	 Investment	 Bank	 (EIB),	 and	 US$	 90.1	 billion	 by	 the	Kreditanstalt	 für	 Wiederaufbau	 (KfW),	 while	 the	 total	 assets	 of	 the	 BNDES	reached	US$	594.5	billion	compared	 to	US$	106.3	billion	of	 the	 IDB,	US$	153.1	billion	of	the	ADB,	US$	358.9	billion	of	the	World	Bank,	US$	594.5	billion	of	the	KfW,	US$	659.2	billion	of	the	EIB,	and	US$	1.7	trillion	of	the	China	Development	Bank39.	In	short,	few	(if	any)	national	development	banks	on	a	global	scale	were	as	relevant	for	their	domestic	economy	as	the	BNDES.	Furthermore,	the	bank	has	not	limited	its	actions	to	the	promotion	of	small	and	medium	enterprises	(SMEs),	innovative	and	high	technology	sectors,	or	other	structural	policy	measures,	but	pursued	 developmentalist	 state	 policies,	 served	 as	 an	 important	 instrument	 of	industrial	policy	and	interfered	strongly	in	private	economic	activity.	Yet,	instead	of	harnessing	the	institutions	of	public	finance	for	development	to	actively	foster	CBMD,	the	public	system	was	rather	a	competitor	of	the	corporate	bond	market,	because	 it	 offered	 (mostly	 large)	 companies	 a	 favorable	 alternative	 for	 the	funding	of	their	investment	projects.	After	 this	 short	 introduction	 to	 the	 empirical	 study	 of	 the	 development	 of	 a	domestic	 corporate	bond	market	 in	an	emerging	market	 country,	based	on	 the	case	of	Brazil,	the	remainder	of	the	chapter	is	structured	as	follows.	Sub-chapter	3.1	 gives	 a	 description	 of	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 financial	system	within	its	international,	political,	and	macroeconomic	context	and	serves	as	a	background	for	the	following	main	analytical	chapter.	In	sub-chapter	3.2,	the	relevant	 determinants	 of	 corporate	 bond	 market	 development	 (CBMD)	 are	examined	 within	 three	 sub-periods.	 The	 analysis	 of	 each	 sub-period,	 in	 turn,	comprises	a	short	overview	of	macroeconomic	and	regulatory	developments	as	well	as	the	evolution	of	the	corporate	bond	market,	which	will	then	be	explained	in	terms	of	the	 impact	of	public	debt	management,	monetary	policy,	and	public	finance	 for	 development.	 The	 closing	 sub-chapter	 3.3	 resumes	 the	 main	arguments.	




The	 following	 presentation	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 domestic	 financial	 system	together	 with	 relevant	 political,	 macroeconomic,	 and	 international	 events	 is	important	 to	 contextualize	 the	 subsequent	 analysis	 of	 corporate	 bond	 market	development	 (CBMD)	 in	 Brazil,	 because	 financial	 systems	 are	 shaped	 by	 a	specific	 history.	 This	 sub-chapter	 is	 divided	 into	 two	 sections,	 with	 each	 one	describing	 the	 development	 before	 and	 after	 the	 Plano	Real,	 respectively.	 The	first	section	gives	the	historic	context	up	to	the	Plano	Real,	so	that	 institutional	peculiarities	can	be	understood	and	factors	more	directly	linked	to	CBMD	can	be	analyzed	 considering	 how	 they	 evolved	 historically.	 The	 second	 section	describes	macroeconomic	events	in	more	detail,	serves	as	a	background	for	the	analysis	of	CBMD	in	sub-chapter	3.2.	and	is	already	structured	according	to	the	respective	 sub-periods.	 Overall,	 economic	 and	 political	 events,	macroeconomic	developments,	 policy	 changes,	 institutional	 innovations	 and	 regulatory	adjustments	are	presented	according	to	their	relevance	for	the	evolution	of	 the	Brazilian	 financial	 system,	 and	 in	 particular	with	 respect	 to	 factors	 that	might	influence	the	domestic	corporate	bond	market.	The	 relevant	 corporate	 bond	 market	 in	 Brazil	 has	 been	 the	 market	 for	debentures40,	not	only	because	they	have	been	the	only	long-term	debt	security	for	non-financial	corporations	in	the	domestic	capital	markets,	but	also	because	debentures	have	been	the	most	common	corporate	debt	securities	in	Brazil.	That	is	also	the	reason,	why	there	is	more	data	and	information	available	than	about	other	private	debt	securities.	According	to	Brazilian	legislation,	a	debenture	is	a	security	(see	law	n.	6,385/76,	art.	 2,	 I)	 based	 on	 a	 contract	 between	 the	 issuing	 company	 and	 the	 acquiring	investors	(debenture	holders	represented	by	a	trustee),	which	gives	the	latter	a	credit	 right	against	 the	 first,	according	 to	 the	 terms	 lined	out	 in	 the	 issue	deed	(law	 n.	 6,404/76,	 art.	 52).	 The	 company	 is	 allowed	 to	 issue	 more	 than	 one	placement,	 each	 one	 divided	 into	 various	 series	 (law	 n.	 6,404/76,	 art.	 53).	Initially,	 decree	 n.	 177-A	 of	 September	 15th	 1893	 had	 defined	 the	 loan	 as	 the	fundamental	 relationship	 of	 debentures,	 but	 this	 concept	 has	 later	 been	expanded	 by	 law	 n.	 6,404/76,	 which	 has	 opened	 the	 possibility	 to	 issue	debentures	that	could	be	exchanged	for	company	shares	(art.	172,	II).	Whenever	 data	 restrictions	 allow	 it	 and	 the	 additional	 information	 is	appropriate,	this	study	also	discusses	other	corporate	debt	instruments	such	as	securitized	debt,	like	the	Receivables	Investment	Fund	(FIDC41),	and	short-term	
																																																								40	Debentures,	corporate	debentures	and	corporate	bonds	will	be	used	interchangeably	throughout	this	study.	41	According	 to	 the	 Portuguese	 term	 Fundo	 de	 Investimento	 em	 Direitos	 Creditórios	(FIDC).	
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debt	securities,	like	commercial	paper42.	The	FIDC	is	a	receivables	fund,	which	is	often	 used	 by	 SMEs	 as	 it	 does	 not	 require	 the	 issuing	 company	 to	 be	 publicly	owned,	 allowing	 it	 to	 advance	 its	 clients’	 payments	 through	 the	 issue	 of	 these	papers.	A	commercial	paper	is	a	short-term	(up	to	one	year)	debt	security	and	its	market	has	grown	substantially	during	the	analyzed	period.	Other	debt	securities	are	 not	 treated	 specifically	 in	 this	 study,	 as	 they	 have	 been	 only	 indirectly	connected	 to	 corporate	 funding	 or	 restricted	 to	 certain	 sectors,	 such	 as,	 for	example,	 the	 mortgage-backed	 securities	 CRIs	 (Certificados	 de	 Recebíveis	
Imobiliários),	or	the	different	debt	securities	issued	by	financial	institutions	like	CDBs	 (Certificados	 de	 Depósito	 Bancário),	 RDBs	 (Recibos	 de	 Depósitos	
Bancários)43,	 CDIs	 (Certificado	 de	 Depósito	 Interfinanceiro)	 or	 Financial	 Bills	(LFs44).	
3.1.1 Historical	evolution	of	the	domestic	financial	system	in	Brazil	
before	the	Plano	Real	The	 focus	 of	 this	 study	 lies	 on	 the	 period	 after	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	stabilization	 plan	 Plano	 Real,	 because	 the	 most	 relevant	 developments	 with	respect	to	the	corporate	bond	market	took	place	during	these	years.	Yet,	in	order	to	better	understand	these	developments,	 it	 is	important	to	know	the	historical	and	institutional	context.	Therefore,	the	following	sub-chapters	give	an	overview	of	the	history	of	the	Brazilian	financial	system,	including	a	brief	description	of	its	most	 important	 institutions,	 with	 references	 to	 main	 economic	 and	 political	events45.	 The	 proceedings	 that	 were	 directly	 linked	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	corporate	bond	market	in	Brazil	are	given	special	attention,	which	also	explains	the	division	of	the	sub-chapters	according	to	important	changes	in	the	legislation	of	this	market.	
3.1.1.1 1st	phase:	1882	–	1965	With	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 Portuguese	 Court,	 the	 first	 Bank	 of	 Brazil	 (BB46)47	was	created	in	1808,	which	marked	the	starting	point	in	the	history	of	the	Brazilian	financial	 system.	 A	 specific	 regulation	 of	 the	 financial	 system	 only	 emerged	 in	1920/21,	 when	 banking	 supervision	 was	 institutionalized	 by	 decrees	 n.	4,182/20	 and	 n.	 14,728/21.	 The	 first	 time	 debentures	 were	 regulated,	 was																																																									42	In	the	Brazilian	 financial	market	 jargon,	 the	terms	commercial	paper,	nota	comercial	(legal	denomination),	nota	promissória	comercial	 and	nota	promissória	have	been	used	synonymously.	43 For	 a	 short	 description	 of	 the	 two	 securities	 and	 their	 main	 differences,	 see:	http://www.brasil.gov.br/economia-e-emprego/2011/09/conheca-as-diferencas-entre-cdb-e-rdb.	44	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Letra	Financeira	(LF).	45	The	historical	overview	in	chapter	3.1.1.	is	mainly	based	on	(ANBIMA	2014e;	ANDIMA	1998;	Andrezo	and	Lima	2007;	Assaf	Neto	2011;	Cadier	2011;	Fritz	1996).	46	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Banco	do	Brasil	(BB).	47	The	 Bank	 of	 Brazil	 (BB)	 known	 today	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 a	merger	 between	 the	fourth	BB	and	the	Bank	of	the	Republic	of	Brazil	(Banco	da	República	do	Brasil),	in	1906.	
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already	in	imperial	Brazil,	in	the	First	Corporate	Law	(law	n.	3,150	of	November	4th,	 1882)	 and	 the	 earliest	 legal	 document	 to	 explicitly	 mention	 the	 term	debenture,	as	a	synonym	for	bearer	bond,	was	the	law	n.	8,821	of	December	30th,	1882.	 Decree	 n.	 177-A	 of	 November	 15th,	 1893,	 known	 as	 the	 Law	 of	 Loans	through	 Debentures	 (Lei	 dos	 Empréstimos	 por	Debêntures),	 served	 as	 the	 legal	basis	 for	 the	 issuance	 of	 debentures	 in	 Brazil	 until	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 New	Corporate	Law	n.	6,404/76.	The	proceedings	in	case	of	insolvency	of	an	issuing	company	were	 set	 in	decree	n.	 2,519	of	May	22nd,	 1897.	British	 as	well	 as	US-American	commercial	law	inspired	the	legal	origins	of	debentures	in	Brazil.	During	the	transition	period	from	the	monarchy	to	the	republic,	Brazil	registered	rapid	 economic	 growth,	 but	 it	 soon	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 a	 bubble	 that	 burst	 and	eventually	 developed	 into	 a	 financial	 crisis.	 The	 period	 became	 known	 as	 the	
encilhamento	and	as	a	response	to	this	experience,	a	rigid	legislation	was	passed	that	 limited	 the	 total	 volume	 to	 be	 issued	 to	 the	 capital	 stock	 of	 the	 company.	Afterwards,	these	regulations	were	softened	again,	in	order	to	stimulate	certain	economic	sectors.	In	1933,	two	important	decrees	were	passed:	The	so-called	Usury	Law	(decree	n.	22,626	of	April	7th,	1933)	established	a	12%-ceiling	on	interest	rates,	and	the	so-called	Gold	Clause	Law	(decree	n.	23,501	of	November	27th,	1933)	prohibited	the	denomination	of	contracts	in	foreign	currency	as	well	as	monetary	adjustments	to	 exchange	 rate	 fluctuations	 or	 changes	 in	 the	 gold	 price.	 At	 the	 time,	 the	inflation	 rate	 was	 close	 to	 2%,	 so	 these	 restrictions	 didn’t	 have	 major	consequences.	However,	 due	 to	 these	 two	 decrees,	 an	 increase	 of	 the	 inflation	rate	above	12%	needed	to	be	avoided,	in	order	for	real	interest	rates	not	to	turn	negative.	 Decree	 n.	 781	 of	 October	 12th,	 1938	 regulated	 the	 interests	 of	debenture	 holders	 and	 became	 known	 as	 the	 Law	 of	 Common	 Interests	 of	Debenture	 Holders	 (Lei	 da	 Comunhão	 dos	 Interesses	 dos	 Debenturistas).	 In	 the	1930s,	 the	 Brazilian	 economy	 experienced	 an	 important	 transition	 from	 an	agricultural	 exporter,	 relying	 mainly	 on	 one	 product	 (coffee)	 and,	 thus,	 being	extremely	vulnerable	to	external	crises,	to	an	industrializing	country,	adhering	to	the	strategy	of	import	substitution	industrialization	(ISI).	Among	the	most	relevant	events	for	the	financial	system	development	 in	Brazil	during	 the	 1940s	were	 the	 enactment	 of	 decree-law	n.	 2,627/40,	 the	 so-called	Second	Corporate	Law	(Segunda	lei	das	Sociedades	por	Ações),	and	the	creation,	via	 decree-law	 n.	 7,293/45,	 of	 the	 Superintendency	 of	 Money	 and	 Credit	(Sumoc 48 ),	 which	 had	 the	 control	 over	 the	 money	 market	 and	 was	 the	predecessor	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 Central	 Bank	 (BACEN49)	 that	 was	 instituted	 two	decades	 later.	 The	 Second	 Corporate	 Law	 required,	 among	 other	 things,	 the	registration	of	a	debenture	issuance.	Decree-law	n.	7,661	of	June	21st,	1945,	the	so-called	 Bankruptcy	 Law	 (Lei	 das	 Falências),	 regulated	 creditors’	 rights	 and	proceedings	of	insolvent	companies.	Apart	from	these	legal	innovations,	Brazil	continued	to	align	its	economic	policy	according	 to	 ISI,	 which	 required	 finance	 and	 funding	 for	 medium-term																																																									48	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Superintendência	da	Moeda	e	do	Crédito	(Sumoc).	49	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Banco	Central	do	Brasil	(BACEN).	
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investment	 projects.	 At	 the	 time,	 the	 financial	 system	 was	 restricted	 to	 the	banking	sector,	which	was	unable	to	offer	adequate	financing	conditions.	Rising	inflation	rates	aggravated	the	situation.	Due	to	the	Usury	Law,	real	interest	rates	became	negative.	The	clear	preference	by	wealth	holders	 for	 tangible	assets	 to	the	 detriment	 of	 financial	 assets	 put	 pressure	 on	 the	 real	 estate	 market.	 The	rising	demand	for	credit	was	not	attended	by	banks,	but	led	to	the	emergence	of	credit	and	financing	companies,	the	so-called	Financeiras,	in	1946.	Initially,	their	intention	was	to	finance	and	invest,	but	in	practice,	their	activities	were	limited	to	the	financing	of	working	capital	for	companies	and	the	provision	of	credit	for	the	 purchase	 of	 durable	 consumer	 goods.	 The	Financeiras	had	 found	 a	way	 to	bypass	 the	 Usury	 Law	 with	 the	 creation	 of	 so-called	 Participation	 Companies	(SCP50)	whose	remuneration	was	interpreted	as	profit	and,	hence,	the	Usury	Law	did	not	apply.	Later,	bills	of	exchange	(letras	de	câmbio)	gradually	replaced	the	SCPs	as	the	vehicle	of	the	Financeiras.	Decree-law	n.	7,583/45	dealt	frankly	with	enterprises	 such	 as	 the	 Financeiras,	 determining	 that	 the	 ministry	 of	 finance	should	 regulate	 them.	 A	 more	 specific	 regulation	 was	 passed	 only	 in	 1959	(ministerial	order	n.	309	of	November	30th,	1959).	The	mechanisms	 that	companies	used	 to	 fund	 the	early	 industrialization	of	 the	country,	mainly	private	bond	and	equity	markets,	practically	disappeared	since	the	 1930s,	 after	 the	 Usury	 Law	 imposed	 interest	 rate	 ceilings	 and	 inflation	reached	two	digits,	which	was	reflected	in	the	decline	of	the	stock	of	 long-term	loans	from	close	to	20%	of	GDP	in	1914	to	below	2%	in	the	1950s	(Lazzarini	et	al.	2015,	 239).	 As	 a	 result,	 a	 public	 development	 bank,	 the	 National	 Bank	 for	Economic	and	Social	Development	(BNDES51),	was	created	in	195252.	During	the	first	years,	 it	mostly	 financed	public	 infrastructure	projects,	 leaving	 the	private	sector	without	sufficient	finance	and	funding.	It	was	a	time	of	euphoria	about	the	Brazilian	 developmentalist	 state	 policies,	 which	 realized	 large-scale	 projects,	including	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 new	 capital	 Brasília,	 and	 high	 growth	 rates	(between	1957	and	1961	the	Brazilian	GDP	grew	more	than	8%	per	year).	Nowadays53,	the	BNDES	acts	indirectly	through	certified	financial	institutions	or	directly	 through	 its	 two	 subsidiaries,	 the	 Special	 Industrial	 Financing	 Agency	(FINAME54),	which	finances	the	acquisition	of	machinery	and	equipment,	and	the	BNDES	 Participations	 Joint-Stock	 Company	 (BNDESPAR55),	 which	 subscribes	securities	 on	 the	 capital	markets.	According	 to	 its	 official	mandate,	BNDESPAR	focuses	 on	 companies	 with	 the	 prospect	 to	 enter	 the	 capital	 markets	 in	 the	medium	 term,	 including	operations	of	 internationalization,	 restructuring	of	 the	company	or	mergers	and	acquisitions,	as	well	as	on	companies	that	are	already																																																									50	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Sociedades	em	Conta	de	Participação	(SCP).	51	According	 to	 the	 Portuguese	 term	 Banco	 Nacional	 de	 Desenvolvimento	 Econômico	 e	
Social	(BNDES).	52	Its	 original	 name	 was	 Banco	 Nacional	 de	 Desenvolvimento	 Econômico	 (BNDE),	 i.e.	National	Bank	 for	Economic	Development,	which	was	 changed	 to	BNDES	by	decree	n.	1,940	of	May	25th,	1982.	53	For	an	overview	of	the	ideological	debate	about	the	role	of	the	BNDES	in	the	Brazilian	economic	development	since	the	1950s,	see	Torres	Filho	and	Costa	(2013).	54 	According	 to	 the	 Portuguese	 term	 Agência	 Especial	 de	 Financiamento	 Industrial	(FINAME).	55	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	BNDES	Participações	S.A.	(BNDESPAR).	
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publicly	 owned.	 Innovative	 small	 and	 medium-sized	 enterprises	 (SMEs)	 are	preferably	capitalized	by	the	BNDES,	as	part	of	its	mission,	either	through	direct	participation	 or	 through	 private	 equity	 funds.	 Once	 the	 investment	 is	consolidated,	BNDESPAR	usually	sells	these	securities,	because	its	participation	is	 supposed	 to	 be	 minor	 and	 transitory.	 Apart	 from	 the	 Workers´	 Assistance	Fund	 (FAT56),	 which	 is	 financed	 by	mandatory	 contributions,	 the	 funds	 of	 the	Brazilian	development	bank	BNDES	stem	from	budget	allocations,	foreign	funds	and	 the	return	of	 its	own	operations.	The	BNDES	mainly	works	with	 the	Long-term	 Interest	 Rate	 TJLP57,	 which	 is	 set	 below	 the	 base	 rate	 by	 the	 National	Monetary	 Council	 (CMN58),	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 its	 balance	 sheet,	 implying	 that	 it	uses	 workers’	 forced	 savings	 to	 supply	 companies	 with	 long-term	 funding	 at	subsidized	rates.	Although	 the	BNDES	 is	 the	main	 instrument	 of	 the	Brazilian	public	 finance	 for	development	system,	there	are	other	federal	development	banks	with	a	regional	focus,	e.g.	the	Banco	do	Nordeste	do	Brasil	S.A.,	which	concentrates	its	activities	in	the	 Northeastern	 part	 of	 the	 country,	 or	 the	 Banco	 da	 Amazônia	 S.A.,	 whose	operations	 are	 concentrated	 in	 the	 Amazon	 region.	 Furthermore,	 the	 public	finance	 for	 development	 system	 comprises	 of	 development	 banks	 on	 the	 state	level	 as	 well	 as	 specific	 development	 funds.	 There	 are	 two	more	 state-owned	banks	of	 the	Brazilian	government	 that	play	an	 important	 role	 in	 the	Brazilian	financial	 system:	 both	 the	 Bank	 of	 Brazil	 (BB)	 and	 the	 Federal	 Savings	 Bank	(CEF59)	are	universal	banks	and	rank	among	the	largest	banks	of	the	country,	not	only	measured	by	assets	but	also	by	number	of	agencies,	among	other	indicators.	While	the	focus	of	BB	is	in	retail	banking,	the	CEF	is	closely	related	to	payments	of	 the	 social	 security	 system	 and	 programs	 of	 the	 federal	 government	 such	 as	
Bolsa	Família.	With	the	beginning	of	the	inflationary	process	in	the	1950s,	the	capital	markets,	especially	 debenture	 loan	 operations,	 practically	 disappeared	 (ANDIMA	 1998,	13).	At	that	time,	mechanisms	like	indexation	that	could	protect	against	the	loss	of	purchasing	power	of	the	currency,	in	which	the	bond	is	denominated,	did	not	exist.	 Given	 these	 limitations,	 some	 short-term	 securities	 were	 issued	 with	 a	discount	on	their	nominal	value,	but	legislation	did	not	extend	this	possibility	to	debenture	placements.	As	a	consequence,	there	were	no	records	of	the	issuance	of	debentures	until	the	advent	of	the	Capital	Market	Law	n.	4,728	in	1965.	
3.1.1.2 2nd	phase:	1965	–	1976	Towards	the	end	of	the	1950s	and	beginning	of	the	1960s,	with	inflation	and	the	public	 deficit	 on	 the	 rise,	 the	 ISI	 strategy	 became	 exhausted.	Most	 economists	analyzing	 the	 situation	 of	 Brazil	 at	 the	 time	 suggested	 reforms	 in	 the	 areas	 of	financial	 market	 supervision;	 control	 of	 currency	 issuance,	 taking	 away	 the	power	of	issuance	from	the	Bank	of	Brazil	(BB);	and	the	creation	of	new	financial																																																									56	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Fundo	de	Amparo	ao	Trabalhador	(FAT).	57	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Taxa	de	Juros	de	Longo	Prazo	(TJLP).	58	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Conselho	Monetário	Nacional	(CMN).	59	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Caixa	Econômica	Federal	(CEF).	
		 109 	
institutions	 and	 new	 financing	 instruments,	 further	 strengthening	 the	 stock	market.	 Additionally,	 it	 was	 fundamental	 that	 wealth	 holders	 returned	 to	acquiring	 public	 debt	 securities,	 which	 would	 then	 serve	 as	 an	 important	instrument	to	finance	the	public	deficit	and	to	conduct	monetary	policy.	Despite	the	 consensus	 about	 the	 necessity	 of	 institutional	 reforms,	 the	 democratic	governments	were	not	able	 to	push	them	through.	Only	after	 the	military	coup	and	 by	way	 of	 authoritarian	 impositions,	 the	 reforms	 of	 the	 financial	markets	were	 realized.	 The	 implemented	 reforms	 laid	 the	 ground	 for	 the	 current	Brazilian	financial	system	(SFN60),	structuring	it	through	three	specific	laws:	law	n.	4,380	of	August	21st,	1964,	which	created	the	Financial	System	of	the	Housing	Sector	(SFH61),	 law	n.	4,595	of	December	31st,	1964,	which	also	became	known	as	the	Law	of	the	Banking	Reform	(Lei	da	Reforma	Bancária),	and	law	n.	4,728	of	July	14th,	1965,	the	so-called	Capital	Market	Law	(Lei	do	Mercado	de	Capitais).	After	the	military	coup	in	1964,	the	SFN	experienced	a	profound	transformation	process.	Before,	 the	 financial	markets	were	regulated	by	a	number	of	 laws	and	decrees	without	 the	consistency	of	a	uniform	policy.	The	newly	structured	SFN	was	composed	of	a	body	of	 institutions	that	were	part	of	the	financial	markets,	either	as	regulatory	authorities,	i.e.	regulating	and	supervising	its	participants,	or	as	 financial	 institutions,	 i.e.	 facilitating	 the	 transfer	 of	 financial	 resources	between	savers	and	borrowers	or,	 in	other	words,	between	wealth	holders	and	entrepreneurs.	Prior	to	the	Law	of	the	Banking	Reform,	Brazil	had	been	lacking	a	central	bank,	as	 various	 institutions	 had	 carried	 out	 its	 typical	 functions,	 including	 the	National	 Treasury	 (TN62),	 the	 Sumoc,	 and	 the	 BB.	 This	 structure	 was	 not	compatible	 anymore	 with	 the	 growing	 obligations	 and	 responsibilities	 of	monetary	 policy	 and	 financial	 market	 supervision.	 The	 law	 n.	 4,595/64	determined	 the	 aims	 of	 the	 currency	 and	 credit	 policy,	 and	 instituted	 the	National	Monetary	Council	(CMN)	as	the	organ	in	charge	of	 its	 formulation	and	coordination,	 while	 the	 Brazilian	 central	 bank	 (BACEN)	 became	 the	 executing	and	supervising	organ.	The	CMN	did	not	only	get	the	power	to	set	the	guidelines	in	the	fields	of	monetary,	credit,	budgetary,	fiscal,	exchange	rate,	and	internal	as	well	 as	 external	 public	 debt	 policy,	 but	 also	 to	 discipline	 the	 constitution,	operation,	 and	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 participating	 institutions	 in	 the	 financial	markets.	The	newly	defined	functions	of	the	Brazilian	central	bank	that	it	carries	out	 until	 today	 included	 i)	 the	 currency	 issuance	 and	 to	 perform	 any	 services	relating	 to	 the	money	 supply;	 ii)	 the	 formulation,	 execution	 and	monitoring	 of	monetary,	credit,	and	exchange	rate	policy	with	the	aim	to	foster	the	internal	as	well	as	external	stability	of	the	Brazilian	currency;	iii)	the	formulation,	execution	and	monitoring	of	 the	policy	reigning	external	 financial	 relations	 together	with	the	administration	and	safekeeping	of	international	reserves;	iv)	the	supervision	and	monitoring	of	 the	SFN,	 ensuring	 the	 resilience	of	 the	 financial	 institutions;	and	v)	 taking	deposits	 from	banks	 and	extending	 credits	 to	 them,	 acting	 like	 a	bank	of	the	banks.	
																																																								60	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Sistema	Financeiro	Nacional	(SFN).	61	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Sistema	Financeiro	de	Habitação	(SFH).	62	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Tesouro	Nacional	(TN).	
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Although	 the	power	of	currency	 issuance	was	 transferred	 to	 the	newly	created	BACEN,	 it	 continued	 to	 attend	 the	 necessities	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 Brazil	 (BB).	 The	untying	of	BB	from	the	currency	issuance	was	only	completed	in	1986,	with	the	extinction	of	the	so-called	Operational	Account	(Conta	Movimento)	of	BACEN.	In	 1996,	 BACEN	 circular	 n.	 2,698	 instituted	 the	 Monetary	 Policy	 Committee	(COPOM63)	with	the	purpose	to	establish	the	guidelines	of	monetary	policy	and	to	 define	 the	 base	 interest	 rate.	 The	 aim	 was	 to	 make	 the	 monetary	 policy	decision	 process	 more	 transparent.	 By	 decree	 n.	 3,088/99,	 Brazil	 adopted	 an	inflation	targeting	(IT)	regime	with	the	CMN	setting	the	annual	 inflation	target,	the	COPOM	meeting	regularly	to	decide,	according	to	the	economic	situation	and	inflation	trends,	on	the	required	interest	rate	level	to	achieve	the	inflation	target,	and	 the	BACEN	employing	 the	necessary	monetary	policy	 instruments	 in	order	to	maintain	the	market	interest	rate	on	the	level	of	the	base	rate	target	set	by	the	COPOM.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 BACEN	 became	 responsible	 for	 executing	 the	monetary	policy	according	to	the	provisions	of	the	COPOM,	which	decides	on	the	level	of	the	base	rate.	The	CMN	sets	the	inflation	target,	which	serves	as	a	point	of	departure	for	the	COPOM	meetings.	Until	May	2002,	the	BACEN	had	issued	its	own	public	bonds	to	conduct	monetary	policy.	 Afterwards,	 it	 was	 not	 allowed	 anymore,	 due	 to	 article	 34	 of	complementary	 law	 n.	 101/00,	 the	 so-called	 Fiscal	 Responsibility	 Law	 (Lei	 de	
Responsabilidade	Fiscal),	and	the	BACEN	had	to	confine	itself	to	the	exclusive	use	of	public	debt	securities	issued	by	the	TN.	Although	the	BACEN	stopped	handing	out	 loans	 to	 the	 government,	 it	 is	 legally	 not	 completely	 independent,	 because	the	 President	 of	 Brazil	 appoints	 the	 central	 bank	 president	 for	 an	 open-ended	mandate	that	can	be	terminated	at	any	time	by	the	Federal	President.	The	National	Treasury	issues	public	debt	securities	mainly	to	comply	with	fiscal	policy.	The	vast	majority	of	public	bond	issuance	is	realized	through	auctions	in	an	 electronic	 system	 of	 the	 central	 bank,	 where	 only	 licensed	 institutions	 are	able	 to	 participate.	 In	 2002,	 the	 TN	 created	 a	 program	 called	 “Tesouro	Direto”	with	the	aim	to	facilitate	the	access	to	public	bonds	for	natural	persons	living	in	Brazil	(Proite	2010).	The	secondary	market	 is	called	SISBEX64,	and	was	created	by	 the	 Stock	 Exchange	 of	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 (BVRJ65).	 Even	 though	 the	 finance	ministry	announced	the	use	of	new	names	for	the	sovereign	bonds	in	2015,	the	former	 names	 will	 be	 used	 throughout	 this	 study.	 The	 new	 names	 are	 here	displayed	in	italic	with	the	former	names	(in	parentheses):	Fixed	rate	public	bonds	
• Tesouro	Prefixado	(LTN):	Principal	and	interest	payment	on	the	maturity	date	
• Tesouro	 Prefixado	 com	 Juros	 Semestrais	 (NTN-F):	 Semi-annual	 coupon	payments	Floating	rate	public	bonds																																																									63	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Comitê	de	Política	Monetária	(COPOM).	64	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Sistema	de	Negociação	de	Títulos	Públicos	(SISBEX).	65	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Bolsa	de	Valores	Rio	de	Janeiro	(BVRJ).	
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• Tesouro	SELIC	(LFT):	Principal	and	interest	payment	on	the	maturity	date;	daily	return	indexed	to	the	base	rate	SELIC	
• Tesouro	 IPCA+	 com	 Juros	 Semestrais	 (NTN-B):	 Semi-annual	 coupon	payments;	return	indexed	to	the	inflation	rate	(IPCA)	
• Tesouro	IPCA+	(NTN-B	Principal):	Principal	and	 interest	payment	on	 the	maturity	date;	return	indexed	to	the	inflation	rate	(IPCA).		Although	 there	 already	 existed	 stock	 exchanges,	 joint-stock	 companies	 and	stockbrokers	 in	 Brazil	 before	 the	 1960s,	 the	 capital	 markets	 did	 not	 play	 an	important	 role	 in	 the	 Brazilian	 economy	 and	were	 not	 regulated	 by	 a	 specific	legislation.	This	 changed	with	 the	enactment	of	 the	Capital	Market	Law	(law	n.	4,728/65),	which	represented	a	central	element	of	the	new	regulation	of	the	SFN	and	 aimed	 at	 the	 organization	 and	 development	 of	 the	 capital	 markets	 as	 a	distinct	segment	from	the	banking	sector.	The	CMN	and	the	BACEN	were	put	in	charge	of	regulating	and	supervising	the	capital	markets.	For	example,	the	CMN	set	the	regulations	according	to	which	the	BACEN	monitored	the	stock	exchanges,	which	 nevertheless	 were	 granted	 administrative,	 financial	 and	 patrimonial	autonomy	 and	 the	 principle	 of	 self-regulation	was	 preserved.	 Brokerage	 firms	needed	 to	be	a	member	of	 the	 stock	exchange	 in	order	 to	 intermediate	 trades.	Companies	had	 to	be	 registered	at	 the	BACEN	so	 that	 their	 securities	 could	be	traded	on	stock	exchanges.	The	Capital	Market	Law	also	established	various	new	 terms	and	conditions	 for	the	issuance	of	debentures.	The	new	legislation	allowed	i)	monetary	adjustment	clauses,	removing	the	barrier	to	CBMD	created	by	the	Usury	Law	in	a	context	of	high	 inflation;	 ii)	 the	 endorsable	 form,	 which	 was	 advantageous	 compared	 to	bearer	bonds	due	to	 its	 lower	tax	burden	(from	the	investor’s	perspective)	and	because	of	its	registration	(from	the	regulator’s	point	of	view)	iii)	the	conversion	into	 company	 shares,	 iv)	 transactions	 that	 were	 detached	 from	 subscription	rights	 of	 the	 issuing	 company’s	 capital,	 and	 v)	 joint	 obligation	 of	 the	 financial	institutions	 to	 accept	 the	debentures.	 Furthermore,	 the	 law	 raised	 the	 limit	 on	the	 issuance	 volume	 by	 taking	 the	 equity	 capital	 (patrimônio	 liquido)	 as	 the	reference	instead	of	the	capital	stock	(capital	social)	and	regulated	the	procedure	of	the	public	issuance	of	debentures.	CMN	resolution	n.	18	of	February	18th,	1966	regulated	investment	banks	and	development	banks,	setting	the	parameters	for	the	provision	of	 their	 joint	 obligation	 to	 accept	debentures.	 In	1968	and	1972,	the	CMN	passed	 resolutions	n.	88	and	n.	214,	 respectively,	which	 specified	 the	registration	 requirements	 for	 public	 issues	 of	 securities,	 in	 particular	 of	debentures.	 CMN	 resolution	 n.	 109	 of	 February	 4th,	 1969	 regularized	 the	issuance	of	convertible	debentures.	The	financing	conditions	of	the	housing	sector	were	also	restructured	during	this	period,	and	the	national	housing	bank	(BNH66)	was	created	as	a	key	part	of	the	Financial	System	of	the	Housing	Sector	(SFH67),	according	to	law	n.	4,380/64.	In	1986,	the	BNH	was	liquidated	and	most	of	its	financial	resources,	stemming	from																																																									66	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Banco	Nacional	da	Habitação	(BNH).	67	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Sistema	Financeiro	de	Habitação	(SFH).	
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the	 Employees	 Severance	 Guarantee	 Fund	 (FGTS 68 ),	 the	 Savings	 Account	(Caderneta	 de	 Poupança)	 and	 other	 sources,	 as	 well	 as	 its	 functions	 and	responsibilities	were	transferred	to	 the	Federal	Savings	Bank	(CEF),	which	had	been	funded	in	1861	by	Emperor	Dom	Pedro	II	and	turned	into	the	main	agent	of	the	SFH	nowadays.	One	 of	 the	 most	 important	 tributary	 alterations	 was	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	Monetary	 Adjustment	 Law	 (Lei	 de	 Correção	Monetária)	 n.	 4,357	 of	 July	 1964,	because	the	lack	of	this	instrument	had	led	to	the	taxation	of	illusory	profits	and	had	incentivized	the	delay	of	payments.	Not	only	the	tax	collection	was	adjusted	to	 inflation,	 but	 also	 newly	 created	 public	 debt	 securities,	 the	 so-called	 Re-adjustable	Obligations	of	the	National	Treasury	(ORTNs69).	The	same	principle	of	indexation,	i.e.	monetary	adjustment,	was	applied	to	a	broad	system	of	controlled	prices	 and	 gradually	 led	 to	 the	 indexation	 of	 practically	 all	 contracts	 in	 the	economy.	 While	 the	 new	 regulation,	 allowing	 for	 monetary	 adjustments,	 i.e.	positive	real	interest	rates	even	in	a	context	of	high	inflation	rates,	resolved	some	of	the	most	pressing	economic	and	financial	issues	of	Brazil	at	the	time,	it	caused	new	problems	by	creating	expectations	of	rising	prices,	that	way	reinforcing	the	inflationary	 process.	 Several	 funds	 were	 created	 that	 served	 as	 important	sources	 of	 compulsory	 savings,	 like	 the	 FGTS,	 the	 Social	 Integration	 Program	(PIS70),	 or	 the	 Public	 Servants’	 Investment	 Fund	 (PASEP71).	While	 the	 CEF	 has	administered	 the	 assets	 of	 the	 FGTS,	 which	 played	 a	 fundamental	 role	 in	 the	consolidation	 and	 expansion	 of	 the	 SFH,	 the	 assets	 of	 PIS-PASEP72	have	 been	administered	by	the	BNDES	since	1974	and	represent	the	main	revenue	source	of	the	FAT.	New	rules	for	institutional	investors	arose	through	the	regulation	of	insurance,	capitalization,	and	consortium	operations.	On	March	13th,	1974,	law	n.	6,024	was	implemented	and	set	detailed	rules	for	the	processes	of	intervention	and	extrajudicial	liquidation	of	financial	institutions.	In	2005,	 the	New	Bankruptcy	 Law	 (Nova	Lei	de	Falências),	 law	n.	 11,101/05	was	issued	and,	by	generally	not	applying	 to	 financial	 institutions73,	maintained	 the	approach	 of	 the	 former	 legislation	 (decree-law	 n.	 7,661/45)	 of	 submitting	certain	 companies	 to	 distinctive	 regimes.	 The	 law	 n.	 6,024/74	 conferred	 far-reaching	powers	 in	 these	processes	 to	 the	BACEN,	which	had	a	 large	decision-making	scope	and	assumed	the	roles	of	 judge,	 legislator,	and	executor.	As	both	processes	 (intervention	 and	 extrajudicial	 liquidation)	 were	 extreme	 measures	with	potentially	unsettling	effects,	the	government	created	alternative	measures	with	 law	 n.	 9,447/97,	 leaving	 it	 up	 to	 the	 BACEN	 to	 decide	 which	 to	 apply.	Afterwards,	the	scope	of	measures	was	broadened	even	further	with	the	creation																																																									68	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Fundo	de	Garantia	por	Tempo	de	Serviço	(FGTS).	69 	According	 to	 the	 Portuguese	 term	 Obrigações	 Reajustáveis	 do	 Tesouro	 Nacional	(ORTNs);	 with	 the	 passing	 of	 decree	 n.	 2,283/86,	 ORTNs	 were	 renamed	 to	 National	Treasury	 Obligations	 (OTNs,	 according	 to	 the	 Portuguese	 term	Obrigações	do	Tesouro	
Nacional).	70	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Programa	de	Integração	Social	(PIS).	71	According	 to	 the	Portuguese	 term	Programa	de	Formação	do	Patrimônio	do	Servidor	
Público	(PASEP).	72	Complementary	law	n.	26/75	joined	the	two	funds	under	the	new	name	PIS-PASEP.	73	Law	 n.	 6,024/74	 set	 out	 certain	 situations,	 in	 which	 financial	 institutions	 were	declared	bankrupt.	
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of	RAET74,	PROER	and	PROES.	The	creation	of	the	Credit	Guarantee	Fund	(FGC75)	was	also	related	to	the	topic	of	financial	institutions	with	difficulties.	Although	operations	that	were	resembling	leasing	had	already	been	carried	out	during	 the	 1960s,	 it	 was	 only	 in	 1974	 that	 leasing	 operations	 were	 explicitly	regulated	according	to	law	n.	6,099.	It	is	important	to	point	out	that,	even	though	leasing	companies	were	classified	as	financial	institutions,	they	were	allowed	to	issue	debentures,	since	they	didn’t	receive	deposits	from	the	public.	Until	 the	1930s,	Brazil	 had	obtained	 foreign	 funding	mainly	 through	 loans	and	financing,	 borrowed	 in	 most	 cases	 by	 the	 federal	 government,	 states,	 or	municipalities.	In	1962,	the	Foreign	Capital	Law	(Lei	de	Capitais	Estrangeiros)	n.	4,131/62	 was	 passed	 and	 represents	 until	 today	 the	 basic	 statute	 for	 foreign	capital	 in	 Brazil.	 Later,	 the	 subject	 was	 additionally	 disciplined	 by	 CMN	resolution	 n.	 63/67	 (allowing	 banks	 to	 raise	 external	 funds76),	 BACEN	 circular	letter	 n.	 5/69	 (regulating	 bank	 accounts	 of	 non-residents77),	 and	 the	 Foreign	Capital	 Department	 of	 BACEN	 (FIRCE78)	 announcement	 n.	 10/69	 (requiring	previous	consent	of	the	BACEN	for	foreign	capital	transactions).	CMN	resolution	n.	 2,770/0079	changed	 and	 consolidated	 the	 regulation	 of	 loan	 operations	with	foreigners,	 as	 part	 of	 the	 National	 De-Bureaucratization	 Program	 (Programa	
Nacional	de	Desburocratização).	The	Foreign	Capital	Law	also	instituted	the	need	to	register	any	kind	of	international	capital	flow	and	defined	the	tax	regulations.	An	additional	tax	on	foreign	capital	remunerations	exceeding	12%	per	year	was	introduced	by	law	n.	4,390/64.	This	elevated	taxation	of	foreign	capital	was	only	removed	by	law	n.	8,383	in	1991.	In	 1975,	 the	 decree-law	 n.	 1,401	 created	 foreign	 investors’	 investment	 trusts,	which	did	not	succeed	in	attracting	large	flows	of	foreign	capital	inflows,	mostly	due	to	several	restrictions	and	the	high	taxation.	At	the	same	time,	the	state	was	able	to	attract	large	foreign	capital	inflows,	representing	a	first	wave	of	external	indebtedness,	which	was	officially	justified	as	necessary	for	the	internal	growth.	Due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 long-term	 funding	 mechanisms	 in	 Brazil,	 the	 country	supposedly	 needed	 to	 fall	 back	 on	 external	 sources,	 which	 were	 available,	because	 of	 profound	 changes	 and	 high	 liquidity	 in	 the	 international	 financial	system.	The	Brazilian	government	had	not	issued	public	bonds	abroad	for	more	than	 40	 years80,	 when	 it	 returned	 to	 international	 financial	 markets	 in	 1972,	mostly	 through	 the	 issuance	of	bonds	and	notes.	The	 first	of	 these	bond	 issues																																																									74	The	 Temporary	 Special	 Administration	 Regime	 (RAET,	 according	 to	 the	 Portuguese	term	Regime	de	Administração	Especial	Temporária)	was	 established	 by	 decree-law	 n.	2,321/87	as	a	response	to	the	difficulties	of	commercial	banks,	especially	those	owned	by	the	states.	75	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Fundo	Garantidor	de	Créditos	(FGC).	76	Hence,	„operation	4,131“	became	a	synonym	for	a	direct	foreign	loan	and	„operation	63“	for	an	indirect	foreign	loan.	77	For	a	long	time,	bank	accounts	of	non-residents	were	called	“CC5	accounts”	according	to	the	Portuguese	term	Carta-Circular	n°	5/69.	78	According	 to	 the	 Portuguese	 term	 Departamento	 de	 Capitais	 Estrangeiros	 do	 Banco	
Central	do	Brasil	(FIRCE).	79	Revoked	by	CMN	resolution	n.	3,844/10.	80	In	1931,	the	Brazilian	government	issued	a	so-called	„Funding	Loan“.	
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was	denominated	in	European	Currency	Units	(ECU)	and	the	second	in	Deutsche	Mark	 (DM)	 and	 both	 were	 placed	 on	 the	 German	 market,	 while	 a	 third	 issue	during	 that	year	was	placed	 in	 the	USA,	denominated	 in	US$.	 In	October	1973,	Brazil	participated	in	the	newly	established	Japanese	market	for	foreign	issuers.	Shortly	afterwards,	the	international	bond	market	practically	came	to	a	halt	due	to	the	oil	crisis,	but	already	in	June	1974,	Brazil	was	able	to	make	another	issue,	this	time	on	the	Arabian	market,	recycling	petrodollars.	While	all	of	these	debt	securities	were	issued	by	the	Brazilian	state,	in	1976,	for	the	first	time,	a	Brazilian	company	issued	a	bond	abroad.	The	example	was	set	by	
Companhia	Vale	do	Rio	Doce81	and	soon	 followed	by	other	Brazilian	companies,	such	 as	Petrobras,	Light,	BNDES,	CESP	 and	Eletrobrás,	 all	 of	which	were	 state-owned	 companies	 at	 the	 time.	 Just	 like	 it	 was	 the	 case	 with	 the	 public	 bond	issues,	 the	 German	 market	 was	 chosen	 for	 the	 initial	 bond	 issues	 of	 these	companies,	because	these	investors	readily	accepted	the	placement	of	Brazilian	bonds82.	 From	 that	 year	 onwards,	 Brazilian	 companies	 as	 well	 as	 the	 state	started	 to	 play	 an	 increasingly	 important	 role	 on	 international	 bond	markets.	Due	 to	 high	 international	 liquidity	 and	 low	 interest	 rates,	 emerging	 market	countries	accumulated,	less	through	bond	issuance	and	more	through	bank	loans,	large	 external	debts	during	 the	1970s,	which	 later	 caused	 severe	problems	 for	these	countries,	primarily	after	the	second	oil	crisis	in	1979.	In	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s,	Brazil	experienced	a	high-growth	period	that	became	 known	 as	 the	 Economic	 Miracle	 (Milagre	 Econômico).	 A	 successful	reform	process	and	favorable	external	conditions	were	the	main	reasons	behind	the	62.0%	accumulated	growth	of	Brazilian	GDP	between	1967	and	1973	with	average	 annual	 growth	 rates	 of	 about	 10.5%	 (Andrezo	 and	 Lima	 2007,	 85).	Inflation	rates	were	decreasing,	from	38.0%	per	year	in	1966	to	15.4%	in	1973.	In	 the	 following	 years,	 prices	 rose	 faster	 again	 (about	 28.0%	 in	 1974/75	 and	about	42.0%	 in	1976/77).	 Euphoria	 about	 the	Economic	Miracle	 raised	profits	and	 led	 several	 companies	 as	 well	 as	 individual	 and	 institutional	 investors	 to	enter	the	stock	exchanges.	At	the	end	of	the	1960s,	the	government	applied	tax	incentives	 to	 foster	 capital	 market	 development	 and	 succeeded	 in	 raising	 the	number	of	 publicly	 owned	 companies	 that	were	 registered	 at	 the	BACEN	 from	289	in	1968	to	493	in	1971.	Furthermore,	the	trading	volume	of	the	main	stock	exchanges	 increased	 significantly,	 from	 CR$	 416	 million	 in	 1968,	 to	 CR$	 2.46	billion	in	1969,	and	CR$	4.55	billion	in	1970.	In	1970-71	the	Brazilian	stock	market	grew	rapidly	and	the	fixed-income	market	became	less	attractive	(U06	2011).	Investment	funds,	which	were	subjected	to	a	more	 detailed	 regulation	 after	 197083,	 were	 obliged	 to	 invest	 at	 least	 60%	 of	their	 assets	 in	 company	 shares	 or	 convertible	 debentures,	 yet	 not	 more	 than	40%	 in	 fixed-income	 securities.	All	 of	 this	 resulted	 in	 the	1971	Brazilian	 stock																																																									81	Today	called	Vale	S.A.	82	Nowadays,	 Brazilian	 companies	 preferably	 place	 their	 bonds	 and	notes	 on	 the	Euro	Multilateral	 Trading	 Facility	 (Euro	 MTF)	 of	 the	 Luxembourg	 Stock	 Exchange,	 which	registers	the	highest	trading	volume	of	these	debt	securities,	together	with	the	London	Stock	Exchange.	83	Following	CMN	resolution	n.	145/70,	which	does	not	apply	anymore,	but	was	similar	to	current	regulation.	
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market	boom,	which	soon	turned	out	to	be	a	bursting	bubble.	As	a	consequence,	investors	fled	from	the	stock	exchanges	and	the	confidence	of	investors	had	to	be	regained,	 while	 first	 signs	 of	 rising	 inflation	 appeared.	 In	 this	 environment	 of	high	uncertainty,	together	with	the	first	oil	crisis	in	1973-74,	investors	were	not	accepting	 fixed	 rate	 debt	 securities	 anymore.	 At	 that	 time	 the	 demand	 of	 the	floating	rate	public	bond	ORTN	increased.	Despite	a	global	recession	in	consequence	of	the	first	oil	crisis,	Brazil	maintained	its	growth	path	due	to	strong	state	intervention	according	to	the	Second	National	Development	Plan	(II	PND84),	which	covered	the	period	between	1975	and	1979.	Inflation	 as	well	 as	 deficits	 in	 the	 trade	 balance	 started	 to	 pose	 a	 problem.	 In	order	to	regain	the	investors’	confidence,	the	government	tried	to	build	a	more	complex	 institutional	 framework	 for	 the	 capital	 markets	 during	 the	 1970s,	similar	to	the	restructuring	of	the	banking	sector	in	the	1960s.	
3.1.1.3 3rd	phase:	1976	–	1995	During	 the	 1970s,	 the	 sophistication	 of	 the	 institutional	 framework	 of	 the	Brazilian	 capital	 markets	 increased	 thanks	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Securities	Commission	 (CVM85 )	 and	 the	 new	 Corporate	 Law.	 The	 financial	 markets	developed	with	the	 implementation	of	 the	SELIC	together	with	a	more	detailed	legislation	 of	 the	 intervention	 and	 extrajudicial	 liquidation	 of	 financial	institutions.	 Furthermore,	 laws	 were	 passed	 to	 regulate	 leasing	 companies	 as	well	 as	 important	 institutional	 investors,	 such	 as	 private	 pension	 funds,	investment	 funds,	 and	 foreign	 capital	 flows.	Despite	 the	 efforts	 to	promote	 the	development	of	the	financial	markets,	the	state	continued	to	play	a	major	role	in	the	 Brazilian	 financial	 system	 and	 the	 economy,	 in	 general.	 The	 institution	 of	monetary	 adjustments	 was	 created	 as	 a	 means	 to	 correct	 for	 the	 distortions	caused	 by	 inflation.	 It	 was	 believed	 that	 inflation	would	 soon	 return	 to	 lower	levels	 and	monetary	adjustments	 could	 therefore	be	abolished	 shortly,	 as	well.	Instead,	 inflation	 continued	 to	 rise	 and	 ever	 more	 areas	 of	 the	 economy	implemented	 indexation	 mechanisms,	 which	 ended	 up	 causing	 distortions	themselves.	The	period	was	also	marked	by	large	external	indebtedness	and	high	capital	inflows	into	the	country.	At	 the	 time	 of	 the	 enactment	 of	 law	 n.	 4,728/65	 (the	 so-called	 Capital	Market	Law),	 no	 necessity	 was	 seen	 in	 creating	 a	 special	 agency	 for	 the	 incipient	Brazilian	 capital	markets,	 so	 that	 the	 BACEN	was	 charged	with	 the	 regulation	and	monitoring	of	 both,	 the	banking	 and	 the	 capital	markets.	The	boom	of	 the	stock	exchange	 in	the	early	1970s	changed	this	evaluation	and	the	government	perceived	 that	 the	 accumulation	 of	 these	 functions	 in	 one	 institution	 was	 not	appropriate	anymore.	A	specialized	regulating	body	for	the	formulation	of	rules	that	determined	the	issuance	and	trading	of	securities	as	well	as	the	disclosure	of	data	about	the	issuing	company	was	needed.	Therefore,	the	government	created	the	 CVM	 in	 resemblance	 to	 the	 US-American	 Securities	 and	 Exchange																																																									84	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	II	Plano	Nacional	de	Desenvolvimento	(II	PND).	The	I	PND	for	the	period	1972-74	had	pursued	practically	the	same	goals.	85	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Comissão	de	Valores	Mobiliários	(CVM).	
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Commission	 (SEC),	 by	 law	 n.	 6,385/76.	 As	 part	 of	 the	 restructured	 regulating	body,	the	CMN	defined	the	policy	to	guide	the	organization	and	operation	of	the	securities	 market,	 regulated	 the	 use	 of	 credit	 in	 this	 market,	 and	 set	 general	guidelines	 for	 the	 CVM.	 The	 BACEN	 continued	 to	 be	 responsible	 for	 the	monitoring	 of	 the	 financial	markets	 as	 a	 whole,	 but	 certain	 assignments	 were	transferred	 to	 the	 CVM,	 which	 became	 the	 agency	 in	 charge	 of	 disciplining,	monitoring,	and	developing	the	securities	markets.	The	CVM	was	created	as	an	autonomous	body,	tied	to	the	ministry	of	finance,	and	was	 assigned	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 tasks	 in	 the	 securities	 market,	 including	regulation,	 registration,	monitoring,	 imposition	of	penalties,	 and	promoting	 the	market	 development.	 It	 was	 in	 charge	 of	 lining	 out	 the	 regulatory	 framework	that	derived	from	the	new	Corporate	Law	as	well	as	from	law	n.	6,385/76.	The	CVM	 was	 responsible	 for	 the	 constant	 supervision	 of	 the	 securities	 market	activities	 and	 services,	 the	 companies	 listed	 on	 the	 stock	 exchanges,	 and	 the	divulgation	 of	 information	 about	 the	 market,	 its	 participants	 as	 well	 as	 the	traded	values.	Additionally,	it	was	expected	to	engage	in	mentoring	activities	for	the	agents	of	the	securities	markets	or	any	other	investor.	Furthermore,	the	CVM	had	 to	 manage	 the	 registration	 of	 publicly	 owned	 companies,	 the	 issuance	 of	securities,	audit	 firms,	consultants,	and	other	market	participants,	by	 lining	out	the	 specifications	 of	 the	 registration	 as	 well	 as	 the	 cases,	 in	 which	 the	registration	 would	 be	 dispensed.	 The	 supervision	 of	 the	 stock	 exchanges	 was	also	 transferred	 from	 the	 sphere	 of	 responsibility	 of	 the	 BACEN	 to	 that	 of	 the	CVM,	 which	 neither	 changed	 their	 administrative,	 financial	 and	 patrimonial	autonomy,	 nor	 the	 important	 role	 the	 stock	 exchanges	 played	 in	 assisting	 the	regulating	body	by	 supervising	 its	members	 and	 the	operations	 carried	out	on	their	market	places.	As	a	consequence	of	 the	run	on	 the	stock	exchange	and	with	 the	aim	 to	regain	wealth	holders’	 confidence	 in	 equity	 securities,	 understanding	 that	 the	 current	regulation	 did	 not	 offer	 sufficient	 protection	 to	 minority	 shareholders,	 the	government	did	not	only	create	 the	CVM,	but	also	established	a	new	Corporate	Law	 (Lei	das	Sociedades	por	Ações).	 This	 law	 n.	 6,404/76,	 amended	 by	 laws	 n.	9,457/97	 and	 n.	 12,431/11	 among	 others,	 has	 served	 until	 today	 as	 the	 legal	basis	for	the	establishment	and	operation	of	joint-stock	companies.	An	important	reform	 of	 this	 law	 was	 the	 compulsory	 monetary	 adjustment	 of	 permanent	assets	and	net	equity,	in	order	to	make	the	inflationary	impact	on	the	assets	and	liabilities	 of	 a	 company	 explicit	 and	 show	 its	 actual	 economic	 and	 financial	results86.	The	 main	 legal	 innovations	 with	 respect	 to	 debentures	 of	 law	 n.	 6,404/76	included	 i)	 the	 extension	 of	 possible	 types	 of	 debentures	 to	 be	 issued;	 ii)	 the	setting	 of	 new	 limits	 for	 the	 issuance	 volume	 of	 debentures,	 tying	 it	 to	 the	guaranty	offered,	as	well	as	the	creation	of	the	subordinated	debenture	that	had	no	 issuance	 limit;	 iii)	 the	 permission	 to	 issue	 debentures	 with	 their	 nominal	value	 denominated	 in	 foreign	 currency	 and	 their	 placement	 abroad;	 iv)	 the	creation	 of	 the	 legal	 figure	 of	 the	 trustee87	replacing	 the	 institution	 of	 the																																																									86	Law	9,249/95	abolished	the	monetary	adjustment	of	the	balance	sheets.	87	The	trustee	was	also	regulated	by	CVM	instruction	n.	28/83.	
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Common	 Interests	 of	 Debenture	 Holders	 (Comunhão	 de	 Interesses	 dos	
Debenturistas);	v)	 the	definition	of	 the	 issue	deed	registration,	according	to	 the	terms	 and	 conditions	 accepted	 by	 the	 CVM;	 vi)	 the	 provision	 that	 authorized	financial	 institutions	 received	 permission	 to	 issue	 debenture	 bills	 (cédulas	 de	
debêntures88);	vii)	the	creation	of	subscription	bonuses	that	could	be	attached	to	the	debentures	as	an	additional	advantage;	viii)	the	assignment	of	competences	to	 the	 CVM	 empowering	 the	 commission	 to	 control	 and	 set	 the	 rules	 for	 the	issuance	of	debentures.	The	 new	 Corporate	 Law	 gave	 the	 companies	 more	 freedom	 in	 defining	 the	benefits	 that	 the	 debentures	 would	 provide	 for	 their	 holders.	 Furthermore,	 it	allowed	 the	 annual	 general	meeting	 of	 a	 company	 to	 delegate	 the	 deliberation	about	 the	 possibility	 to	 issue	 debentures	 as	 well	 as	 the	 specifications	 of	 the	issuance	 to	 the	 board	 of	 directors.	 The	 new	 legislation	 also	 increased	 the	alternatives	with	respect	to	the	kind	of	guaranties	from	two	(real	or	floating)	to	the	 following	 four:	 i)	 real	 guaranty	 (collateralized	 by	 a	 specific	 right	 to	 a	 real	estate	or	other	physical	 property)	with	 the	 issuance	volume	 limited	 to	80%	of	the	value	of	the	collateral;	ii)	floating	guaranty	(collateralized	by	all	the	goods	of	the	 issuing	 company,	 ranking	 the	holder	of	 the	bond	 above	 all	 other	 creditors,	while	not	 impeding	 the	 company	 to	 trade	 its	 goods)	with	 the	 issuance	 volume	limited	 to	 70%	of	 the	 accounting	 value	 of	 the	 unsecured	 assets;	 iii)	 unsecured	(backed	only	by	the	capacity	of	the	cash	flow	of	the	issuing	company	with	equal	rights	as	the	remaining	creditors)	with	the	issuance	volume	limited	to	the	value	of	 the	 capital	 stock	 of	 the	 company;	 iv)	 subordinated	 (ranking	 only	 above	shareholders)	without	limitations	as	to	the	issuance	volume.	The	creation	of	the	CVM	as	well	as	the	reformulation	of	the	Corporate	Law	aimed	at	 strengthening	 the	 companies	 in	 the	 private	 sector	 and	 at	 improving	 the	efficiency	of	 the	 securities	markets.	On	 July	15th,	 1977,	 the	government	passed	law	 n.	 6,435	 that	 regulated	 private	 pension	 funds	with	 the	motivation,	 among	other	 things,	 to	 improve	 the	 channeling	 of	 funding	 resources	 to	 Brazilian	companies.	 The	 financial	 applications	 of	 the	 pension	 funds	 had	 to	 follow	 the	rules	established	by	the	CMN.	Closed	pension	funds	were	disciplined	by	decree	n.	81,240/78	and	defined	as	not-for-profit	organizations,	while	open	pension	funds	were	disciplined	by	decree	n.	81,402/78	and	could	be	 incorporated	either	as	a	not-for-profit	organization	or	as	a	joint-stock	company.	BACEN	circular	n.	466/79	of	October	22nd,	197989	created	the	Special	System	for	Settlement	 and	 Custody	 (SELIC 90 ),	 an	 electronic	 system	 designed	 for	 the	registration	and	liquidation	of	financial	transactions	with	public	bonds91	as	well	as	for	the	custody	of	these	securities.	The	SELIC	was	an	important	breakthrough	in	 terms	of	 reducing	 the	costs	and	risks	 involved	 in	 such	 transactions.	Prior	 to																																																									88	Term	 used	 in	 law	 n.	 9,457/97;	 before,	 these	 debenture	 bills	 were	 called	 cédulas	
pignoratícias	de	debêntures.	89	Currently,	the	SELIC	is	regulated	by	BACEN	circular	n.	3,857/12.	90	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Sistema	Especial	de	Liquidação	e	Custódia	(SELIC).	91	Initially,	 the	SELIC	was	called	Special	System	for	Settlement	and	Custody	of	National	Treasury	Bills	(Sistema	Especial	de	Liquidação	e	Custódia	de	Letras	do	Tesouro	Nacional),	because	 it	was	restricted	 to	operations	with	public	bonds,	but	 the	name	was	adjusted,	when	the	system	was	opened	to	include	interbank	deposits.	
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this,	public	bonds	were	physically	issued	and	their	custody	was	a	manual	process,	from	 the	 storage	 to	 the	 movement	 of	 one	 bank	 vault	 to	 the	 other.	 These	processes	implied	large	risks	of	fraud	or	loss,	which	led	the	National	Association	of	 Financial	 Market	 Institutions	 (ANDIMA 92 )	 and	 the	 BACEN	 to	 sign	 an	agreement	 about	 the	 development	 of	 the	 SELIC.	 In	 the	 new	 system,	 the	registered	participants	electronically	communicated	their	 trading	operations	 to	the	system,	which	then	transferred	the	bond	to	the	buyer	and	created	a	credit	on	the	 seller’s	 account.	 The	 financial	 settlement	 of	 the	 operations	 was	 charged	directly	to	the	account	of	bank	reserves	at	the	end	of	the	day	according	to	the	net	result	 of	 the	 participant.	 As	 of	 April	 22nd,	 200293,	 the	 settlement	 of	 SELIC	operations	were	processed	on	a	 real	 time	gross	basis,	which	was	an	 important	adjustment	to	the	original	design	of	the	system,	because	the	BACEN	was	not	any	longer	exposed	to	the	risk	that	an	institution	bought	a	bond,	but	actually	lacked	sufficient	reserves	to	pay	for	it.	The	new	system	also	increased	the	control	over	bank	 reserves.	 Nowadays,	 the	 SELIC	 is	 the	 central	 depository	 of	 public	 debt	securities	 and	 operates	 modules	 through	 which	 the	 public	 bond	 auctions	 are	realized.	 Furthermore,	 secondary	 market	 operations	 are	 registered	 and	liquidated.	Additionally,	the	SELIC	settles	the	rediscount	as	well	as	open	market	operations	 related	 to	 the	 conduct	 of	 monetary	 policy.	 The	 base	 rate	 SELIC	 is	derived	 from	 the	 interest	 rates	 that	 are	 charged	 during	 the	 daily	 trading	operations	 registered	 in	 the	 SELIC.	 The	 SELIC	 rate	 represents	 an	 important	benchmark	in	Brazil	as	it	reflects	the	interest	paid	on	sovereign	debt	securities.	In	the	end	of	the	1970s,	Brazil	faced	an	economic	crisis,	which	brought	external	capital	 flows	 to	 a	 halt	 and	 caused	 a	 rapid	 expansion	 of	 the	 internal	 debt.	Companies	 turned	 to	 autonomous	 financing	 options,	 such	 as	 stocks	 and	debentures,	where	the	latter	instrument	only	started	to	be	effectively	used	after	the	enactment	of	 law	n.	6,404/76.	Yet,	even	with	the	 improvements	of	 the	new	Corporate	Law	and	the	institution	of	the	CVM,	full	development	of	the	Brazilian	debentures	 market	 was,	 until	 1978,	 hampered	 by	 broad	 public	 finance	 for	development	 policies.	 While	 the	 primary	 sector	 (agriculture	 and	 mining)	received	subsidized	credits	or	nonrefundable	grants,	the	secondary	sector	(basic	industry	 and	 manufacturing	 sector)	 had	 access	 either	 to	 public	 long-term	funding	 programs	 when	 the	 company	 was	 domestically	 owned,	 or	 to	 more	favorable	 borrowing	 terms	 abroad	 in	 case	 of	 foreign	 held	 companies.	 The	construction	 industry,	 in	 turn,	 was	 linked	 to	 public	 investments	 and	 the	 SFH.	Furthermore,	a	large	fraction	of	the	companies	in	the	tertiary	sector	were	state-owned	companies	that	could	rely	on	public	resources.	Due	to	such	a	wide	range	of	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 options,	 only	 few	 companies	 opted	 for	debenture	issuance	as	a	funding	source.	The	domestic	economic	situation	towards	the	end	of	the	1970s	had	already	been	complex	 and	 instable,	when	 the	 second	 oil	 crisis	 in	 1979	 showed	 the	 external	vulnerability	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 economy.	 The	 worst	 effect	 of	 the	 crisis	 was	 the																																																									92	According	 to	 the	 Portuguese	 term	 Associação	 Nacional	 das	 Instituições	 do	 Mercado	
Financeiro	(ANDIMA).	93 	From	 that	 day	 on,	 operations	 with	 Interbank	 Deposits	 (DI,	 according	 to	 the	Portuguese	term	Depósitos	Interfinanceiros)	were	not	any	longer	processed	in	the	SELIC,	but	exclusively	in	the	CETIP.	
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increase	of	the	international	interest	rate	level	at	a	time,	when	the	Brazilian	debt	was	 on	 the	 rise,	 because	 the	 country’s	 growth	 had	 been	 based	 on	 external	financing.	When	the	Brazilian	government	turned	to	the	domestic	bond	market	to	finance	its	debt,	pressures	on	the	interest	rate	rose,	which,	in	turn,	hampered	the	economic	growth	process.	The	1980s	became	known	as	the	lost	decade,	because	the	period	was	marked	by	low	 growth	 rates	 together	 with	 increasing	 external	 debt	 and	 a	 series	 of	unsuccessful	 attempts	 to	 bring	 inflation	 under	 control	 through	 the	implementation	 of	 stabilization	 plans.	 In	 the	 financial	 markets,	 a	 few	 changes	stood	 out:	 The	 emergence	 of	 the	 futures	 and	 options	 market,	 the	 managerial	reorganization	of	the	public	financial	institutions	and	the	creation	of	the	Clearing	House	for	the	Custody	and	Financial	Settlement	of	Securities	(CETIP94)	as	well	as	the	 Appeal	 Court	 of	 the	 SFN	 (CRSFN95),	 the	 so-called	 “Conselhinho”,	 and	 the	creation	 of	 universal	 banks.	 Article	 192	 of	 the	 1988	 constitution	 regulated	 the	domestic	financial	system	SFN.	At	the	end	of	the	decade,	efforts	to	make	financial	instruments	more	flexible	showed	effects,	as	the	inflow	of	foreign	capital	into	the	country	increased.	Nevertheless,	the	financial	system	continued	overly	regulated.	In	 political	 terms,	 the	 1980s	were	marked	 by	 the	 transition	 from	 the	military	regime	to	the	New	Republic	with	the	main	goal	to	contain	inflation	and	realize	a	gradual	opening,	both	economically	and	politically.	In	1982,	with	external	credits	ceasing	and	capital	flowing	out	of	the	country,	the	Brazilian	government	decided	to	seek	support	from	the	International	Monetary	Fund	 (IMF).	During	 the	 following	19	 years	Brazil	 drew	on	 the	 IMF	 another	 17	times,	always	due	to	 insufficient	 funds	in	foreign	currency	to	close	the	external	balance.	Only	in	2005,	Brazil	paid	off	all	its	debt	to	the	IMF.	While	the	1982	IMF	program	was	able	to	revert	the	deficit	in	the	trade	balance	into	a	surplus	in	1983	and	1984,	two	key	problems	were	not	solved:	The	inflation	rate	continued	to	rise	and	the	budget	deficit	was	not	closed,	since	it	was	the	public	sector	that	needed	foreign	currency	to	pay	for	 its	external	debt,	but	the	trade	balance	surplus	was	mainly	benefiting	the	exporting	sector.	The	government	could	choose	from	three	alternatives	to	solve	the	problem,	but	neither	the	first,	to	raise	taxes,	was	a	real	option,	because	of	the	recession	and	the	already	high	tax	burden,	nor	the	second,	to	issue	currency,	because	it	would	counteract	the	inflationary	control	attempts.	Therefore,	 the	 government	 decided	 on	 the	 third	 option,	 i.e.	 to	 pay	 its	 external	debt	 by	 taking	 on	 internal	 debt,	 under	 increasingly	 bad	 conditions,	 i.e.	 ever	higher	interest	rates	and	ever-shorter	maturities.	The	 large	 supply	 of	 high-yielding	 public	 bonds	 had	 adverse	 effects	 on	 the	Brazilian	 stock	 exchanges,	 because	 of	 the	 higher	 risk	 involved	 in	 acquiring	company	shares	compared	to	sovereign	bonds.	In	1982,	the	government	created	a	 subsidiary	 of	 the	 BNDES,	 the	 BNDESPAR.	 It	 was	 supposed	 to	 temporarily	acquire	 shares	 of	 companies	 with	 funding	 needs,	 without	 assuming	 corporate	control.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 BNDESPAR	 would	 stimulate	 the	 Brazilian	 stock																																																									94	According	 to	 the	 Portuguese	 term	 Central	 de	 Custódia	 e	 Liquidação	 Financeira	 de	
Títulos	(CETIP).	95	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Conselho	de	Recursos	do	Sistema	Financeiro	Nacional	(CRSFN).	
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exchanges	by	filling	the	gap	of	the	absent	private	investor.	From	1984	onwards,	the	 stock	market	 was	 recovering	 strongly,	 mainly	 due	 to	 growth	 expectations	that	were	related	to	lower	interest	rates	and	rising	consumption	caused	by	one	of	the	economic	plans,	the	so-called	Plano	Cruzado.	However,	in	1987	the	bubble	burst	on	the	stock	exchange,	which	only	recovered	six	years	later.	The	second	half	of	the	1980s	was	characterized	by	successive	stabilization	plans,	strong	 macro-economic	 instabilities	 including	 oscillating	 inflation	 rates,	worsening	 of	 the	 public	 budget,	 exchange	 rate	 difficulties	 and	 external	 debt	restructuring.	 Within	 three	 years,	 the	 Sarney	 administration	 (1985-1990)	replaced	three	finance	ministers,	each	employing	a	different	stabilization	plan,	so	that	a	wide	range	of	measures	to	contain	inflation	were	implemented,	including	the	freezing	of	prices	and	wages,	exchange	rate	devaluations,	credit	restrictions,	and	the	creation	of	new	currencies,	but	little	was	accomplished	to	reduce	public	expenditures.	On	October	5th,	 1988,	 the	new	 constitution	was	 enacted.	 Since	 it	envisaged	a	social	welfare	state,	various	new	social	benefits	were	installed	and,	as	a	 consequence,	 fiscal	 imbalances	and	government	 financing	needs	 increased	even	further,	leading	to	rising	interest	rates	and	inflation.	The	main	innovations	in	the	financial	markets	during	the	first	half	of	the	1980s	included	regulations	about	derivatives	(CVM	instructions	n.	14/80	and	n.	19/81)	and	factoring96	(BACEN	circular	n.	703/82),	as	well	as	the	creation	of	investment	clubs	(CVM	instructions	n.	40/84,	n.	45/85,	and	n.	54/86).	During	the	second	half	of	the	decade,	the	CETIP	and	CRSFN	were	created	and	the	public	banking	system	was	restructured.	The	BACEN,	the	ANDIMA,	and	a	few	financial	 institutions	created	the	CETIP	for	the	 registration,	 custody	 and	 financial	 settlement	 of	 operations	 with	 private	fixed-income	 securities	 and	 public	 bonds	 that	 were	 not	 listed	 at	 the	 SELIC.	Established	 in	1984	and	starting	operations	 in	1986,	 it	was	based	on	a	 similar	concept	 as	 the	 SELIC,	 i.e.	 the	 CETIP	 was	 an	 electronic	 system	 related	 to	registration,	trading	and	settlement	of	assets	and	securities,	as	well	as	a	central	securities	 depository	 (CSD).	 The	 market	 immediately	 benefited	 from	 the	 new	system,	because	the	electronic	 form	made	the	physical	 issuance	and	transfer	of	securities	obsolete,	that	way	reducing	fraud	and	loss,	while	making	the	processes	more	 efficient	 and	 faster.	 The	 CRSFN,	 in	 Brazil	 called	 “Conselhinho”,	 was	instituted	 by	 decree	 n.	 91,152/85	 as	 an	 appeal	 court	 with	 the	 assignment	 to	judge,	in	the	second	and	ultimate	administrative	instance,	actions	against	BACEN	as	well	as	CVM	decisions	about	penalties,	taking	over	this	function	from	the	CMN.	In	 1986,	 the	 government	 decided	 to	 reorganize	 public	 finance	 and	 the	 state-owned	 financial	 institutions,	 resulting	 in	 the	 liquidation	 of	 the	BNH	 and,	more	importantly,	a	clear	separation	of	accounts	and	functions	of	the	BACEN,	Bank	of	Brazil,	and	the	National	Treasury.	Decree-law	n.	2,290/86	brought	back	monetary	adjustment	mechanisms,	and	in	some	sectors	even	daily	adjustments,	by	allowing	from	March	1987	onwards,	the	financial	 intermediation	and	indexation	of	OTNs,	based	on	the	variations	of	 the																																																									96	In	 Brazil,	 several	 terms	 have	 been	 used	 with	 the	 same	 meaning	 of	 „factoring“,	including	fomento	mercantil,	fomento	comercial	and	faturização.	
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BACEN	Bill	 of	 Exchange	 (LBC97).	 Public	 bonds	with	 floating	 rates	were	 able	 to	avoid	 a	 collapse	 of	 the	 financial	 system	 within	 a	 context	 of	 extremely	 high	inflation	rates,	and	allowed	the	private	banks	to	work	very	profitable	(U06	2011).	During	the	high	inflation	period,	Brazilian	banks	developed	a	lucrative	business	model:	They	received	sight	deposits	at	zero	operational	cost	and	invested	these	funds	 with	 monetary	 adjustment.	 The	 prospect	 of	 large	 earnings	 and	 a	 new	regulation,	CMN	resolution	n.	1,524/88	allowing	Brazilian	 financial	 institutions	to	 be	 organized	 as	 universal	 banks	 (bancos	múltiplos),	 resulted	 in	 the	 sudden	spike	 in	the	 founding	of	banks.	Between	1988	and	1989	alone,	more	than	sixty	new	banks	were	incorporated.	Due	to	the	strong	competition	between	the	two	main	Brazilian	stock	exchanges,	several	 spot	 market	 rules	 were	 softened	 after	 1984	 and	 the	 stock	 exchanges	adjusted	 their	options	market	 to	make	 them	more	attractive,	which	resulted	 in	highly	 leveraged	 operations.	 In	 1989,	 several	 investors	 and	 brokers	 were	 not	able	to	settle	their	operations	and	needed	to	file	bankrupt.	As	a	consequence,	the	regulation	of	the	futures	and	commodity	exchanges,	stock	exchanges,	brokerage	firms,	and	securities	dealers	was	revised	(according	to	CMN	resolutions	n.	1,645,	n.	1,656,	n.	1,655,	and	n.	1,653,	respectively,	which	were	all	passed	in	1989)	and	these	companies	were	prohibited	to	offer	their	clients	financing	operations.	Until	1980,	the	debentures	market	was	highly	concentrated,	on	both	sides	of	the	market.	About	half	of	the	bonds	were	in	the	portfolios	of	private	pension	funds	and	 the	 extinct,	 so-called	 fiscal	 funds	 157	 (fundos	 fiscais	 157)98,	 while	 the	remainder	was	mostly	part	of	the	technical	reserves	of	the	insurance	companies	and	financial	institutions,	leaving	only	about	5%	of	the	debentures	in	circulation	to	 the	 general	 public.	 Similarly,	 the	 underwriting	 industry	 was	 extremely	concentrated	with	eight	financial	institutions	attending	70%	of	the	public	issues	that	represented	80%	of	the	primary	market	volume.	During	the	first	two	years	of	the	1980s,	the	number	of	placements	rose	strongly,	and	pension	funds	stood	out	as	the	main	acquirer.	Shortly	afterwards,	the	market	stagnated	 again	 due	 to	 various	 modifications	 in	 taxation	 until,	 in	 1987,	 the	Brazilian	Central	Bank	passed	resolution	n.	1,401,	which	equated	the	income	tax	incidence	of	debentures	with	other	fixed-income	securities.	In	1988,	the	National	Debentures	System	(SND99)	was	developed	 together	by	ANDIMA	and	CETIP,	 in	order	 to	 improve	 transparency	 as	well	 as	 reliability	 in	 the	 debentures	market.	From	 1988	 onwards,	 the	 market	 for	 debentures	 recovered,	 partly	 because	 of	further	tax	adjustments	through	CMN	resolution	n.	1,562/88	that	leveled	the	tax	burden	 on	 debentures	 with	 that	 of	 the	main	 securities	 traded	 in	 the	 financial	markets	 for	 financial	 institutions	 subscribing	 or	 buying	debentures,	 and	partly	because	the	so-called	Plano	Verão	introduced,	in	January	1989,	a	wider	range	of	indices	for	the	monetary	adjustment	of	debentures.																																																									97	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Letra	de	Câmbio	do	Banco	Central	(LBC).	98	By	 investing	 in	 the	 fiscal	 funds	 157,	 which	 were	 created	 by	 decree-law	 n.	 157/67,	Brazilian	 taxpayers	 were	 able	 to	 deduct	 part	 of	 their	 income	 tax.	 In	 1984,	 when	 the	Brazilian	government	was	 in	urgent	need	of	 financial	 resources,	 it	 abolished	 the	 fiscal	funds	157	in	order	to	receive	the	full	amount	of	income	tax	payments.	99	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Sistema	Nacional	de	Debêntures	(SND).	
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Different	 stimulating	 as	well	 as	 limiting	 factors	 influenced	 the	 development	 of	the	debentures	market	during	 these	 years.	Determinants	 that	promoted	CBMD	included	i)	a	gradual	diminution	of	subsidized	credits;	ii)	tax	increases	on	credit	operations	 while	 the	 tax-exemption	 for	 the	 purchase	 and	 sale	 of	 debentures	remained;	iii)	monetary	policy	of	decontrolling	interest	rates;	iv)	restrictions	on	the	 credit	 expansion	 of	 financial	 institutions;	 and	 v)	 the	 relaxation	 of	 the	requirements	for	the	registration	of	a	publicly	owned	company.	On	 the	 contrary,	 CBMD	was	 hampered	 by	 the	 following	 factors:	 i)	 restrictions	imposed	 by	 CMN	 resolutions	 n.	 756/82	 and	 n.	 794/83,	 which	 prohibited	 the	purchase	of	debentures	by	pension	 funds	and	commercial	banks,	 as	well	 as	 an	increase	of	the	tax	burden	due	to	the	incidence	of	taxes	on	the	discount	granted	at	 the	 issuance	 of	 the	 bond,	 according	 to	 decree-law	 n.	 2,072/83;	 ii)	 the	 joint	effects	 of	 the	 moratorium	 on	 the	 Mexican	 debt,	 announced	 in	 August	 1982,	together	with	the	Brazilian	balance	of	payments	crisis	in	the	early	1980s,	caused	restrictions	 on	 the	 external	 financing	 options	 of	 the	 public	 sector,	 which	increased	competition	for	the	domestic	funding	resources.	At	the	same	time,	the	economic	 recession	 in	 itself	 was	 already	 a	 factor	 working	 against	 the	development	 of	 the	 debentures	 market	 in	 Brazil;	 iii)	 the	 compulsory	 de-indexation	of	the	economy,	implemented	by	the	Plano	Cruzado	 in	1986,	implied	that	 the	 issuance	 of	 debentures	 with	 a	 monetary	 adjustment	 clause	 was	prohibited,	 and,	 as	 a	 consequence,	 rendered	 this	 long-term	 debt	 security	practically	inoperable	when	inflation	returned.	The	 Brazilian	 Central	 Bank	 circular	 note	 n.	 1,773/90	 banned	 repo	 operations	with	 debentures100,	which	were	 instituted	 by	 CMN	 resolution	 1,088/86.	While	this	 had	 a	 negative	 effect	 on	 the	 development	 of	 the	 debentures	 market	 in	general,	 the	 authorization	 of	 debenture	 bill	 issuance	 by	 financial	 institutions	through	 CMN	 resolution	 n.	 1,825/91	 attenuated	 this	 effect.	 Elevated	 reserve	requirements	 and	 other	 restrictions	 on	 the	 asset	 and	 liability	 operations	 of	financial	 institutions	 set	 by	 the	 BACEN	 ended	 up	 inducing	 the	 issuance	 of	debenture	 bills,	 which	 had	 a	 positive	 influence	 on	 the	 development	 of	 the	debenture	 market	 as	 a	 whole.	 However,	 BACEN	 circular	 note	 n.	 2,457/94	imposed	 a	 30%	 reserve	 requirement	 on	 debenture	 bills,	 lowering	 the	attractiveness	of	this	instrument.	With	 respect	 to	 international	 financial	 flows,	 the	 1980s	 were	 also	 marked	 by	important	 changes,	 because	 countries	 like	 Brazil,	 experiencing	 external	 debt	crises,	 saw	 their	 financing	 options	 drastically	 reduced.	 While	 banks	 retreated	from	 the	 international	 credit	market,	 institutional	 investors	 from	 the	advanced	countries	stepped	in.	This	happened	in	a	context	of	increasing	globalization	and	rising	 pressure	 on	 the	 developing	 countries	 to	 adopt	 neo-liberal	 policies.	Brazilian	 securities	 were	 particularly	 attractive	 for	 these	 foreign	 investors,	which	also	opened	up	new	possibilities	for	the	Brazilian	government	to	acquire	external	 funding.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 legislation	 of	 foreign	 investments	was	
																																																								100	CMN	resolution	n.	2,675/99	 revoked	BACEN	circular	note	n.	1,773/90	and	allowed	repo	 operations	 with	 debentures,	 which	 have	 afterwards	 been	 regulated	 by	 CMN	resolution	n.	3,339/06.	
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revised	over	the	years101,	with	the	most	important	changes	implemented	in	CMN	resolution	 n.	 1,289/87102	and	 its	 annexes,	 but	 overall,	 the	 Brazilian	 economy	remained	relatively	closed,	both	in	terms	of	import	restrictions	and	with	respect	to	foreign	investors,	when	compared	to	other	countries.	A	 profound	 transformation	 process	 marked	 the	 Brazilian	 economy	 during	 the	1990s,	which	was	 characterized	mainly	 by	 the	 containment	 of	 the	 inflationary	process	 with	 the	 stabilization	 plan	 Plano	 Real,	 a	 reduced	 participation	 of	 the	state	in	economic	activities	due	to	the	intensification	of	the	privatization	process,	and	the	liberalization	process,	i.e.	a	further	opening	of	the	Brazilian	economy.	In	the	beginning	of	the	1990s,	the	Sarney	administration	handed	over	the	Brazilian	economy	 in	 a	 precarious	 condition	 to	 the	 Collor	 administration:	 The	 whole	economy	was	indexed	and	monetary	policy,	due	to	the	high	interest	level	and	the	inefficient	 use	 of	 reserve	 requirements	 in	 a	 context	 of	 diminishing	 credit	operations,	 had	 only	 one	 instrument	 left,	 open	market	 operations,	 but	 its	 use	further	nourished	indexation103.	With	the	public	deficit	reaching	8%	of	GDP	and	the	 government	 losing	 credibility,	 the	 National	 Treasury	 faced	 difficulties	 to	place	public	bonds	in	the	primary	market,	so	that	the	government	opted	for	the	issuance	of	currency	to	pay	for	the	public	debt,	which	further	pushed	up	inflation.	The	 Collor	 administration	 (1990-1992)	 implemented	 a	 stabilization	 plan	 that	was	based	on	a	new	diagnosis	of	the	inflationary	process,	detecting	the	high	and	rising	liquidity	of	financial	assets	as	the	root	of	the	problem.	The	proposed	and	implemented	 solution	was	 to	block	access	 to	 any	kind	of	 financial	 assets	 (cash	withdrawals	were	only	allowed	up	to	a	small	amount)	and	to	freeze	prices	and	wages,	 but	 within	 a	 few	 months,	 the	 situation	 deteriorated	 because	 the	government	had	not	created	the	necessary	conditions	for	the	de-indexation	and	the	economic	adjustment.	Apart	 from	attempts	to	bring	 inflation	under	control,	the	Collor	administration	tried	to	modernize	the	country	and	to	reform	the	state.	The	 presidency	 of	 Fernando	 Collor	 ended	with	 his	 impeachment	 and	 his	 vice-president,	 Itamar	 Franco,	 took	 over	 what	 became	 a	 transitional	 government	(1992-1994)	 with	 several	 finance	 ministers,	 among	 them	 the	 next	 president,	Fernando	Henrique	Cardoso	(FHC),	who	was	in	office	between	1995	and	2003.	Part	of	the	liberalization	process	was	also	the	opening	of	the	domestic	financial	markets,	 which	 substantially	 changed	 the	 scenario	 of	 the	 1980s	 when	 capital	flows	into	Brazil	were	on	a	low	level.	The	financial	liberalization	was	also	driven	by	 the	 external	 environment,	 which	 offered	 more	 funding	 resources	 at	 lower	costs	compared	to	the	earlier	period,	opening	up	possibilities	to	renegotiate	the	external	debt.	The	Brazilian	government	created	not	only	new	means	to	capture	external	resources,	but	also	interesting	investment	opportunities	in	the	course	of	the	 privatization	 process.	 With	 the	 successful	 stabilization	 of	 the	 Brazilian	economy	in	the	middle	of	the	1990s,	the	country	became	even	more	attractive.	
																																																								101	See,	for	example,	CMN	resolutions	n.	790/83	and	n.	1,224/86.	102	CMN	resolution	n.	1,289/87	was	revoked	by	CMN	resolution	n.	4,373/14,	which	has	since	regulated	foreign	investments	in	the	Brazilian	financial	and	capital	markets.	103	The	 BACEN	 created	 with	 its	 open	 market	 operations	 overnight	 interest	 rates	 that	were	based	on	current	inflation	expectations.	
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During	 the	1980s,	 the	 role	of	 the	 state	 in	 the	Brazilian	economy	had	only	very	timidly	 been	 reduced,	 but	 that	 changed	 with	 the	 National	 Program	 of	Denationalization	 (PND104)	of	 the	Collor	administration,	provided	 for	by	 law	n.	8,031/90,	which	was	later	revoked	under	the	Cardoso	administration	by	law	n.	9,491/97	providing	for	the	new	PND.	The	PND	aimed	at	repositioning	the	state	in	the	economy,	reducing	the	public	debt,	and	incentivizing	private	investments,	in	 order	 to	 make	 funding	 for	 Brazilian	 companies	 available,	 to	 increase	international	competitiveness,	and	to	modernize	the	 industrial	 facilities.	Hence,	the	promotion	of	 capital	market	development	 through	 the	additional	 supply	of	securities	and	the	democratization	of	the	capital	ownership	played	a	key	part	in	the	PND.	The	BNDES	was	assigned	to	realize	the	privatizations.	The	participation	of	domestic	and	foreign	wealth	holders	as	investors	in	the	privatization	process	was	 facilitated	 by,	 respectively,	 the	 creation	 of	 Privatization	 Mutual	 Funds	 –	Privatization	 Certificates	 (see	 CVM	 instruction	 n.	 141/91)	 and	 Privatization	Funds	–	Foreign	Capital	(see	CMN	resolution	n.	1,806/91).	While	foreign	wealth	holders	only	contributed	about	5%	of	the	total	amount	invested	in	privatizations	during	 the	 years	 1990-1994,	 this	 share	 increased	 significantly	 in	 the	 following	years.	 The	 privatization	 process	 in	 general	 was	 intensified	 after	 the	implementation	 of	 the	 Plano	 Real	 in	 1995,	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 increased	economic	stability,	constitutional	reforms	(mainly	those	aiming	at	the	break-up	of	monopolies),	and	a	greater	political	support	for	the	PND.	The	Brazilian	stock	market	remained	bearish,	because	wealth	holders	preferably	invested	in	fixed-income	securities	due	to	the	widespread	monetary	adjustment	mechanisms,	and	the	situation	on	the	stock	market	worsened	even	further	with	the	drastic	decrease	 in	 liquidity	of	 the	Plano	Collor.	Circumstances	 improved	 in	1992,	 when	 international	 investors	 started	 to	 show	 interest	 in	 the	 Brazilian	stock	 exchanges	 due	 to	 the	 low	 share	 prices	 of	 Brazilian	 companies	 and	 the	privatization	 process.	 Additionally,	 the	 BNDESPAR	 intensified	 its	 purchases	 of	company	shares	as	well	as	debentures,	taking	the	role	of	the	still	absent	private	investor	and	playing	an	important	part	in	the	privatization	process.	Several	 innovations	 in	 the	 Brazilian	 financial	 system	 were	 introduced	 by	 the	promulgation	of	 law	n.	8,078/90,	the	Code	of	Consumer	Protection	(CDC105).	 In	2001,	the	CMN	passed	resolution	n.	2,878,	which	was	called	the	Code	of	Banking	Consumer	Protection	(Código	de	Defesa	do	Consumidor	Bancário).	The	 following	modifications	 also	 contributed	 to	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 capital	markets:	With	the	passing	of	law	n.	8,021/90,	anonymity	in	the	financial	markets	was	 prohibited,	 i.e.	 payment	 or	 redemption	 of	 any	 security	 or	 financial	application	to	an	anonymous	beneficiary	was	not	allowed,	which	also	abolished	bearer	 bonds.	 CMN	 resolution	 n.	 1,723/90	 defined	 a	 commercial	 paper	 as	 a	marketable	 security,	 if	 it	 was	 issued	 by	 a	 publicly	 owned	 company	 (excluding	financial	 institutions)	 and	 designed	 for	 a	 public	 offer.	 That	 way,	 an	 already	existing	credit	instrument	was	turned	into	a	debt	security	with	access	to	funding	resources	from	the	general	public.	A	new	regulation	of	the	real	estate	investment	funds	(fundos	de	investimento	imobiliário)	was	passed	(see	law	n.	8,668/93,	CVM	instruction	n.	205/94,	and	CMN	resolution	n.	2,248/96).																																																									104	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Programa	Nacional	de	Desestatização	(PND).	105	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Código	de	Defesa	do	Consumidor	(CDC).	
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In	the	1990s,	rules	were	 introduced	to	govern	the	securitization	of	receivables,	which	 was	 a	 structured	 financial	 operation	 involving	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 special	purpose	 company	 (SPC)	 that	 issued	marketable	 securities,	which	were	 usually	debentures.	 These	 debentures	 were	 backed	 by	 receivables	 of	 the	 originating	company	that	sold	the	receivables	to	the	SPC.	The	first	rules	about	securitization	in	Brazil	emerged	in	1991,	when	CMN	resolution	n.	1,834	allowed	securitization	of	export	receivables.	CMN	resolution	n.	2,026/93	established	trade-	and	service	receivables.	 In	1997,	 law	n.	 9,514	 created	 real	 estate	 receivables,	 and	 in	1998,	CMN	resolution	n.	2,493	instituted	banking	receivables.	CMN	resolution	n.	63/67	was	the	main	vehicle	to	raise	foreign	capital	until	1988,	when	other	instruments,	such	as	commercial	paper,	bonds	and	notes,	started	to	be	more	commonly	used	as	well.	Additional	options	were	regulated	and	inserted	as	 annexes	 to	 CMN	 resolution	 n.	 1,289/87,	 including	 the	 Securities	 Portfolio	(Anexo	IV	–	Carteira	de	Valores	Mobiliários),	 the	Depository	Receipts	 (Anexo	V	–	
Depository	 Receipts),	 and	 the	 Foreign	 Capital	 Fixed-Income	 Fund	 (Anexo	 VI	 –	
Fundo	 de	 renda	 fixa	 –	 capital	 estrangeiro),	 as	 provided	 by	 CMN	 resolutions	 n.	1,832/91,	n.	1,927/92,	and	n.	2,028/93,	respectively.	The	Plano	Real106	was	 implemented	 in	 1994	 and	 initiated	 a	 new	 era	 in	 Brazil.	FHC’s	plan	to	use	a	currency	unit	parallel	to	the	old	currency	for	a	certain	time,	before	actually	implementing	a	new	currency,	which	was	tied	to	the	US$,	turned	out	to	work	well	 for	Brazil:	For	the	 first	 time	 in	decades	 inflation	rates	sank	to	sustainable	 levels	and	stayed	under	control	ever	 since.	 Its	primary	goal	was	 to	cut	down	inflation,	and	in	this	sense	one	may	call	the	Plano	Real	successful.	The	 Plano	 Real	 was	 less	 successful	 in	 creating	 a	 stable	 macroeconomic	environment	 and	 prosperous	 growth	 rates,	 which	 lagged	 far	 behind	 the	economic	 growth	 rates	 achieved	 during	 the	 Economic	 Miracle.	 The	 average	growth	 rate	 between	 1947	 and	 1980	 was	 7.1%,	 contrasting	 with	 an	 average	growth	rate	of	only	2.6%	between	1981	and	2008	(Paula	and	Faria	Jr.	2012,	111).	Some	of	 the	 reasons	 for	 the	 low	growth	 rate	were	high	 inflation,	high	external	vulnerability,	 and	 elevated	 real	 interest	 rates	 (about	 11%	 between	 1990	 and	2006).	Furthermore,	 investment	rates	remained	below	20%	of	GDP	since	1996,	considerably	 lower	 than	 the	 average	 investment	 rate	 of	 about	 25%	during	 the	1970s.	The	Brazilian	economy	was	marked	by	macroeconomic	 instability	 since	the	 1980s,	 expressed	 in	 stop-and-go	 cycles,	which	 increased	 uncertainties	 and	discouraged	 greater	 expectation	 horizons	 for	 investors	 and	 companies	 alike	(Paula	et	al.	2009).	The	high	degree	of	uncertainty	was	the	main	reason	for	the	short-term	nature	of	the	Brazilian	debt,	which	was	to	a	large	degree	also	indexed	to	an	overnight	interest	rate.	On	the	one	hand,	the	Brazilian	financial	system	could	be	considered	very	efficient	from	a	microeconomic	point	of	view,	mainly	in	terms	of	its	operational	efficiency																																																									106	The	Plano	Real	was	an	economic	stabilization	program	initiated	by	President	Itamar	Franco	on	February	27th	1994	through	provisional	measure	n.	434,	which	was	converted	into	 law	n.	8,880	on	May	27th	1994.	On	 June	29th	1994	President	Franco	 implemented	new	 rules	 through	 provisional	 measure	 n.	 539,	 which	 exactly	 one	 year	 later,	 was	converted	 under	 the	 new	 President	 Fernando	 Henrique	 Cardoso	 into	 the	 law	 n.	9,069/95:	the	Plano	Real	Law.	
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and	the	sophistication	of	its	banking	technology	(Hermann	and	Paula	2011,	2–3).	The	banking	sector	developed	one	of	the	most	advanced	clearing	systems	of	the	world	 and	 the	 domestic	 financial	 markets	 created	 some	 very	 sophisticated	financial	instruments,	including	various	types	of	derivatives.	On	the	other	hand,	the	 Brazilian	 financial	 system	 could	 not	 be	 considered	 efficient	 from	 a	macroeconomic	point	of	view,	because	it	was	not	functional	to	development.	The	main	shortcoming	was	related	to	its	inability	to	provide	for	sufficient	long-term	finance	and	funding.	The	following	subchapters	give	an	overview	of	the	political,	international	and	economic	context	of	 the	post-Plano	Real	period,	which	serves	as	 a	 background	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 development	 of	 the	 market	 for	debentures,	one	of	the	main	funding	instruments	in	Brazil.	
3.1.2 Two	decades	of	Brazilian	financial	system	development	and	
macroeconomic	performance	Building	on	 the	previous	 sub-chapter	3.1.1.,	which	has	described	 the	historical	evolution	 of	 the	 domestic	 financial	 system,	 the	 institutional	 set-up,	 and	 the	regulatory	framework	in	Brazil	up	to	the	Plano	Real,	this	sub-chapter	outlines	the	economic,	political,	and	international	context	of	the	development	of	the	financial	system	with	a	special	focus	on	possible	determinants	of	corporate	bond	market	development	in	Brazil	during	the	analyzed	period	between	1995	and	2014.	The	subsequent	chapter	3.2.	 is	based	on	 the	macroeconomic	overview	presented	 in	this	 section	 and	 is	 equally	 divided	 into	 three	 parts,	 covering	 the	 same	 sub-periods	(1995-2003,	2004-2008,	2009-2014)	according	to	important	changes	in	the	debentures	markets.	
3.1.2.1 1995-2003:	stop-and-go	policies	and	macroeconomic	
instabilities	The	aim	of	the	Plano	Real	was	to	contain	inflation	and	the	proposal	was	based	on	three	pillars,	namely	an	exchange	 rate	anchor,	 restrictive	monetary	policy,	 and	fiscal	discipline107.	With	the	intensification	of	the	liberalization	and	privatization	processes,	 and	 due	 to	 the	 increased	 macroeconomic	 stability,	 large	 capital	inflows	 were	 registered,	 from	 1995	 onwards.	 While	 this	 not	 only	 helped	 to	accumulate	 foreign	 exchange	 reserves,	 necessary	 for	 the	 BACEN	 to	 conduct	monetary	 and,	 in	 particular,	 exchange	 rate	 policy,	 but	 also	 financed	 rising	imports,	which	caused	a	trade	deficit,	 the	situation	would	not	be	sustainable	 in	the	long-run,	because	capital	inflows	required	financial	returns	in	the	future,	yet	the	 imports	 were	 mostly	 composed	 of	 consumption	 goods	 and	 not	 used	 for	productive	 investments.	 Further	 aggravating	 the	 situation,	 the	 capital	 inflows	were	 mostly	 of	 short-term	 nature	 and	 could	 leave	 the	 country	 as	 soon	 as	expectations	would	turn	negative.	
																																																								107	Chapter	3.1.2.1.	 is	mainly	based	on	(ANBIMA	2014e;	Andrezo	and	Lima	2007;	Assaf	Neto	2011;	Cadier	2011).	
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The	 drastic	 reduction	 of	 the	 inflation	 was	 accompanied	 by	 moderate	 growth	rates,	 rising	 unemployment,	 trade	 deficits	 and	 a	 harsh	 increase	 of	 the	 public	deficit	and	the	public	debt,	during	the	second	half	of	the	1990s.	Due	to	the	strong	dependence	 on	 foreign	 capital	 inflows,	 the	model	 of	 the	Plano	Real	was	 put	 at	risk	every	time	a	new	crisis	broke	out	in	the	world.	The	reaction	of	the	Brazilian	government	 to	 the	 successive	 crises	 in	Mexico	 (1994),	Asia	 (1997),	 and	Russia	(1998)	was	to	raise	the	interest	rate	in	order	to	attract	foreign	investors	and	to	avoid	the	devaluation	of	the	Brazilian	currency.	Yet,	this	turned	out	to	be	a	trap,	because	 the	 increase	 of	 the	 interest	 rate	 deteriorated	 the	 public	 finances	 even	further.	 This	 scenario	 persisted	 until	 January	 1999,	 when	 the	 Brazilian	 real	strongly	devalued	and	the	exchange	rate	anchor	was	substituted	for	an	inflation	targeting	regime.	The	transition	went	smoother	than	most	analysts	had	expected	and	 international	 investors	 soon	 returned	 to	 show	 their	 confidence	 in	 the	Brazilian	economy.	Although	 a	 complete	 fiscal	 reform	 has	 not	 yet	 been	 implemented,	 some	important	 efforts	 to	 balance	 the	 public	 budget	 have	 been	made,	 including	 the	administrative	and	pension	reforms	 in	1998,	 the	Fiscal	Responsibility	Law	(Lei	
de	Responsabilidade	Fiscal)	 in	2000,	and	another	pension	reform	 in	2003.	With	respect	 to	 the	 financial	 markets,	 several	 measures	 were	 implemented	 to	restructure	 and	 strengthen	 the	Brazilian	 financial	 system,	because	 the	banking	sector	 experienced	 great	 difficulties	 in	 adjusting	 to	 the	 new	 economic	environment	with	a	lot	lower	inflation	rates	and	increased	competition	of	foreign	banks	due	to	the	financial	liberalization.	The	adopted	measures	encompassed	the	ratification	 of	 the	 Basel	 Capital	 Accord	 in	 1994108,	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Credit	Guaranty	Fund	(FGC109)	in	1995110,	the	same	year	that	the	government	installed	the	Program	for	Stimulating	the	Restructuring	and	Strengthening	of	the	National	Financial	System	(PROER111)112,	which	incentivized	a	higher	concentration	in	the	banking	 sector	 and	 facilitated	 mergers	 and	 acquisitions	 of	 institutions	 in	difficulty,	the	Program	for	Encouraging	a	Reduction	in	the	Participation	of	state-owned	 Banks	 in	 the	 Financial	 System	 (PROES113),	 which	 was	 introduced	 in	1996114,	 the	 realization	 of	 the	 Strengthening	 Program	 for	 Federal	 Financial	Institutions	 (PROEF115)	 in	 2001116,	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Credit	 Risk	 System	(Central	de	Risco	de	Crédito)	in	1997117,	which	has	later	been	renamed	to	Credit																																																									108	The	CMN	resolution	n.	2,099/94	established	the	methodology	of	minimum	reserves	in	Brazil.	109	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Fundo	Garantidor	de	Crédito	(FGC).	110	Established	by	CMN	resolutions	n.	2,197/95	and	n.	2,211/95.	111	According	 to	 the	 Portuguese	 term	 Programa	 de	 Estímulo	 à	 Reestruturação	 e	 ao	
Fortalecimento	do	Sistema	Financeiro	Nacional	(PROER).	112	Regulated	by	BACEN	provisional	measure	n.	1,179/95	and	 the	BACEN	resolution	n.	2,208/95.	113	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Programa	de	Incentivo	à	Redução	do	Setor	Público	
Estadual	na	Atividade	Bancária	(PROES).	114	Regulated	by	provisional	measure	n.	1,514/96,	CMN	resolution	n.	2,365/97	and	the	BACEN	circulars	n.	2,742/97,	n.	2,744/97	and	n.	2,745/97.	115 	According	 to	 the	 Portuguese	 term	 Programa	 de	 Fortalecimento	 das	 Instituições	
Financeiras	Federais	(PROEF).	116	Regulated	by	provisional	measure	n.	2,155/01.	117	Regulated	by	CMN	resolution	n.	2,390/97.	
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Information	 System	 (SCR118),	 the	 establishment	 of	 compliance	 requirements	 in	1998119	and	the	need	to	install	the	so-called	Chinese	Wall,	segregating	the	asset	management	area,	in	the	end	of	the	1990s120.	As	a	result,	the	SFN	experienced	a	concentration	 in	 the	 banking	 sector,	 with	 a	 reduction	 of	 the	 participation	 of	public	banks,	especially	those	owned	by	the	federal	states,	and	an	increase	of	the	share	of	foreign	banks.	During	 this	 period,	 new	 regulation	 was	 also	 implemented	 that	 applied	 to	institutional	 investors121,	 especially	 the	 investment	 funds	 and	 private	 pension	funds.	 This	 complementary	 pension	 fund	 system	 grew	 strongly,	 because	 the	public	pensions	were	reduced	in	response	to	growing	deficits	and	the	stabilized	economy	 allowed	 for	 longer-term	 plans	 of	 individuals,	 which	 caused	 rising	demand	 for	 different	 private	 pension	 plans.	 The	 Brazilian	 Settlement	 and	Custody	Company	(CBLC122)	was	created	in	1997	as	a	demerger	of	the	Bovespa,	which	previously	 realized	 the	settlement	and	custody	of	 shares.	The	CBLC	also	offered	 this	 service	 for	 other	 types	 of	 securities,	 including	 debentures,	 and	executed	the	trades	according	to	the	SFI-DVP	standard	(Simultaneous,	Final	and	Irrevocable	Delivery	vs.	Payment).	Other	legal	innovations	included	the	creation	of	 Brazilian	 Depository	 Receipts	 (BDRs)	 by	 CMN	 resolution	 n.	 2,318/96,	 the	enactment	 of	 the	 Money	 Laundering	 Law	 (Lei	 de	 “Lavagem”	 de	 Dinheiro)123	in	1998,	 and	 the	 reform	 (according	 to	 laws	 n.	 9,447/97	 and	 n.	 9,457/97)	 of	 the	Capital	Market	Law	and	the	Corporate	Law.	Law	n.	9,447/97	redefined	the	legal	competences	of	the	BACEN	and	the	CVM	over	the	financial	institutions	and	law	n.	9,457/97	strengthened	the	CVM	in	its	important	surveillance	role	and	facilitated	the	 restructuring	 and	 privatization	 of	 companies.	 In	 order	 to	 facilitate	 these	processes,	 the	 law	 restricted	 or	 even	 eliminated	 a	 large	 range	 of	 minority	shareholders’	rights,	which	was	highly	criticized	and	led	to	the	re-adjustment	of	several	 rules	 that	 had	 been	 implemented	 by	 law	 n.	 9,457/97,	 when	 laws	 n.	10,194/01	and	10,303/01	became	enacted	in	a	context	of	higher	concerns	about	corporate	governance.	The	public	pension	scheme	accumulated	rising	deficits	from	1995	onwards	and	was	reformed	by	the	constitutional	amendment	n.	20	in	1998.	That	year	was	an	election	year	 and	president	Fernando	Henrique	Cardoso	was	 re-elected	 for	his	second	term.	 In	2003,	another	pension	reform,	this	 time	with	a	 focus	on	public	servants,	 was	 passed	 by	 constitutional	 amendment	 n.	 41,	 accompanied	 by	constitutional	 amendment	 n.	 47/05.	 Although	 the	 pension	 reforms	 lowered	payments	to	the	beneficiaries,	 the	financial	health	of	 the	public	pension	system	was	only	partially	restored.	The	decrease	 in	public	pension	payments	added	to	the	increased	demand	for	private	pension	funds,	which	could	also	be	attributed	to	 tax	 benefits	 and,	 most	 importantly,	 to	 the	 end	 of	 the	 high	 inflation	 period,																																																									118	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Sistema	de	Informações	de	Crédito	(SCR).	119	Regulated	by	CMN	resolution	n.	2,554/98.	120	Regulated	by	CMN	resolution	n.	2,451/97	and	n.	2,486/98.	121	Since	2002,	all	investment	funds	fall	under	the	regulation	and	supervision	of	the	CVM,	as	determined	by	law	n.	10,303/01	and	BACEN/CVM	joint	decision	n.	10/02.	122	According	 to	 the	 Portuguese	 term	 Companhia	 Brasileira	 de	 Liquidação	 e	 Custódia	(CBLC).	123	Law	n.	9,613/98.	
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which	 decreased	 uncertainties	 and	 therefore	 allowed	 wealth	 holders	 to	 take	longer-term	investment	decisions,	as	opposed	to	before,	when	the	main	concern	was	almost	exclusively	 focused	on	avoiding	 the	 loss	of	value	 in	 the	short	 term.	Among	 the	 newly	 established	 private	 pension	 funds	 were	 the	 Individually	Scheduled	 Pension	 Fund	 (FAPI124),	 regulated	 by	 law	 n.	 9,477/97	 and	 CMN	resolution	 n.	 2,424/97,	 the	 Free	 Benefit	 Generator	 Plan	 (PGBL125),	 created	 in	1997126,	and	the	Free	Benefit	Generating	Life	Insurance	plan	(VGBL127),	created	in	2001128.	In	2001,	complementary	law	n.	109	revoked	law	n.	6,435/77	and	set	new	rules	for	private	pension	funds.	Although	 foreign	 investments	 increased,	 the	 situation	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 capital	markets	 became	 critical	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1990s	 and	 beginning	 of	 the	2000s.	Both,	 the	number	of	publicly	owned	companies	and	the	value	traded	on	the	 stock	 markets	 diminished	 each	 year.	 Possible	 explanations	 for	 these	problems	 included	 the	 incidence	 of	 the	 financial	 transactions	 tax	 CPMF129	on	transactions	 in	 the	Brazilian	 stock	 exchanges	 (contributing	 to	 the	migration	 of	several	companies	to	 issue	their	securities	abroad),	poor	corporate	governance	rules	 (as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 legislation	 passed	 in	 1997	 to	 facilitate	 privatizations),	and	the	high	level	of	the	interest	rate.	After	two	years	of	stagnation	(GDP	growth	in	1998:	0.2%	and	in	1999:	0.8%),	the	Brazilian	economy	grew	4.5%	in	2000	in	a	more	favorable	international	environment	and	decreasing	inflation	rates,	which	allowed	monetary	policy	to	not	only	lower	the	base	rate	SELIC,	but	also	to	loosen	reserve	 requirements.	 In	 2001,	 the	 situation	 already	 worsened	 again.	 A	combination	 of	 factors	 contributed	 to	 the	 low	 GDP	 growth	 rate,	 which	 only	reached	1.3%.	The	build-up	of	the	Argentinian	crisis	had	negative	effects	on	the	Brazilian	exports	and	exchange	rate,	which	also	suffered	from	the	skyrocketing	US	 dollar.	 An	 electric	 energy	 crisis,	 including	 energy	 rationing,	 caused	 a	reduction	 of	 consumption	 and	 investment	 and	 an	 increase	 of	 prices.	 Although	interest	rates	were	raised	again,	international	investors	withdrew	their	capital	in	what	 became	 known	 as	 a	 flight	 to	 quality,	 also	 due	 to	 a	 slowdown	 of	 world	economic	 growth.	 The	 proximity	 to	 the	 presidential	 elections	 created	 further	uncertainties.	Although	the	inflation	rate	started	to	increase,	it	remained	within	the	target	range.	The	GDP	 growth	 rate	 stayed	on	 a	 relatively	 low	 level	 in	 2002	 (1.5%)	due	 to	 a	decline	of	foreign	capital	inflows	and	the	repercussions	of	the	electoral	process.	The	prospect	of	the	presidential	candidate	of	the	Workers’	Party	(PT130)	Lula131	winning	deterred	investors,	because	they	were	afraid	that	he	would	implement	radical	changes	 in	the	economic	policy	of	 the	country.	With	capital	 flowing	out,	the	exchange	rate	 further	deteriorated,	also	causing	an	 increase	of	 the	 inflation																																																									124	According	 to	 the	 Portuguese	 term	 Fundo	 de	 Aposentadoria	 Programada	 Individual	(FAPI).	125	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Plano	Gerador	de	Benefício	Livre	(PGBL).	126	Regulated	by	CNSP	resolution	n.	6/97	and	SUSEP	circular	n.	33/98.	127	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Vida	Gerador	de	Benefício	Livre	(VGBL).	128	Regulated	by	CNSP	resolution	n.	49/01.	129 	According	 to	 the	 Portuguese	 term	 Contribuição	 Provisória	 sobre	 Movimentação	
Financeira	(CPMF).	130	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Partido	dos	Trabalhadores	(PT).	131	Luis	Inácio	Lula	da	Silva,	known	as	Lula.	
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rate.	 When	 Lula	 took	 over	 the	 presidency	 from	 FHC	 in	 2003,	 the	 economic	situation	 of	 Brazil	 was	 still	 marked	 by	 its	 elevated	 risk	 premium,	 less	 foreign	capital	 available,	 a	 devaluating	 currency,	 and	 rising	 inflation.	 Against	 this	background,	monetary	policy	kept	its	focus	on	price	stability	and	the	orientation	of	economic	policy	was	maintained,	as	well.	As	a	result,	 inflation	decreased	and	the	economy	resumed	its	growth	path	in	the	second	semester,	but	nevertheless	the	GDP	fell	0.2%	in	2003.	The	activity	level	continued	to	depend	strongly	on	the	Brazilian	exports.	The	main	barriers	to	a	faster	and	smoother	economic	growth	were	the	elevated	interest	 rate	 level	 and	 the	difficulty	 that	most	 companies	 faced	when	 trying	 to	attain	 funding.	 In	order	 to	 improve	 this	 situation,	 the	Brazilian	capital	markets	experienced	profound	changes.	The	government	implemented	measures	to	make	the	capital	markets	more	popular.	It	allowed	that	part	of	the	resources	from	the	FGTS	 could	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 purchase	 of	 company	 shares.	 CMN	 resolution	 n.	2,689/00	 made	 the	 access	 for	 foreign	 investors	 easier	 by	 simplifying	proceedings	 and	 by	 giving	 them	 the	 same	 rights	 as	 resident	 investors	 with	respect	to	the	available	instruments,	products	and	securities	to	choose	from	for	the	investment	decision.	Important	 impulses	also	came	from	the	private	sector,	starting	 with	 the	 unification	 of	 the	 nine	 Brazilian	 stock	 exchanges	 in	 2000,	resulting	in	the	centralization	of	negotiations	of	private	securities	at	the	Bovespa	and	public	securities	at	the	BVRJ.	In	December	2000,	the	Bovespa	established	the	New	Market	(Novo	Mercado)	and	Special	 Corporate	 Governance	 Levels	 (Níveis	 de	 Práticas	 Diferenciadas	 de	
Governança	 Corporativa)	 for	 those	 companies	 choosing	 to	 submit	 themselves	under	these	stricter	regulations	than	those	provided	by	legislation	with	respect	to	 transparency	 and	 shareholder	 protection.	 Since	 the	 Bovespa	 created	 these	new	segments	without	the	influence	of	the	legislator,	this	initiative	could	be	seen	as	 a	 good	example	of	how	self-regulation	 could	 improve	 corporate	 governance	practices.	 The	 BNDES	 installed	 a	 special	 credit	 line	 for	 companies	 observing	these	corporate	governance	rules	 in	order	 to	 incentivize	adherence	 to	 the	New	Market.	 Furthermore,	 the	 Bovespa	 implemented	 various	 technological	innovations	 in	 order	 to	 constantly	 improve	 its	 services,	 such	 as	 the	establishment	of	the	automated	platforms	“Home	Broker”	and	“	After	Market”,	in	1999.	For	the	negotiation	of	private	fixed-income	securities,	the	Bovespa	offered	a	 separate	 section	 on	 the	 stock	 exchange,	 the	 so-called	 BOVESPA	 FIX,	 and	 an	organized	OTC	system,	the	so-called	SOMA	FIX,	which	are	electronic	systems	for	the	trading,	settlement	and	custody	of	these	securities.	Since	1997,	when	several	rights	were	taken	away	from	minority	shareholders	in	order	to	facilitate	the	privatization	and	the	restructuring	of	Brazilian	companies,	there	was	 a	 debate	 about	 adjusting	 the	 Capital	Market	 Law	 and	 the	 Corporate	Law.	 In	2001,	a	reform132	of	 these	 laws	passed	with	the	aim	to	promote	capital	market	development,	so	that	companies	would	have	better	financing	and	funding	conditions,	 and	 to	 push	 economic	 growth.	 In	 order	 to	 achieve	 these	 goals,	 the	CVM	was	given	more	power,	turning	it	into	an	independent	legislative	authority,																																																									132	The	new	legislation	was	regulated	by	laws	n.	10,194/01,	n.	10,198/01,	n.	10,303/01	and	n.	10,411/02	and	decree	n.	3,995/01.	
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and	 more	 adequate	 corporate	 governance	 structures	 were	 implemented.	 As	 a	result,	transparency	as	well	as	minority	shareholder	rights	were	improved.	With	respect	to	debentures,	law	n.	10,303/01	shortened	the	period	from	90	to	60	days	during	which	the	trustee	had	to	inform	the	debenture	holders	about	any	sign	of	default.	 BACEN	 circulars	 n.	 3,068/01	 and	n.	 3,082/02	 introduced	 the	mark-to-market	 accounting	 for	 marketable	 securities.	 CVM	 instruction	 n.	 356/01	 and	CMN	resolution	n.	2,907/02	created	a	new	type	of	receivables	securitization,	the	so-called	 Credit	 Receivables	 Investment	 Funds	 (FIDCs133),	 which	 became	 a	popular	financial	instrument.	An	 important	 barrier	 to	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 capital	markets	was	removed	by	constitutional	amendment	n.	37/02,	which	excluded	the	 trading	of	company	 shares	 on	 stock	 exchanges	 or	 OTC	 markets	 from	 the	 CPMF	 tax	incidence.	The	restructuring	of	the	SFN	that	started	in	1995	with	the	PROER	and	PROES	was	 continued	 in	2002	with	 the	 creation	of	 the	new	Brazilian	Payment	System	 (SPB134),	which	 also	 aimed	at	 reducing	 the	 risks	of	 financial	 crises	 and	their	negative	effects	on	the	real	economy.	Again,	the	attempt	was	to	strengthen	the	SFN,	but	this	time	the	focus	lied	on	the	risks	involved	in	the	cash	settlements.	CVM	instruction	n.	384/03	created	the	possibility	to	install	a	market	maker	for	a	security	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 its	 liquidity	 premium.	 In	 an	 attempt	 to	make	 the	Brazilian	rules	more	similar	to	those	in	the	USA,	the	CVM	adjusted	the	regulation	of	public	offers	of	marketable	 securities	and	passed	 instruction	n.	400/03.	The	public	 offer	 of	 marketable	 securities	 could	 be	 categorized	 according	 to	 the	offerer	 (primary,	 secondary,	 or	 both),	 according	 to	 the	 venue,	 where	 the	securities	 were	 offered	 (in	 Brazil,	 abroad,	 or	 both),	 and	 according	 to	 the	requirement	of	registration	with	the	CVM	(public	or	private	offer).	Every	public	offer	needed	to	be	registered	with	the	CVM	and	under	certain	circumstances,	the	security	 could	 be	 offered	 privately,	which	 allowed	 dispense	 of	 registration.	 An	example	 for	 a	 private	 offer	would	 be	 an	 offer	 that	was	 directed	 exclusively	 at	qualified	 investors.	 In	 some	 cases,	 the	 security	 met	 the	 requirements	 for	 an	automatic	 dispense	 of	 registration,	 and	 in	 some	 cases,	 a	 request	 needed	 to	 be	formulated	 in	 order	 to	 make	 a	 private	 offer.	 The	 aim	 of	 CVM	 instruction	 n.	400/03	was	 to	 protect	 the	 interests	 of	 investors	 and	 the	market	 in	 general	 by	requiring	broad,	 transparent,	 and	 adequate	provision	of	 information	 about	 the	offer,	 the	offered	 security,	 the	 issuing	 company,	 the	offerer,	 and	other	 relevant	information.	An	 important	 innovation	 of	 this	 legislation	 was	 to	 allow	 for	 the	 so-called	greenshoe	 option,	 which	 allowed	 the	 underwriter	 to	 sell	 investors	 more	securities	 than	 originally	 planned	 by	 the	 issuer	 (up	 to	 a	 certain	 share	 of	 the	original	 volume).	 Another	 innovation	 concerned	 companies	 that	 already	 had	realized	 a	 public	 offer.	 These	 companies	 were	 allowed	 to	 make	 a	 shelf	registration,	 giving	 them	 the	 right	 to	 realize	 public	 offers	 of	 marketable	securities	mentioned	in	the	shelf	registration.	
																																																								133	According	 to	 the	 Portuguese	 term	 Fundos	 de	 Investimento	 em	 Direitos	 Creditórios	(FIDCs).	134	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Sistema	de	Pagamentos	Brasileiro	(SPB).	
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According	to	the	Brazilian	Corporate	Law,	a	company	becomes	a	publicly	owned	company	 as	 soon	 as	 any	 of	 its	 marketable	 securities,	 including	 debentures	 or	commercial	 paper,	 receive	 the	 permission	 to	 be	 traded	 on	 the	 stock	 exchange.	Therefore,	the	so-called	Initial	Public	Offering	(IPO)	of	any	type	of	security	by	a	company	 results	 in	 its	 going	 public.	 Yet,	 in	 the	market	 jargon	 a	 company	 only	really	goes	public,	when	it	realizes	the	IPO	of	its	company	shares.	
3.1.2.2 2004-2008:	half	a	decade	of	prolonged	growth	The	Brazilian	economy	continued	on	the	growth	path,	it	had	already	returned	to	during	the	second	semester	of	2003,	for	another	five	years,	until	2008,	when	the	ramifications	of	the	international	financial	crisis	caused	a	recession	in	Brazil135.	Up	 to	 that	 point,	 Brazil	 had	 experienced	 a	 remarkable	 episode	 of	 sustained	economic	 growth	 together	 with	 social	 inclusion	 in	 a	 context	 of	 increased	macroeconomic	stability,	which	can	be	“considered	one	of	the	longest	periods	of	growth	and	of	greater	dissemination	since	the	Second	World	War”	(BACEN	2008,	11).	 Annual	 GDP	 growth	 rates	 over	 the	 period	 2004-2008	were	 consecutively	above	 3.0%	 and	 on	 average	 4.8%.	 The	 favorable	 international	 environment	helped	 the	 country	 to	 realize	 large	 and	 consecutive	 current	 account	 surpluses,	build-up	 foreign-exchange	 reserves	 and	 improve	 other	 external	 solvency	indicators.	 Brazil	 benefited	 from	 the	 high	 demand	 for	 commodities,	 especially	from	China,	and	large	capital	inflows	caused	the	Brazilian	currency	to	appreciate,	which	 exerted	 downward	 pressures	 on	 domestic	 prices,	 especially	 in	 the	tradable	 sector,	 keeping	 inflation	 under	 control.	 The	 domestic	 economy	 was	marked	 by	 decreasing	 unemployment	 rates	 and	 rising	 demand	 for	 durable	consumer	goods,	largely	financed	with	personal	credits.	In	 2004,	 the	 Brazilian	 economy	 grew	 by	 5.7%	 due	 to	 strong	 exports	 and	 the	internal	 market	 recovery.	 Consumption	 was	 sustained	 by	 increased	 credit	availability,	 and	 later	 also	 by	 growing	 income	 levels,	 related	 to	 the	 increasing	employment	level.	Investment	expanded	reflecting	the	positive	outlook	since	the	second	 semester	 of	 2003,	 when	 the	 BACEN	 started	 to	 lower	 the	 base	 rate.	 In	September	2004,	monetary	policy	started	to	tighten	again	and,	despite	rising	oil	prices,	inflation	closed	below	the	2003	level.	Since	the	end	of	2003,	international	market	 conditions	 had	 been	 particularly	 favorable	 to	 Brazil	 and	 allowed	 the	country	to	 issue	sovereign	debt	securities	abroad	that	were	denominated	 in	 its	national	 currency.	Brazil’s	 country	 risk	dropped	sharply	due	 to	expectations	of	strong	world	 growth	 and	 various	 positive	 results,	 including	 a	 current	 account	surplus,	 even	 with	 strong	 GDP	 growth,	 an	 exceptionally	 high	 trade	 surplus,	substantially	 improved	 external	 and	 public	 debt	 indicators,	 and	 a	 primary	surplus	that	was	well	above	the	agreed	target	with	the	IMF.	The	index	of	the	São	Paulo	stock	exchange	(Ibovespa)	was	on	a	downward	trend	until	May,	but	 from	then	on	 it	 started	 to	rise.	With	 the	aim	to	stimulate	capital	market	 development	 and	 economic	 growth,	 the	 government	 passed	 measures	that	allowed	tax	reductions	for	investment	activities.	CVM	instruction	n.	404/04																																																									135	Chapter	3.1.2.2.	is	mainly	based	on	(ANBIMA	2014e;	BACEN	2004,	2005,	2006,	2007,	2008;	Andrezo	and	Lima	2007;	Assaf	Neto	2011;	Cadier	2011).	
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created	 the	 Standardized	Debentures	 to	 increase	 transparency	 and	 liquidity	 of	the	 market,	 yet	 no	 issues	 were	 registered	 under	 this	 regulation.	 BACEN	communiqué	n.	12,746	of	December	2004	regulated	 the	 implementation	of	 the	new	Basel	Accord	(Basel	II).	The	rules	concerning	repo	operations	were	loosened,	allowing	 the	use	of	any	kind	of	 fixed-income	security,	even	 in	 those	operations	that	were	previously	restricted	to	public	bonds.	Additionally,	permitting	security	exchanges	 and	 loans,	 further	 increased	 the	 liquidity	 of	 private	 debt	 securities,	because	 it	 allowed	 financial	 institutions	 to	 engage	 in	 such	 operations	 without	coverage	due	to	the	guarantees	given	by	the	clearinghouses.	CVM	instruction	n.	409/04	 established	 new	 rules	 for	 the	 investment	 funds	 and	 categorized	 them	into	seven	different	classes	according	to	their	portfolio	composition.	Additional	types	of	investment	funds	also	had	to	be	registered	with	the	CVM,	but	followed	specific	 regulations,	 such	 as	 the	 private	 equity	 funds	 (FIP136),	 which	 were	regulated	by	CVM	instructions	n.	391/03	and	n.	406/04.	In	 2005,	 the	 Brazilian	 economy	 continued	 to	 grow,	 although	 at	 a	 slower	 pace	(3.2%	 GDP	 growth),	 with	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 domestic	 market	 driven	 by	improved	 credit	 conditions	 and	 a	 gradual	 recovery	 in	 real	 income	 and	employment.	 The	 credit	 market	 was	 dominated	 by	 payroll-deducted,	 i.e.	personal	 and	 consumer	 credits.	 In	 2005,	 the	 debentures	 market	 started	 to	rapidly	increase,	but	the	surge	was	mostly	based	on	issues	by	leasing	companies	to	 fund	banking	operations,	while	 the	primary	market	of	 corporate	debentures	showed	much	less	activity.	The	government	was	able	to	present	highly	positive	fiscal	 results,	 including	 a	 primary	 surplus	 and	 a	 reduction	 in	 net	 public	 debt.	Monetary	policy	continued	to	raise	the	base	rate	during	the	first	semester,	taking	a	very	cautious	stance	against	risks	stemming	from	oil	prices	and	other	factors.	In	 September,	 a	 gradual	 process	 of	 easing	 monetary	 policy	 started	 and	 the	consistently	 low	 inflation	 rate	 closed	 the	 year	 at	 5.7%.	Abundant	 international	liquidity	 resulting	 in	 rising	 flows	 of	 external	 funding,	 especially	 steady	 foreign	direct	 investments,	 as	 well	 as	 an	 excellent	 performance	 of	 the	 foreign	 trade	sector	led	to	successive	reductions	in	the	Brazil	risk,	suggesting	that	the	positive	investment	climate	would	remain.	Brazil	was	able	to	raise	more	funds	with	bond	issuance	 abroad	 than	 planned	 and,	 thus,	 was	 able	 to	 anticipate	 IMF	 debt	repayments.	 Furthermore,	 external	 sector	 risk	 conditions	 improved	 by	 the	continued	build-up	of	foreign	reserves.	With	respect	 to	 the	Brazilian	capital	markets,	 law	n.	11,196/05	was	among	the	most	 important	 legal	 innovations	 of	 that	 year	 and	 aimed	 at	 stimulating	productive	 investments,	exports	 in	 the	 technological	goods	and	services	sector,	as	well	as	technological	innovation	and	digital	inclusion.	In	order	to	improve	the	monitoring	of	the	liquidity	situation	of	financial	institutions,	the	CMN	passed	the	resolution	 n.	 3,272/05,	 which	 required	 the	 registration	 of	 the	 issuance	 of	securities	(mainly	CDBs).	A	public-private	partnership	program	was	installed	by	law	n.	11,079/04	and	decrees	n.	5,385/05	and	n.	5,411/05	created,	respectively,	the	Public-Private	Partnership	Management	Committee	(CGP137)	 for	 the	project	selection	 and	 authorized	 quota	 payments	 of	 the	 Public-Private	 Partnerships																																																									136	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Fundo	de	Investimento	em	Participações	(FIP).	137	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Comitê	Gestor	de	Parceria	Público-Privada	Federal	(CGP).	
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Guarantor	Fund	(FGP138).	The	legislative	process	of	the	Law	on	Bankruptcy	and	Corporate	Recovery	(law	n.	11,101)	took	several	years,	but	on	February	9th	2005	the	law	was	finally	passed	and	replaced	the	previous	legislation	that	had	been	in	effect	 since	 1945.	 The	 main	 innovation	 was	 the	 introduction	 of	 extrajudicial	recovery,	i.e.	companies	in	difficulty	were	allowed	to	renegotiate	debts	with	their	creditors.	 In	order	to	formalize	the	agreement,	nothing	more	than	the	approval	of	 a	 judge	 was	 needed,	 who	 simply	 had	 to	 ensure	 compliance	 with	 legal	procedures.	Continued	world	economic	expansion,	driven	by	 the	USA	and	emerging	market	countries,	and	a	benign	macroeconomic	scenario	 in	2006	contributed	to	higher	growth	 and	 lower	 inflation	 in	 Brazil,	 compared	 to	 the	 previous	 year.	 The	expanding	 internal	 demand	 had	 been	 mainly	 pushed	 by	 Gross	 Fixed	 Capital	Formation	 (GFCF),	 which	 showed	 the	 economic	 agents’	 confidence	 in	 the	ongoing	 process	 of	 economic	 growth,	 and	 household	 consumption,	 which	reflected	 rising	 real	 income,	 expanding	 credit,	 and	 improved	 expectations.	Responsible	 fiscal	 management	 resulted	 in	 successive	 primary	 surpluses	 and	qualitative	 improvements	 in	 spending	 allocation.	 The	 SELIC	 interest	 rate	 was	lowered	throughout	2006,	which	had	been	facilitated	by	a	downward	movement	of	inflation	expectations	that	even	fell	below	the	inflation	target.	Another	factor	that	helped	monetary	policy	to	lower	the	base	rate	was	related	to	the	evolution	of	 the	 exchange	 rate,	 which	 enhanced	 internal	 competition	 in	 the	 segment	 of	tradables.	 In	 2006,	 the	 government	 passed	 a	 law	 to	 exempt	 foreign	 investors	from	 the	 income	 tax	 on	 capital	 income139,	 aiming	 at	 the	 prolongation	 of	 the	public	debt	structure.	Furthermore,	the	ongoing	process	of	international	reserve	accumulation	 and	 the	 anticipated	 buybacks	 of	 debt	 securities	 denominated	 in	foreign	 currency,	 which	 also	 served	 as	 a	 benchmark	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 a	more	 complete	 interest	 curve,	 generated	 positive	 impacts	 on	 external	 funding	conditions	by	reducing	risk	premiums.	Falling	external	public	debt	together	with	an	overall	 improved	public	debt	structure,	and	expanding	exports,	all	added	 to	the	 increasing	 external	 resilience	 of	 Brazil	 and	 gave	 rise	 to	 the	 outlook	 for	improved	country	risk	ratings.	The	acting	president	Lula	was	able	to	profit	from	this	 positive	 economic	 environment	 and	 emerged	 victorious	 from	 the	 2006	presidential	election.	In	 continuation	 of	 the	 vigorous	 development	 that	 started	 in	 2002,	 the	 capital	markets	performed	highly	positive	 in	2006	with	 the	São	Paulo	Stock	Exchange	Index	 (Ibovespa)	 setting	 a	 record	 of	 44,500	 points	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2006.	 Large	companies	gained	access	 to	 funding	sources	outside	the	banking	sector,	mainly	through	Initial	Public	Offerings	(IPOs)	of	their	company	shares.	Banks	continued	to	shift	 the	 focus	of	 resource	allocation	 from	their	 securities	portfolio	 to	credit	operations.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 profile	 of	 the	 securities	 portfolio	 was	 also	adjusted,	 lowering	 the	 share	 of	 public	 bonds	 and	 raising	 the	 participation	 of	private	 securities,	 mostly	 involving	 debentures.	 CMN	 resolution	 n.	 3,339/06	aimed	at	improving	the	market	liquidity	of	private	debt	securities	by	expanding	the	 list	of	securities	 that	were	accepted	 in	repo	operations	and	by	allowing	the																																																									138	According	 to	 the	 Portuguese	 term	 Fundo	 Garantidor	 de	 Parcerias	 Público-Privadas	(FGP).	139	See	provisional	measure	n.	281,	later	converted	into	law	n.	11,312	of	June	27th,	2006.	
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contracting	 of	 repo	 operations	 with	 individual	 persons	 and	 non-financial	companies,	 even	 including	 private	 securities.	 CMN	 resolution	 n.	 3,380/06	regulated	the	operational	risk	management	of	financial	institutions,	which	were	required	 to	 develop	 adequate	 structures	 to	 identify,	 monitor,	 control	 and	mitigate	 their	 exposures	 until	 the	 end	 of	 2007,	 according	 to	 the	 New	 Basel	Accord	 (Basel	 II).	 CMN	 resolution	 n.	 3,400/06	 improved	 the	 conditions	 of	 the	Credit	Guarantee	Fund	(FGC)	by	raising	the	maximum	nominal	value	guaranteed	from	 R$	 20,000	 to	 R$	 60,000,	 reducing	 the	 contributions	 (from	 0.025%	 to	0.0125%)	and	expanding	the	universe	of	guaranteed	deposits.	Exchange	banks,	focusing	 on	 foreign	 currency	 operations,	 were	 created	 by	 CMN	 resolution	 n.	3,426/06	to	stimulate	competition	in	this	market.	In	 2007,	 several	 factors	 contributed	 to	 the	 annual	 GDP	 growth	 rate	 of	 6.0%.	Increased	macroeconomic	stability	together	with	loosening	monetary	policy	and	improved	 labor	market	 conditions	 raised	 optimism	 in	 consumer	 and	 business	expectations,	which	heated	up	internal	demand,	reflected	in	a	sharp	expansion	of	the	investment	volume	as	well	as	steady	increase	of	household	consumption.	The	latter,	more	 specifically	 the	 acquisition	 of	 vehicles,	was	 responsible	 for	 a	 large	part	of	 the	strong	dynamics	 in	credit	operations.	Business	 loans	also	expanded	sharply,	 particularly	 for	 working	 capital	 and	 investment	 operations.	 As	 in	previous	 years,	 the	 banking	 sector	 mainly	 attended	 SMEs,	 because	 large-scale	corporations	had	access	to	alternative	sources	of	funding.	Rising	prices	of	major	commodities	on	international	markets	posed	a	first	threat	to	 rising	 inflation	 rates	 in	 Brazil,	 which	 received	 additional	 upward	 pressure	from	 the	 expansionary	 movements	 of	 employment,	 income,	 credit	 as	 well	 as	government	 transfers.	 Additionally,	 the	 delayed	 effects	 of	 the	 650	 base	 point	reduction	in	the	SELIC	rate	during	2006	had	to	be	taken	into	account,	when	the	COPOM	decided	to	slow	down	the	pace	of	 interest	rate	cuts.	The	exchange	rate	had	a	disciplining	 effect	 on	 the	prices	of	 tradable	 goods,	which	helped	 to	keep	inflation	 low.	 In	 the	 end	 of	 the	 year,	 monetary	 policy	 justified	 its	 decision	 to	maintain	 the	base	 rate	 on	 its	 current	 level	with	 the	 accelerating	 growth	 in	 the	domestic	 economy.	 The	 BACEN	 employed	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 to	 avoid	increased	 volatility	 in	 the	 exchange	 rate	 market,	 yet	 without	 assuming	 any	commitment	 as	 to	 the	 level	 of	 the	 exchange	 rate,	 constantly	 adjusting	 their	activities	to	market	conditions.	Notwithstanding	 signs	 of	 reduced	 liquidity	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 rising	 interest	rates	 in	 the	 advanced	 economies	 and	 increased	 global	 market	 volatility,	 the	external	scenario	for	the	Brazilian	economy	remained	favorable,	especially	with	regard	to	 its	 financing	conditions.	The	growing	confidence	among	 international	investors	 regarding	 the	 consistency	 of	 Brazil’s	 macroeconomic	 fundamentals	generated	 a	 continuous	 inflow	 of	 longer-term	 capital.	 The	 domestic	 capital	markets,	especially	the	stock	market,	showed	strong	growth	and	were	sustained	mostly	by	foreign	institutional	investors.	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	Brazilian	risk	premium	had	reached	its	lowest	level	(at	138	points	in	mid-June	2007)	since	the	series	was	first	calculated	in	1994,	when	the	international	financial	crisis	started	to	exert	its	effects	upon	Brazil	and	raised	the	country	risk	well	above	200	points	(254	 points	 in	 November)	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 year,	 again.	 Nevertheless,	
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major	 international	 rating	 agencies	 (Standard	 and	 Poor’s,	 Fitch	 and	 Moody’s)	raised	the	sovereign	risk	rating	of	Brazil	to	just	one	level	below	investment	grade.	The	evolution	of	rising	consumption	and	investment	levels	contributed	to	lower	trade	 balance	 surpluses.	 The	 positive	 results	 of	 the	 external	 accounts	made	 it	possible	to	adopt	a	consistent	policy	for	managing	foreign	liabilities,	then	from	a	creditor	 position,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 sharp	 growth	 in	 foreign	 reserves	 and	significant	 reductions	 in	 the	 external	 debt.	 The	 resilience	 to	 adverse	 external	shocks	 had	 been	 increased,	 as	 could	 be	 observed,	 when	 the	 turbulences	 on	international	credit	markets	 that	 followed	upon	 the	subprime	crisis	 in	 the	USA	only	exerted	a	marginal	impact	on	the	country’s	economy.	On	 January	22nd,	2007,	 the	government	announced	a	 series	of	measures	under	the	roof	of	the	Growth	Incentive	Program	(PAC140)	that	aimed	at	improving	the	infrastructure	 of	 the	 country	 and	 increasing	 the	 pace	 of	 economic	 growth.	Several	measures	were	 implemented	 to	 improve	 the	 investment	 environment,	such	 as	 law	 n.	 126/07	 that	 opened	 the	 reinsurance	 market.	 The	 PAC	Management	 Committee	 was	 instituted	 by	 decree	 n.	 6,025/07.	 In	 2007,	 the	government	designated	R$	24.5	billion	to	PAC	investments	(all	R$	values	in	this	thesis	 have	 been	 deflated	 to	 constant	 December	 2014	 R$,	 using	 the	 inflation	index	IPCA,	unless	otherwise	stated).	Independently	of	the	PAC,	law	n.	11,457/07	created	 the	 Federal	 Revenue	 Service	 (RFB141)	 through	 the	 unification	 of	 the	Federal	 Revenue	 Secretariat	 with	 the	 Social	 Security	 Revenue	 Secretariat	 in	order	 to	 enhance	 the	 efficiency	 of	 federal	 tax	 management,	 by	 simplifying	collection	 and	 inspection	 processes	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 reinforcing	 efforts	against	tax	evasion.	Among	 the	most	 important	 legal	 innovations	 of	 2007	 in	 the	Brazilian	 financial	system	was	 the	 CMN	 resolution	 n.	 3,477/07,	which	 created	 the	 position	 of	 an	ombudsman	as	an	organizational	component	of	financial	institutions,	whose	role	was	to	ensure	compliance	with	consumer	rights	and	to	provide	a	communication	channel	 for	 the	 institution	 and	 their	 clients.	 CMN	 resolution	 n.	 3,518/07	determined	a	standardization	of	fee	tables	of	banks	so	that	clients	would	be	able	to	 compare	 the	prices	 charged	by	different	 institutions	more	 easily.	Related	 to	this,	CMN	resolution	n.	3,516/07	prohibited	the	charging	of	fees	in	case	of	early	settlement	of	loan	and	lease	contracts.	Previously,	it	was	difficult	for	borrowers	to	 move	 from	 one	 financial	 institution	 to	 another,	 offering	 more	 favorable	conditions.	Another	measure	to	improve	the	position	of	banking	clients	was	CMN	resolution	 n.	 3,517/07	 that	 required	 the	 provision	 of	 information	 on	 the	 total	effective	cost	corresponding	 to	all	 charges	and	expenses	 involved	 in	credit	and	leasing	operations	contracted	by	or	offered	to	individual	clients.	During	the	first	three	quarters	of	2008,	economic	activity	followed	the	trajectory	of	 the	 second	 half	 of	 2007	 with	 strong	 growth,	 although	 the	 impact	 of	 the	international	 financial	 crisis	 could	 already	 be	 felt.	 Domestic	 demand	 sustained	the	 growth	 process,	 pushed	 by	 improved	 credit	 conditions	 as	 well	 as	 rising	employment	 and	 income.	 Furthermore,	 GFCF	 reached	 with	 18.6%	 its	 highest																																																									140	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Programa	de	Aceleração	do	Crescimento	(PAC).	141	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Secretaria	da	Receita	Federal	do	Brasil	(RFB).	
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level	 since	 1995,	 reflecting	 the	 entrepreneurs’	 expectations	 of	 continued	economic	growth.	This	picture	changed	drastically	during	the	last	months	of	the	year,	 when	 growing	 restrictions	 in	 the	 credit	 market	 and	 the	 worsening	 of	economic	agents’	expectations	initiated	a	recession	in	Brazil.	Nevertheless,	over	the	entire	year	Brazilian	GDP	grew	5.0%	 in	2008.	The	 inflation	 rate	 closed	 the	year	at	5.9%,	higher	 than	the	previous	year,	but	still	within	 the	 inflation	target	range.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 tightening	 of	 the	 monetary	 policy,	 initiated	 in	 the	beginning	 of	 2008	 when	 inflation	 expectation	 had	 increased,	 the	 demand	 for	inflation	 indexed	 public	 bonds	 rose,	while	 the	 stock	 of	 fixed	 rate	 public	 bonds	decreased.	In	 May	 of	 2008,	 the	 Brazilian	 government	 announced	 an	 industrial	 policy	strategy,	 the	 so-called	 Productive	 Development	 Policy	 (PDP),	 with	 the	 goal	 to	extend	 the	 recently	 experienced	 growth	 path.	 As	 part	 of	 the	 PDP,	 provisional	measure	 n.	 428/08,	 converted	 into	 law	 n.	 11,774/08,	 provided	 for	 a	 set	 of	measures	that	aimed	at	encouraging	private	investments,	investments	in	science	and	 technology	 research,	 productivity	 of	 the	 domestic	 industry,	 and	 the	participation	of	Brazilian	exports	in	the	international	market,	all	of	which	should	help	 to	 expand	 the	 production	 capacity	 and	 to	 meet	 the	 growing	 demand	 for	consumer	 goods	 as	 well	 as	 increase	 the	 competitiveness	 of	 the	 national	productive	 sector.	 Within	 the	 PDP,	 an	 estimated	 R$295	 billion	 in	 projects	 for	capacity	expansion,	modernization	and	innovation	in	industry	and	services	were	allocated	to	the	BNDES.	In	October,	the	development	bank	introduced	a	new	line	of	 export	 finance	 and	 its	 disbursements	 directed	 to	 exports	 rose	 by	 57.1%	compared	 to	 the	 previous	 year.	 The	 Brazilian	 Sovereign	Wealth	 Fund	 (FSB142)	was	created	by	law	n.	11,887/08	and	had	the	objective	of	promoting	investments	in	 Brazil	 and	 abroad,	 generating	 public	 savings,	 mitigating	 the	 effects	 of	economic	 cycles,	 and	 fostering	 strategic	 projects	 at	 home	 and	 abroad.	 The	government	supplied	the	FSB	with	R$	20	billion	in	2008,	through	the	issuance	of	sovereign	debt	securities.	The	positive	performance	of	Brazilian	capital	markets	during	the	previous	years	came	 to	 a	halt	 in	2008,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 instable	 scenario	 in	 the	 international	financial	 system.	 Primary	market	 activities	 of	 company	 shares	 and	 debentures	were	 concentrated	 in	 the	 first	 eight	months	 of	 the	 year	 and	 practically	 ceased	afterwards,	 being	 partly	 replaced	 by	 the	 issuance	 of	 commercial	 paper.	 The	sudden	 market	 slump	 of	 the	 previously	 so	 vigorously	 growing	 market	 of	debentures	 issued	 by	 leasing	 companies	 was	 not	 only	 caused	 by	 the	 external	crisis,	but	also	by	a	regulatory	change	(Loureiro	2008).	BACEN	circular	n.	3,375,	issued	 on	 January	 31st,	 2008,	 introduced	 reserve	 requirements	 for	 these	 debt	securities,	terminating	the	special	treatment	of	this	mechanism	of	bank	funding.	Up	 to	 that	 point,	 it	 was	 common	 practice	 for	 banks	 to	 use	 a	 leasing	 company	belonging	 to	 the	 same	 financial	 conglomerate	 to	 issue	 debentures	 in	 order	 to	fund	 its	 operations	 (those	 of	 the	 bank),	 taking	 advantage	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	capital	 acquired	 through	 this	 funding	mechanism	was	 exempted	 from	 reserve	requirements.	 After	 the	 banking	 sector	 had	 increasingly	 relied	 on	 this	 funding	instrument,	 especially	 since	 2005,	 Brazilian	 authorities	 decided	 to	 apply	 the																																																									142	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Fundo	Soberano	do	Brasil	(FSB).	
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reserve	 requirement	 to	achieve	an	equal	 treatment	 compared	 to	other	 funding	sources	of	banks,	such	as	CDBs.	The	continuous	rise	of	the	Brazilian	stock	exchange	index	Ibovespa	through	May	reflected	 positive	 expectations,	 but	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 year	 the	 Ibovespa	dropped	 and	 its	 volatility	 significantly	 increased,	 as	 the	 international	 financial	crisis	intensified	and	commodity	prices	and	external	trade	were	reduced.	Lower	liquidity	 in	 the	 financial	 system	 and	 uncertainty	 about	 interest	 rate	developments	caused	an	increased	risk	aversion	of	investors,	which	reflected	in	net	redemptions	in	nearly	all	classes	of	investment	funds,	with	the	exception	of	short-term	funds,	which	even	attracted	new	resources.	In	 the	 end	of	 2008,	 global	 credit	 and	 capital	markets	 rapidly	deteriorated	 as	 a	consequence	of	the	worsening	and	spreading	of	the	international	financial	crisis.	Especially	North	American	and	European	major	financial	institutions	were	faced	with	 insolvency	 risks	 as	 the	 credit	 shrinking	 and	 liquidity	 trap	 scenario	 of	 the	first	 semester	 aggravated.	 Once	 authorities	 perceived	 the	 systemic	 crisis	 that	resulted	from	the	persistent	obstruction	of	the	credit	channels,	the	USA	and	EU	took	coordinated	actions	to	stabilize	their	financial	systems.	Liquidity	and	credit	constraints	were	alleviated	through	the	actions	taken	by	major	central	banks	as	well	 as	 direct	 government	 interventions,	 which	 strengthened	 the	 capital	structure	of	 several	 financial	 institutions.	Nevertheless,	 these	measures	proved	insufficient	 to	 cause	 a	 reversal	 of	 the	 trend	 of	 rising	 risk	 aversion143.	 As	 a	consequence,	 investors	started	to	retreat	 from	riskier	markets	and	the	demand	for	sovereign	bonds	of	advanced	economies	increased,	causing	a	decline	of	these	public	 bond	 yields,	 which	 was	 sustained	 by	 less	 restrictive	 monetary	 policies	during	 the	 period.	 The	 increased	 risk	 aversion	 led	 to	 significant	 losses,	 even	among	 the	major	 stock	 exchanges144,	 in	 2008.	 In	 emerging	market	 economies,	the	 stock	 exchanges	 also	 registered	 severe	 losses 145 ,	 because	 they	 were	additionally	affected	by	the	reduction	in	prices	and	exports	of	commodities	due	to	recessions	in	advanced	economies	and	a	slowdown	of	world	trade,	on	the	one	hand,	 as	well	 as	 the	 depreciation	 of	 the	 local	 currencies	 against	 the	 US	 dollar	(US$),	related	to	 the	so-called	 flight	 to	quality,	reflecting	the	 increased	demand	for	 US	 government	 bonds,	 on	 the	 other	 hand.	 The	 international	 credit	 crunch	tightened	the	financing	conditions	of	countries	running	a	current	account	deficit	even	further.	Against	 this	 background,	 the	 COPOM	 decided	 to	 discontinue	 the	 restrictive	course	 it	 had	adopted	 since	 early	2008	and	 the	Brazilian	government	 together	with	 the	BACEN	carried	out	 various	 counter-cyclical	measures,	 such	as	 foreign	currency	 loans	 to	 finance	 exports	 and	 guarantee	 market	 liquidity;	 monetary	policy	easing;	tax	incentives	with	tax	cutbacks	and	increased	spending,	especially																																																									143	The	 Volatility	 Index	 of	 the	 Chicago	 Board	 Options	 Exchange	 (VIX)	 is	 an	 important	indicator	 of	 risk	 aversion	 and,	 on	 November	 20	 of	 2008,	 the	 VIX	 reached	 its	 highest	value	since	the	series	started	in	1990.	144	The	 annual	 losses	 of	 the	 Japanese	Nikkei	 index,	 the	German	DAX,	 the	US-American	S&P	500,	and	the	British	FTSE	100	amounted	to	42%,	40%,	38%,	and	31%,	respectively.	145	The	stock	exchange	of	Brazil	registered	an	annual	loss	of	41%,	the	Chinese	65%,	the	Hungarian	53%,	the	Indian	and	the	Turkish	both	52%,	the	Mexican	24%,	and	the	South	Korean	also	41%.	
		 139 	
investments	 in	 infrastructure;	 and	 the	 exemption	 of	 reserve	 requirements	 in	order	to	increase	liquidity	of	the	domestic	financial	system,	thus	encouraging	the	expansion	of	credit	operations.	After	 five	 consecutive	 years	 of	 positive	 results	 the	 Brazilian	 current	 account	turned	 negative,	 mainly	 due	 to	 increasing	 imports	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 strong	internal	 growth	 together	 with	 the	 increase	 in	 net	 remittances	 of	 services	 and	income,	 especially	 those	 relating	 to	 profits	 and	 dividends.	 While	 the	 country	registered	 unprecedented	 FDI	 inflows	 in	 the	 amount	 of	 US$	 45.1	 billion	(UNCTAD	 2009),	 it	 also	 reported	 outflows	 of	 foreign	 capital,	 which	 were	concentrated	 in	 the	 last	 quarter	 of	 the	 year	 and	 mostly	 related	 to	 portfolio	investments,	 especially	 in	 shares.	 Furthermore,	 foreign	medium	 and	 long-term	loans	were	less	frequently	renewed.	BACEN	interventions	of	US	dollar	purchases	reverted	to	cash	sales	from	October	to	December.	The	Brazilian	foreign	exchange	market	experienced	a	 significant	net	outflow	of	 foreign	exchange	as	a	 result	of	the	so-called	flight	to	quality,	which	resulted	in	the	first	net	deficit	in	this	market	since	2002.	Even	 in	 the	 scenario	 of	 deterioration	 of	 international	 financial	 markets,	 the	Brazilian	stock	of	international	reserves	continued	to	rise.	Additionally,	external	debt	 indicators	 remained	 as	 positive	 as	 in	 2007,	 showing	 the	 persistent	improvement	in	macroeconomic	fundamentals	and	the	continuing	soundness	in	the	 implementation	 of	 the	 domestic	monetary	 and	 fiscal	 policies.	 Additionally,	regulation	was	changed	in	order	to	 improve	data	dissemination	in	the	financial	system,	 to	 comply	 with	 international	 standards.	 In	 April,	 Standard	 &	 Poor’s	raised	its	rating	of	Brazil	to	investment	grade,	followed	by	Fitch	Ratings	in	May.	
3.1.2.3 2009-2014:	Brazil’s	reaction	to	the	international	financial	crisis	The	 immediate	 effects	 of	 the	 international	 financial	 crisis	 were	 absorbed	relatively	well	by	the	Brazilian	economy,	which	quickly	came	out	of	the	recession	in	2009	and	registered	a	very	high	growth	rate	in	2010146.	During	the	following	years,	 the	 external	 scenario	 remained	 complex	 with	 major	 central	 banks	injecting	 liquidity	 into	 their	 national	 financial	 systems,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	resurging	 volatility	 on	 international	 financial	 markets	 due	 to	 growing	uncertainties	 related	 to	 various	 events,	 on	 the	 other	 hand.	 Against	 this	background,	 the	Brazilian	government	 implemented	 counter-cyclical	measures,	deployed	 the	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 system	 to	 fill	 the	 gap	 that	 the	private	 credit	 sector	 left	 and	 introduced	 an	 industrial	 policy	 plan.	 The	intensification	of	developmentalist	state	policies	were	accompanied	by	measures	that	 were	 directed	 at	 the	 promotion	 of	 a	 domestic	market	 for	 long-term	 debt	securities.	After	the	strong	recovery	 in	2010,	the	pace	of	economic	activity	was	more	 moderate,	 despite	 the	 strong	 increase	 of	 government	 action	 and	 the	coordination	 of	 fiscal	 and	monetary	 policy	 (in	 2012,	 a	 clear	 adjustment	 of	 the	monetary	policy	 stance	 took	place).	 In	2014,	 the	 fiscal	 accounts	worsened	 and	the	Brazilian	economy	experienced	signs	of	stagflation.																																																									146	Chapter	3.1.2.3.	is	mainly	based	on	(ANBIMA	2014e;	BACEN	2009,	2010,	2011,	2012,	2013,	2014,	2015;	Assaf	Neto	2011;	Cadier	2011).	
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Between	 June	 of	 2008	 and	 June	 of	 2014,	 the	 indebtedness	 of	 legal	 entities	 in	Brazil	 tripled	without	 significant	 changes	 in	 the	 commitment	of	 income	due	 to	improvements	 in	 the	 debt	 profile	 in	 terms	 of	maturity	 and	 cost	 (BACEN	2014,	28–31).	Brazilian	 companies	were	able	 to	 contract	debt	with	 longer	 terms	and	lower	 interest	 rates,	 because	 of	 the	 increased	 reliance	 on	 the	 domestic	 capital	markets,	 external	 capital	 and	 directed	 credits,	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 domestic	banks.	 The	 latter	 continued	 to	 supply	 the	 largest	 share	 of	 finance	 to	 Brazilian	companies,	 but	 their	 participation	 dropped	 from	43%	 in	 June	 2008	 to	 31%	 in	June	 2014,	 while	 the	 domestic	 capital	 markets,	 external	 capital,	 and	 directed	credits	 increased	their	shares	from	8%	to	10%,	24%	to	29%,	and	25%	to	30%,	respectively.	Turning	 to	 a	 more	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	 events	 after	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	international	 financial	crisis,	one	could	observe	 that	 the	recession	of	 the	global	economy	 lasted	 up	 to	 the	 second	 quarter	 of	 2009.	 In	 response	 to	 the	international	financial	crisis,	the	governments	and	central	banks	of	the	USA	and	Europe	 took	 coordinated	 actions	 to	 stabilize	 their	 financial	 markets	 and	 to	mitigate	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 crisis	 on	 economic	 activities.	 As	 emerging	 market	countries	were	particularly	suffering	 from	the	shortage	of	external	 finance	and	the	 drying	 up	 of	 international	 trade,	 their	 governments	 and	 central	 banks	deployed	fiscal	easing	as	well	as	cuts	in	the	monetary	policy	rates.	The	counter-cyclical	measures	were	crucial	to	the	recovery	of	the	world	economy	during	the	second	 semester.	 One	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 improved	 outlook,	 together	 with	increasing	Chinese	imports,	was	the	reversal	of	commodity	prices	that	started	to	rise	 again.	 The	 inflation	 forecasts	 of	 major	 advanced	 economies	 remained	favorable,	 so	 that	 their	 central	 banks	 maintained	 the	 expansionary	 nature	 of	monetary	policy	and	continued	to	inject	liquidity	into	their	financial	systems.	The	 expected	 recovery	 of	 global	 economic	 growth	 rates	 contributed	 to	 the	decline	 of	 risk	 aversion,	 which	 was	 reflected	 in	 the	 downward	 trend	 of	 the	Volatility	 Index	 of	 the	 Chicago	 Board	 Options	 Exchange	 (VIX).	 The	 VIX	 is	 an	important	 indicator	of	risk	aversion	and	dropped	18.3	points	 in	2009,	reaching	21.7	points	at	the	end	of	the	year.	Although	risk	aversion	came	down,	it	was	still	relatively	 high:	 the	 average	 VIX	 score	 of	 2009	 (31.5	 points)	 stood	 17.3	 points	above	 the	 average	 recorded	 during	 the	 period	 of	 low	 risk	 aversion	 before	 the	crisis,	 from	 July	 2003	 to	 June	 2007.	 As	 risk	 aversion	was	 descending	 from	 its	elevated	 level,	 the	 demand	 for	 riskier	 assets	 increased	 and,	 facilitated	 by	 the	environment	 of	 abundant	 liquidity,	 the	 downward	 trend	 of	 the	 major	 stock	markets	was	reversed.	Solid	macroeconomic	fundamentals	of	emerging	markets	attracted	 net	 capital	 flows	 into	 these	 economies	 and	 even	 resulted	 in	 higher	gains	 in	 their	 stock	 exchanges	 than	 in	 those	 of	 the	 advanced	 economies.	 The	recovery	of	the	financial	markets	only	suffered	a	small	setback	in	the	middle	of	December,	when	 uncertainties	 about	 the	 sovereign	 risk	 of	 European	 countries	arose	due	to	their	high	fiscal	deficits.	In	 Brazil,	 the	 government	 responded	 to	 the	 recessionary	 environment	 in	 the	advanced	 economies	 by	 taking	 measures	 in	 the	 fields	 of	 fiscal,	 monetary	 and	foreign	 exchange	 policy	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 domestic	market	 liquidity	 and	 to	stimulate	 aggregate	 demand.	 Fiscal	 policy	 measures	 included	 temporary	 tax	reliefs	and	government	transfer	programs,	which	contributed	to	the	drop	in	the	
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primary	surplus	from	3.3%	of	GDP	in	2008	to	2.0%	in	2009.	Tax	revenues	were	also	 reduced	 due	 to	 the	 lower	 domestic	 activity	 level.	 For	 the	 first	 time	 since	2002,	 public	 sector	 net	 debt	 (PSND)	 increased,	 mainly	 because	 of	 the	 rise	 in	BNDES	 disbursements	 and	 the	 depreciation	 of	 the	 real	 (R$).	 A	 government	program	 created	 a	 mechanism	 that	 encouraged	 and	 enabled	 low-income	households	 (with	 incomes	 of	 up	 to	 ten	minimum	wages)	 to	 purchase	 a	 house.	The	program,	 implemented	on	March	25th	2009	by	provisional	measure	n.	459,	was	 called	 Minha	 Casa,	 Minha	 Vida	 (My	 House,	 My	 Life)	 and	 aimed	 at	 the	construction	 and	 purchase	 of	 one	million	 houses.	Many	 other	 policy	measures	also	 helped	 to	 maintain	 the	 employment	 level	 high,	 that	 way	 strengthening	domestic	demand.	Although	 the	 annual	 GDP	 growth	 rate	 was	 slightly	 negative	 (-0.2%),	 the	recession	in	the	Brazilian	economy	was	very	short-lived:	the	seasonally	adjusted	quarterly	GDP	growth	only	retreated	during	the	last	quarter	of	2008	and	the	first	quarter	 of	 2009.	 The	 key	 factor	 to	 the	 fast	 recovery	 was	 the	 strong	 domestic	demand.	 Higher	 consumer	 spending	 translated	 into	 rising	 retail	 sales	 and	reflected	 regained	 consumer	 confidence.	 Furthermore,	 expectations	 of	entrepreneurs	 improved	and	caused	 them	 to	 take	on	new	 investment	projects,	preventing	GFCF	 to	decline	even	more	 (GFCF	decreased	 from	18.6%	of	GDP	 in	2008	 to	 17.6%	 in	 2009).	 The	 lively	 internal	 demand	 was	 also	 stimulated	 by	favorable	 credit	 conditions,	 resulting	 from	counter-cyclical	monetary	and	 fiscal	measures	that	aimed,	on	the	one	hand,	at	providing	domestic	market	liquidity	by	loosening	reserve	requirements,	such	as	CMN	resolution	n.	3,692/09	and	BACEN	circular	n.	3,468/09.	On	the	other	hand,	these	policies	were	designed	to	support	external	 trade	 activities	 with	 foreign	 currency	 loans.	 Brazilian	 companies	 had	difficulties	 to	 realize	 international	 trade	 operations	 due	 to	 the	 shortage	 of	foreign	 credit	 lines.	 External	 trade	 policy	 reacted	 by	 creating	 instruments	 that	provided	 foreign	 currency	 liquidity,	 shifting	 a	 significant	 share	 of	 financial	transactions	related	to	external	trade	to	the	domestic	market.	The	 credit	 sector	 also	 recovered	 due	 to	 the	 rising	 employment	 level,	 which	provided	the	background	for	the	increase	of	payroll-deducted	loans	and	vehicle	financing,	 especially	 during	 the	 second	 semester.	 Additionally,	 decreasing	interest	 rates	across	different	 categories	 to	unprecedented	 low	values	 fostered	the	 growth	 in	 the	 credit	 market.	 The	 expansion	 in	 bank	 lending	 was	 largely	based	 on	 the	 increasing	 use	 of	 earmarked	 resources,	 which	 were	 mostly	allocated	to	housing	and	infrastructure	projects	as	well	as	the	productive	sector.	These	 sectors	 were	 primarily	 promoted	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 PAC	 and	 PDP	government	programs.	As	a	result,	the	share	of	public	financial	institutions	in	the	total	 loan	portfolio	 of	 the	Brazilian	 financial	 system	was	 raised	 from	36.3%	 in	2008	 to	 41.5%	 in	 2009.	 The	 role	 of	 the	 BNDES	 in	 financing	 productive	investment	 as	 well	 as	 providing	 foreign	 trade	 and	 investment	 projects	 with	credit	 guarantees	 was	 strengthened	 by	 raising	 the	 credit	 volume	 that	 the	national	treasury	was	allowed	to	grant	to	the	development	bank	from	R$	134.5	billion	 to	 R$	 242.2	 billion147.	 BNDES	 disbursements	 increased	 by	 44%	 from	R$	127.5	billion	 in	2008	to	R$	183.5	billion	 in	2009	and	the	 fraction	related	to																																																									147	See	 provisional	measures	 n.	 453,	 issued	 on	 January	 22nd,	 and	 provisional	measure	n.472,	of	December	15th,	together	with	decrees	n.7,031	and	7,032,	of	December	14th.	
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foreign	 trade	 transactions	 increased	 from	 a	 total	 of	 US$	 6.6	 billion	 in	 2008	 to	US$	8.3	billion	in	2009.	Although	the	average	daily	Brazilian	external	trade	flow	decreased	by	23.4%	in	2009,	 totaling	US$	1.1	billion,	which	was	the	 first	decline	after	 five	consecutive	years	of	expansion,	the	trade	balance	surplus	registered	an	increase	in	nominal	terms,	 closing	 the	 year	 at	 US$	 25.3	 billion,	 which	 represented	 the	 ninth	consecutive	positive	result.	The	improvement	in	the	trade	balance	was	the	main	reason	for	the	reduction	in	the	current	account	deficit,	which	represented	1.5%	of	 GDP	 compared	 to	 1.7%	 in	 the	 previous	 year.	 The	 depreciating	 trend	 of	 the	Brazilian	currency,	which	had	started	in	the	second	semester	of	2008,	reversed	and	the	nominal	exchange	rate	appreciated	25.5%	in	nominal	terms	throughout	2009.	As	Brazil	was	able	to	continuously	improve	macroeconomic	fundamentals,	the	 country	 risk	 indicator	 returned	 to	 its	 pre-crisis	 level	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2009,	reaching	 192	 points,	 after	 it	 had	 peaked	 at	 688	 points	 on	 October	 23rd,	 2008.	Recognizing	 the	 resilience	 Brazil	 has	 shown	 to	 external	 shocks	 as	 well	 as	 the	achievements	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 structure	 of	 its	 public	 debt,	 Moody’s	acknowledged	 Brazil	 investment	 grade	 in	 late	 September	 of	 2009,	 that	 way	following	 up	 on	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	 other	 two	major	 rating	 agencies,	which	had	already	decided	to	upgrade	the	country	risk	rating	in	the	previous	year.	Within	 an	 environment	 that	 was	 characterized	 by	 exceptionally	 high	 liquidity	together	with	growing	demand	 for	 riskier	assets,	Brazil	was	very	attractive	 for	international	 capital	 flows.	 Against	 this	 background,	 the	 country	 continued	 its	program	of	international	reserve	accumulation,	became	a	creditor	country	of	the	IMF	for	the	 first	 time	since	the	 institution	was	established,	and	carried	out	 five	funding	 operations	 on	 the	 international	 financial	markets	with	 a	 total	 value	 of	US$	 4.1	 billion.	 The	 index	 of	 the	 São	 Paulo	 stock	 exchange,	 Ibovespa,	 reached	68,588	points	 in	the	final	closing	of	 the	year,	which	reflected	a	strong	recovery	from	earlier	 losses	and	amounted	to	a	rise	of	82.7%	in	2009.	At	the	same	time,	the	 market	 value	 of	 the	 companies	 that	 were	 listed	 on	 the	 São	 Paulo	 stock	exchange	increased	by	55%,	from	R$	2.0	trillion	in	December	of	2008	to	R$	3.1	trillion	a	year	later.	An	 important	 factor	 that	 contributed	 to	 the	 resilience	of	 the	Brazilian	 financial	system	 against	 instabilities	 stemming	 from	 international	 markets	 was	 the	progress	that	had	been	made	with	respect	to	prudential	regulation.	For	example,	the	 limit	 on	 leverage	 was	 set	 below	 internationally	 recommended	 levels	 and	economic	and	 financial	 conglomerates	were	under	consolidated	supervision.	 In	2009,	 the	 national	 financial	 system	 was	 continuously	 adapted	 to	 the	international	 normative	 framework	 set	 out	 by	 the	 Basel	 Committee,	 known	 as	Basel	 II,	 according	 to	 resolution	n.	3,721	 issued	on	April	30th	 and	 resolution	n.	3,786	issued	on	September	24th.	The	Brazilian	Association	of	the	Entities	of	the	Financial	 and	 Capital	 Markets	 (ANBIMA148 ),	 representing	 all	 actors	 in	 the	Brazilian	financial	markets,	was	created	on	October	21st,	2009,	resulting	from	the	
																																																								148	According	 to	 the	Portuguese	 term	Associação	Brasileira	das	Entidades	dos	Mercados	
Financeiro	e	de	Capitais	(ANBIMA).	
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consolidation	 of	 the	 National	 Association	 of	 Investment	 Banks	 (ANBID149)	 and	the	 National	 Association	 of	 Financial	 Market	 Institutions	 (ANDIMA150).	 Apart	from	 its	 representative	 functions,	ANBIMA	has	played	an	 important	 role	 in	 the	Brazilian	 financial	 markets	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 self-regulating	 process,	 by	certifying	professionals,	and	because	of	its	large	database.	While	monetary	policy	decided	to	maintain	 the	base	rate	at	13.75%	during	 the	last	 two	 meetings	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2008,	 justifying	 its	 decision	 with	 rising	uncertainties	about	the	growth	outlook	in	the	face	of	the	international	financial	crisis,	 it	 strongly	 reduced	 it	 during	 the	 first	 two	meetings	 of	 2009.	 The	 cut	 in	those	first	two	meetings	represented	half	the	interest	decline	of	the	whole	year,	which	was	completed	in	July,	when	the	COPOM	lowered	the	SELIC	rate	to	8.75%.	Until	the	end	of	the	year,	the	base	rate	remained	at	this	level	and	even	though	the	inflation	rate	markedly	declined	on	an	annual	basis,	from	5.9%	in	2008	to	4.3%	in	2009,	price	markups	strongly	accelerated	towards	the	end	of	the	year.	After	 the	 international	 financial	 crisis	 had	 curtailed	 domestic	 primary	 market	activity	 during	 the	 first	months	 of	 2009,	 primary	 issues	 of	 shares,	 debentures	and	commercial	paper	resumed	a	strong	pace	in	the	second	semester,	closing	the	year	with	an	annual	 increase	of	29.5%.	The	sharp	 increase	of	debenture	 issues	indicated	 that	 one	 of	 the	 goals	 of	 CVM	 instruction	 n.	 476/09	 was	 achieved,	namely	to	broaden	capital	market	access	by	reducing	the	operational	costs	and	by	enabling	smaller	 funding	rounds	as	well	as	smaller	companies	 to	access	 the	market	(ANBIMA	2014d).	The	measure	was	issued	on	January	16th	of	2009	and	introduced	 a	 new	 modality	 of	 placing	 debentures	 and	 other	 financial	 assets,	allowing	 even	 privately	 held	 companies	 to	 make	 a	 public	 offer	 of	 their	 debt	securities	to	a	limited	number	of	qualified	investors.	Since	the	circle	of	potential	buyers	was	restricted	to	qualified	investors,	the	issuing	companies	had	to	fulfill	less	 demands.	 While	 the	 initial	 regulation	 only	 applied	 to	 the	 issuance	 of	securities	such	as	debentures,	closed	investment	fund	shares,	CRIs	and	CRAs	and	commercial	 paper,	 CVM	 instruction	 n.	 551,	 issued	 on	 September	 25th	 2014,	extended	 the	 modality	 to	 other	 financial	 instruments,	 in	 particular	 company	shares.	The	 global	 economic	 recovery	 continued	 in	 2010,	 yet	 with	 a	 great	 disparity	between	 the	 growth	 performances	 of	 different	 countries.	 Although	 financial	market	volatility	was	overall	on	a	lower	level	than	during	the	two	previous	years,	it	 increased	 during	 the	 months	 between	 May	 and	 August	 because	 of	 rising	concerns	 about	 the	 public	 debt	 of	 several	 European	 countries	 and	 the	 gloomy	outlook	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 US	 American	 economic	 recovery	 as	 well	 as	 the	sustainability	 of	 the	 Chinese	 activity	 level.	 Towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 year,	when	more	 optimistic	 prospects	 about	 the	 USA	 and	 China	 prevailed	 again,	 the	increased	 global	 liquidity	 fostered	 the	 upward	 trend	 in	 major	 stock	 exchange	indices.	 The	 second	 semester	 was	 also	marked	 by	 a	 price	 hike	 of	 agricultural	commodities,	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 deteriorating	 supplies	 that	 faced	 rising																																																									149	According	 to	 the	 Portuguese	 term	 Associação	 Nacional	 dos	 Bancos	 de	 Investimento	(ANBID).	150	According	 to	 the	 Portuguese	 term	 Associação	Nacional	 das	 Instituições	 do	Mercado	
Financeiro	(ANDIMA).	
		 144 	
demand,	especially	 from	emerging	market	economies.	The	surge	 in	 commodity	prices	 caused	 inflationary	 pressures	 in	 advanced	 economies	 and	 emerging	market	 economies	 alike.	 In	 Brazil,	 this	 reflected	 in	 the	 strong	 contribution	 of	market	 prices,	 particularly	 in	 the	 food,	 apparel	 and	 service	 sectors,	 to	 the	acceleration	 of	 the	 inflation	 rate.	 The	 consumer	 price	 index	 IPCA	 increased	 by	5.9%	 during	 the	 year.	 The	 COPOM	 kept	 inflation	 within	 the	 target	 range	 by	holding	the	basic	interest	rate	at	its	level	of	8.75%	during	the	first	two	meetings	of	the	year,	before	elevating	it	in	three	consecutive	meetings	to	10.75%,	where	it	remained	until	the	end	of	the	year.	In	 2010,	 the	 second	 term	 of	 president	 Lula	 ended	 and	 his	 successor,	 from	 the	same	 party,	 Dilma	 Rousseff	 won	 the	 election.	 The	 Brazilian	 economy	 took	advantage	of	the	more	benign	international	scenario	and	was	pushed	by	a	sound	domestic	demand	to	the	highest	annual	GDP	growth	(7.6%)	since	1986.	Within	this	 environment	 of	 economic	 expansion,	 the	 continued	 enhancement	 of	employment	 and	 income,	 together	with	 growing	 credit	 operations,	 contributed	to	 the	 strengthening	 of	 the	 consumer	 confidence	 levels.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	improved	 business	 confidence	 indicators	 were	 reflected	 in	 the	 rise	 of	 GFCF,	which	 reached	 18.9%	 of	 GDP.	 The	 Brazilian	 credit	 market	 continued	 on	 its	expansionist	 path	 with	 the	 stronger	 impulses	 still	 stemming	 from	 the	 use	 of	earmarked	resources,	which	were	mostly	disbursed	by	the	BNDES,	especially	for	infrastructure	projects	and	the	acquisition	of	machinery	and	equipment	by	small	and	medium-sized	companies	(SMEs).	More	than	90%	of	the	total	disbursements	of	the	BNDES	in	2010	were	spent	according	to	the	PDP	(BNDES	2010,	70).	After	BNDES	 disbursements	 had	 surged	 by	 44%	 in	 the	 previous	 year,	 they	 further	increased	by	17%	from	R$	183.5	billion	 in	2009	to	R$	214.0	billion	 in	2010.	 In	addition,	 a	 large	 fraction	 of	 earmarked	 credit	 was	 attributed	 to	 housing.	Regarding	 the	 use	 of	 non-earmarked	 resources,	 in	 the	 personal	 credit	 market	payroll-deducted	loans	as	well	as	vehicle	financing	continued	to	grow	and	in	the	corporate	 credit	 market	 domestic	 resources	 gained	 in	 importance	 to	 the	detriment	of	external	funds,	while	the	participation	of	credits	to	SMEs	stood	out.	Efforts	 to	 improve	 the	 competitiveness	 of	 Brazilian	 exporters	were	 intensified	and	the	role	of	the	BNDES	in	foreign	trade	policies	was	amplified	by	creating	two	institutions,	namely	the	Foreign	Trade	Guarantee	Fund	(FGCE151)	as	well	as	the	Brazilian	 Export	 Credit	 Agency	 (EXIM	 Brasil 152 ),	 and	 by	 raising	 BNDES	disbursements	related	to	foreign	trade	operations	from	R$	11.2	billion	in	2009	to	R$	 14.2	 billion	 in	 2010.	 EXIM	 Brasil,	 a	 wholly	 owned	 subsidiary	 of	 BNDES,	intended	to	centralize	and	amplify	efforts	of	the	government	to	support	Brazilian	exports	 and	 its	 operations	 were	 guaranteed	 by	 the	 FGCE.	 While	 being	 an	instrument	 of	 private	 nature,	 the	 FGCE	 was	 administered	 by	 the	 BNDES.	Furthermore,	 the	 BNDES	 financed	 consumer	 goods	 exports	 worth	 a	 financing	volume	 of	 R$	 8.9	 billion	 at	 the	 subsidized	 interest	 rate	 TJLP 153 .	 Despite	accelerated	 efforts	 to	 promote	 Brazilian	 exports,	 the	 trade	 surplus	 retreated	from	US$	 25.3	 billion	 in	 2009	 to	US$	 20.1	 billion	 in	 2010,	mainly	 because	 the																																																									151	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Fundo	Garantidor	de	Comércio	Exterior	(FGCE).	152	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Agência	de	Crédito	à	Exportação	do	Brasil	S.A	(EXIM	Brasil).	153	See	resolution	n.	3,851	of	April	29th	and	resolution	n.	3,910	of	September	30th.	
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domestic	economy	grew	faster	than	the	rest	of	the	world,	resulting	in	a	stronger	growth	 of	 imports	 (42.3%)	 than	 exports	 (32.0%).	 The	 current	 account	 deficit	markedly	increased	to	US$	47.3	billion	(from	US$	24.3	billion	in	2009)	due	to	the	development	of	the	trade	balance	together	with	rising	net	remittances	of	income	abroad,	which	resulted	mainly	 from	the	recovery	of	 the	Brazilian	economy	and	the	 consequential	 increase	 in	 the	 distribution	 of	 profit	 to	 foreign	 investors.	Conversely,	 the	 improved	 prospects	 for	 the	 Brazilian	 economy	 favored	 net	inflows	of	US$	99.9	billion	in	the	capital	and	financial	account.	Throughout	 the	 year,	 exchange	 rate	 policy	 aimed	 at	 keeping	 volatility	 low	and	avoiding	imbalances	in	the	foreign	exchange	market.	 In	this	context,	 the	rate	of	the	financial	transactions	tax	(IOF154)	on	foreign	investors’	capital	flows	into	the	Brazilian	fixed-income	market	was	doubled	from	2%	to	4%	by	decree	n.	7,323	on	April	 10th	 and	 further	 raised	 to	 6%	 by	 decree	 n.	 7,330	 on	 October	 18th.	 The	Brazilian	 currency	 appreciated	 by	 4.3%	 against	 the	 US	 dollar	 in	 2010.	 At	 the	same	 time,	BACEN	maintained	 the	policy	of	building	up	 international	 reserves,	raising	them	by	US$	50.1	billion	to	US$	288.6	billion	at	the	end	of	the	year.	Apart	from	 the	markup	of	 the	 IOF	 tax,	 other	 contributions	 to	 the	 rise	 in	 government	revenues	of	27.1%,	which	totaled	R$	1,168.5	billion,	included	an	extra-ordinary	inflow	in	the	amount	of	R$	95.0	billion	from	granting	the	right	to	explore	oil	 in	the	 sub-salt	 layer	 off	 the	 Brazilian	 coast,	 the	 economic	 upturn	 causing	 an	increase	 of	 major	 tax	 revenues,	 and	 the	 phasing	 out	 of	 measures	 that	 were	introduced	to	mitigate	the	effects	of	 the	 international	 financial	crisis.	While	the	increase	of	22.4%	in	government	spending,	amounting	 to	R$	889.4	billion,	was	lower	than	the	increase	in	government	revenues,	it	accelerated	compared	to	the	previous	year.	In	 2010,	 the	 public	 offering	 of	 Petrobras	 shares,	 reaching	 R$	 152.7	 billion,	dominated	 primary	 issues	 on	 the	 Brazilian	 capital	 markets.	 At	 the	 time,	 the	capital	 raised	was	equivalent	 to	 about	US$	70	billion,	 representing	 the	world’s	largest	share	sale	ever.	The	total	volume	of	stocks	issued	in	the	primary	market	during	the	year	amounted	to	R$	190.9	billion	and	primary	issues	of	debentures	totaled	R$	67.4	billion,	compared	to	R$	63.4	billion	and	R$	37.2	billion	in	2009,	respectively.	The	Ibovespa	closed	the	year	at	the	same	level	as	one	year	before,	rising	only	1%	and	reaching	69,304	points	at	the	last	closing	of	the	year.	During	the	 first	 semester	 the	 index	suffered	 from	volatility,	before	 it	 climbed	up	 to	 its	annual	peak	of	72,657	points	on	November	8th.	In	addition	to	the	increase	of	the	base	rate,	monetary	policy	was	further	tightened	by	raising	reserve	and	capital	requirements155.	Partly	reversing	measures	that	had	been	introduced	during	the	international	 financial	 crisis,	 these	 policy	 instruments	were	 applied	within	 the	macro-prudential	 framework	 that	 CMN	 and	 BACEN	 implemented	 in	 order	 to	ensure	 the	 stability	of	 the	SFN	 together	with	 a	 sustainable	development	of	 the	credit	market,	in	line	with	the	Basel	II	framework156.	
																																																								154	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Imposto	sobre	Operações	Financeiras	(IOF).	155	See	 BACEN	 circulars	 n.	 3,485,	 n.	 3,513,	 and	 3,514	 on	 the	 elevation	 of	 reserve	requirements	and	BACEN	circular	n.	3,515	on	the	increase	of	capital	requirement.	156 	See	 BACEN	 circular	 n.	 3,498	 for	 the	 regulation	 of	 how	 to	 calculate	 capital	requirements	considering	market	risks.	
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In	the	 face	of	 the	more	restricted	access	to	external	 funding	sources	due	to	the	international	 financial	 crisis,	 the	 Brazilian	 government	 had	 answered	 a	 long-standing	request	of	the	domestic	financial	system	for	an	instrument	that	would	allow	 financial	 institutions	 to	 raise	 long-term	 funds	 on	 the	 domestic	 market,	similar	 to	debentures,	by	creating	the	Financial	Bill	 (LF157)	 through	provisional	measure	n.	472	in	December	of	2009	that	was	transformed	into	law	n.	12,249	on	June	11th,	2010	and	regulated	by	CMN	resolution	n.	3,836,	issued	on	February	2nd	of	 2010,	which	was	 later	 replaced	by	CMN	 resolution	n.	 4,123/2012	 (ANBIMA	2013b).	 Among	 the	 required	 characteristics	 of	 the	 LF	 that	 helped	 the	 issuing	financial	 institutions	 to	 improve	 their	 asset	 liability	 management	 were	 a	minimum	 maturity	 of	 two	 years	 without	 early	 redemption	 option	 and	 a	minimum	interval	of	six	months	for	periodical	yield	payments.	BACEN	circular	n.	3,513,	issued	on	December	2nd,	2010,	raised	the	appeal	of	LFs	by	exempting	them	from	reserve	requirements.	Only	financial	institutions	were	allowed	to	issue	LFs,	e.g.	 mortgage	 companies	 as	 well	 as	 universal,	 commercial,	 investment,	 or	development	banks,	 including	the	BNDES,	which	was	added	later,	on	December	16th,	2010,	to	the	list	of	admitted	issuers	of	Financial	Bills	by	CMN	resolution	n.	3,933.	 CMN	 resolution	 n.	 4,123/2012	 flexibilized	 some	 of	 the	 rules	 initially	established,	 for	 example	 by	 opening	 the	 possibility	 to	 buy	 back	 the	 LF	 before	maturity	 under	 certain	 conditions	 (maturity	 of	more	 than	 48	months	 and	 not	indexed	to	the	interbank	market	rate	DI158)	or	by	reducing	the	minimum	nominal	value	 per	 unit	 from	 R$	 300,000	 to	 R$	 150,000	 for	 LFs	 that	 did	 not	 contain	 a	subordination	 clause.	 The	 latest	 alterations	 to	 the	 regulation	 of	 Financial	 Bills	became	necessary,	because	 in	the	beginning	of	2013	none	of	 the	Brazilian	debt	securities	met	the	criteria	established	in	the	Basel	III	framework.	For	that	reason,	the	 Brazilian	 Central	 Bank	 decided	 to	 adjust	 the	 LF,	 through	 CMN	 provisional	measure	 n.	 608/2013,	 so	 that	 it	would	 serve	 as	 reference	 equity	 according	 to	Basel	III	and	extended	the	possibility	to	issue	LFs	to	all	entities	it	had	authorized	to	function	in	the	financial	markets.	After	the	world	economy	had	started	to	recover	from	the	international	financial	crisis	in	2010,	global	uncertainties	worsened	again	in	2011	with	adverse	effects	both	on	economic	activity,	especially	 in	advanced	economies,	and	 international	financial	markets,	which	showed	increased	volatility.	Several	incidents	added	to	rising	insecurities,	including	the	ongoing	upward	trend	of	commodity	prices	that	had	started	 in	 the	previous	year,	 the	 intensification	of	 the	 fiscal	 crises	of	 some	countries	in	the	Euro	area,	geopolitical	tensions	in	the	North	African	and	Middle	Eastern	 region,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 strong	 earthquake	 that	 hit	 Japan	 including	 its	economic	 impact.	 The	 inflation	 rates	 of	major	 advanced	 and	 emerging	market	economies	 were	 still	 affected	 by	 the	 supply	 shock	 of	 commodities	 from	 the	previous	year,	 so	 that	 the	monetary	 and	 fiscal	policies	of	 these	 countries	were	tightened	further.	Against	this	background	both	entrepreneurs’	and	consumers’	expectations	deteriorated.	Within	this	international	environment	of	growing	uncertainties	and	an	economic	slowdown	 of	major	 advanced	 economies,	 the	 Brazilian	 GDP	 grew	 at	 a	 pace	 of	3.9%,	which	was	markedly	 lower	than	during	the	previous	year,	but	still	above																																																									157	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Letra	Financeira	(LF).	158	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Depósito	Interbancário	(DI).	
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the	average	growth	rate	of	2.7%	of	GDP	during	 the	period	 from	2009	 to	2014.	Similarly,	 the	 investment	 rate	 measured	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 GFCF-to-GDP	 ratio	decreased,	 while	 remaining	 on	 a	 relatively	 high	 level,	 from	 18.9%	 in	 2010	 to	18.3%	in	2011.	The	more	moderate	expansion	of	the	Brazilian	economy	was	also	in	line	with	policy	measures	that	were	implemented	at	the	end	of	2010,	aiming	at	reduced	market	liquidity	as	well	as	the	mismatch	between	aggregate	supply	and	demand.	 Domestic	 demand,	 especially	 consumption,	 recording	 the	 eighth	consecutive	 annual	 growth,	 was	 the	main	 factor	 that	 contributed	 to	 economic	activity	 in	 Brazil.	 It	 was	 sustained	 by	 robust	 household	 income	 that	 benefited	from	 favorable	 conditions	 on	 the	 labor	market	 together	with	 the	 continuation	and	expansion	of	government	social	programs.	For	example,	the	program	Minha	
Casa,	 Minha	 Vida	 was	 enhanced	 by	 provisional	 measure	 n.	 514,	 issued	 on	December	 1st	 of	 2010,	 which	 established	 the	 target	 of	 financing	 two	 million	housing	 units	 for	 low-income	 households	 until	 2014	 corresponding	 to	 an	estimated	 investment	 volume	 of	 R$	 150	 billion	 and	 the	 program	 Brasil	 sem	
Miséria	 (Brazil	 without	Misery)	 was	 launched,	 comprising	 of	 income	 transfers	and	improved	access	to	public	services.	During	 the	 first	 semester	 of	 2011,	monetary	 policy	 evaluated	 that	 inflationary	pressures,	originating	mainly	from	international	commodity	prices	and	internal	demand,	 had	 to	 be	 contained	 by	 elevating	 the	 base	 rate	 in	 five	 consecutive	COPOM	meetings	 from	 10.75%	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2010	 to	 12.50%	 in	 July	 of	 2011.	During	 the	remaining	 three	meetings	of	 the	year,	 the	COPOM	decided	to	revert	the	cycle	of	monetary	tightening	and	successively	cut	the	base	rate	to	11.0%.	It	justified	 the	 loosening	 of	monetary	 policy	with	 the	 deteriorating	 international	scenario	 and	 the	 declining	 domestic	 capacity	 utilization.	 During	 the	 year,	 the	consumer	 price	 index	 IPCA	 rose	 by	 6.5%,	 reaching,	 and	 yet	 not	 crossing,	 the	upper	limit	of	the	inflation	target	band.	The	more	restrictive	monetary	policy	stance	early	in	the	year	together	with	the	impact	 of	 macro-prudential	 measures	 from	 the	 previous	 year	 that	 aimed	 at	 a	more	 sustainable	 development	 of	 the	 credit	 sector	 caused	 the	 Brazilian	 credit	market	 to	 expand	more	moderately	 than	 in	 the	 previous	 year,	 in	 a	 context	 of	economic	slowdown.	The	total	volume	of	credit	operations	still	grew	by	18.8%	in	2011,	compared	 to	20.6%	 in	2010	and	15.2%	 in	2009,	while	 the	credit-to-GDP	ratio	 had	 increased	 from	 42.6%	 in	 2009	 to	 44.1%	 in	 2010,	 before	 it	 reached	46.5%	 in	 2011.	 There	was	 a	 less	 than	 two	 percent	 shift	 of	market	 share	 from	(domestic	 and	 foreign)	 private	 financial	 institutions	 to	 public	 banks.	Correspondingly,	 the	 use	 of	 earmarked	 funds	 increased,	 which	 was	 mostly	related	to	 the	expansion	of	housing	 finance.	 In	contrast,	BNDES	disbursements,	totaling	R$	165.6	 billion	 and	 representing	 3.17%	of	GDP	 in	 2011	 compared	 to	4.33%	in	2010,	decreased	by	23%	in	2011,	reflecting	lower	demand	for	funding	of	 investment	 projects	 in	 the	 face	 of	 dimmed	 growth	prospects.	Moreover,	 the	reduction	 of	 BNDES	 disbursements	 partly	 related	 to	 the	 purchase	 of	 shares	 in	connection	with	the	Petrobras	capitalization	in	2010.	The	Brazilian	 financial	system	(SFN)	displayed	adequate	conditions	 in	 terms	of	liquidity,	profitability	and	capital	levels	in	order	to	cover	its	operational	risks	in	2011,	 even	 in	 the	 context	 of	 elevated	 international	 financial	 market	 volatility.	Modern	prudential	 regulation,	 reasonable	 leverage	 levels	 and	 the	quality	 of	 its	
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assets	guaranteed	the	stability	and	sustainable	development	of	the	SFN.	During	the	first	semester,	BACEN	started	to	prepare	the	capital	and	liquidity	structure	of	the	 Brazilian	 financial	 institutions	 for	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 Basel	 III	framework.	 Furthermore,	 the	 external	 vulnerability	 of	 Brazil	 was	 reduced,	 as	suggested	by	several	 indicators,	 such	as	 the	decreasing	current	account	deficit,	the	 increasing	 external	 trade	 flow	 of	 goods	 and	 services	 or	 the	 expanding	international	 reserves,	 which	 were	 strongly	 raised	 from	 US$	 288.6	 billion	 in	2010	to	US$	352.0	billion	in	2011.	Additionally,	the	general	review	of	IMF	quota	resulted	in	an	upward	adjustment	of	the	Brazilian	quota	in	the	IMF	from	SRD	3.0	billion	before,	 to	 SRD	4.3	billion	 in	March	2011.	Recognizing	 the	 robustness	of	the	SFN	and	the	Brazilian	external	position	together	with	the	consistency	of	the	macroeconomic	 policy	 setup	 based	 on	 the	 inflation	 targeting	 framework,	 a	floating	exchange	rate	regime	and	fiscal	responsibility,	the	major	rating	agencies	decided	to	upgrade	their	ratings	of	Brazilian	sovereign	credit,	first	Fitch	in	April,	followed	by	Moody’s	in	June	and	Standard&Poor’s	in	November.		As	 a	 result,	 and	 despite	 rising	 volatility	 on	 international	 financial	 markets,	resulting	 in	 part	 from	 uncertainties	 related	 to	 the	 sovereign	 debt	 of	 some	European	countries,	Brazil	attained	the	lowest	level	of	sovereign	financing	costs	on	 international	markets	 in	 forty	years,	when	the	country	realized	two	funding	operations	 with	 a	 total	 volume	 of	 US$	 1.7	 billion.	 The	 private	 sector	 also	attracted	rising	international	capital	flows,	resulting	in	net	inflows	of	US$	112.4	billion	 in	 the	capital	and	 financial	account,	 compared	 to	US$	99.9	billion	 in	 the	previous	 year.	 The	main	 contribution	 to	 this	 increase	 came	 from	 the	 surge	 in	foreign	 direct	 investment	 (FDI).	 In	 fact,	 FDI	 net	 inflows	 to	 Brazil	 increased	 by	37.4%	over	the	year,	reaching	a	record	high	of	US$	66.7	billion	and	turning	the	country	into	the	world’s	fifth	largest	recipient	of	FDI	net	inflows,	only	behind	the	USA,	UK,	China	and	Hong	Kong	(UNCTAD	2012).	Brazilian	 foreign	debt	rose	by	US$	41.4	billion	and	reached	US$	298.2	billion,	in	2011.	The	term	structure	of	the	foreign	debt	improved	as	its	long-term	component	increased	by	US$	58.6	billion	to	 US$	 258.1	 billion	 while	 its	 short-term	 component	 decreased	 by	 US$	 17.2	billion	 to	 US$	 40.1	 billion.	 In	 December	 2011,	 the	 long-term	 foreign	 debt	was	mainly	 composed	of	debt	 securities	and	 loans,	 each	with	a	 share	of	43.1%	and	41.4%,	 respectively,	 and	 commercial	 credits,	 representing	 12.5%	 of	 the	 total.	While	 the	 major	 part	 (62.8%)	 of	 total	 foreign	 debt	 was	 accounted	 for	 by	 the	private	sector,	only	a	small	fraction	worth	US$	4.7	billion	of	this	private	external	debt	consisted	of	short-term	operations	and	the	vast	majority,	with	a	volume	of	US$	160	billion,	consisted	of	long-term	operations.	While	the	current	account	deficit	rose	from	US$	47.3	billion	in	2010	to	US$	52.5	billion	 in	2011,	 the	trade	balance	registered	a	higher	surplus	(US$	29.8	billion)	than	in	the	previous	year	(US$	20.1	billion),	reflecting	the	stronger	expansion	of	exports,	 growing	 26.8%,	 compared	 to	 imports,	 growing	 24.5%.	 In	 2011,	 the	Brazilian	 real	 (R$)	 depreciated	 12.6%	 against	 the	 US	 dollar	 (US$).	 The	 harsh	drop	of	the	total	volume	issued	in	primary	capital	markets	for	shares,	corporate	debentures,	and	commercial	paper,	from	R$	282.0	billion	in	the	previous	year	to	R$	 104.6	 billion	 in	 2011,	 was	 mainly	 reflecting	 the	 extraordinarily	 high	comparison	basis	in	2010,	which	included	the	public	offer	of	Petrobras	shares	in	the	amount	of	R$	152.7	billion,	and	the	absence	of	primary	market	activity	since	September	2011	as	a	consequence	of	uncertainties	in	the	international	scenario.	
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Accordingly,	the	primary	market	for	company	shares	registered	a	strong	decline	from	R$	190.9	billion	in	2010	to	R$	22.6	billion	in	2011,	while	the	decline	in	the	primary	 market	 for	 corporate	 debentures	 was	 less	 severe,	 dropping	 from	R$	67.3	billion	in	2010	to	R$	60.5	billion	in	2011.	The	Ibovespa	closed	the	year	at	56,754	points,	decreasing	18.1%	over	the	12-month	period,	after	it	had	dropped	below	50,000	points	to	its	lowest	level	during	the	year	on	August	8	with	48,668	points.	In	line	with	the	Productive	Development	Policy	(PDP)	implemented	in	2008,	the	government	launched	the	Greater	Brazil	Plan	(PBM159)	on	August	2nd,	2011,	the	first	 industrial	 policy	 plan	 in	 Brazil	 for	 more	 than	 thirty	 years	 (Araujo	 and	Martins	2012,	9).	The	PBM	was	established	by	decree	n.	7,540/2011	and	its	aim	was	to	promote	technological	and	productive	investment	as	well	as	innovation	in	order	 to	 improve	 the	 competitiveness	 of	 Brazilian	 companies	 at	 home	 and	abroad.	While	 emerging	market	 economies	 in	 Southeast	Asia	were	on	 the	 rise,	Brazilian	 industry	 lost	 competitiveness,	 among	 other	 things	 due	 to	 the	appreciation	 of	 the	 exchange	 rate	 during	 the	 previous	 years.	 The	 measures	encompassed	 tax	 advantages	 for	 the	 exporting	 sector 160 	as	 well	 as	 the	acquisition	 of	 capital	 goods,	 funding	 of	 research	 and	 development	 activities	 in	the	amount	of	US$	1	billion,	financing	and	guarantee	schemes	for	the	exporting	sector,	 and	 preferential	 treatment,	 i.e.	 a	 25%	 quota,	 of	 domestic	 products	 in	government	 purchases.	 However,	 there	 was	 concern	 about	 the	 lack	 of	 an	increase	 in	 public	 expenditures,	 particularly	 directed	 at	 investments,	 and	 that	this	 spending	was	 actually	 reduced	 relative	 to	 GDP	 (Araujo	 and	Martins	 2012,	20;	Serrano	and	Summa	2011).	The	 envisaged	 export	 financing	 and	 guarantees	 were	 to	 be	 provided	 by	 the	Export	 Financing	 Fund	 (FFEX161),	 which	 was	 created	 according	 to	 provisional	measure	n.	541	on	August	2nd,	 converted	 into	 law	n.	12,545	on	December	14th.	The	 FFEX	was	 private	 in	 nature,	 established	 and	 administered	 by	 the	 Bank	 of	Brazil	 (BB)	and	accessible	 for	companies	with	revenues	below	R$	71.6	million.	The	law	authorized	the	government	to	equip	the	fund	with	up	to	R$	1.2	billion.	Furthermore,	 the	FFEX	would	be	equipped	with	earnings	 related	 to	 the	export	financing	program	 (Proex162)	 and	 contributions	 of	 private	 companies.	 In	 2011,	the	 BNDES	 continued	 to	 be	 engaged	 in	 foreign	 trade	 operations,	 and	 its	disbursements	in	this	area	amounted	to	US$	6.7	billion.	On	 June	 24th,	 2011,	 the	 Brazilian	 government	 passed	 the	 law	 n.	 12,431	 and	introduced	 fiscal	 incentives	 for	 financial	 instruments	 related	 to	 the	 funding	 of	long-term	 investment	 projects	 and	 created	 accordingly	 the	 so-called	infrastructure	bonds	(debêntures	de	infraestrutura)	(ANBIMA	2014c,	2013a).	The	stated	 objectives	 of	 the	 law	 included	 the	 stimulation	 of	 financial	 assets	 with																																																									159	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Plano	Brasil	Maior	(PBM).	160	The	 government	 created	 the	 so-called	 Special	 System	 of	 Tax	 Refund	 for	 Exporting	Companies	 (Reintegra),	 involving	 estimated	 tax	 reliefs	 in	 the	 order	 of	 R$	 29.2	 billion	during	the	fiscal	years	of	2011	and	2012.	161	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Fundo	de	Financiamento	à	Exportação	(FFEX).	162	The	 export-financing	 program	 (Proex),	 being	 exclusively	 realized	 by	 the	 Bank	 of	Brazil	(BB)	and	using	resources	of	the	National	Treasury	(TN),	has	provided	exporters	as	well	as	importers	of	Brazilian	goods	and	services	with	a	specific	financing	model.	
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longer	 maturities,	 expansion	 of	 capital	 market	 access	 for	 Brazilian	 companies	and	 the	 promotion	 of	 investment	 projects	 in	 the	 fields	 of	 infrastructure,	 high-technology	 production,	 research	 and	 development	 as	 well	 as	 innovation.	 The	infrastructure	 bonds	 were	 issued	 by	 Brazilian	 companies	 by	means	 of	 special	purpose	 entities	 (SPEs 163 )	 in	 order	 to	 realize	 infrastructure	 projects	 in	prioritized	sectors	such	as	energy,	transportation,	water	and	sanitation	facilities	as	well	as	 irrigation	systems.	The	holder	of	such	an	infrastructure	or	 long-term	bond	 benefitted	 from	 a	 reduction	 of	 the	 income	 tax	 on	 the	 yields	 of	 the	 bond.	Additionally,	 the	 IOF	 rate	 on	 foreign	 investments	 in	 the	 Brazilian	 market	 for	company	shares,	long-term	as	well	as	infrastructure	bonds	was	reduced	from	six	to	zero	percent,	according	to	decree	n.	7,632	of	December	1st,	2011.	In	 accordance	 with	 the	 legal	 innovation	 aiming	 at	 the	 development	 of	 a	 long-term	 corporate	 bond	 market,	 BNDES	 and	 ANBIMA	 created	 the	 so-called	 New	Market	 for	Fixed-Income	Securities	 (NMRF	according	 to	 the	Portuguese	 initials	of	Novo	Mercado	de	Renda	Fixa),	 in	 order	 to	 foster	 this	 segment	 of	 the	 capital	markets	 as	 a	 source	 of	 (long-term)	 funding	 for	 Brazilian	 companies.	 By	establishing	differential	rules	for	the	registration	of	fixed-income	securities,	the	NMRF	incentivized	characteristics	that	increased	the	transparency	as	well	as	the	liquidity	 premium	 of	 the	 asset	 and	 its	 market.	 Furthermore,	 the	 NMRF	 was	divided	 into	 a	 long-term	 and	 a	 short-term	 segment.	 The	 assets	 of	 the	 first	segment	additionally	had	to	meet	the	same	requirements,	in	terms	of	minimum	maturity	and	repurchase	conditions,	which	defined	long-term	assets	according	to	law	n.	12,431/11.	In	October	of	2011,	ANBIMA	issued	a	code	of	best	practices	for	the	NMRF	and	in	the	beginning	of	2012	the	first	issue	of	a	debenture	in	the	new	market	for	fixed-income	securities	was	registered.	The	 slowdown	 of	 the	 world	 economy	 throughout	 2012	 was	 mainly	 a	consequence	of	the	aggravating	European	fiscal,	banking	and	political	crisis,	the	decelerating	recovery	of	 the	US	economy	and	 the	growing	risk	aversion	on	 the	international	financial	markets.	Even	though	the	USA,	UK	and	China	registered	a	short	 period	 of	 economic	 recovery	 in	 the	 third	 quarter,	 the	 global	 economic	activity	lost	dynamism	towards	the	end	of	the	year,	again.	The	USA	suffered	from	a	political	deadlock	related	 to	 the	so-called	 fiscal	 cliff.	The	Euro	area	entered	a	more	 intense	recession	at	 the	end	of	 the	year,	even	after	 the	European	Central	Bank	 (ECB)	 had	 loosened	monetary	 policy	 even	 further	 and	 announced	 that	 it	would	 defend	 the	 euro	 (€)	 unconditionally.	 Against	 this	 background,	 the	declining	 trend	 of	 commodity	 prices,	 initiated	 in	 2011,	 continued	 and	contributed	 to	 the	 downward	 path	 of	 inflation,	 which	 in	 turn	 favored	 the	maintenance	of	exceptionally	low	interest	rates	in	the	advanced	economies	and	the	prolongation	of	the	expansive	monetary	as	well	as	fiscal	policy	cycles	in	the	emerging	market	economies.	In	Brazil,	the	annual	GDP	growth	was	lower	than	during	the	previous	year	for	the	second	 time	 in	 a	 row	and	 closed	 the	year	with	a	 growth	 rate	of	1.8%	 in	2012,	after	 3.9%	 in	 2011	 and	 7.6%	 in	 2010.	 On	 the	 bright	 side,	 seasonally	 adjusted	quarterly	 GDP	 growth	 revealed	 a	 positive	 development	 of	 increasingly	 lively	economic	activity	in	the	course	of	the	year,	rising	from	0.1%	in	the	first	quarter																																																									163	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Sociedade	de	Propósito	Específico	(SPE).	
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to	0.3%,	0.4%	and	0.6%	 in	 the	 remaining	 three	quarters	of	2012,	 respectively.	The	 economy	 continued	 to	 depend	 on	 domestic	 demand	 as	 its	 main	 backing,	receiving	strong	impulses	from	household	consumption,	which	was	sustained	by	the	(moderate)	expansion	of	credit	operations	and	the	vigor	of	the	labor	market.	Gross	fixed	capital	formation	(GFCF)	declined	to	16.9%	of	GDP	as	a	consequence	of	growing	uncertainties	 in	the	external	scenario	that	worsened	entrepreneurs’	confidence	and	expectations.	Since	the	COPOM	had	elevated	the	base	rate	to	12.50%	in	July	2011,	it	started	to	lower	the	base	rate	three	consecutive	times	during	the	remainder	of	the	year	to	11.00%	and	maintained	this	downward	path	throughout	2012,	cutting	down	the	SELIC	 rate	 another	 seven	 successive	 times	 to	 7.25%	 in	 October	 2012.	 In	 the	November	meeting,	 the	COPOM	decided	 to	maintain	 the	base	 rate	at	 this	 level.	Justifying	this	decision,	the	COPOM	explained	that	its	assessment	of	inflationary	risks,	 considering	 the	 recovery	 of	 the	 domestic	 economy	 and	 the	 complex	international	scenario,	came	to	the	conclusion	that	the	appropriate	strategy	for	the	 convergence	 of	 the	 inflation	 rate	 to	 its	 target	 was	 to	 stabilize	 monetary	conditions	for	a	sufficiently	long	period.	In	this	environment,	the	consumer	price	index	IPCA	reached	5.8%	in	2012,	which	was	within	the	target	range	and	lower	than	the	inflation	rates	registered	during	the	previous	two	years	of	5.9%	in	2010	and	6.5%	in	2011,	but	still	above	the	inflation	target	of	4.5%.	The	 credit	 market	 experienced	 a	 strong	 decrease	 of	 interest	 rates,	 reaching	historical	 lows,	 which	 favored	 the	 reduction	 of	 constrained	 household	 income	and,	from	mid	2012	onwards,	the	containment	of	default	of	payment	rates.	The	credit-to-GDP	ratio	 increased	to	49.3%	in	2012,	up	from	46.5%	in	the	previous	year.	While	the	expansion	of	the	credit	sector	remained	on	a	relatively	high	level,	it	 continued	 to	slow	down,	 converging	 towards	a	 sustainable	growth	path.	The	total	 volume	 of	 credit	 operations	 rose	 by	 16.4%	 in	 2012,	 after	 it	 had	 risen	 by	18.8%	 and	 20.6%	 in	 2011	 and	 2010,	 respectively.	 Especially	 public	 banks	contributed	 to	 the	 expansion	 of	 credit	 operations,	 raising	 their	 share	 of	 the	Brazilian	credit	market	from	43.6%	in	the	previous	year	to	47.9%	in	2012.	The	disbursements	 of	 the	 BNDES	 went	 up	 by	 6%	 to	 R$	 175.8	 billion,	 partly	recovering	 the	 decline	 of	 the	 previous	 year,	 when	 this	 figure	 had	 dropped	 by	23%.	At	 the	 end	of	2012,	 the	Brazilian	 external	debt	 amounted	 to	US$	312.9	billion,	rising	by	US$	14.7	billion	within	twelve	months.	As	in	the	previous	year,	the	term	structure	improved,	as	the	long-term	component	of	external	debt	was	raised	by	US$	 22.2	 billion	 to	 US$	 280.3	 billion,	 while	 the	 short-term	 component	 was	reduced	 by	 US$	 7.5	 billion	 to	 US$	 40.1	 billion.	 In	 2012,	 Brazil	 realized	 three	sovereign	 bond	 issuance	 operations	 on	 international	 markets	 with	 a	 total	volume	of	US$	3.9	billion.	The	 uncertainties	 about	 the	 duration	 and	 intensity	 of	 the	 international	 crisis	didn’t	exert	a	negative	 influence	on	 foreign	capital	 flows	to	Brazil	 in	2012.	The	capital	 and	 financial	 account	 registered	 net	 inflows	 of	 US$	 70.0	 billion,	 with	positive	net	contributions	under	the	headings	of	loans,	long-term	debt	securities,	and	company	shares.	FDI	net	inflows	were	almost	on	the	same	record	high	level	of	the	previous	year,	decreasing	only	by	2.1%	to	US$	65.3	billion,	which	placed	
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Brazil	fourth	on	the	international	ranking	of	FDI	receiving	countries,	moving	up	one	position	(UNCTAD	2013).	 In	2012,	FDI	 flows	to	advanced	economies	were,	for	 the	 first	 time,	 lower	 than	 those	 to	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	economies.	The	Brazilian	real	depreciated	by	8.9%	against	the	US	dollar	in	2012.		In	line	with	the	government	directive	to	simplify	and	modernize	the	foreign	exchange	market,	the	 National	 Monetary	 Council	 (CMN)	 defined	 simplification	 measures.	 CMN	resolution	n.	4,051	of	January	26th	changed	the	conditions	of	participation	in	the	foreign	 exchange	 market	 for	 exchange	 broker	 and	 dealer,	 seeking	 increased	competition	among	agents	 in	exchange	 transactions	with	smaller	amounts	and,	as	 a	 result,	 lower	 transaction	 costs.	 During	 the	 first	 months	 of	 the	 year,	 the	elevated	 liquidity	 on	 international	 markets	 induced	 renewed	 auctions	 for	 the	purchase	 of	 international	 reserves,	 which	 increased	 from	 US$	 352.0	 billion	 in	December	2011	to	US$	373.1	billion	one	year	later.	Within	this	context,	various	measures	were	adopted	to	adjust	the	entrance	of	foreign	capital	into	the	country	and	to	discourage	short-term	capital	flows164.	As	of	May	2012,	the	risk	aversion	on	 international	 financial	markets	 increased,	 requiring	 a	 gradual	 flexibilization	of	the	measures	that	had	been	implemented	in	the	beginning	of	the	year165.	The	 deficit	 in	 the	 current	 account	 increased	 from	US$	 52.5	 billion,	 or	 2.1%	 of	GDP,	 in	 2011	 to	US$	 54.2	 billion,	 or	 2.4%	of	 GDP,	 in	 2012.	 The	 surplus	 in	 the	trade	balance	markedly	decreased	by	US$	10.4	billion	 to	US$	19.4	billion,	 from	US$	29.8	billion	in	the	previous	year.	Government	action	in	the	area	of	external	trade	 policy	 as	 well	 as	 industrial	 policy	 was	 guided	 by	 the	 continuity	 of	 the	Greater	Brazil	Plan	(PBM),	which	was	enhanced	by	a	series	of	measures	with	the	goal	 to	 strengthen	 international	 market	 competitiveness	 of	 the	 domestic	industry	and	to	encourage	investments	in	the	country166.	The	policy	of	fostering	competitiveness	 of	 the	 domestic	 industry	 encompassed	 the	 increase	 of	 public	resources	 for	 the	provision	of	 finance	of	exportable	production,	 the	removal	of	taxation	on	exports	and	investments,	and	the	resumption	of	the	agenda	to	lower	the	 so-called	Brazil	Cost	 (Custo	Brasil).	Main	achievements	of	 the	PBM	 in	2012	include	 the	 payroll	 tax	 exemption	 in	 labor-intensive	 sectors,	 a	 reduction	 in	energy	 prices,	 as	well	 as	 the	 government	 programs	 of	 concessions	 and	public-private	partnerships	in	the	fields	of	infrastructure,	transportation	and	logistics167.																																																									164	See,	 for	example,	decree	n.	7,683	of	March	1st	 and	decree	7,698	of	March	9th,	2012,	which	were	extending	the	minimum	duration	of	financial	investment	operations	eligible	for	preferential	tax	treatment	from	720	days	to	1,080	days,	and	later	to	1,800	days.	165	See,	for	example,	decree	n.	7,751	of	June	14th	and	decree	7,853	of	December	5th,	2012,	which	 reversed	 the	 earlier	 extensions	 of	 minimum	 duration	 of	 financial	 investment	operations	 eligible	 for	 preferential	 tax	 treatment,	 cutting	 it	 down	 from	 1,800	 days	 to	720	days,	and	later	to	360	days.	166	See,	 for	example,	provisional	measure	n.	564	of	April	3rd,	which	was	converted	 into	law	 n.	 12,712	 of	 August	 30th,	 or	 provisional	 measure	 n.	 563	 of	 April	 3rd,	 which	 was	converted	into	law	n.	12,715	of	September	17th.	167	Concerning	the	infrastructure	sector,	provisional	measures	n.	579	of	September	31st	and	 n.	 595	 of	 December	 6th	 were	 regulating,	 respectively,	 the	 concession	 of	 energy	generation,	 transmission	 and	distribution	 and	 the	new	 regime	 for	 the	 installation	 and	operation	of	ports.	The	adjustments	in	the	energy	sector	aimed	at	a	future	reduction	of	energy	prices	 for	Brazilian	 customers	 as	well	 as	 securing	 the	 energy	 supply.	 The	new	
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Furthermore,	 activities	 were	 publicly	 sponsored	 that	 gave	 incentives	 to	innovation	 and	 the	 elevation	 of	 domestic	 content	 in	 final	 products,	 e.g.	 in	 the	automotive	sector.	The	fiscal	measures	implied	an	estimated	loss	of	tax	revenue	in	 the	amount	of	R$	52.3	billion.	The	BNDES	disbursements	related	 to	external	trade	operations	amounted	to	US$	5.5	billion	 in	2012,	 i.e.	US$	1.2	billion	 lower	than	in	the	previous	year.	The	export-financing	program	(Proex)	with	a	volume	of	US$	4.9	billion	in	2012	accounted	for	1.7%	of	total	exports	and	was	enhanced	by	law	n.	12,699	of	July	30th,	which	extended	the	credit	of	the	TN	by	R$	1.6	billion.	On	April	30th,	2012,	law	n.	12,618	was	passed,	which	authorized	the	creation	of	three	 entities,	 one	 for	 each	 power	 of	 the	 state,	 of	 closed	 and	 complementary	pension	funds	for	the	public	servants.	In	the	low	interest	rate	environment,	the	capital	 markets	 experienced	 a	 surge	 in	 primary	 issues,	 mainly	 pushed	 by	corporate	debentures,	which	 increased	by	68%	from	R$	60.5	billion	 in	2011	to	R$	 101.4	 billion	 in	 2012.	 While	 primary	 issues	 of	 commercial	 paper	 also	increased,	 from	 R$	 21.5	 billion	 to	 R$	 25.5	 billion,	 the	 primary	 market	 for	company	shares	dropped	to	R$	16.1	billion,	even	below	the	already	low	level	of	the	previous	year	of	R$	22.6	billion.	The	Brazilian	stock	exchange	index	Ibovespa	registered	 60,952	 points	 in	 the	 last	 closing	 of	 the	 year,	 representing	 a	 7.4%	annual	 growth,	 after	 experiencing	 high	 volatility	 during	 the	 year.	 The	 annual	maximum	was	reached	in	March,	at	68,394	points,	and	the	minimum	in	June,	at	52,481	points.	The	recovery	of	the	world	economy	in	2013	was	mainly	based	on	greater	activity	in	the	advanced	economies,	with	the	economic	performance	of	the	USA	and	UK	sticking	out,	together	with	the	return	of	the	euro	area	to	a	positive	growth	path.	In	 these	 economies,	 inflation	 remained	 below	 the	 levels	 that	 the	 respective	central	 bank	 envisaged,	 which	 therefore	 lowered	 base	 rates	 to	 historic	 levels.	Emerging	market	 economies	 disappointed	 initial	 projections	 of	 their	 economic	performance	 in	 2013,	 a	 result	 that	 was	 partly	 related	 to	 financial	 market	instabilities	throughout	the	year.	Between	May	and	September,	it	was	not	clear,	when	 the	US	American	 central	 bank	 (Fed)	would	 end	 its	 policy	of	 quantitative	easing	(tapering)	and	whether	 it	would	 initiate	 the	process	of	normalization	of	its	 monetary	 policy	 sooner	 than	 expected.	 These	 uncertainties	 translated	 into	increased	volatility	of	 financial	markets	and	 long-term	interest	rates,	especially	in	 the	 USA.	 Adverse	 effects	 of	 these	 events	 on	 the	 capital	 flows	 to	 emerging	market	 countries	 caused	 their	 currencies	 to	 depreciate	 against	 the	 US	 dollar.	Governments	and	monetary	authorities	of	emerging	market	countries	reacted	to	this	 uncertain	 environment	 by	 taking	 measures	 to	 limit	 their	 economies’	exposure	to	foreign	currencies.	In	 this	 context	 of	 enhanced	 global	 economic	 activity	 and	 financial	 market	volatility,	 the	 Brazilian	 economy	 registered	 an	 annual	 GDP	 growth	 of	 2.7%	 in	2013,	 reversing	 the	 slowdown	 since	 the	 peak	 in	 2010.	 The	 acceleration	 of	domestic	 growth	 was	 mainly	 sustained	 by	 agricultural	 production	 with																																																																																																																																																															port	regime	was	seeking	to	amplify	the	infrastructure	and	modernize	the	management	of	the	Brazilian	ports,	in	order	to	encourage	private	wealth	holders	to	invest	and	to	raise	the	cargo-handling	capacity	combined	with	cost	reductions	and	the	removal	of	entrance	barriers.	
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additional	 contributions	 from	 positive	 results	 in	 the	 industrial	 and	 service	sectors.	As	regards	the	components	of	aggregate	demand,	the	recovery	of	gross	fixed	 capital	 formation	 stood	out,	which	was	based	on	 increased	production	of	capital	 goods	 for	 construction	 as	 well	 as	 transport	 equipment.	 The	 relative	moderation	of	household	consumption	reflected	the	recent	evolution	of	incomes,	the	credit	market	and	consumer	confidence	indicators.	The	composition	change	in	 rising	 demand,	 with	 investments	 growing	 faster	 than	 consumption,	 was	conducive	to	a	more	sustainable	long-term	growth.	These	developments	can	also	be	 interpreted	 in	 light	of	 the	upcoming	FIFA	World	Cup	 in	2014,	which	caused	increased	 investment	 expenditures,	 particularly	 in	 the	 construction	 and	infrastructure	sectors.	At	the	same	time,	the	less	benign	evolution	of	the	private	households’	 economic	 situation	 might	 be	 related	 to	 the	 outburst	 of	 political	protest	in	June	2013	in	the	host	cities	of	the	FIFA	Confederations	Cup.	Government	 action	 in	 the	 fields	 of	 foreign	 trade	 and	 industrial	 policy	 in	 2013	was	 guided	by	 the	 continued	 implementation	of	 the	Greater	Brazil	 Plan	 (PBM)	together	with	measures	to	boost	not	only	competitiveness	of	domestic	industry,	but	 also	 investments	 in	 productive	 capacity,	 as	 well	 as	 innovation,	 and	 the	improvement	 of	 the	 trade	 defense	 system.	 Concerning	 foreign	 trade	 policy,	BNDES	 disbursements	 related	 to	 international	 business	 loan	 operations	amounted	 to	US$	7.1	billion	(up	 from	US$	5.5	billion	 in	 the	previous	year)	and	the	 total	 volume	 of	 the	 export-financing	 program	 (Proex)	 grew	 from	 US$	 4.9	billion	 in	2012	to	US$	6.3	billion	 in	2013.	Despite	 increased	public	spending	to	foster	Brazilian	companies	in	the	external	sector,	the	trade	balance	dropped	88%	from	US$	19.4	billion	in	the	previous	year	to	US$	2.3	billion	in	2013,	in	a	context	of	a	depreciating	real	(R$).	The	decline	in	the	trade	balance	was	the	main	reason	for	the	increase	of	the	current	account	deficit	from	US$	54.2	billion,	representing	2.4%	of	GDP	in	the	previous	year	to	US$	81.2	billion,	representing	3.6%	of	GDP	in	2013.	After	the	COPOM	had	left	the	SELIC	rate	on	its	record	low	level	of	7.25%	during	the	first	two	meetings	of	the	year,	it	decided	to	increase	the	base	rate	by	0.25%	in	 the	 third	 meeting,	 because	 it	 had	 come	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 rising	inflation	rate	required	a	monetary	policy	reaction.	In	the	following	four	meetings	the	SELIC	rate	was	elevated	by	another	0.50%	each,	raising	 it	 to	10.00%	at	the	end	of	the	year.	The	COPOM	justified	its	decisions,	in	May	with	the	worsening	of	inflation	expectations,	 in	July	and	August	with	the	depreciation	and	volatility	of	the	 exchange	 rate	 that	 exerted	 inflationary	 pressures,	 and	 in	 the	 October	 and	December	 meetings	 with	 the	 conjuncture	 of	 rising	 prices,	 indexation,	 and	inflation	 expectations.	 The	 consumer	 price	 index	 IPCA	 registered	 an	 annual	inflation	 rate	of	5.9%	 in	2013,	 slightly	 above	 the	previous	year	 and	within	 the	inflation	target	range.	The	 deceleration	 of	 growth	 in	 the	 Brazilian	 credit	 sector	 continued	 in	 2013,	when	 the	 total	 volume	 of	 credit	 operations	 grew	 14.7%	 throughout	 the	 year,	compared	 to	annual	credit	growth	rates	of	16.4%	 in	2012,	18.8%	 in	2011,	and	20.6%	 in	 2010.	 During	 the	 same	 period,	 the	 credit-to-GDP	 ratio	 increased	 to	51.0%	in	2013,	from	49.3%,	46.5%,	and	44.1%,	respectively,	in	the	earlier	years.	In	 2013,	 especially	 the	 credit	 segment	 with	 non-earmarked	 resources	 was	slowing	down,	reflecting	 the	 impact	of	higher	 interest	rates	of	consumer	 loans.	
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Credit	operations	with	earmarked	resources,	rising	24.5%	during	the	year,	were	pushed	 by	 the	 dynamic	 performance	 of	 rural	 credit	 and	 by	 the	 continued	expansion	 of	 housing	 finance	 as	 well	 as	 financing	 operations	 with	 BNDES	resources.	The	disbursements	of	the	BNDES	grew	by	15%	to	R$	202.6	billion	in	2013.	 In	 this	 context,	 public	 banks	 represented	 51.2%	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 credit	market	at	the	end	of	the	year,	raising	their	share	from	47.9%	in	the	previous	year.	Furthermore,	 the	 credit	market	 registered	 not	 only	 an	 increase	 of	 the	 interest	rates,	but	also	of	the	medium	terms,	while	spreads	as	well	as	default	of	payment	rates	were	reduced	in	the	course	of	the	year.	Gross	external	debt	decreased	by	1.4%	in	2013	to	US$	308.6	billion	in	December.	The	 reduction	 of	 US$	 4.3	 billion	was	 completely	 attributable	 to	 the	 long-term	foreign	debt,	which	closed	the	year	at	US$	276.0	billion.	The	short-term	foreign	debt,	 in	 turn,	remained	stable	at	US$	32.6	billion.	The	private	sector	accounted	for	 61.5%	 of	 gross	 external	 debt,	 and	 these	 obligations	 consisted	 of	 long-term	operations	in	the	amount	of	US$	162.1	billion	and	of	short-term	operations	in	the	amount	 of	 US$	 27.8	 billion,	 while	 the	 remaining	 38.5%	 fraction	 of	 the	 public	sector	consisted	of	long-	and	short-term	operations	in	the	amount	of	US$	113.9	billion	and	US$	4.8	billion,	 respectively.	Brazil	 realized	 two	operations	of	bond	issuance	on	international	markets	with	a	total	volume	of	US$	4.1	billion	in	2013.	Uncertainties	related	to	the	timing	of	adjustments	in	the	monetary	policy	stance	of	 the	USA	caused	 financial	market	volatility	 to	 rise	 together	with	expectations	about	decreasing	liquidity	conditions	as	well	as	risk	aversion.	As	a	consequence,	international	 capital	 flows	 to	 major	 emerging	 market	 economies	 dried	 up	 for	large	parts	of	the	year	and	the	dollar	appreciated	against	most	of	the	currencies	of	 these	 countries.	 In	 Brazil,	 the	 BACEN	 attenuated	 the	 impact	 of	 this	 adverse	environment	 by	 further	 loosening	 capital	 controls168	and	 by	 offering	 hedge	against	 foreign	exchange	risks169.	 In	 this	 context,	net	 inflows	 in	 the	capital	and	financial	account	amounted	to	US$	74.4	billion	in	2013,	slightly	above	the	result	in	 the	 previous	 year	 (US$	 70.0	 billion).	 Although	 net	 FDI	 flows	 to	 Brazil	decreased	by	2.0%,	the	US$	64.0	billion	registered	in	2013	represented	the	third-highest	 volume	 in	 history	 and	placed	Brazil	 fifth	 in	 the	 country	 ranking	 of	 the	highest	FDI	recipients	(UNCTAD	2014).	Global	FDI	flows	increased	from	US$	1.35	trillion	in	2012	to	US$	1.45	trillion	in	2013	and	for	the	second	consecutive	year	the	advanced	economies	received	less	than	the	developing	economies,	each	with	a	share	of	total	flows	of	39%	and	54%,	respectively.	Net	portfolio	investment	flows	more	than	doubled	from	US$	16.5	billion	in	2012	to	 US$	 34.7	 billion	 in	 2013.	 Transactions	 in	 equity	 securities	 of	 Brazilian	companies	 registered	 net	 inflows	 of	 US$	 11.6	 billion,	 rising	 up	 from	 US$	 5.6	billion	 in	 the	 previous	 year.	 The	 net	 inflow	 to	 the	Brazilian	medium	and	 long-term	fixed-income	market	increased	by	398.0%	during	this	period,	from	US$	5.1																																																									168	The	rate	of	the	financial	transaction	tax	(IOF)	for	foreigners	acquiring	property	fund	shares	was	reduced	to	zero	by	decree	n.	7,894	of	January	30th,	2013.	On	June	4th,	2013,	decree	 n.	 8,023	 reduced	 the	 IOF	 rate	 on	 foreign	 capital	 inflow	 to	 the	 fixed-income	market	 to	 zero,	 and	 on	 June	 12th	 decree	 n.	 8,027	 reduced	 the	 IOF	 rate	 to	 zero	 on	increases	of	the	short	position	in	the	foreign	exchange	derivatives	market.	169	The	BACEN	announced	 a	 program	of	 daily	 liquidity	 supply	 in	 the	 foreign	 exchange	market	through	its	notice	n.	24,370	of	August	22nd,	2013.	
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billion	to	US$	25.4	billion,	which	was,	essentially,	a	consequence	of	the	IOF	rate	reduction.	 Despite	 the	 strong	 increase	 of	 foreign	 capital	 inflows,	 the	 primary	market	 for	company	shares,	debentures	and	commercial	paper	decreased	 from	R$	143.1	billion	in	2012	to	R$	122.5	billion	in	2013.	The	decline	reflected	mainly	the	 R$	 26.5	 billion	 reduction	 of	 primary	 debenture	 issues,	 which	 reached	 an	issuance	volume	of	R$	74.9	billion.	The	issues	of	debentures	and	company	shares	represented	61.1%	and	20.7%,	respectively,	of	the	primary	market.	The	Brazilian	stock	 exchange	 also	 experienced	 a	 downward	 tendency	 throughout	 the	 year,	while	 additionally	 registering	 high	 volatility.	 The	 Ibovespa	 fell	 15.5%	 in	 2013,	reaching	 its	maximum	 in	 January	with	 63,312	 points	 and	 its	minimum	 in	 July	with	 45,044	 points,	 before	 closing	 the	 year	 at	 51,507	 points.	 Not	 only	 the	Brazilian	 stock	 exchange	 was	 negatively	 affected	 by	 increased	 volatility,	 risk	aversion,	and	uncertainty	about	the	anticipation	of	monetary	policy	adjustments	in	 the	 USA,	 causing	 portfolio	 reallocations,	 but	 also	 other	 emerging	 markets,	which	 registered	 annual	 losses	 in	 their	 stock	 exchanges:	 The	 Chilean	 IPSA	(14.0%),	the	Turkish	BIST	(13.3%)	and	the	Chinese	Shanghai	Composite	(6.7%).	On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 Indian	 Sensex	 increased	 by	 9.0%	 in	 2013.	 Most	 stock	exchanges	of	advanced	economies	experienced	strong	upward	movements,	with	the	 Nikkei	 of	 Japan	 (56.7%),	 the	 Standard&Poor’s	 500	 of	 the	 USA	 (29.6%),	Deutscher	 Aktienindex,	 DAX,	 of	 Germany	 (25.5%),	 and	 the	 Financial	 Times	Securities	Exchange	Index,	FTSE	100,	of	the	UK	(14.4%)	sticking	out.	In	2014,	the	international	scenario	remained	complex	as	the	global	economy	was	expected	 to	 continue	 on	 its	 growth	 path	 initiated	 in	 the	 previous	 year,	 with	emphasis	on	the	recoveries	in	the	USA	and	UK,	economic	resilience	in	China	and	signs	 of	 stability	 in	 the	 euro	 area,	 but	 these	 high	 initial	 expectations	 were	disappointed	and	only	moderate	and	unequal	growth	was	registered.	While	the	USA	experienced	oscillating	growth	and	moderate	inflation	throughout	the	first	months	 of	 the	 year,	 its	 domestic	 economic	 activities	 accelerated	 during	 the	second	 semester.	On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 economic	 recovery	 in	 Japan	and	Europe	was	 slower	 than	 expected	 and	 even	 turned	 into	 a	 recession	 in	 Japan.	Furthermore,	major	emerging	market	countries,	 in	particular	China,	 caught	 the	focus	of	attention,	because	 their	growth	rates	were	slowing	down.	At	 the	same	time,	the	prices	of	oil	and	other	commodities	were	decreasing	and	contributed	to	a	 deflationary	 scenario.	After	 inflation	 rates	 in	major	 advanced	 economies	had	already	been	low	throughout	most	of	the	year,	they	reduced	further	towards	the	end	of	2014.	The	euro	zone	even	registered	an	annual	deflation	rate	of	0.2%	in	December.	In	 January,	 currency	 sell-offs	 in	 Argentina,	 Turkey	 and	 South	 Africa	 caused	turbulences	 on	 foreign	 exchange	 markets,	 while	 expectations	 about	 a	 strong	recovery	 of	 the	 US	 economy	 and	 subsequent	 earlier-than-expected	 tapering	 in	the	USA	caused	increased	volatility	on	international	financial	markets,	but	these	expectations	soon	reversed.	The	 improved	predictability	of	US	monetary	policy	together	with	signs	of	a	continuation	of	the	high	liquidity	environment	given	by	the	central	banks	of	the	USA,	China,	Japan	and	the	euro	area,	and	the	perception	of	lower	systemic	risks,	all	contributed	to	a	decreasing	volatility	of	international	financial	markets,	especially	in	the	second	quarter	of	2014.	Lower	risk	aversion	was	 reflected	 in	 rising	 demand	 for	 riskier	 assets	 and	 not	 only	 drove	 stock	
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exchanges	in	advanced	economies	to	record	highs,	but	also	caused	a	surge,	from	March	onwards,	in	emerging	market	issues	of	sovereign	and	corporate	securities.	This	 picture	 was	 reversed	 during	 the	 second	 semester	 of	 2014,	 when	international	financial	market	volatility	increased	again,	reflecting	a	combination	of	factors.	Financial	markets	were	reacting	to	lower	than	expected	growth	rates	in	emerging	market	countries	and	in	important	advanced	economies,	especially	in	Europe	and	Japan,	and	to	the	risk	of	deflation	 in	the	euro	area.	Yet,	 financial	stability	was	not	only	adversely	affected	by	the	disappointing	global	growth	itself,	but	 also	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 was	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 supported	 by	 a	 high	 liquidity	environment,	 which	 led	 to	 an	 underpricing	 of	 risks	 and	 to	 increased	 financial	leverage.	 Additionally,	 accumulated	 high	 risks	 were	 identified	 in	 the	 so-called	shadow	 banking	 system.	 Furthermore,	 instabilities	 were	 stemming	 from	geopolitical	factors,	including	conflicts	in	the	Middle	East	and	Eastern	Europe,	an	embargo	against	Russia,	and	uncertainties	related	to	the	election	and	formation	of	government	in	Greece.	Various	peaks	of	risk	aversion,	raising	the	demand	for	assets	with	higher	liquidity	premium,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	rapid	decline	of	the	 prices	 of	 oil	 and	 other	 commodities,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 contributed	 to	 the	depreciation	 of	 most	 currencies	 against	 the	 US	 dollar,	 especially	 those	 of	commodity	exporting	countries170.	The	appreciation	of	the	US	dollar	was	also	a	consequence	of	the	more	benign	outlook	for	the	US	economy	compared	to	other	important	 economic	 areas	 together	 with	 the	 increasingly	 divergent	 monetary	policy	 stance	 of	 the	 Fed	 in	 contrast	 to	 that	 of	 the	ECB	 and	 the	 central	 bank	of	Japan	(BoJ).	In	 this	 context,	 the	 Brazilian	 economy	 stagnated	 in	 2014,	 recording	 an	 annual	GDP	growth	rate	of	0.2%,	after	 it	had	grown	2.7%	in	2013.	Seasonally	adjusted	quarterly	GDP	grew	at	a	reasonable	pace	of	0.6%	during	the	first	quarter,	before	it	collapsed	in	the	second	quarter,	falling	by	1.3%.	During	the	last	two	quarters,	the	 pace	 of	 economic	 expansion	 came	 close	 to	 a	 standstill	 with	 seasonally	adjusted	quarterly	GDP	growth	rates	of	-0.1%	and	0.1%,	respectively.	Apart	from	the	 low	 economic	 activity,	 Brazil	 faced	 a	 series	 of	 challenges	 that	 intensified	during	 the	 second	 semester,	 including	 the	 worsening	 of	 fiscal	 results	 with	 a	decreasing	 primary	 surplus	 from	 May	 onwards,	 continuously	 high	 inflation	expectations,	 as	 well	 as	 uncertainties	 related	 to	 the	 presidential	 election,	 and	consequently,	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 new	 economic	 cabinet.	 On	 October	 26th,	president	 Dilma	 was	 reelected	 for	 a	 second	 mandate.	 The	 public	 sector	borrowing	 requirements	 doubled	within	 a	 year,	 from	 3.1%	 of	 GDP	 in	 2013	 to	6.2%	 in	 2014,	 mainly	 because	 the	 primary	 surplus	 of	 1.8%	 of	 GDP	 in	 the	previous	year	had	turned	into	primary	deficit	of	0.6%	of	GDP	by	December	2014,	representing	the	first	primary	deficit	since	1999.	
																																																								170	In	the	second	semester	of	2014,	the	US	dollar	appreciated	against	the	Chilean	peso	by	9.7%,	 the	pound	sterling	by	9.8%,	 the	euro	by	13.2%,	 the	Mexican	peso	by	13.8%,	 the	Australian	dollar	by	15.5%,	the	yen	by	18.2%,	the	real	by	20.0%,	and	the	Russian	ruble	by	 78.7%.	 The	 strong	 depreciation	 of	 the	 ruble	 and	 falling	 prices	 of	 Russian	 assets	reflected	 liquidity	 restrictions	 in	 the	 banking	 system	 of	 the	 country	 as	 well	 as	 the	increased	demand	for	foreign	currency	to	pay	external	debt.	After	losing	US$	100	billion	of	its	international	reserves,	the	Russian	central	bank	allowed	the	exchange	rate	to	float.	
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In	 May	 2014,	 the	 COPOM	 discontinued	 the	 cycle	 of	 interest	 rate	 hikes	 it	 had	started	 in	 April	 2013,	 and	 waited	 until	 October	 to	 resume	 it.	 In	 January,	 the	rhythm	 of	 0.50%	 base	 rate	 elevations	 was	 retained,	 raising	 the	 SELIC	 rate	 to	10.5%,	 because	 of	 a	 resistant	 inflation	 and	 uncertainties	 concerning	 the	 fiscal	policy	stance.	In	the	February	and	April	meetings,	the	COPOM	slowed	down	the	interest	 rate	 increases	 to	0.25%,	raising	 the	base	rate	 to	11.0%.	 It	 remained	at	this	 level	 until	 October	 in	 a	 context	 of	 economic	 slowdown	 and	 low	 inflation,	after	it	had	been	raised	3.75%	in	total	since	April	2013.	In	October,	the	COPOM	resumed	to	raise	the	base	rate	by	0.25%.	As	inflation	expectations	continued	to	rise,	 the	 COPOM	 elevated	 the	 SELIC	 rate	 by	 another	 0.50%	 in	 the	 December	meeting,	lifting	it	up	to	11.75%.	In	the	third	quarter,	the	BACEN	tried	to	improve	the	 distribution	 of	 liquidity	 in	 the	 Brazilian	 financial	 system	 through	 macro-prudential	 measures	 and	 adjustments	 of	 the	 reserve	 requirements171 .	 The	inflation	rate	stayed	barely	within	the	target	range,	as	the	consumer	price	index	IPCA	 increased	 by	 6.4%,	 moving	 even	 further	 away	 from	 the	 4.5%	 inflation	target	 than	 last	 year,	 when	 the	 inflation	 rate	 had	 risen	 from	 5.8%	 in	 2012	 to	5.9%	in	2013.	Under	 these	 conditions,	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 credit	 sector	 (11.3%)	was	 lower	than	in	the	previous	year	(14.7%)	for	the	fourth	consecutive	year,	registering	a	credit-to-GDP	 ratio	 of	 53.1%	 in	 December	 2014.	 Non-earmarked	 credit	operations	 only	 grew	 by	 4.6%	 (down	 from	 7.9%	 in	 2013),	 while	 the	 credit	segment	 with	 earmarked	 resources	 rose	 19.6%	 in	 2014.	 The	 increase	 of	earmarked	 credit	was	 lower	 than	 in	 the	 previous	 year,	when	 it	 had	 grown	 by	24.5%,	but	 this	 segment	 continued	 to	play	 the	major	 role	 in	 the	 growth	of	 the	credit	 market.	 Accordingly,	 public	 banks	 expanded	 their	 market	 share	 from	51.2%	 in	2013	 to	53.8%	 in	2014.	By	 contrast,	 the	BNDES	disbursements	were	lowered	by	7%	from	R$	202.6	billion	to	R$	187.8	billion.	The	interest	rates	in	the	domestic	 credit	 market	 increased	 on	 average,	 together	 with	 the	 spread	 and	medium	term	of	credit	transactions,	while	the	default	of	payment	rate	continued	to	decrease.	As	financial	institutions	in	Brazil	increased	their	net	asset	position,	the	 Brazilian	 banking	 system	 continuously	 showed	 low	 liquidity	 risks	 and	elevated	solvency,	which	was	confirmed	by	results	of	stress	tests	and	a	simulated	adoption	of	Basel	III	requirements.	Furthermore,	the	risks	related	to	the	shadow	banking	system	in	Brazil	were	low.	In	 2014,	 the	 gross	 external	 debt	 of	 Brazil	 increased	 by	 12.9%	 from	US$	 308.6	billion	in	December	2013	to	US$	348.5	billion	twelve	months	later.	The	US$	39.9	billion	rise	in	foreign	debt	was	composed	of	US$	25.0	billion	in	additional	short-term	 and	 US$	 14.8	 billion	 in	 additional	 long-term	 operations.	 Especially	 the	76.8%	 surge	 in	 short-term	 external	 debt,	 from	 US$	 32.6	 billion	 to	 US$	 57.6	billion,	stood	out,	while	long-term	obligations	with	a	volume	of	US$	290.8	billion,	representing	83.4%	of	foreign	debt,	registered	an	increase	of	5.4%.	Throughout	the	year,	Brazil	 realized	 three	bond	 issues	on	 international	markets	amounting	to	a	total	volume	of	US$	6.0	billion.	At	the	end	of	2014,	international	reserves	had	reached	US$	363.6	billion,	compared	to	US$	358.8	billion	in	the	previous	year.																																																									171	See	BACEN	circulars	n.	 3,712	of	 July	24th,	 2014,	 as	well	 as	n.	 3,714	 and	n.	 3,715	of	August	20th,	2014.	
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The	 depreciation	 of	 the	 real	 (R$)	 in	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 year	 was	 already	reversed	 during	 the	 first	 semester.	 The	 exchange	 rate	 experienced	 lower	volatility,	 after	 the	BACEN	announced,	 in	 June	2014,	 that	 it	would	maintain	 its	program	of	currency	swap	auctions	and	dollar	repo	transactions	with	the	aim	to	offer	 hedge	 to	 economic	 agents	 and	 provide	 liquidity	 in	 the	 foreign	 currency	market.	The	exchange	 rate	 remained	 relatively	 stable	until	 September,	when	 it	started	 to	 strongly	 depreciate	 against	 the	 US	 dollar.	 In	 reaction	 to	 the	 strong	devaluation	 of	 the	 Russian	 ruble	 and	 its	 repercussions	 on	 the	 currencies	 of	emerging	market	economies,	the	BACEN	announced,	in	December,	that	it	would	extend	 the	program	of	 foreign	 currency	 auctions	beyond	 the	 end	of	 2014.	The	real	closed	the	year	at	R$	2.66/US$,	reflecting	an	annual	depreciation	of	13.4%.	Brazil’s	 current	 account	 deficit	 increased	 from	 US$	 81.2	 billion	 in	 2013	 to	US$	91.3	billion	in	2014	and	the	trade	balance	turned	negative	for	the	first	time	since	 2001,	 as	 exports	 decreased	 by	 7.0%	and	 imports	 by	 4.5%,	 resulting	 in	 a	trade	 deficit	 of	 US$	 4.0	 billion,	 compared	 to	 a	 US$	 2.3	 billion	 surplus	 in	 the	previous	year.	Net	inflows	to	the	capital	and	financial	account	expanded	by	about	one	 third	 to	US$	 99.1	 billion	 in	 2014,	 even	 though	 FDI	 flows	 to	 Brazil	 slightly	decreased	 by	 2.3%	 (UNCTAD	 2015b).	 Nevertheless,	 foreign	 direct	 investment	contributed	 US$	 62.5	 billion	 to	 external	 capital	 flows	 into	 the	 country,	 which	secured	Brazil	sixth	place	among	FDI	recipient	countries,	 falling	back	one	rank.	In	2014,	global	FDI	flows	came	down	from	US$	1,452	billion	in	2013	to	US$	1,228	billion.	 The	 major	 share	 of	 these	 flows	 (55%)	 went	 to	 developing	 economies,	while	advanced	economies	received	41%	of	 these	 flows,	compared	to	54%	and	39%,	respectively,	in	the	previous	year.	The	 index	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 stock	 exchange	 (Ibovespa)	 continued	 its	 downward	trend	 since	 October	 2013	 until	 the	middle	 of	March	 2014.	 On	March	 24th,	 the	rating	 agency	 Standard&Poor’s	 downdgraded	 the	 sovereign	 credit	 rating	 of	Brazil,	which	nevertheless	retained	its	investment	level.	At	the	end	of	March,	the	GDP	growth	of	2013	was	released,	which	was	higher	than	expected,	supporting	the	 3.2%	 rise	 during	 the	 first	 semester	 of	 the	 Ibovespa	 as	 well	 as	 the	improvement	 of	 the	 country	 risk.	 This	 upward	 trend	 did	 not	 last	 long,	 as	 the	rating	agency	Moody’s	lowered	the	outlook	of	its	Baa2	sovereign	rating	of	Brazil	from	stable	to	negative,	on	September	9th.	From	then	on,	the	Ibovespa	reversed	the	 earlier	 upward	 trend	 and	 closed	 the	 second	 semester	 with	 a	 5.9%	 loss,	strongly	 influenced	by	 the	41%	 loss	of	value	of	 the	Petrobras	shares.	Although	the	presentation	of	the	new	economic	cabinet	reduced	volatility	in	the	domestic	capital	markets,	 it	shortly	flared	up	again	in	the	course	of	the	Russian	currency	crisis,	 but	 was	 soon	 stabilized	 after	 the	 announcement	 of	 reduced	 public	spending	as	well	as	the	orthodox	discourse	of	the	new	finance	minister.	Primary	market	activity	reached	almost	 the	same	 level	as	 in	 the	previous	year,	when	 the	 total	 volume	 issued	 of	 company	 shares,	 corporate	 debentures,	 and	commercial	paper	amounted	to	R$	122.5	billion.	In	2014,	primary	issues	totaled	R$	120.3	billion,	also	because	the	sharp	drop	of	nearly	40%	in	the	primary	stock	market	was	to	a	large	part	compensated	by	primary	issues	of	commercial	paper.	While	 the	 primary	 market	 registered	 company	 share	 issues	 in	 the	 amount	 of	R$	 15.4	 billion	 in	 2014,	 down	 from	 R$	 25.4	 billion	 in	 2013,	 the	 respective	volumes	of	commercial	paper	issues	were	R$	30.5	billion	and	R$	22.1	billion.	The	
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primary	issues	of	corporate	debentures	decreased	slightly	from	R$	74.9	billion	in	the	previous	year	to	R$	74.4	billion	in	2014.	Various	measures	 were	 implemented	 in	 the	 course	 of	 2014	 that	 aimed	 at	 the	improvement	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 financial	 system	 in	 terms	 of	 stability,	 security,	transparency	 and	 efficiency172.	 The	most	 important	 legal	 innovations	 included	measures	 that	 facilitated	 the	 access	 of	 international	 investors	 to	 the	 Brazilian	capital	 markets	 by	 simplifying	 procedures	 and	 clarifying	 the	 existing	regulation173.	 The	 main	 intention	 of	 these	 measures	 was	 to	 promote	 private	investment	 projects,	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 infrastructure	 projects,	 and	 the	development	 of	 the	 domestic	 capital	 markets,	 especially	 the	 segment	 of	 long-term	 securities.	 Furthermore,	 measures	 were	 implemented	 to	 align	 domestic	legislation	 with	 the	 recommendations	 of	 the	 Basel	 III	 accord174,	 including	 the	above-mentioned	regulative	adjustments	concerning	the	Financial	Bill175.	
3.1.3 Resuming	the	relevant	context	and	financial	system	
development	in	Brazil	The	legal	roots	of	debentures	in	Brazil	date	back	to	the	19th	century	and	served	as	the	legal	basis	for	their	issuance	until	the	New	Corporate	Law	was	passed	in	1976.	 Due	 to	 the	 12%	 interest	 cap	 of	 the	 Usury	 Law	 in	 combination	with	 the	prohibition	 of	 monetary	 adjustments	 outlawed	 by	 the	 Gold	 Clause	 Law	 (both	decrees	were	passed	in	1933),	long-term	debt	contracts	became	unviable	during	the	 1940s,	 when	 inflation	 rose	 and	 real	 interest	 rates	 turned	 negative.	 As	 a	consequence,	 corporate	 bond	 markets	 in	 Brazil	 practically	 disappeared	 after	they	 had	 offered	 an	 important	 funding	 source	 for	 the	 early	 Brazilian	industrialization.	 To	 circumvent	 growing	 difficulties	 to	 finance	 and	 fund	 the	Brazilian	 developmentalist	 state	 policies	 that	 were	 guided	 by	 an	 import	substitution	industrialization	(ISI)	strategy,	the	public	development	bank	BNDES	was	created	in	1952.	Nevertheless,	the	ISI	strategy	wore	out	towards	the	end	of	the	 decade	 as	 inflation	 and	 public	 deficit	 continued	 to	 increase.	 Although	 the	Brazilian	democratic	governments	at	the	time	recognized	the	need	for	reforms,	it	was	only	after	the	military	coup	in	1964	and	through	authoritarian	impositions	that	 the	 financial	markets	were	restructured,	 laying	 the	ground	 for	 the	current	Brazilian	financial	system	(SFN).	Apart	from	law	n.	4,380/64	creating	the	Financial	System	of	the	Housing	Sector	(SFH),	the	other	two	main	pillars	of	the	financial	restructuring	included	the	Law	of	 the	 Banking	 Reform	 of	 1964,	 which	 reorganized	 the	 monetary	 policy	authorities	by	 instituting	 the	National	Monetary	Council	 (CMN)	as	 the	organ	 in	charge	 of	 formulating	 the	 credit	 and	 currency	 policy	 and	 the	 Brazilian	 central																																																									172	For	example,	CMN	resolution	n.	4,327	of	April	25th,	2014,	established	the	guidelines	for	 the	 implementation	 of	 social	 and	 environmental	 responsibility	 policies	 by	 the	institutions	of	the	SFN.	173	See	CMN	resolution	n.	4,319	of	March	27th,	2014,	BACEN	circular	n.	3,702	of	March	28th,	2014,	and	CMN	resolution	n.	4,373	of	September	29th,	2014.	174	See,	for	example,	BACEN	circular	n.	3,701	of	March	13th,	2014.	175	See	CMN	resolution	n.	4,330	of	May	26th,	2014,	and	law	n.	12,838	of	July	9th,	2014.	
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bank	 (BACEN)	 as	 the	 executing	 and	 supervising	 organ,	 and	 the	 Capital	Market	Law	 in	 1965,	 which	 envisaged	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 capital	 markets	 as	 a	distinct	 segment	 from	 the	 banking	 sector	 in	 the	 SFN	 that	 were	 regulated	 and	supervised	 by	 the	 CMN	 and	 the	 BACEN.	 Among	 the	 legal	 adjustments	 of	 the	Capital	 Market	 Law	 were	 new	 terms	 and	 conditions	 for	 the	 issuance	 of	debentures	including	the	permission	of	monetary	adjustment	clauses,	which	led	to	 the	 revival	 of	 the	primary	market	 for	debentures	 after	decades	without	 any	activity.	 In	 1964,	 the	Monetary	Adjustment	 Law	 initiated	 the	 indexation	 of	 the	Brazilian	 economy	 and,	 as	 a	 consequence,	 not	 only	 corporate	 bonds,	 but	 also	sovereign	bonds	 (the	 so-called	ORTNs)	were	 indexed	 to	 the	 inflation	 rate.	 The	admission	of	monetary	adjustments	was,	on	the	one	hand,	a	solution	to	some	of	the	most	 pressing	 problems	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 economy	 at	 the	 time	 by	 enabling	positive	real	interest	rates	despite	elevated	inflation,	and,	on	the	other	hand,	the	cause	 of	 new	 problems,	 because	 the	 indexation	 provoked	 rising	 inflationary	expectations,	which	reinforced	price	hikes.	Soon	 after	 the	 reforms	were	 implemented,	 the	 Brazilian	 economy	was	 able	 to	take	 advantage	 of	 a	 benign	 international	 scenario	 and	 reached	 extraordinary	high	GDP	growth	rates	of	more	than	10%	per	year	on	average	between	1967	and	1973,	 a	 period	 which	 became	 known	 as	 the	 Economic	 Miracle	 (Milagre	
Econômico).	While	the	fixed-income	market	became	less	attractive,	the	Brazilian	stock	market	experienced	a	boom	phase	between	1970	and	1971.	After	a	 four-decade	 absence	 on	 international	 financial	 markets,	 the	 Brazilian	 government	issued	 a	 sovereign	 bond	 abroad	 in	 1972.	 In	 1976,	 the	 first	 corporate	 bond	issuance	 abroad	 by	 a	 Brazilian	 (state-owned)	 company	 was	 completed.	 The	international	 context	 of	 high	 liquidity	 and	 low	 interest	 rates	 in	 the	 1970s	facilitated	 the	 accumulation	 of	 large	 external	 debts	 (mostly	 bank	 loans)	 by	developing	 and	 emerging	 market	 economies,	 which	 later	 caused	 severe	problems	for	these	countries,	primarily	after	the	second	oil	crisis	in	1979.	The	boom	on	 the	Brazilian	 stock	market	 in	 the	early	1970s	 soon	 reversed	and	stock	 prices	 tumbled.	 In	 the	 resulting	 high	 uncertainty	 environment	 that	 was	aggravated	 by	 the	 first	 oil	 crisis	 in	 1973-74,	wealth	 holders’	 demand	 for	 fixed	rate	bonds	vanished	and	the	demand	for	the	indexed	sovereign	bonds	(ORTNs)	increased.	 The	 Brazilian	 government	 reacted	 to	 the	 increased	 uncertainties	related	 to	 the	 oil	 crisis,	 which	 caused	 a	 global	 recession,	 with	 strong	 state	intervention	 according	 to	 the	 Second	National	Development	 Plan	 (II	 PND)	 and	was	able	to	keep	the	Brazilian	economy	on	its	growth	track.	At	the	same	time,	it	augmented	the	Brazilian	capital	market	infrastructure	with	the	aim	to	regain	the	confidence	of	 investors.	 In	1976,	 the	Securities	Commission	(CVM)	was	created	to	discipline,	monitor	 and	promote	 the	development	of	 the	Brazilian	 securities	markets	 and	 the	 so-called	 new	 Corporate	 Law	 was	 passed.	 By	 imposing	monetary	 adjustment	 of	 permanent	 assets	 and	 net	 equity,	 it	 made	 the	inflationary	impact	on	the	assets	and	liabilities	of	a	company	explicit	and	showed	its	 actual	 economic	 and	 financial	 results.	 Furthermore,	 the	 new	 regulation	extended	the	range	of	possible	types	of	debenture	issues	with	varying	degrees	of	guarantees	and	a	corresponding	cap	on	the	issuance	volume.	An	 important	 step	 in	 the	 financial	 development	 of	 the	 country	 was	 the	implementation	 of	 an	 electronic	 system	 that	 allowed	 the	 registration	 and	
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liquidation	of	financial	transactions	with	and	the	custody	of	sovereign	bonds,	the	so-called	Special	System	 for	Settlement	and	Custody	(SELIC)	 in	1979.	The	base	rate	 SELIC	 is	 derived	 from	 the	 interest	 rates	 that	 are	 charged	during	 the	daily	trading	 operations	 registered	 in	 the	 SELIC	 and	 represents	 an	 important	benchmark	in	Brazil	as	it	reflects	the	interest	paid	on	sovereign	debt	securities.	Despite	 the	 improvements	 in	 the	 institutional	 framework	 of	 the	 Brazilian	financial	 system,	 the	 development	 of	 the	 domestic	 market	 for	 debentures	continued	to	struggle	in	the	1970s,	which	can	be	attributed	to	the	availability	of	a	wide	 range	 of	 alternative	 funding	 sources	 provided	 by	 public	 finance	 for	development.	Brazil	depended	on	external	sources	to	finance	its	growth,	so	that	the	 second	 oil	 crisis	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 decade	 and	 the	 resulting	 interest	 rate	increase	 on	 an	 international	 level	 exposed	 the	 external	 vulnerability	 of	 the	Brazilian	economy.	By	 then	 turning	 to	 the	domestic	bond	market	 to	 finance	 its	debt,	 the	Brazilian	 government	 put	 pressures	 on	 the	 base	 rate,	which,	 in	 turn,	hampered	the	economic	growth	process.	In	political	 terms,	 the	 transition	 from	 the	military	 regime	 to	 the	New	Republic	stood	out	in	the	1980s176.	The	so-called	lost	decade	was	furthermore	marked	by	weak	 economic	 growth,	 rising	 external	 debt,	 a	 series	 of	 unsuccessful	 price	stabilization	plans,	and	a	gradual	opening	of	the	country,	both	economically	and	politically.	In	1982,	Brazil	sought	support	from	the	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	for	the	first	of	a	total	18	times	in	two	decades,	which	helped	the	country	to	revert	 its	 trade	 deficit	 into	 a	 surplus	 in	 1983	 and	 1984,	 but	Brazil	 did	 neither	contain	 its	 rising	 inflation	nor	 its	 budget	 deficit,	which	 it	 financed	 through	 the	issuance	 of	 sovereign	 bonds.	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 large	 supply	 of	 high-yielding	public	bonds,	wealth	holders’	demand	for	company	shares	declined.	The	government	 reacted	 by	 creating	 the	BNDESPAR,	 a	 subsidiary	 of	 the	BNDES,	 in	1982	to	stimulate	the	Brazilian	stock	exchanges	and	to	fill	the	gap	of	the	absent	private	 investor.	 Two	 years	 later,	 in	 a	 context	 of	 lower	 interest	 rates	 and	expectations	 of	 an	 economic	 upswing,	 the	 stock	 market	 strongly	 resumed	 its	growth	path.	The	boom	on	the	Brazilian	stock	exchanges	lasted	until	the	crash	in	1987,	from	which	it	only	recovered	six	years	later.	The	 high	 concentration	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 corporate	 bond	 market	 was	 reduced	when	in	1981-82	the	number	of	placements	strongly	increased.	Yet,	the	market	stagnated	again	soon	after	due	to	various	modifications	in	taxation	and	rules	that	prohibited	 some	 institutional	 investors	 to	 purchase	 debentures.	 In	 1984,	 the	Clearing	House	 for	 the	 Custody	 and	 Financial	 Settlement	 of	 Securities	 (CETIP)	was	 created	 in	 resemblance	 to	 the	 SELIC	 and	 mostly	 aimed	 at	 private	 fixed-income	securities.	The	domestic	 corporate	bond	market	benefited	greatly	 from	increased	 speed	 and	 safety	 related	 to	 the	 electronic	 processing,	 but	 it	 only	recovered	 towards	 the	 end	of	 the	decade,	when	 the	 tax	burden	on	debentures	was	 leveled	 with	 that	 of	 other	 important	 financial	 assets.	 Other	 factors	 that	exerted	 a	 positive	 influence	 on	 the	 market	 development	 included	 a	 gradual	diminution	 of	 subsidized	 credits,	 the	 policy	 of	 decontrolling	 interest	 rates	 by	monetary	authorities,	and	the	relaxation	of	the	requirements	for	the	registration	of	 a	 publicly	 owned	 company.	Moreover,	 corporate	 bond	market	 development	was	fostered	by	the	implementation	of	the	National	Debentures	System	(SND)	in																																																									176	The	new	constitution	of	1988	regulated	the	domestic	financial	system	in	article	192.	
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1988,	which	was	developed	by	ANDIMA	and	CETIP	to	improve	the	transparency	as	well	as	the	reliability	in	the	debentures	market.	The	 Brazilian	 economy	 underwent	 a	 profound	 transformation	 process	 in	 the	1990s	 that	 was	 characterized	 by	 a	 partial	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 state	 from	 the	economy	through	more	 intense	privatization,	by	 the	 liberalization	process,	 and	by	 the	 success	 of	 the	 Plano	 Real	 in	 containing	 inflation.	 In	 1990,	 the	 Collor	administration	 launched	 the	National	Program	of	Denationalization	 (PND)	 that	aimed	at	 repositioning	 the	 state	 in	 the	economy,	 reducing	 the	public	debt,	 and	incentivizing	 private	 investments,	 in	 order	 to	 make	 funding	 for	 Brazilian	companies	 available,	 to	 increase	 international	 competitiveness,	 and	 to	modernize	the	industrial	facilities.	The	BNDES	was	in	charge	of	the	privatization	process,	which	called	 for	 the	participation	of	both	domestic	and	 foreign	wealth	holders	 as	 investors.	 Additionally,	 the	 BNDESPAR	 intensified	 its	 purchases	 of	company	shares	as	well	as	debentures.	In	1997,	the	Capital	Market	Law	and	the	Corporate	 Law	were	 reformed	with	 the	 aim	 to	 facilitate	 the	 restructuring	 and	privatization	 of	 companies,	 which	 was	 accomplished	 by	 restricting	 or	 even	eliminating	a	large	range	of	minority	shareholders’	rights.	The	strong	growth	of	the	complementary	pension	fund	system	was	related	both	to	the	reduction	of	the	public	pensions	 as	part	of	 austerity	measures	 and	 to	 the	 extension	of	 the	 time	horizon	 due	 to	 the	 more	 stable	 economy,	 which	 allowed	 individuals	 to	 make	longer-term	plans	and,	thus,	raised	the	demand	for	private	pension	plans.	In	 order	 to	make	 the	monetary	 policy	 decision	 process	more	 transparent,	 the	Monetary	Policy	Committee	(COPOM)	was	instituted	in	1996	with	the	purpose	to	establish	the	guidelines	of	monetary	policy	and	to	define	the	base	interest	rate.	The	model	of	the	Plano	Real	was	based	on	an	exchange	rate	anchor	together	with	restrictive	monetary	policy	and	fiscal	discipline.	As	a	consequence,	Brazil	had	a	strong	 dependence	 on	 foreign	 capital	 inflows,	 which	 threatened	 to	 dry	 up	whenever	a	crisis	 in	a	developing	or	emerging	market	economy	broke	out.	The	reaction	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 authorities	 to	 these	 crises	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	1990s	was	to	raise	the	 interest	rate	 in	order	to	attract	 foreign	 investors	and	to	avoid	the	devaluation	of	the	Brazilian	currency,	but	the	detrimental	effect	of	the	elevated	interest	rate	on	the	public	finances	worsened	the	situation	even	further.	This	 scenario	 persisted	 until	 January	 1999,	 when	 the	 Brazilian	 real	 strongly	devalued	and	the	exchange	rate	anchor	was	substituted	for	an	inflation	targeting	regime.	 Overall,	 the	 drastic	 reduction	 of	 the	 inflation	 was	 accompanied	 by	moderate	growth	rates,	rising	unemployment,	trade	deficits	and	a	harsh	increase	of	the	public	deficit	and	the	public	debt.	Although	the	Plano	Real	was	able	to	bring	 inflation	under	control,	 the	Brazilian	economy	 continued	 to	 suffer	 from	 macroeconomic	 instabilities,	 expressed	 in	stop-and-go	 cycles,	 which	 increased	 uncertainties	 and	 discouraged	 greater	expectation	 horizons	 for	 investors	 and	 companies	 alike.	 The	 high	 degree	 of	uncertainty	was	the	main	reason	for	the	short-term	nature	of	the	Brazilian	debt,	which	 was	 to	 a	 large	 degree	 also	 indexed	 to	 an	 overnight	 interest	 rate.	 The	banking	 sector	 experienced	 great	 difficulties	 in	 adjusting	 to	 the	 new	 economic	environment	with	a	lot	lower	inflation	rates	and	increased	competition	of	foreign	banks	 due	 to	 the	 financial	 liberalization.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 SFN	 experienced	 a	concentration	 in	 the	 banking	 sector,	 with	 a	 reduction	 of	 the	 participation	 of	
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public	banks,	especially	those	owned	by	the	federal	states,	and	an	increase	of	the	share	of	foreign	banks.	Although	foreign	investments	increased,	the	situation	of	the	Brazilian	capital	markets	became	critical	 towards	the	end	of	 the	1990s	and	beginning	of	the	2000s.	Both,	the	number	of	publicly	owned	companies	and	the	value	 traded	on	 the	stock	markets	diminished	each	year.	Possible	explanations	for	these	problems	included	the	incidence	of	the	financial	transactions	tax	CPMF	on	transactions	in	the	Brazilian	stock	exchanges	(contributing	to	the	migration	of	several	companies	to	 issue	their	securities	abroad),	poor	corporate	governance	rules	 (as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 legislation	 passed	 in	 1997	 to	 facilitate	 privatizations),	and	the	high	level	of	the	interest	rate.	The	1997	reform	of	the	Capital	Market	Law	and	the	Corporate	Law	that	curtailed	minority	shareholder	rights	had	already	been	highly	criticized	at	the	time	and	in	2001,	 in	 a	 context	 of	 higher	 concerns	 about	 corporate	 governance,	 the	 debate	about	adjusting	these	 laws	resulted	 in	a	reform	of	 the	reform,	which	took	back	most	of	the	restrictions	of	minority	shareholder	rights.	The	aim	was	to	promote	capital	market	development,	so	that	companies	would	have	better	financing	and	funding	conditions,	and	to	push	economic	growth.	In	order	to	achieve	these	goals,	the	 CVM	 was	 given	 more	 power,	 turning	 it	 into	 an	 independent	 legislative	authority,	 and	 more	 adequate	 corporate	 governance	 structures	 were	implemented.	As	a	result,	 transparency	was	 increased.	For	example,	 the	period	during	which	the	trustee	had	to	inform	the	debenture	holders	about	any	sign	of	default	was	shortened	from	90	to	60	days	and	the	mark-to-market	accounting	for	marketable	securities	was	introduced.	In	addition	to	the	measures	implemented	by	the	government	to	make	the	capital	markets	more	popular,	the	private	sector	also	set	important	impulses	including	the	unification	of	the	nine	Brazilian	stock	exchanges	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 market	 segment	 for	 companies	 that	committed	 to	 stricter	 corporate	 governance	 rules,	 the	 so-called	 New	 Market	(Novo	Mercado),	 by	 the	Bovespa	 in	 2000.	 The	BNDES	 installed	 a	 special	 credit	line	in	order	to	incentivize	adherence	to	the	New	Market.	For	the	negotiation	of	private	 fixed-income	 securities,	 the	 Bovespa	 offered	 a	 separate	 section	 on	 the	stock	 exchange,	 the	 so-called	BOVESPA	FIX,	 and	 an	organized	OTC	 system,	 the	so-called	SOMA	FIX,	which	are	electronic	systems	for	the	trading,	settlement	and	custody	of	these	securities.	In	 2002,	 the	 new	 Brazilian	 Payment	 System	 (SPB)	 was	 installed	 to	 lower	 the	risks	 involved	 in	 cash	 settlements	 and	 to	 ultimately	 strengthen	 the	 Brazilian	financial	 system	 (SFN).	 Furthermore,	 the	 National	 Treasury	 (TN)	 created	 a	program	 called	 “Tesouro	Direto”	with	 the	 aim	 to	 facilitate	 the	 access	 to	 public	bonds	 for	 natural	 persons.	 Moreover,	 by	 exempting	 company	 shares	 from	 the	CPMF	 tax,	 an	 important	 barrier	 to	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 capital	markets	was	removed.	One	year	 later,	 the	possibility	 to	 install	a	market	maker	for	 a	 security	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 its	 liquidity	 premium	was	 introduced.	 In	 an	attempt	 to	make	 the	Brazilian	rules	more	similar	 to	 those	 in	 the	USA,	 the	CVM	adjusted	 the	 regulation	 of	 public	 offers	 of	 marketable	 securities	 and	 passed	instruction	n.	400/03,	which	allowed	the	dispense	of	registration	under	certain	circumstances	and	 introduced	 the	so-called	greenshoe	option	and	 the	so-called	shelf	registration	in	the	Brazilian	capital	markets.	
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After	FHC	had	been	 reelected	 in	1998,	his	 second	 term	ended	 in	2002	and	 the	presidential	 election	 stirred	 up	 anxiety	 about	 drastic	 adjustments	 of	 the	macroeconomic	 framework	 with	 Lula	 as	 FHC’s	 successor.	 External	 capital	inflows	 declined,	 putting	 pressure	 on	 the	 exchange	 rate	 and,	 thus,	 also	 on	inflation.	A	tight	monetary	policy	stance	was	able	to	maintain	price	stability,	but	to	 the	detriment	of	economic	growth	 in	2002	and	2003.	 In	 the	 following	years,	Brazil	benefited	from	the	high	demand	for	commodities	and	large	capital	inflows	caused	the	Brazilian	currency	to	appreciate,	which	exerted	downward	pressures	on	domestic	prices.	This	allowed	monetary	policy	to	lower	the	base	rate,	which	nevertheless	remained	on	a	relatively	high	level.	Annual	GDP	growth	rates	over	the	 period	 2004-2008	 were	 consecutively	 above	 3.0%	 and	 on	 average	 4.8%.	Since	 the	 end	 of	 2003,	 international	 market	 conditions	 had	 been	 particularly	favorable	 to	 Brazil	 and	 helped	 the	 country	 to	 realize	 large	 and	 consecutive	current	 account	 surpluses,	 build-up	 foreign-exchange	 reserves	 and	 improve	other	external	solvency	indicators,	which	allowed	the	country	to	issue	sovereign	debt	securities	abroad	that	were	denominated	in	its	national	currency.	Falling	 external	 public	 debt	 together	 with	 an	 overall	 improved	 public	 debt	structure,	and	expanding	exports,	all	added	to	the	increasing	external	resilience	of	 Brazil	 and	 gave	 rise	 to	 the	 outlook	 for	 improved	 country	 risk	 ratings.	 The	domestic	 capital	 markets,	 especially	 the	 stock	 market,	 showed	 strong	 growth	and	 were	 sustained	 mostly	 by	 foreign	 institutional	 investors.	 The	 acting	president	Lula	was	able	 to	profit	 from	this	positive	economic	environment	and	emerged	 victorious	 from	 the	 2006	 presidential	 election.	 In	 June	 2007	 the	Brazilian	 risk	 premium	 reached	 a	 historical	 low	 and	 even	 though	 it	 markedly	increased	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 year,	 the	 three	 major	 international	 rating	agencies	elevated	their	rating	of	the	Brazilian	sovereign	risk.	In	2008,	even	in	the	scenario	of	deterioration	of	international	financial	markets,	the	Brazilian	stock	of	international	reserves	continued	to	rise	and	in	April,	Standard	&	Poor’s	raised	its	rating	 of	 Brazil	 to	 investment	 grade,	 followed	 by	 Fitch	 Ratings	 in	May	 and	 by	Moody’s	in	September	of	the	following	year.	The	attempt	of	the	CVM	to	raise	the	transparency	and	liquidity	of	the	corporate	bond	market	by	creating	the	so-called	Standardized	Debentures	in	2004	failed	in	the	sense	 that	 the	 instrument	was	never	used.	 In	2005,	 the	debentures	market	started	to	rapidly	increase,	but	the	surge	was	mostly	based	on	issues	by	leasing	companies	 to	 fund	banking	 operations,	while	 the	 primary	market	 of	 corporate	debentures	showed	much	less	activity.	Large	companies	gained	access	to	funding	sources	outside	the	banking	sector,	mainly	through	Initial	Public	Offerings	(IPOs)	of	 their	 company	shares.	The	São	Paulo	Stock	Exchange	 Index	 (Ibovespa)	 set	a	record	 of	 44,500	 points	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2006.	 The	 fact	 that	 equity	 markets	outperformed	 corporate	 bond	markets	 could	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 sign	 that	 the	interest	rate	level	was	still	relatively	high	in	Brazil.	While	banks	generally	shifted	the	 focus	 of	 resource	 allocation	 from	 their	 securities	 portfolio	 to	 credit	operations,	they	also	made	adjustments	in	their	securities	portfolio,	lowering	the	share	of	public	bonds	and	raising	the	participation	of	private	securities,	mostly	involving	 debentures.	 Furthermore,	 the	 market	 liquidity	 of	 private	 debt	securities	was	improved	because	the	list	of	securities	that	were	accepted	in	repo	operations	was	 expanded	and	because	 the	 contracting	of	 repo	operations	with	
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individual	 persons	 and	 non-financial	 companies,	 even	 including	 private	securities,	was	allowed.	In	 2007,	 several	 factors	 contributed	 to	 the	 annual	 GDP	 growth	 rate	 of	 6.0%.	Increased	macroeconomic	stability	together	with	loosening	monetary	policy	and	improved	 labor	market	 conditions	 raised	 optimism	 in	 consumer	 and	 business	expectations,	which	improved	further	after	the	government	announced	a	series	of	measures	under	the	roof	of	the	Growth	Incentive	Program	(PAC)	that	aimed	at	enhancing	the	infrastructure	of	the	country	and	increasing	the	pace	of	economic	growth	 over	 a	 four-year	 horizon.	 One	 year	 later,	 these	 measures	 were	complemented	 by	 an	 industrial	 policy	 strategy,	 the	 so-called	 Productive	Development	 Policy	 (PDP),	 with	 the	 goal	 to	 extend	 the	 recently	 experienced	growth	path.	During	the	first	three	quarters	of	2008,	economic	activity	followed	the	trajectory	of	the	second	half	of	2007	with	strong	growth,	although	the	impact	of	 the	 international	 financial	 crisis	 could	 already	 be	 felt.	 Domestic	 demand	sustained	the	growth	process,	pushed	by	 improved	credit	conditions	as	well	as	rising	 employment	 and	 income.	 Furthermore,	 GFCF	 reached	 with	 18.6%	 its	highest	level	since	1995,	reflecting	the	entrepreneurs’	expectations	of	continued	economic	growth.	This	picture	changed	drastically	during	the	last	months	of	the	year,	 when	 global	 credit	 and	 capital	 markets	 rapidly	 deteriorated	 as	 a	consequence	of	the	worsening	and	spreading	of	the	international	financial	crisis,	which	 also	 reflected	 in	 Brazil	 where	 growing	 restrictions	 in	 the	 credit	market	and	the	worsening	of	economic	agents’	expectations	initiated	a	recession.	The	positive	performance	of	Brazilian	capital	markets	during	the	previous	years	came	 to	 a	halt	 in	2008,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 instable	 scenario	 in	 the	 international	financial	 system.	 Primary	market	 activities	 of	 company	 shares	 and	 debentures	were	 concentrated	 in	 the	 first	 eight	months	 of	 the	 year	 and	 practically	 ceased	afterwards,	being	partly	replaced	by	the	issuance	of	commercial	paper,	a	short-term	debt	security.	Yet,	the	collapse	of	the	primary	market	for	debentures	issued	by	 leasing	 companies	 could	 be	 attributed	 primarily	 to	 a	 change	 in	 regulation,	which	 introduced	 reserve	 requirements	 for	 these	 debt	 securities	 and,	 thus,	terminated	the	special	treatment	of	this	funding	mechanism	for	banks.	The	stock	exchanges	 of	 emerging	market	 economies	 registered	particularly	 severe	 losses	during	 the	 international	 financial	 crisis,	 because	 these	 countries	 were	additionally	affected	by	the	reduction	in	prices	and	exports	of	commodities	due	to	recessions	in	advanced	economies	and	a	slowdown	of	world	trade,	on	the	one	hand,	 as	well	 as	 the	 depreciation	 of	 the	 local	 currencies	 against	 the	 US	 dollar	(US$),	related	to	 the	so-called	 flight	 to	quality,	reflecting	the	 increased	demand	for	US	government	bonds,	on	the	other	hand.	Due	to	the	actions	taken	by	major	central	banks	as	well	as	direct	government	interventions	in	advanced	economies	to	 alleviate	 liquidity	 and	 credit	 constraints,	 investors	 started	 to	 retreat	 from	riskier	 markets	 and	 the	 demand	 for	 sovereign	 bonds	 of	 advanced	 economies	increased,	causing	a	decline	of	these	public	bond	yields,	which	was	sustained	by	less	restrictive	monetary	policies	during	the	period.	Against	 this	 background,	 the	 COPOM	 decided	 to	 discontinue	 the	 restrictive	course	 it	 had	adopted	 since	early	2008	and	 the	Brazilian	government	 together	with	the	BACEN	carried	out	various	counter-cyclical	measures.	As	a	consequence,	the	 immediate	 effects	 of	 the	 international	 financial	 crisis	 were	 absorbed	
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relatively	well	by	the	Brazilian	economy,	which	quickly	came	out	of	the	recession	in	2009	and	registered	a	very	high	growth	rate	in	2010.	The	key	factor	to	the	fast	recovery	 was	 the	 strong	 domestic	 demand,	 which	 was	 also	 stimulated	 by	favorable	 credit	 conditions,	 resulting	 from	counter-cyclical	monetary	and	 fiscal	measures	that	aimed,	on	the	one	hand,	at	providing	domestic	market	liquidity	by	loosening	 reserve	 requirements	 and	 strongly	 lowering	 the	 SELIC	 rate	 in	 2009,	and	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 at	 providing	 support	 to	 external	 trade	 activities	 by	creating	 instruments	 that	 raised	 foreign	 currency	 liquidity,	 which	 shifted	 a	significant	 share	 of	 financial	 transactions	 related	 to	 external	 trade	 to	 the	domestic	 market.	 Within	 an	 environment	 that	 was	 characterized	 by	exceptionally	 high	 liquidity	 together	 with	 growing	 demand	 for	 riskier	 assets,	Brazil	was	very	attractive	for	international	capital	flows,	allowing	the	country	to	continue	 its	program	of	 international	 reserve	accumulation	and	 to	become,	 for	the	first	time,	a	creditor	country	of	the	IMF.	After	 the	 international	 financial	 crisis	 had	 curtailed	 domestic	 primary	 market	activity	 during	 the	 first	months	 of	 2009,	 primary	 issues	 of	 shares,	 debentures	and	commercial	paper	resumed	a	strong	pace	in	the	second	semester,	closing	the	year	with	an	annual	 increase	of	29.5%.	The	sharp	 increase	of	debenture	 issues	indicated	 that	 one	 of	 the	 goals	 of	 the	 limited	 distribution	modality	 created	 by	CVM	 instruction	 n.	 476/09	 was	 achieved,	 namely	 to	 broaden	 capital	 market	access	by	reducing	the	operational	costs	and	by	enabling	smaller	funding	rounds	as	well	 as	 smaller	 companies	 to	 access	 the	market.	 The	measure	 introduced	 a	new	 modality	 of	 placing	 debentures	 and	 other	 financial	 assets,	 allowing	 even	privately	 held	 companies	 to	 make	 a	 public	 offer	 of	 their	 debt	 securities	 to	 a	limited	 number	 of	 qualified	 investors.	 In	 December	 of	 the	 same	 year,	 the	government	 created	 the	 so-called	 Financial	 Bill	 (LF),	 which	 allowed	 financial	institutions	to	raise	long-term	funds	on	the	domestic	market.	Two	months	before,	the	 National	 Association	 of	 Investment	 Banks	 (ANBID)	 and	 the	 National	Association	of	 Financial	Market	 Institutions	 (ANDIMA)	 joined	 together	 to	 form	the	 Brazilian	 Association	 of	 the	 Entities	 of	 the	 Financial	 and	 Capital	 Markets	(ANBIMA),	representing	all	actors	in	the	Brazilian	financial	markets.	In	2010,	the	Brazilian	economy	took	advantage	of	the	more	benign	international	scenario	and	was	pushed	by	a	sound	domestic	demand	to	the	highest	annual	GDP	growth	(7.6%)	since	1986.	 In	this	context,	Dilma	Rousseff	won	the	presidential	election,	succeeding	party	colleague	Lula	after	his	second	term.	To	the	increasing	commodity	prices,	which	caused	inflationary	pressures,	monetary	policy	reacted	by	 elevating	 the	 SELIC	 rate	 to	 10.75%	 and	 by	 raising	 reserve	 and	 capital	requirements.	 Despite	 the	 tightening	 of	 monetary	 policy,	 the	 Brazilian	 credit	market	 continued	 on	 its	 expansionist	 path,	 although	 one	 should	 note	 that	 the	stronger	 impulses	 came	 from	 the	 use	 of	 earmarked	 resources,	 which	 were	mostly	 disbursed	 by	 the	 BNDES,	 resulting	 from	 counter-cyclical	 measures	implemented	 by	 the	 government,	 which	 deployed	 the	 public	 finance	 for	development	 system	 to	 fill	 the	 gap	 that	 the	 private	 credit	 sector	 left.	 What	 is	more,	the	financial	transactions	tax	(IOF)	on	foreign	investors’	capital	flows	into	the	Brazilian	fixed-income	market	was	raised	from	2%	to	6%.	On	August	2nd,	2011,	the	government	 introduced	the	first	 industrial	policy	plan	in	 Brazil	 for	 more	 than	 thirty	 years,	 the	 so-called	 Greater	 Brazil	 Plan	 (PBM),	
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which	 was	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 Productive	 Development	 Policy	 (PDP)	implemented	 in	 2008	 and	 aimed	 at	 the	 promotion	 of	 technological	 and	productive	 investment	 as	 well	 as	 innovation	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 the	competitiveness	of	Brazilian	companies	at	home	and	abroad.	A	few	weeks	earlier,	law	 n.	 12,431/2011	 created	 the	 so-called	 infrastructure	 bonds	 (debêntures	 de	
infraestrutura)	together	with	fiscal	incentives	for	financial	instruments	related	to	the	 funding	 of	 long-term	 investment	 projects.	 Consistent	 with	 the	 PBM,	 the	objectives	 of	 this	 law	 included	 the	 stimulation	 of	 financial	 assets	 with	 longer	maturities,	 expansion	of	 capital	market	 access	 for	Brazilian	 companies	 and	 the	promotion	of	investment	projects	in	the	fields	of	infrastructure,	high-technology	production,	research	and	development	as	well	as	innovation.	In	addition,	the	IOF	rate	 on	 foreign	 investments	 in	 the	 Brazilian	market	 for	 company	 shares,	 long-term	 as	well	 as	 infrastructure	 bonds	was	 reduced	 from	 six	 to	 zero	 percent.	 In	accordance	with	the	legal	innovation	aiming	at	the	development	of	a	long-	term	corporate	bond	market,	BNDES	and	ANBIMA	created	the	so-called	New	Market	for	Fixed-Income	Securities	(NMRF),	in	order	to	foster	this	segment	of	the	capital	markets	 as	 a	 source	 of	 (long-term)	 funding	 for	 Brazilian	 companies.	 By	establishing	differential	rules	for	the	registration	of	fixed-income	securities,	the	NMRF	incentivized	characteristics	that	increased	the	transparency	as	well	as	the	liquidity	premium	of	the	asset	and	its	market.	Global	 uncertainties	 worsened	 again	 in	 2011	 and	 the	 Brazilian	 economy	experienced	a	more	moderate	expansion	that	was	sustained	by	robust	household	income,	which	benefited	from	favorable	conditions	on	the	labor	market	together	with	the	continuation	and	expansion	of	government	social	programs.	Monetary	policy	continued	to	raise	the	base	rate	up	to	12.50%	until	the	middle	of	the	year	and	then	reverted	the	cycle	of	monetary	tightening	and	successively	cut	the	base	rate	to	11.0%	at	the	end	of	the	year.	Although	the	use	of	earmarked	funds	in	the	credit	market	 increased,	which	was	mostly	related	 to	 the	expansion	of	housing	finance,	 BNDES	 disbursements	 decreased	 by	 23%	 in	 2011,	 which	 could	 be	explained	by	dimmed	growth	prospects	that	lowered	the	demand	by	companies	for	funding	of	investment	projects.	Due	to	the	uncertainties	in	the	international	scenario,	 the	Brazilian	capital	markets	registered	no	 issues	during	the	 last	 four	months	of	 the	year.	As	a	consequence,	 the	primary	market	 for	company	shares	strongly	declined	from	R$	190.9	billion177	in	2010	to	R$	22.6	billion	in	2011.	The	decline	 in	 the	 primary	 market	 for	 corporate	 debentures	 was	 less	 severe,	dropping	from	R$	67.3	billion	in	2010	to	R$	60.5	billion	in	2011.	In	 2012,	 the	 world	 economy	 slowed	 down	 and	 the	 Brazilian	 GDP	 growth	declined	 for	 the	 second	 consecutive	 year.	 A	 clear	 adjustment	 of	 the	monetary	policy	stance	took	place	and	the	base	rate	SELIC	was	lowered	to	unprecedented	levels,	reaching	7.25%	in	October	2012.	In	the	low	interest	rate	environment,	the	capital	 markets	 experienced	 a	 surge	 in	 primary	 issues,	 mainly	 pushed	 by	corporate	 debentures,	 which	 increased	 by	 68%	 over	 the	 year.	 Other	 interest	rates	 in	 the	 credit	market	 also	decreased	 strongly	 and	 reached	historical	 lows,	which	helped	the	credit	sector	to	continuously	expand,	although	it	cooled	down	and	converged	towards	a	more	sustainable	growth	path.	Especially	public	banks	contributed	 to	 the	 expansion	 of	 credit	 operations,	 including	 the	BNDES	whose																																																									177	The	issue	of	shares	by	Petrobras	alone	accounted	for	almost	80%	of	that	amount.	
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Source:	BACEN;	IBGE;	own	calculations		The	 following	 three	 sections	 correspond	 to	 the	 three	 distinct	 sub-periods	 of	CBMD	between	1995	and	2003,	2004	and	2008,	as	well	as	2009	and	2014,	which	are	 each	 analyzed	 following	 the	 same	 pattern.	 After	 a	 short	 overview,	concentrating	on	certain	main	points	during	the	respective	period,	 three	policy	variables	 that	determine	CBMD	 in	Brazil	 are	analyzed.	Each	of	 the	 three	policy	variables	is	discussed	in	a	separate	sub-section,	highlighting	the	role	of	the	state	and	its	impact	on	the	evolution	of	the	debentures	market.	In	the	first	sub-section,	public	 debt	 management	 is	 analyzed,	 because	 of	 the	 important	interconnectedness	of	the	public	and	the	corporate	bond	markets	in	Brazil.	Due	to	the	high	relevance	of	the	interest	rate	level,	the	influence	of	monetary	policy	on	the	domestic	market	for	corporate	long-term	debt	securities	is	examined	in	a	second	 step.	 Each	 sub-period	 analysis	 closes	with	 a	 sub-section	 on	 the	 role	 of	public	banks	with	respect	 to	domestic	CBMD,	as	 these	 institutions	 traditionally	have	a	significant	function	in	the	Brazilian	financial	system	as	the	main	source	of	long-term	funding.	



























overvaluation	of	the	Brazilian	real	(R$),	and	therefore	pressures	on	the	exchange	rate,	which	were	 contained	 –	 together	with	 resurging	 inflation	 pressures	 –	 by	raising	the	monetary	policy	rate.	The	resulting	stop-and-go	policies	discouraged	market	participants,	wealth	holders	and	entrepreneurs	alike,	to	form	long-term	expectations.	 The	 conservative	 monetary	 policy	 stance	 that	 was	 mainly	concerned	about	lowering	the	inflation	rate	kept	the	base	rate,	also	in	real	terms,	at	 an	 elevated	 level,	 which	 depressed	 not	 only	 corporate	 bond	 market	development	(CBMD),	but	also	any	other	kind	of	private	credit.	The	high	interest	rate	 level	might	have	been	 the	main	barrier	 to	 financial	development	 in	Brazil,	especially	during	the	1990s.	The	public	debt	structure	was	focused	in	the	short-term,	reflecting	high	liquidity	preferences	 of	 wealth	 holders,	 who	 demanded	 an	 interest	 rate	 indexation	 in	return	for	longer	terms	(while	the	maturity	remained	zero	due	to	the	indexation)	and	lower	yields.	As	a	consequence,	the	public	bond	market	did	not	offer	a	yield	curve	 that	 served	 as	 a	 benchmark	 for	 corporate	 bond	 placements.	 Different	forms	of	 indexations	 offered	 a	 good	way	 to	 hedge	 against	 various	 risks,	which	were	 perceived	 to	 be	 high,	 because	 of	 macroeconomic	 fragilities,	 such	 as	 a	double	 deficit	 in	 the	 public	 and	 the	 current	 accounts,	 rising	 public	 debt,	difficulties	 of	 the	 banking	 sector	 etc.	 As	 real	 overvaluation	 continued	 and	exchange	 rate	 pressures	 increased,	 public	 debt	 management	 issued	 more	 and	more	exchange	rate	indexed	bonds.	Up	to	the	currency	crisis	in	1999,	the	overvalued	Brazilian	currency	encouraged	Brazilian	 companies	 to	 issue	 securities	 abroad.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	liberalization	 process	 caused	 large	 foreign	 capital	 inflows.	 Yet,	 Brazilian	companies	 benefited	 only	 marginally	 from	 these	 flows,	 which	 were	 mostly	directed	 towards	public	bonds	and	 the	 stock	market,	mainly	 related	 to	 IPOs	of	formerly	 public	 companies	 as	 part	 of	 the	privatization	process.	 In	 comparison,	foreign	investors	did	not	play	any	relevant	role	in	the	debentures	market.	Later,	during	 the	 crises	 in	 1999	 and	 2002/2003,	 net	 foreign	 currency	 flows	 were	reversed,	causing	a	capital	market	crash,	which	also	reflected	in	the	debentures	market.	Apart	from	the	international	financial	centers,	Brazilian	companies	had	another	major	source	of	long-term	funding,	i.e.	the	public	development	bank	BNDES.	The	very	incipient	stage	of	the	corporate	bond	market	meant	that	it	was	only	a	small	source	 of	 funding	 for	 a	 few,	mainly	 large	 companies.	 Although	 there	was	 little	evidence	 that	 BNDES	 activities	 suppressed	 the	 issuance	 of	 corporate	 bonds,	some	 aspects	might	 have	 had	 a	 detrimental	 effect	 on	 CBMD,	 such	 as	 the	 pro-cyclical	behavior	of	 the	bank	as	well	as	 its	subsidized	 interest	rate	TJLP,	which	was	set	without	reference	to	the	current	monetary	policy.	During	the	late	1990s	and	early	2000s,	there	were	a	few,	independent	efforts	to	incentivize	CBMD,	such	as	the	implementation	of	an	electronic	trading	platform	(Lopes,	Antunes,	and	Cardoso	2007,	60).	Although	 this	electronic	platform	was	merely	 used	 to	 register	 the	 trades,	 which	 were	 negotiated	 on	 the	 phone,	 it	represented	 an	 important	 step	 towards	 a	 more	 transparent	 price	 formation	process.	The	National	Debentures	System	(SND)	also	underwent	a	reformulation,	including	cost	reductions	through	the	use	of	technologies,	guidelines	for	the	texts	
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and	 calculations	 of	 debenture	 deeds,	 repurchase	 agreements	 with	 debentures,	provision	of	information,	securitization	of	receivables,	and	electronic	trading,	in	order	to	stimulate	the	issuance	of	debentures.	
3.2.1.1 Public	debt	management:	macroeconomic	instability	reflected	
in	public	debt	structure	The	 implementation	 of	 the	 Plano	 Real	 marked	 the	 starting	 point	 for	 a	 rapid	increase	 in	government	debt	securities.	Apparently,	 in	 the	evaluation	of	wealth	holders,	the	fact	that	the	government	stopped	monetizing	fiscal	deficits,	that	way	increased	macroeconomic	stability	and	brought	inflation	down,	weighed	heavier	than	the	continuous	increase	in	government	debt.	The	strong	hike	in	the	stock	of	domestic	public	bonds	was	partly	due	to	the	issuance	of	new	debt,	and	partly	due	to	 the	 switch	 from	 foreign	 to	 domestic	 debt,	 also	 triggered	 by	 the	 Mexican	Tequila	 crisis	 in	December	 1994	 (Borensztein	 et	 al.	 2008b,	 7).	 Various	 factors	combined	 could	 be	 responsible	 for	 the	 Brazilian	 debt	 rising	 so	 fast,	 especially	during	 the	 second	half	of	 the	1990s.	Among	 them	were	 the	already	mentioned	loss	 of	 the	 possibility	 to	monetize	 fiscal	 deficits,	 as	well	 as	 the	 newly	 adopted	policy	of	greater	 transparency	regarding	 the	public	budget,	which	 included	 the	recognition	 and	 inclusion	 of	 several	 liabilities	 that	 were	 hidden	 before	 (Silva,	Carvalho,	and	Medeiros	2010,	66).	Furthermore,	the	tight	monetary	policy	stance,	which	entailed	an	extremely	high	level	of	the	real	interest	rate,	and	fiscal	policy	producing	 very	 small	 primary	 surpluses	 or	 even	 primary	 deficits	 added	 to	 the	elevation	of	the	public	debt.	Analyzing	the	period	from	1995	to	2003,	one	can	see	the	effect	of	the	elevated	level	of	the	real	interest	rate:	the	Brazilian	debt	was	so	expensive,	that	interest	payments	in	the	government	budget	never	dropped	below	4.5%	of	GDP,	raising	the	government	deficit	to	5.0%	on	average.	Even	when	the	Brazilian	government	focused	on	achieving	solid	primary	surpluses,	after	the	currency	crisis	and	the	adoption	of	the	inflation	targeting	regime,	which	effectively	reduced	the	nominal	deficit	in	2000	and	2001	(from	an	average	of	5.8%	of	GDP	during	1995-1999	to	an	average	of	3.3%	during	those	two	years),	the	continuous	primary	surpluses	were	not	able	to	maintain	the	nominal	deficit	on	a	lower	level,	or	even	turn	it	into	a	surplus,	because	the	country	had	to	pay	an	increasing	price	to	roll	over	its	debt,	also	due	to	the	so-called	presidential	election	crisis	of	2002/2003.	During	the	presidential	campaign	in	2002,	expectations	deteriorated	due	to	the	fear	of	a	discontinuity	in	economic	policy,	in	general,	and	a	forced	renegotiation	of	the	sovereign	debt,	in	particular	(Torres	Filho	and	Macahyba	2012,	41).			
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Table	1:	Government	budget178	(in	%	of	GDP),	1995-2003	
	 Nominal	result	 Interest	payments	 Primary	result	
	 total	 internal	 external	 total	 internal	 external	
1995	 6.55	 8.36	 -1.82	 6.79	 6.30	 0.49	 -0.24	
1996	 5.24	 6.06	 -0.82	 5.16	 4.74	 0.41	 0.09	
1997	 5.40	 4.76	 0.65	 4.53	 4.29	 0.25	 0.87	
1998	 6.78	 4.78	 2.00	 6.79	 6.52	 0.27	 -0.01	
1999	 5.15	 3.13	 2.02	 8.00	 7.09	 0.91	 -2.85	
2000	 3.31	 3.35	 -0.04	 6.48	 5.69	 0.79	 -3.17	
2001	 3.35	 2.73	 0.62	 6.59	 5.51	 1.08	 -3.24	
2002	 4.41	 1.92	 2.49	 7.60	 6.53	 1.07	 -3.19	
2003	 5.17	 6.04	 -0.87	 8.41	 7.35	 1.05	 -3.23	
Source:	BACEN		As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 repetitive	 large	 public	 deficits,	 the	 Brazilian	 net	 debt	grew	 considerably,	 almost	 doubling	 between	 1995	 and	 1999,	 and	 reaching	R$	1.7	trillion	in	December	of	2003.	Several	interview	partner	suggested	that	the	high	level	of	the	public	debt	was	an	important	determinant	of	CBMD	(U01	2010a,	2010b;	U02	2010;	U03	2010).	The	 high	 government	 borrowing	 needs	 raised	 the	 public	 debt,	 which	 the	government	funded	by	issuing	more	public	bonds.	The	increase	of	public	bonds	might	explain,	at	least	partly,	the	low	growth	rates	of	corporate	bonds	in	Brazil	during	 the	period	1995-2003.	Yet,	 it	 remained	an	open	question	whether	 large	government	bond	markets	foster	or	push	back	corporate	bonds	(cf.	sub-section	2.3.2.2),	and	 there	are	both	 theoretical	arguments	as	well	as	empirical	 findings	supporting	one	or	 the	other	hypothesis	 (Borensztein	et	al.	2008b,	19–24).	This	topic	 repeatedly	 came	 up	 during	 the	 expert	 interviews,	 e.g.	 the	 public	 bond	markets	were	 identified	 as	 important	 determinants	 of	 the	 development	 of	 the	corporate	 bond	 market	 (A01	 2010)	 and	 the	 connection	 between	 the	development	 of	 the	 public	 and	 the	 private	 bond	markets	 was	 discussed	 (U05	2010).	The	theoretical	discussion	in	chapter	2,	e.g.	about	the	signaling	as	well	as	the	 competitiveness	 effect,	 showed	 that	 the	 volume	 of	 public	 bond	 issues	was	less	 relevant	 for	 the	development	 of	 the	 corporate	 bond	market	 in	Brazil	 than	the	characteristics	of	the	issued	public	bonds	that,	together,	form	the	structure	of	the	public	debt,	which	is	one	of	the	main	determinants	of	CBMD.	The	profile	of	the	public	debt	in	Brazil	was	marked	by	its	short-term	nature	and	a	high	 share	 of	 bonds	 that	were	 indexed	 to	 the	 SELIC	 interest	 rate	 (Paula	 et	 al.	2009,	 6).	 Those	 characteristics	were	 best	 explained	 by	 the	 Brazilian	 record	 of	macroeconomic	instability	since	the	1980s,	which	resulted	in	stop-and-go	cycles.																																																									178 	Consolidated	 public	 sector	 (until	 November	 2001	 including	 Petrobras	 and	Eletrobras)	borrowing	requirements	without	exchange	devaluation,	 flows	accumulated	in	 12	 months,	 December	 values;	 positive	 values	 represent	 deficits;	 nominal	 result	 =	primary	 result	 +	 interest	 payments;	 total	 borrowing	 requirements	 are	 differentiated	into	internal	(domestic)	and	external	(international)	borrowing	requirements.	
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With	so	many	uncertainties	 in	 the	Brazilian	economy,	 investors	and	companies	were	 discouraged	 to	 form	 long-term	 expectations.	 The	 Brazilian	 economy	suffered	 from	macroeconomic	 instability	 for	many	 years,	 yet	 the	 public	 bonds	always	offered	a	 good	way	 to	hedge	against	 these	 threats	 through	 its	different	indexations	 (Paula	 et	 al.	 2009,	 12–14).	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 public	 debt	structure	 changed	 in	 response	 to	 the	 demand	 of	 wealth	 holders,	 i.e.	 the	importance	of	different	indexed	bonds	varied	according	to	what	appeared	to	be	the	highest	risk	in	the	wealth	holders’	perceptions	and	expectations.	In	order	to	analyze	this,	we	need	to	look	at	the	structure	of	the	public	debt	and	begin	with	a	view	at	the	composition	according	to	the	different	indexed	bonds.		
Figure	6:	Public	bonds,	share	of	indexation	(in	%	of	total),	1995-2003	
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The	bonds	that	were	linked	to	the	base	rate	SELIC,	the	so-called	LFTs,	were	not	issued	 anymore	 after	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Plano	 Real,	 so	 that	 their	participation	 fell	 as	 low	 as	 18.6%	 in	 1996.	 The	 Brazilian	 treasury	was	 able	 to	issue	 fixed	 rate	bonds	and	 succeeded	 in	prolonging	 their	 terms179,	 starting	out	with	one	month,	moving	to	two	and	three	months	terms	in	1995	(Silva,	Carvalho,	and	Medeiros	2010,	66).	In	1996,	it	was	possible	to	offer	all	fixed	rate	bonds	with	a	6	months	term	in	the	primary	market,	and	in	1997	the	treasury	even	succeeded	in	placing	 fixed	 rate	bonds	with	 a	 term	of	2	 years	 in	 the	primary	market.	This	implied,	that	there	was	no	long-term	interest	rate	that	could	serve	as	a	reference	for	corporate	issues,	up	to	this	point	in	Brazil.	After	the	Asian	crisis	unraveled,	a	reduction	 of	 terms	was	 necessary,	 so	 that	 3-months-bonds	were	 issued,	 again.	Then	came	the	Russian	crisis	and	aggravated	the	situation,	also	for	Brazil,	even	further.	 It	 was	 not	 an	 option	 to	 reduce	 the	 term	 even	 further,	 because	 in	 the	meantime	 the	 public	 debt	 had	 increased	 very	 rapidly,	 so	 that	 a	 need	 to	constantly	roll	over	this	large	stock	of	public	debt	would	put	its	sustainability	in	doubt.	Against	 this	background,	 the	 treasury	was	 forced	to	resort	 to	LFTs	once	again,	 which	were	 accepted	 also	with	 longer	 terms.	 Only	 in	 2003,	 public	 debt	management	 was	 able	 to	 return	 to	 its	 policy	 of	 lengthening	 public	 debt	maturities	through	the	issuance	of	fixed	rate	securities,	which	was	stimulated	by	optimistic	 expectations	 about	 falling	 inflation	 rates	 and	 reductions	 of	 the	 base	rate,	that	arouse	during	the	middle	of	that	year	(Ferreira,	Robotton,	and	Dupita	2004).	The	LFTs	are	an	inheritance	from	the	period	of	high	inflation	in	Brazil	and	were	created	 at	 the	height	 of	 the	Plano	Cruzado	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 financial	 system	vulnerabilities	 towards	 changes	 in	monetary	 policy	 (Paula	 et	 al.	 2009,	 14–18).	The	duration180	of	the	LFT	is	zero,	or	one	day,	because	the	bond	compensates	the	invested	amount	with	the	interest	rate	on	every	day.	In	other	words,	it	is	as	if	the	investor	 would	 reinvest	 principal	 and	 earned	 interest	 at	 the	 current	 market	interest	rate,	on	each	day,	during	the	whole	term	of	the	bond.	As	a	consequence,	the	holder	of	this	bond	is	relieved	from	the	market	risk	that	is	related	to	possible	interest	rate	changes.	While	the	LFT	with	duration	zero	is	an	extreme	case	on	the	one	 end,	 on	 the	other	 end	 there	 are	 fixed	 rate	bonds	 like	 the	LTN	 (now	called	
Tesouro	Prefixado)	whose	duration	equals	the	term,	because	the	investor	has	to	wait	until	the	term	ends	to	be	able	to	adjust	his	investment	according	to	changes	in	the	interest	rate.	The	holder	of	a	fixed	rate	bond	will	suffer	losses	in	case	of	an	interest	rate	 increase,	which	does	not	happen	to	a	holder	of	a	bond	 indexed	 to	the	SELIC	rate.	That	way,	the	LFTs	protect	the	investor	from	the	market	risk,	as	changes	in	the	interest	rate	might	happen	gradually	or	following	an	unexpected	external	shock	to	the	economy.	Of	course,	this	does	not	 imply	that	the	financial	remuneration	of	those	bonds	cannot	be	reduced	compared	to	other	bonds,	fixed	rate	or	indexed	to	other	variables,	as	it	would	actually	happen	with	a	reduction	of	the	interest	rate	SELIC.	What	makes	them	attractive	is	the	possibility	of	a	daily																																																									179	The	 term	of	 a	 bond,	 or	 the	 term	 to	maturity,	 denotes	 the	 amount	 of	 time	until	 the	bond	matures,	 or	 in	 other	words,	 the	 amount	 of	 time	 between	 now	 and	 the	maturity	date.	180	The	 duration	 of	 a	 bond	 is	 a	measure	 of	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 its	 price	 to	 interest	 rate	changes,	i.e.	a	measure	of	interest	rate	risk,	with	higher	bond	duration	reflecting	larger	bond	price	changes	in	response	to	interest	rate	moves.	
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repositioning	 towards	 the	 interest	 rate,	 allowing	 to	 hedge	 against	 unexpected	shocks	in	the	interest	rate.	The	 burden	 of	 the	 market	 risk	 is	 shouldered	 completely	 by	 the	 issuer	 of	 the	indexed	bond,	which	is	the	treasury,	representing	the	public	sector,	in	case	of	the	LFTs	 (Moura	 2006,	 247–48).	 In	 addition,	 the	 investor	 receives	 an	 immediate	liquidity	guaranty,	because	in	principle	he	can	redeem	the	debt	any	day181.	On	a	daily	basis,	 the	price	of	 the	LFTs	 is	 set	according	 to	negotiations	 in	 the	Special	System	 for	 Settlement	 and	 Custody	 (SELIC),	 where	 the	 overnight	 interest	 rate	SELIC,	is	determined	according	to	the	targets	set	by	the	COPOM.	The	mere	 existence	 of	 bonds	 indexed	 to	 the	 SELIC	 interest	 rate	 inhibited	 and	deformed	 the	development	of	 the	private	bond	market	by	combining	 low	risks	and	high	liquidity	with	high	profitability	(Franco	2006,	277ff.;	Paula	et	al.	2009,	15).	 More	 specifically,	 the	 LFTs	 influenced	 the	 conditions	 of	 private	 bond	issuance,	 because	 they	 not	 only	 offered	 a	 high	 liquidity	 premium	 to	 wealth	holders,	 as	 their	 default	 risk	 –	 as	 that	 of	 any	 other	 sovereign	 bond	 –	 was	practically	defining	the	lower	bound	in	the	domestic	financial	markets.	Adding	to	the	high	 liquidity	premium	was	 the	 type	of	 indexation,	which	stripped	 the	LFT	off	the	market	risk	since	its	price	neither	appreciated	nor	depreciated	when	the	market	interest	rates	changed.	As	if	those	advantages	were	not	enough,	the	LFTs	offered	 high	monetary	 returns,	 although	 they	were	 lower	 than	 the	 returns	 on	fixed	rate	bonds.	This	was	a	consequence	of	the	high	interest	rate	policy	applied	by	the	Brazilian	central	bank.	Resulting	from	these	advantageous	characteristics	of	LFTs,	a	competitiveness	effect	contributed	to	the	poor	market	development	of	corporate	bonds.	The	 problem	 that	 LFTs	 made	 it	 almost	 impossible	 for	 corporate	 issuers	 to	compete	with	these	debt	securities,	because	they	offered	such	an	advantageous	combination	of	risk	and	return,	was	also	confirmed	during	the	expert	interviews	(A01	2010;	U02	2010;	U04	2010).	There	was	a	high	demand	for	investments	that	were	 indexed	 to	 the	SELIC	 interest	 rate.	As	a	 result,	 a	 signaling	effect	 could	be	observed:	Investors	mostly	bought	so-called	DI	funds,	whose	reference	was	the	interbank	rate	DI,	or	directly	invested	in	public	bonds	indexed	to	the	SELIC,	the	LFTs.	 Public	 debt	management	 in	 Brazil	 determined	 investors’	 preferences	 by	offering	 a	 combination	 of	 risk	 and	 return	 that	 privileged	 investments	 with	 an	indexation	to	the	SELIC	and	DI	interest	rates	or	investments	in	short-term	bonds.	In	 the	 interviews,	 it	 was	 repeatedly	 emphasized	 that	 the	 demand	 for	 private	bonds	could	be	affected	by	changes	 in	 the	characteristics	of	public	bonds	 (U02	2010;	 F01	 2010).	 As	 such,	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 public	 debt	 was	 an	 important	determinant	of	the	corporate	bond	market.	One	 implication	 of	 the	 increased	 importance	 of	 LFTs	 for	 the	 structure	 of	 the	public	debt	could	be	seen	by	looking	at	the	development	of	the	medium	term	to	maturity	and	medium	duration	of	the	public	debt	from	1996	to	2003	(See	Figure	7).	Up	to	1997,	the	medium	term	and	duration	were	coinciding	at	very	low	levels,	because	of	 the	predominance	of	 the	 fixed	rate	bonds.	Starting	 in	mid-1998,	 the	medium	term	to	maturity	increased,	but	the	duration	continued	at	lower	levels.																																																									181	This	transaction	would	not	be	costless.	
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Term	and	duration	didn’t	coincide	anymore,	because	the	participation	of	indexed	bonds,	 especially	 LFTs	 began	 to	 grow.	 This	 also	 had	 a	 strong	 impact	 on	 the	issuance	 of	 private	 bonds.	 In	 order	 to	 compete	with	 LFTs	 a	 private	 bond	with	longer	 maturity	 would	 need	 to	 pay	 an	 extremely	 high	 risk	 premium	 as	 a	compensation	for	its	lower	liquidity,	as	its	market	and	default	risks	were	higher	(Paula	 et	 al.	 2009,	 16–17).	 In	 the	 end,	 it	 would	 be	 very	 costly	 for	 a	 private	company	 to	 issue	 such	 a	 bond.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 issuer	 of	 private	 debt	securities	had	two	options:	Either	they	issued	fixed	rate	bonds	with	high	returns	and	short	terms,	e.g.	commercial	paper,	or	they	issued	debentures	with	medium	returns	 and	 medium	 terms,	 improving	 the	 liquidity	 premium	 by	 offering	characteristics	 that	were	 relatively	 similar	 to	 those	 of	 the	 LFTs,	 i.e.	 with	 their	returns	indexed	to	the	DI	interest	rate	and	with	zero	duration,	and	still	the	risk	premium	would	 need	 to	 be	 higher	 than	 that	 of	 the	 LFTs.	 By	 indexing	 its	 debt	security	to	the	DI	rate,	the	issuer	was	able	to	extend	the	term	of	the	bond	a	bit,	but	needed	to	take	over	the	interest	rate	risk.		
Figure	 7:	 Term	 to	 maturity	 and	 duration	 of	 public	 bonds	 vs.	 term	 to	 maturity	 of	 corporate	
debentures	(in	months),	1996-2003	
	








1996	 1997	 1998	 1999	 2000	 2001	 2002	 2003	Public	bonds,	medium	term	(LHS)	Public	bonds,	medium	duration	(LHS)	Corporate	debentures,	medium	term	(RHS)	
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issuance	was	not	 subjected	 to	 this	 logic	of	 cost-effectiveness,	but	 responded	 to	the	need	of	financing	the	public	debt.	Looking	at	 the	data	 for	 the	medium	 term	 to	maturity	of	debentures,	one	 could	notice	 that	 it	 was	 actually	 worsening	 during	 the	 analyzed	 period,	 starting	 off	from	 an	 average	 70	months	 in	 1996/1997,	 decreasing	 to	 less	 than	 5	 years	 in	1998	and	dropping	below	4	years	in	2001,	after	it	had	recovered	to	the	mark	of	70	months	in	2000,	resulting	in	an	average	term	of	61	months	during	the	years	1996-2003.	This	might	be	related	to	developments	in	the	public	debt	structure:	As	we	have	seen,	the	public	bonds	experienced	an	increase	in	the	medium	term	between	 1996	 and	 2003,	 while	 the	 medium	 duration	 did	 not	 accompany	 this	movement,	which	could	be	attributed	to	the	growing	importance	of	LFTs	in	the	public	debt	structure.	The	 increasing	share	of	LFTs	 in	 the	public	debt	reflected	the	 growing	 demand	 for	 short-term	 securities,	 or	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 high	liquidity	preference	of	wealth	holders	in	the	Brazilian	market.	The	 lack	of	 liquidity	 in	secondary	markets	 for	debentures	was	one	of	 the	main	reasons	 for	 the	 low	 demand	 of	 these	 debt	 securities,	 also	 contributing	 to	 the	difficulties	 of	 companies	 placing	 longer-term	 bonds	 in	 primary	 markets.	 A	consequence	 of	 the	 almost	 inexistent	 organized	 secondary	 market	 was	 that	wealth	 holders	 couldn’t	 be	 sure	 to	 be	 able	 to	 sell	 the	 debt	 security	 at	 a	reasonable	price,	in	the	future,	which	discouraged	the	demand	for	debt	securities,	especially	with	longer	maturities.	Various	problems	were	pointed	out	to	explain	the	low	development	of	the	secondary	market	for	debentures	(Paula	et	al.	2009,	27).	The	low	standardization	of	debentures	and	their	underlying	contracts	made	it	 difficult	 to	 compare	 these	 debt	 securities	 and,	 hence,	 complicated	 the	 price-setting	process.	In	order	to	find	a	fair	price,	which	was	a	necessary	precondition	for	 trades	 in	 the	 secondary	 market,	 references	 were	 needed.	 The	 relevant	information	from	the	few	negotiations	couldn’t	easily	be	transferred,	due	to	low	standardization,	and	 the	 lack	of	a	yield	curve	 that	could	serve	as	a	benchmark,	further	aggravated	the	situation.	Through	 the	 market	 creation	 effect,	 sovereign	 bond	 markets	 might	 improve	market	liquidity	of	private	debt	securities,	e.g.	providing	well-functioning	market	infrastructure,	 best	 practices,	 a	 yield	 curve	 etc.,	 but	 secondary	 market	development	might	be	hampered	due	to	the	high	share	of	LFTs	in	the	profile	of	the	public	debt	 (Moura	2006,	250–52).	Due	 to	 their	 indexation,	 changes	 in	 the	base	 rate	 couldn’t	 affect	 the	price	of	LFTs.	As	 a	 result,	 LFTs	 suffered	 few	price	variations.	Since	 the	main	reason	 to	speculate	on	price	changes	was	 inexistent,	secondary	 market	 development	 was	 affected.	 Apart	 from	 interfering	 in	 the	market	 creation	 effect,	 the	 high	 share	 of	 LFTs	 contaminated	 corporate	 bond	issues,	 because	 companies	 needed	 to	 compete	 for	 the	 funds	 of	 potential	investors,	who	expected	their	demand	for	market-risk	free	bonds	to	be	attended,	so	that	corporate	debt	securities	often	also	included	an	interest	rate	indexation.	Private	 bonds	 were	 mostly	 indexed	 to	 the	 interbank	 rate	 DI,	 which	 closely	followed	the	SELIC	interest	rate,	so	that	this	indexation	would	hamper	secondary	market	liquidity	in	a	similar	way.	Liquidity	depended	among	other	things	on	the	size	of	the	market.	Not	only	was	the	 debentures	 market	 relatively	 small,	 measured	 as	 the	 stock	 of	 outstanding	
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1995	 	-						 	-						 	83.45				 	13.24				 	0.37				 	2.77				 	-						 	-						 	-						 	0.17				 291,135.3	
1996	 	-						 	-						 	83.55				 	11.18				 	1.22				 	3.89				 	-						 	-						 	-						 	0.16				 498,705.2	
1997	 	-						 	-						 	67.22				 	20.50				 	0.79				 	11.23				 	-						 	-						 	-						 	0.27				 515,703.9	
1998	 	0.47				 	27.62				 	46.83				 	15.14				 	0.82				 	8.53				 	0.10				 	-						 	-						 	0.51				 578,457.4	
1999	 	1.56				 	33.61				 	38.67				 	15.55				 	1.14				 	9.01				 	0.36				 	-						 	-						 	0.09				 724,810.7	
2000	 	3.32				 	30.46				 	40.92				 	14.95				 	1.36				 	8.12				 	0.78				 	-						 	-						 	0.10				 887,640.6	
2001	 	-						 	29.34				 	37.42				 	22.46				 	2.12				 	7.14				 	1.44				 	-						 	-						 	0.08				 932,163.5	
2002	 	-						 	24.65				 	33.17				 	25.51				 	1.68				 	8.74				 	2.89				 	-						 	3.16				 	0.19				 760,082.0	
2003	 	2.74				 	18.85				 	33.47				 	27.54				 	1.31				 	7.87				 	4.31				 	-						 	3.56				 	0.34				 1,025,293.7	














Paper	 Debentures	 Stocks	 Others	
2000	 -	 76.14	 4.52	 2.24	 2.89	 11.11	 3.11	
2001	 -	 75.16	 7.65	 0.33	 4.41	 9.52	 2.94	
2002	 -	 73.43	 5.93	 0.32	 4.76	 10.88	 4.67	
2003	 -	 75.86	 6.77	 0.07	 3.82	 10.33	 3.15	
December	values;	 repo	operations	with	public	 and	private	debt	 securities;	 public	bonds	=	 federal	
debt	securities;	values	of	each	year	always	add	up	to	100.	
Source:	ANBIMA		Comparing	the	investment	funds’	holdings	of	public	and	private	bonds	with	the	outstanding	 stock	 of	 the	 securities,	 and	 considering	 furthermore	 that	 pension	funds	 carried	 an	 additional	 volume	 of	 bonds	 in	 their	 portfolios,	 the	 great	importance	 of	 the	 funding	 industry	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	 domestic	 bond	markets	in	Brazil	becomes	obvious.	While	investment	funds	held	a	large	fraction	
																																																								183	These	R$	values	have	been	deflated	to	constant	July	2015	R$,	using	the	general	price	index	IGP.	
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Paper	 Debentures	 Stocks	 Others	
2000	 	-		 	675,812.3				 	40,081.9				 	19,899.5				 	25,669.9				 	98,608.0				 	27,569.1				
2001	 	-		 	700,594.9				 	71,292.8				 	3,039.9				 	41,119.4				 	88,753.5				 	27,362.9				
2002	 	-		 	558,163.5				 	45,058.4				 	2,453.0				 	36,166.6				 	82,724.5				 	35,516.1				
2003	 	-		 	777,799.9				 	69,443.1				 	717.4				 	39,124.6				 	105,864.8					32,344.0				
December	values;	 repo	operations	with	public	 and	private	debt	 securities;	 public	bonds	=	 federal	
debt	securities;	in	constant	million	R$	of	July	2015,	deflated	with	general	price	index	IGP	
Source:	ANBIMA;	own	calculations		
Table	5:	 Investment	 fund	holdings	of	public	and	corporate	bonds	and	respective	market	share	 (in	
mio.	R$;	in	%),	2000-2003	




2000	 	675,812.3				 50%	 	1,340,573.64				 	25,669.9				 97%	 	26,333.1				
2001	 	700,594.9				 46%	 	1,539,408.93				 	41,119.4				 109%	 	37,891.9				
2002	 	558,163.5				 33%	 	1,669,465.13				 	36,166.6				 78%	 	46,149.3				
2003	 	777,799.9				 44%	 	1,781,091.27				 	39,124.6				 92%	 	42,743.5				
December	values;	 repo	operations	with	public	 and	private	debt	 securities;	 public	bonds	=	 federal	
debt	securities;	in	constant	million	R$	of	July	2015,	deflated	with	general	price	index	IGP	
Source:	ANBIMA;	BACEN;	CETIP;	own	calculations		






*	 end	 of	 month	 data;	 IPCA:	 variation	 in	 12	 months;	 real	 interest	 rate	 SELIC:	 SELIC-IPCA	 (SELIC:	
accumulated	in	the	month,	annualized);	expected	IPCA:	1	year	forecast	

























































































































1995	 45,019	 1.96	 12.88	
1996	 49,529	 1.94	 14.72	
1997	 60,108	 2.22	 16.76	
1998	 58,020	 2.07	 16.74	
1999	 53,942	 1.93	 14.71	
2000	 63,502	 2.19	 14.40	
2001	 84,866	 2.88	 17.20	
2002	 91,852	 3.09	 19.21	
2003	 77,834	 2.48	 17.00	
*	in	constant	2014	R$,	deflated	with	IPCA;	**	credit	operations	outstanding	of	financial	institutions	
under	private	control	
Source:	BACEN;	CETIP;	IBGE;	own	calculations		Several	studies	identified	the	elevated	interest	rate	level	as	a	central	impediment	to	 financial	 development	 in	 Brazil.	 In	 a	 World	 Bank	 study	 Kumar	 (2004,	 33)	stated	 that	 the	 largest	 constraint	 to	 finance	 for	 Brazilian	 companies	 was	 the	elevated	 level	 of	 the	 interest	 rates.	While	 Beck’s	 (1999,	 9)	 focus	 lied	 on	 legal	deficiencies,	 he	 also	 admitted	 that	 the	 high	 real	 rates	 were	 among	 the	 most	important	 factors	 pushing	 up	 financing	 costs	 in	 Brazil.	 Similarly,	 Rocca	 (2001,	74ff.)	found	that	the	main	component	of	the	elevated	funding	cost	in	Brazil	was	the	high	level	of	the	base	rate.	A	study	conducted	for	the	Brazilian	development	bank	BNDES	 (Paula	 et	 al.	 2009,	 11–12),	 ascertained	 that,	 especially	 during	 the	1990s,	 the	 interest	 level	was	 apparently	 too	 high	 for	most	 companies	 to	 issue	debt	securities.	The	argument	goes	along	these	lines:	A	company	seeking	funding	had	to	consider	that	it	would	need	to	pay	a	risk	premium	on	top	of	the	already	high	interest	rate	of	public	bonds.	Only	when	the	profitability	of	the	investment	project	was	higher	than	the	required	interest	rate	for	the	issuance	of	the	bond,	the	company	would	issue	 the	debt	 security	 and	 realize	 the	 investment	project.	 The	 extremely	 tight	monetary	 policy	 stance	 raised	 the	 interest	 level	 to	 a	 point,	 where	 it	 became	unviable	 for	 private	 issuers	 to	 dispute	 for	 the	 funding	 resources,	 which	 were	consequently	destined	in	their	majority	to	the	acquisition	of	public	bonds.	Due	to	the	characteristics	of	the	Brazilian	public	debt	securities,	combining	low	default	risk	 with	 high	 monetary	 returns	 and	 various	 forms	 of	 indexation,	 corporate	issuers	would	have	to	offer	an	even	higher	monetary	return,	which	would	raise	the	costs	of	funding	to	unsustainable	levels.	The	average	real	interest	rate	during	the	late	1990s	of	about	20%	was	well	above	the	rate	of	return	on	asset	of	most	Brazilian	companies	during	this	period	(Rocca	2001,	 46ff.).	 Based	 on	 information	 from	 the	 financial	 statements	 of	 the	 2.500	largest	Brazilian	private	companies	 in	1997,	only	a	small	 fraction	had	a	rate	of	return	on	asset	above	15%,	while	the	cost	of	third	party	capital	varied	between	about	23%	and	39%	per	year	 (Rocca	and	Carvalho	1999).	The	 capital	markets	
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did	only	offer	a	very	 limited	source	of	 finance	 for	Brazilian	companies,	and	 for	most	Brazilian	companies	it	did	not	offer	an	alternative	source	of	funding	at	all	(Rocca	2001,	53ff.).	The	access	to	bank	credit	as	well	as	to	the	capital	markets	was	almost	exclusively	restricted	 to	 the	 largest	 companies	 (Rocca	 2001,	 60ff.).	 Even	 among	 the	companies	 listed	 on	 the	 Brazilian	 stock	 exchange186,	 which	 were	 expected	 to	generally	have	better	 financing	 conditions	due	 to	 their	 size	 and	 their	 status	 as	publicly	 owned	 companies,	 third	 party	 capital	 accumulated	 between	1994	 and	1998	was	strongly	concentrated.	The	quintile	with	the	largest	companies	raised	about	70%	of	the	funds,	leaving	only	about	20%	to	the	next	quintile,	and	10%	to	the	 remaining	 majority	 of	 analyzed	 joint-stock	 companies.	 The	 concentration	was	 even	more	 accentuated	when	 looking	 at	 the	volume	of	 transactions	 in	 the	Brazilian	 stock	 exchange.	 Between	 1996	 and	 1998,	 the	 volume	 of	 the	transactions	of	the	5%	biggest	companies	represented	75.7%	of	the	total	value	of	transactions.	 The	 highly	 concentrated	 capital	 markets	 could	 also	 be	 explained	with	 the	 high	 interest	 rate	 level:	 Only	 the	 largest	 companies	 that	 were	 well-known	 and	 had	 a	 good	 reputation,	were	 able	 to	 issue	 debt	 securities,	 because	their	risk	premiums	were	lower	and,	consequently	raised	the	funding	costs	less,	than	the	risk	premium	of	a	smaller	company.	The	high	level	of	the	interest	rate	in	Brazil	could	be	explained	in	different	ways	and	 various	 factors	 might	 actually	 be	 at	 work	 jointly	 to	 inhibit	 a	 decrease	 to	more	 sustainable	 levels	 of	 the	 base	 rate.	 Most	 authors	 included	 fiscal	considerations	 in	 their	 list	of	potential	 causes	 (Arida,	Bacha,	and	Lara-Resende	2005,	 267;	 Arnold	 2011,	 13).	 As	 public	 debt	 rose,	 they	 argued,	 the	 state	 faced	more	difficulties	to	roll	over	its	debt,	so	a	higher	interest	rate	needed	to	be	paid	in	 order	 to	 find	 investors	 willing	 to	 buy	 these	 bonds.	 Findings	 of	 Gonçalves,	Holland,	 and	 Spacov	 (2007)	 confirmed	 this	 view,	more	 specifically	 they	 found	“statistically	 significant	 correlations	 of	 the	 short-term	 real	 interest	 rate	 with	inflation	 and	 total	 public	 debt-to-GDP	 ratio”	 (Gonçalves,	 Holland,	 and	 Spacov	2007,	 71).	 And	while	 some	 other	 econometric	 studies	 also	 found	 that	 Brazil’s	high	 level	 of	 the	public	debt	was	 adding	 a	 risk	of	 debt	default	 (Bacha	2010,	 3;	Favero	and	Giavazzi	2002),	the	empirical	evidence	was	not	clear	on	this	matter:	Muinhos	 and	 Nakane	 (2006,	 16),	 for	 example,	 couldn’t	 find	 a	 positive	relationship	between	public	debt	levels	and	the	real	interest	rates.	Fiscal	 dominance	 describes	 a	 very	 peculiar	 situation,	where	 an	 increase	 in	 the	interest	 rate,	 which	 under	 normal	 conditions	would	 bring	 inflation	 down,	will	have	perverse	effects	and	actually	increase	inflation	(Sargent	and	Wallace	1981;	Coates	 and	 Rivera	 2004).	 That	 is	 explained	with	 the	 additional	 burden	 on	 the	debt	service	this	increase	in	the	interest	rate	will	have,	in	a	situation	where	the	debt	is	perceived	to	be	at	the	edge	of	an	unsustainable	level.	The	higher	interest	rate	 then	 pushes	 the	 debt	 level	 over	 this	 edge,	 rendering	 public	 bonds	 less	attractive,	 which	 is	 the	 opposite	 outcome	 of	 what	 to	 expect	 under	 normal	conditions,	where	an	increase	in	the	interest	rate	raises	demand	for	government	bonds.	 The	 decrease	 in	 demand	 for	 public	 debt	 will	 push	 up	 inflation	 in	 two																																																									186	Sample	 of	 156	 to	 170	 publicly	 owned	 companies	 that	were	 grouped	 into	 quintiles	according	to	firm	size.	
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	 Stocks	 Debentures	 Deb.	Leasing	 Commercial	Paper	 CRI	 FIDC	
1995	 	6,313				 	22,453				 	2				 	3,643				 	-						 	-						
1996	 	27,332				 	11,833				 	13,165				 	1,487				 	-						 	-						
1997	 	11,221				 	14,876				 	6,398				 	14,565				 	-						 	-						
1998	 	16,615				 	22,720				 	4,165				 	35,922				 	874				 	-						
1999	 	11,854				 	16,295				 	767				 	20,556				 	33				 	-						
2000	 	32,645				 	19,456				 	1,640				 	18,305				 	414				 	-						
2001	 	13,259				 	29,714				 	4,244				 	11,795				 	499				 	-						
2002	 	12,243				 	17,486				 	11,643				 	7,714				 	283				 	398				
2003	 	4,959				 	9,237				 	382				 	3,875				 	524				 	2,804				
Source:	ANBIMA;	IBGE;	own	calculations		Apart	 from	 the	 high	 level	 of	 the	 interest	 rate,	 its	 volatility	 together	 with	 the	general	macroeconomic	instability	of	a	stop-and-go	economy	affected	the	volume	and	the	conditions	of	new	issues	of	private	debt	securities	in	Brazil	by	increasing	the	market	risk,	i.e.	the	risk	of	a	fixed	rate	bond	losing	value	as	a	consequence	of	an	 interest	 rate	 increase,	 as	well	 as	 the	 default	 risk,	 i.e.	 the	 risk	 that	 the	 bond	issuing	company	would	not	be	able	to	repay	the	bond	holders	(Paula	and	Faria	Jr.	2012,	114–15).	Monetary	policy	had	frequently,	i.e.	at	any	sign	of	an	increase	in	economic	 growth	 (and	 the	 aggregate	 demand),	 created	 expectations	 of	 raising	the	base	 rate	 in	order	 to	keep	 inflation	under	 control.	Modenesi	 (2008)	 shows	that	the	Brazilian	central	bank,	when	reacting	to	observed	changes	in	the	output	gap	and/or	deviation	from	the	inflation	target,	asymmetrically	adjusted	the	base	rate,	 i.e.	 monetary	 authorities	 raised	 the	 interest	 rate	 sharper	 and	 faster	 than	they	lowered	it.	As	 a	 consequence	 of	wealth	 holders’	 high	 interest	 rate	 expectations,	 corporate	bond	demand	went	 in	 two	directions:	on	the	one	hand,	expectations	raised	the	premium	claimed	by	demanders	of	securities	with	 longer	maturities,	especially	after	the	expected	base	rate	increase	was	realized	and	sustained	for	a	long	time,	on	the	other	hand,	the	demand	for	securities	that	were	indexed	to	the	interbank	rate	 DI,	 implying	 a	 zero	 interest	 rate	 risk,	 increased.	 Against	 this	 background,	investors	 kept	 their	 liquidity	preferences	whetted,	 and	 even	while	 investing	 in	longer-term	securities,	 they	searched	 for	ways	 to	safeguard	against	 the	market	risk,	 by	 demanding	 indexed	 securities.	 More	 concretely,	 this	 meant	 that	 there	was	a	demand	either	for	short-term	debt	securities,	both	from	public	or	private	issuers,	 with	 high	 monetary	 returns,	 e.g.	 commercial	 paper,	 fixed	 rate	 CDBs,	LTNs,	or	NTNs-F,	or	for	medium-term	public	bonds	that	might	offer	a	little	lower	remuneration	while	being	 indexed	 to	 the	SELIC	rate.	Furthermore,	 longer-term	
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1995	 22.41	 41.22	 40.34	 131.78	 -	 -	 -	 242.23	
1996	 9.56	 23.94	 23.74	 79.33	 -	 -	 -	 147.06	
1997	 5.22	 39.87	 38.98	 96.98	 -	 -	 -	 181.76	
1998	 1.65	 31.24	 30.89	 84.17	 -	 -	 -	 175.43	
1999	 8.94	 18.99	 18.77	 53.81	 -	 -	 -	 138.82	
2000	 5.97	 16.19	 16.13	 44.66	 32.11	 9.01	 -	 152.71	
2001	 7.67	 19.05	 19.05	 50.14	 34.09	 5.88	 -	 160.18	
2002	 12.53	 23.03	 22.91	 56.12	 35.86	 9.54	 -	 163.93	
2003	 9.30	 16.91	 16.81	 44.15	 31.06	 5.01	 -	 144.63	
*Natural	person	
Source:	BACEN		When	 comparing	 the	 DI	 rate	 with	 the	 interest	 rate	 on	 loans	 to	 finance	 the	working	 capital	 of	 companies	 (data	 only	 available	 since	 2000),	 there	 was	 a	relatively	 large	 spread	 of	 about	 15%	 on	 average.	 There	were	 several	 reasons,	why	 banks	were	 able	 to	 charge	 this	 spread	 (Paula	 et	 al.	 2009,	 25).	 First,	 only	publicly	 owned	 companies	 had	 access	 to	 the	 primary	 market	 of	 debentures.	Second,	the	costs	of	funding	via	debenture	were	not	 limited	to	the	interest	rate	costs	and	included	considerable	issuance	costs	that	were	related	to	road	shows,	brokerage	 fees	 etc.	 and	 could	 only	 be	 compensated	 by	 a	 large	 funding	 volume	and/or	long	duration.	Third,	bank	credit	might	also	have	been	more	costly	as	it	was	 more	 readily	 available	 and	 the	 amount	 could	 better	 be	 adjusted	 to	 the	financing	 needs.	 These	 findings	 were	 backed	 by	 international	 experience:	 The	
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country	studies	conducted	in	Borensztein	et	al.	(2008a)	showed	that	companies	issuing	 bonds	 shared	 certain	 characteristics	 and	 that	 issuance	 became	 more	likely	 with	 larger	 firm	 size,	 more	 tangible	 assets,	 higher	 profitability,	 and	greater-than-average	 leverage	 (Borensztein	 et	 al.	 2008b,	 15–18).	 Firm	 size	seemed	 to	 matter	 because	 of	 large	 fixed	 issuance-costs	 that	 could	 be	differentiated	 into	those	of	becoming	an	 issuer	and	those	of	each	 issuance.	The	former	included	disclosure	costs	and	required	accounting	changes	and	the	latter	such	 expenses	 as	 underwriting	 fees.	 These	 findings	 were	 confirmed	 by	 the	results	of	the	firm-level	survey.	Companies	named	several	factors	related	to	fixed	costs	that	made	bonds	less	attractive	than	bank	financing	such	as	high	fees,	issue	requirements,	minimum	size,	information	requirements,	and	lengthy	procedures.	Between	 1995	 and	 1998,	 the	 semi-fixed	 exchange	 rate	 regime	 with	 an	overvalued	 currency	 (in	 real	 terms)	 favored	 the	 issuance	 of	 securities	 abroad.	During	 this	 period,	 Brazilian	 companies	 issued	 on	 international	 markets	US$	 24.4	 billion	 on	 average	 per	 year,	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 long-term	 notes	 and	commercial	paper.	Translating	these	volumes	at	the	average	exchange	rate	of	the	respective	year	into	Brazilian	real	(R$)	and	comparing	it	to	the	domestic	capital	markets,	 one	 can	 see	 that	 about	 60%	of	 the	 total	 volume	 issued	 per	 year	was	funded	 abroad.	 The	 domestic	 primary	 market	 of	 debentures	 and	 commercial	paper	recorded	an	average	annual	volume	of	R$	31.9	billion	during	these	years.	Although	 the	 Brazilian	 capital	markets	 (including	 the	 stock	market)	 were	 less	important	 for	 overall	 funding,	 they	 experienced	 a	 period	 of	 growth	 during	 the	1990s,	 resulting	 largely	 from	 the	massive	 entrance	 of	 foreign	 capital	 (A.	 G.	 de	Carvalho	2000,	596–97).	The	 situation	 changed	 completely,	 reversing	 net	 foreign	 currency	 inflows,	 in	1999	and	2000,	after	a	 floating	exchange	rate	regime	was	adopted,	the	country	risk	 increased	 and	 the	 domestic	 interest	 rates	 decreased.	 Although	 the	implementation	 of	 the	 inflation	 targeting	 (IT)	 regime,	 together	 with	 a	 flexible	exchange	rate	and	continuous	primary	surpluses,	was	able	to	lower	the	interest	rate	level,	it	still	remained	high	(Paula	et	al.	2009,	9ff.).	The	way,	in	which	the	IT	regime	worked,	under	a	 flexible	exchange	rate	regime,	 together	with	an	almost	completely	 open	 capital	 account,	 led	 to	 great	 exchange	 rate	 volatility.	 During	periods	of	net	capital	outflows,	such	as	 in	2002	and	2003,	 the	 instability	of	 the	exchange	 rate	 was	 even	 more	 accentuated.	 The	 macroeconomic	 instabilities	were	not	only	expressed	in	a	volatile	exchange	rate,	but	could	also	be	seen	in	the	unstable	 interest	 rates.	 The	 interbank	market	 rate	 DI	 (Depósito	 Interbancário)	was	 closely	 related	 to	 the	 monetary	 policy	 rate	 SELIC	 and	 also	 showed	 high	volatility.	 These	 great	 macroeconomic	 instabilities	 had	 an	 impact	 on	 both	 the	domestic	and	 the	external	bond	market,	which	were	both	shrinking	during	 the	two	currency	crises	in	the	beginning	of	1999	and	in	the	end	of	2002.	When	 the	 capital	 markets	 crashed	 in	 the	 end	 of	 1990s,	 this	 coincided	 with	several	 international	 crises	 and	 an	 adverse	 macroeconomic	 scenario,	 and	 the	measures	 taken	 to	 resolve	 this	 situation	 included	 the	 increase	of	 the	monetary	policy	rate	and	of	the	CPMF	tax,	which	substantially	raised	transaction	costs	(A.	G.	de	 Carvalho	 2000,	 606ff.).	 While	 these	 two	 measures	 obviously	 negatively	affected	 the	performance	of	 the	capital	markets,	 the	decline	was	also	rooted	 in	structural	weaknesses,	such	as	corporate	governance	issues.	Another	important	
		 192 	
barrier	 to	 the	 development	 of	 capital	markets	 in	 Brazil	were	 the	 high	 costs	 of	going	public	as	well	as	the	regular	costs	to	maintain	a	publicly	owned	company,	which	were	connected,	for	example,	to	the	structure	of	the	underwriting	industry.	These	 factors	 might	 explain	 why	 the	 number	 of	 publicly	 owned	 companies	declined	during	 the	1990s,	 in	 a	period	of	 capital	market	 growth,	 implying	 that	only	few	companies	were	able	to	reap	the	benefits	of	increased	liquidity.	Another	 explanation	 was	 connected	 to	 the	 ownership	 structure	 of	 Brazilian	companies.	 The	 vast	 majority	 of	 large	 companies	 were	 either	 multinational	corporations	or	under	public	control.	Most	of	the	remaining	companies	that	had	a	 sufficiently	 large	 size	 so	 that	 they	 could	 participate	 in	 the	 domestic	 capital	markets	were	mostly	family-owned	with	a	high	self-financing	capacity.	In	other	words,	 these	 companies	had	 less	need	 to	 issue	 corporate	bonds	 as	 a	 source	of	funding.	Also,	it	would	usually	run	against	those	families’	interests	to	lose	control	of	 their	 companies,	 which	 explains	 why	 preferred	 shares	 dominated	 the	Brazilian	 stock	 exchange.	 The	 relative	 lack	 of	 ordinary	 shares	 brought	 other	problems	with	it,	like	the	low	professionalism	of	the	family-owned	businesses	or	the	low	value	of	the	shares,	which	only	allowed	the	investors	to	participate	in	the	profits,	but	didn't	give	the	right	to	participate	in	the	decision	making	process.	Apart	 from	 the	 reasons	 outlined	 above,	 there	 were	 at	 least	 two	more	 factors,	which	 negatively	 affected	 the	 development	 of	 corporate	 bond	 markets:	 There	was	 a	 lack	 of	 standardization.	 Debt	 security	 contracts	 should	 be	 easy	 to	understand	 and	 to	 execute,	 which	 would	 best	 be	 achieved	 by	 adhering	 to	standard	 contracts.	 The	 second	 point	 was	 the	 lack	 of	 efficient	 mechanism	 to	support	the	price	formation	process.	In	more	developed	markets,	there	were	low	cost	 electronic	 trading	 platforms	 installed,	 while	 in	 Brazil,	 corporate	 debt	securities	were	 traded	 almost	 exclusively	 “over	 the	 counter”	 (OTC),	 i.e.	 on	 the	phone	and	negotiations	were	registered	afterwards,	during	the	period	analyzed	here.	
3.2.1.3 Public	banks:	major	domestic	source	of	long-term	finance	and	
funding	Long-term	funding	on	the	domestic	capital	markets	was	restricted	to	a	few	large	companies	during	the	period	between	1995	and	2003.	The	low	development	of	the	 corporate	 bond	 market	 in	 Brazil	 could	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 existence	 of	alternative	sources	of	 funding.	The	option	 to	 issue	abroad,	as	discussed	before,	was	 a	 major	 contribution	 to	 funding	 streams,	 especially	 under	 the	 semi-fixed	exchange	 rate	 regime	 between	 1995	 and	 1999.	 Another	 important	 source	 of	funding	was	supplied	by	public	finance	for	development	programs,	which	offered	subsidized	credits	 for	 specific	 sectors	 in	Brazil.	Public	 finance	 for	development	was	mainly	executed	by	one	 institution	 in	Brazil,	 the	public	development	bank	BNDES.	Access	 to	BNDES	credit	was	 restricted	 to	 certain	 regions,	 industries	or	firm	sizes,	depending	on	the	specifications	of	the	respective	program.	In	the	end,	it	was	a	political	decision	how	these	programs	and	measures	were	designed	and,	consequently,	which	 companies	were	able	 to	apply	 for	 these	 resources.	During	the	 analyzed	 sub-period,	 BNDES	 took	 an	 active	 role	 in	 the	 process	 of	
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privatization	 by	 providing	 loans	 to	 acquirers	 and	 becoming	 a	 minority	shareholder	in	formerly	state-owned	enterprises,	apart	from	offering	its	services	in	planning	and	executing	privatizations.	The	 volume	 of	 BNDES	 disbursements	 were	 almost	 the	 same	 size	 as	 primary	issues	 in	 the	 Brazilian	 capital	 markets	 (see	 Table	 9).	 Towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	analyzed	period,	 in	2002	and	2003,	 its	 share	markedly	 increased,	but	 this	was	less	a	result	of	an	counter-cyclical	effort,	and	more	the	result	of	a	strong	decline	in	the	volume	issued	on	the	Brazilian	capital	markets.		
Table	9:	Capital	markets,	volume	issued	vs.	BNDES	disbursements	(in	%	of	total),	1995-2003	
	 in	%	of	total	volume	
	 Stocks	 Debentures	 Deb.	Leasing	 Commercial	Paper	 CRI	 FIDC	 BNDES	disbursements	
1995	 11.4	 40.4	 0.0	 6.6	 0.0	 0.0	 41.7	
1996	 32.8	 14.2	 15.8	 1.8	 0.0	 0.0	 35.5	
1997	 11.5	 15.2	 6.5	 14.9	 0.0	 0.0	 51.8	
1998	 12.5	 17.1	 3.1	 27.0	 0.7	 0.0	 39.7	
1999	 12.4	 17.0	 0.8	 21.5	 0.0	 0.0	 48.2	
2000	 25.5	 15.2	 1.3	 14.3	 0.3	 0.0	 43.4	
2001	 11.4	 25.6	 3.7	 10.2	 0.4	 0.0	 48.7	
2002	 9.9	 14.1	 9.4	 6.2	 0.2	 0.3	 59.9	
2003	 6.0	 11.1	 0.5	 4.7	 0.6	 3.4	 73.7	








Dec	95	 23,155	 	 1.01%	
Dec	96	 29,630	 28%	 1.16%	
Dec	97	 50,637	 71%	 1.87%	
Dec	98	 52,869	 4%	 1.89%	
Dec	99	 46,131	 -13%	 1.65%	
Dec	00	 55,575	 20%	 1.92%	
Dec	01	 56,478	 2%	 1.92%	
Dec	02	 74,475	 32%	 2.51%	
Dec	03	 61,064	 -18%	 1.95%	
*	accumulated	in	the	year	



















1995	 22.41	 17.72	 41.22	 40.34	 131.78	 -	 -	 -	
1996	 9.56	 11.02	 23.94	 23.74	 79.33	 -	 -	 -	
1997	 5.22	 9.89	 39.87	 38.98	 96.98	 -	 -	 -	
1998	 1.65	 18.06	 31.24	 30.89	 84.17	 -	 -	 -	
1999	 8.94	 12.50	 18.99	 18.77	 53.81	 -	 -	 -	
2000	 5.97	 9.75	 16.19	 16.13	 44.66	 32.11	 9.01	 -	
2001	 7.67	 10.00	 19.05	 19.05	 50.14	 34.09	 5.88	 -	
2002	 12.53	 10.00	 23.03	 22.91	 56.12	 35.86	 9.54	 -	





right	direction	The	 international	 context	 contributed	 to	 a	markedly	 improved	 performance	 of	the	 Brazilian	 economy,	 which	 was	 growing	 at	 relatively	 high	 growth	 rates.	Maybe	 even	 more	 importantly,	 the	 economic	 growth	 was	 accompanied	 by	greater	macroeconomic	stability,	so	that	it	was	not	abruptly	interrupted,	after	a	couple	 of	 years	 already,	 as	 had	 happened	 in	 the	 sub-period	 analyzed	 before.	Against	 this	 background,	 public	 debt	 management	 was	 able	 to	 improve	 the	structure	 of	 the	 public	 debt	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 indexation	 profile	 as	 well	 as	 a	prolongation	of	terms	and	maturities,	that	way	starting	to	construct	a	yield	curve.	Within	 this	 favorable	 environment,	 Brazilian	 companies	 wanted	 to	 realize	investment	 projects	 and	 started	 to	 demand	 funding.	 Instead	 of	 increasingly	issuing	 corporate	 bonds,	most	 companies	 opted	 for	 the	placement	 of	 company	shares	 on	 the	Brazilian	 stock	 exchange,	which	 can	be	 seen	 as	 a	 clear	 sign	 that	interest	 rates	 remained	 on	 a	 too	 high	 level	 compared	 to	 the	 expected	 rate	 of	return	of	most	companies.	 In	 fact,	although	the	 interest	rate	was	 lowered	 from	2005	 onwards,	 mainly	 because	 inflation	 was	 kept	 under	 control	 due	 to	 the	exchange	rate	appreciation,	the	monetary	policy	stance	continued	to	show	signs	of	conservatism.	The	 Brazilian	 development	 bank	 BNDES	 placed,	 through	 its	 subsidiary	BNDESPAR,	a	corporate	bond	with	special	characteristics.	The	placement	aimed	at	 setting	 benchmarks	 and	 to	 establish	 new	 standards,	 in	 order	 to	 improve	market	transparency	and	liquidity	as	well	as	broadening	the	investor	base	of	the	Brazilian	 debentures	 market.	 Even	 this	 specially	 designed	 program	 and	 the	positive	economic	environment	were	apparently	not	enough	to	trigger	a	leap	in	CBMD.	 First	 signs	 of	 improvement	were	 seen,	 but	 then	 came	 the	 international	financial	 crisis	 in	 2008	 and	 left	 its	mark,	 also	 on	 the	Brazilian	 corporate	 bond	market.	
3.2.2.1 Public	debt	management:	improving	the	structure	in	a	more	




	 Nominal	result	 Interest	payments	 Primary	result	
	 total	 internal	 external	 total	 internal	 external	
2004	 2.87	 4.31	 -1.44	 6.56	 5.70	 0.86	 -3.69	
2005	 3.54	 6.68	 -3.14	 7.28	 6.64	 0.64	 -3.74	
2006	 3.57	 7.49	 -3.92	 6.72	 6.38	 0.34	 -3.15	
2007	 2.74	 9.81	 -7.07	 5.98	 5.96	 0.02	 -3.24	
2008	 1.99	 2.83	 -0.84	 5.33	 5.40	 -0.08	 -3.33	
Source:	BACEN		With	 consecutive	 public	 deficits,	 net	 debt	 on	 the	 rise,	 and	 the	 exchange	 of	external	for	internal	debt,	the	stock	of	public	debt	securities	continued	to	rise,	as	well.	In	an	environment	of	greater	macroeconomic	stability,	most	Latin	American	countries,	including	Brazil,	were	able	to	change	the	structure	of	their	public	debt	towards	 “safer”	 forms	 with	 respect	 to	 maturity,	 currency	 composition,	 and	indexation	of	 their	 domestic	 government	 bonds	 (Borensztein	 et	 al.	 2008b,	 11–13).	 In	 Brazil,	 the	 decline	 of	 exchange	 rate	 indexed	 bonds	 and	 the	 increase	 of	fixed	rate	bonds	as	well	as	inflation	indexed	bonds	stood	out,	while	the	reduction	of	 bonds	 indexed	 to	 the	 SELIC	 rate,	 the	 LFTs,	was	 less	 strong	 so	 that	 in	 2008,	LFTs	still	represented	almost	40%	of	the	stock	of	sovereign	bonds.	As	we	saw	in	the	 theoretical	 chapter	 2	 and	 according	 to	 Lopreato	 (2008)	 their	 existence	hampers	the	functioning	of	monetary	policy	as	well	as	public	debt	management,	and	the	development	of	the	corporate	bond	market.		







































Brazilian	 treasury	 to	 set	 a	mark	 in	2007	 and	 realize	 the	placement	 of	 the	 first	fixed	rate	bond	with	a	maturity	of	ten	years.	This	was	an	important	step	towards	building	a	long-term	yield	curve	that	could	serve	as	a	benchmark	for	private	debt	securities.	The	lack	of	a	long-term	interest	rate	in	Brazil,	the	concentration	of	the	demand	 for	debt	securities	 in	 the	short	 term	and	the	 lack	of	a	vision	and	 long-term	 perspective	 were	 issues	 that	 were	 repeatedly	 touched	 upon	 during	 the	interviews	 (F01	 2010;	 U03	 2010;	 U04	 2010).	 They	 explain	 why	 Brazilian	companies	 tended	 to	 invest	 less	 and	 instead	 worked	 at	 full	 capacities,	 which	added	 to	 inflationary	 pressures	 that,	 in	 turn,	 needed	 to	 be	 controlled	 by	 an	increasing	 interest	rate.	Furthermore,	 the	fear	of	an	unexpected	increase	 in	the	interest	 rate	 that	 would	 cause	 losses	 for	 holders	 of	 fixed	 rate	 bonds	 and	 the	corresponding	 focus	 on	 short-term	 and	 indexed	 debt	 securities	 explain,	 why	Brazilian	 debentures	 usually	 had	 a	 built-in	 clause	 allowing	 investors	 to	renegotiate	(U04	2010).	Parallel	 to	 the	 decrease	 of	 LFTs	 in	 the	 stock	 of	 public	 bonds,	 there	 was	 an	increase	 in	operations	of	 fixed	 rate	bonds	 (LTNs	and	NTNFs)	 in	 the	 secondary	market	 that	were	 combined	with	 transactions	 in	 the	 futures	market	 for	 short-term	 interest	 rates,	 aiming	 at	 creating	 so-called	 synthetic	 LFTs	 (Moura	 2007).	While	 this	 showed	 the	 great	 aversion	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 financial	 market	participants	towards	longer-term	commitments,	it	also	implied	that	the	national	treasury	 successfully	 transferred	 the	 ultimate	 interest	 rate	 risk	 to	 the	 market	participants.	Although	the	share	of	LFTs	in	the	public	debt	fell	sharply,	from	55.9%	in	2004	to	34.1%	 in	2007,	 the	difference	between	medium	 term	 to	maturity	 and	medium	duration	 of	 the	 public	 debt	 almost	 didn't	 change,	 as	 both	measures	 increased	(See	Figure	10).	While	the	medium	duration	of	Brazilian	public	bonds	more	than	doubled	 from	11	 to	 25	months,	 increasing	 by	14	months,	 the	medium	 term	 to	maturity	of	sovereign	bonds	was	extended	by	15	months	from	21	to	36	months.	The	medium	 term	 to	maturity	of	 corporate	debentures	 increased	as	well,	 from	67	months	in	2004	to	76	months	in	2008.		
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Figure	 10:	 Term	 to	 maturity	 and	 duration	 of	 public	 bonds	 vs.	 term	 to	 maturity	 of	 corporate	
debentures	(in	months),	2004-2008	
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instruments	were	used,	again,	by	small	and	medium	sized	banks	to	acquire	fresh	capital,	in	a	year	of	a	strong	expansion	of	banking	credits.	The	 boom	 in	 primary	 capital	 markets	 provoked	 increased	 activities	 in	 the	secondary	markets	of	debentures,	as	well,	raising	the	average	monthly	volume	of	negotiations	from	R$	1.9	billion	in	2006	to	R$	3.7	billion	in	2007	(ANBIMA	2007).	It	must	be	emphasized,	though,	that	this	increase	of	the	average	amount	traded	per	month	was	mostly	due	to	punctual	negotiations	of	certain	securities,	and	that	the	daily	trading	volume	of	debentures	was	subject	to	strong	fluctuations.	Due	to	the	 dominance	 of	 institutional	 investors	 in	 the	 primary	market	 of	 debentures,	these	investors	also	accounted	for	the	majority	of	negotiations	in	the	secondary	market.	Therefore,	the	low	liquidity	of	the	debentures	market	was	closely	related	to	 the	 highly	 concentrated	 investor	 base	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 institutional	investors	were	not	circulating	the	debentures,	which	could	be	explained,	among	other	 things,	 with	 tax	 reasons	 and	 regulatory	 requirements.	 The	 market	 for	debentures	was	also	highly	concentrated	on	the	supply	side,	because	there	were	only	few	companies	that	issued	debentures	(Paula	et	al.	2009,	27).	Between	2004	and	 2008,	 the	 largest	 eight	 issuers	were	 responsible	 for	more	 than	 half	 of	 the	volume	issued	in	the	primary	market	for	debentures.	During	the	expert	interviews,	several	other	explanations	for	the	low	liquidity	in	corporate	bond	markets	were	pointed	out:	For	example,	the	lack	of	international	investors	 in	 the	 corporate	 bond	 market	 (F01	 2010;	 U04	 2010)	 that	 could	 be	explained	by	discriminatory	tax	treatments	and	other	regulations	that	advantage	public	bonds,	as	well	as	the	low	attractiveness	of	these	debt	securities	for	retail	investors	 (A01	 2010),	 which	 might	 be	 related	 to	 low	 market	 transparency,	among	 other	 things.	 The	 investor	 base	 could	 be	 broadened	 by	 installing	 a	guarantee	scheme,	insuring	the	investor	that	at	least	part	of	its	investment	was	safe	(U04	2010).	Another	key	problem,	that	has	been	touched	upon	before,	was	the	fact	that	corporate	bonds	lacked	standards	in	issuance,	which	made	it	harder	to	 compare	 different	 securities	 (A01	 2010).	 Although	 the	 problem	 of	 different	issue	dates,	 terms,	 risks	etc.	will	 always	exist	 among	corporate	debt	 securities,	there	 have	 been	ways	 to	make	 at	 least	 some	 characteristics	more	 comparable.	The	 Brazilian	 authorities	 tried	 to	 tackle	 this	 problem	 and	 offered	 a	 vehicle	 to	improve	 standardization190,	 but	 apparently	 the	 requirements	 were	 too	 high,	because	there	were	no	securities	issued	under	this	regulation	(Paula	et	al.	2009,	39;	ANBIMA	2004).	Out	 of	 the	 six	 Latin	 American	 countries	 analyzed	 in	 the	 book	 edited	 by	Borensztein	 et	 al.	 (2008b,	 9–11),	 Brazil	 was	 the	 only	 one	 that	 has	 not	 shifted	from	a	pay-as-you-go	to	a	fully	funded	private	pension	system	during	the	past	35	years191.	The	most	recent	data	for	that	study	shows	that	in	2004,	a	large	fraction	(more	than	20%)	of	domestic	public	debt	was	in	four	countries	directly	held	by	private	 pension	 funds	 (PPFs).	 In	 a	 fifth	 country,	 Brazil,	 PPFs	 also	 had	 a																																																									190	According	to	CVM	instruction	n.	404/2004.	191	In	 Brazil,	 contributions	 to	 the	 public	 pension	 system	 were	 cut	 and	 regulation	 of	private	pension	funds	was	adjusted	in	1998,	and	in	2003,	a	pension	reform	with	a	focus	on	public	servants	was	implemented.	At	the	same	time,	the	demand	for	private	pension	funds	increased	further,	mainly	due	to	tax	incentives.	(See	also	chapter	3.1.2.1.)	
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2004	 	3.66				 	18.00				 	30.26				 	28.57				 	0.78				 	8.17				 	5.80				 	-						 	3.57				 	1.19				 1,086,365.7	
2005	 	2.75				 	20.24				 	39.66				 	17.24				 	0.29				 	8.32				 	6.85				 	-						 	2.55				 	2.11				 1,294,552.1	
2006	 	2.48				 	17.77				 	33.80				 	22.66				 	0.14				 	10.19				 	7.93				 	-						 	2.71				 	2.32				 1,585,837.5	
2007	 	2.39				 	14.56				 	29.98				 	23.78				 	0.06				 	15.51				 	7.98				 	-						 	3.17				 	2.58				 1,814,180.3	
2008	 	3.25				 	16.32				 	29.18				 	23.65				 	0.07				 	10.18				 	9.89				 	1.40				 	2.11				 	3.94				 1,614,262.4	
Net	 worth	 in	 constant	 million	 R$	 of	 July	 2015,	 deflated	 with	 general	 price	 index	 IGP;	 December	
values;	others	=	FIEX	+	FIDC	+	IMOB	+	FEF;	values	of	each	year	always	add	up	to	100.	
Source:	ANBIMA		Public	 bonds	 continued	 to	dominate	 in	 the	portfolio	 of	 investment	 funds,	 even	though	their	fraction	dropped	from	an	average	of	75%	between	2000	and	2003	to	59%	 in	2004.	Moreover,	a	 large	part	of	 this	decline	could	be	explained	with	the	 replacement	 of	 definite	 acquisitions	 of	 public	 bonds	with	 repo	 operations,	which	made	up	about	13%	of	 the	portfolio	 in	2004	and	mainly	 included	public	bonds.	During	the	years	from	2004	to	2008,	the	share	of	public	bonds	continued	to	decrease,	and	even	though	the	growing	share	of	repo	operations	compensated	most	 of	 this	 decline,	 there	was	 a	 downward	 trend	 in	 the	 combined	 figures,	 as	well.	The	lower	share	of	public	bonds	in	the	portfolio	of	investment	funds	found	its	 counterpart	 in	 a	 growing	 importance	 of	 CDBs	 and	RDBs.	While	 debentures	slowly	 expanded	 their	 share	 in	 the	 portfolio,	 the	 participation	 of	 stocks	experienced	 an	 abrupt	 decline	 in	 2008,	 after	 two	 years	 of	 strong	 growth,	 and	peaking	at	22%	of	all	investment	fund	assets	in	2007.	












Paper	 Debentures	 Stocks	 Others	
2004	 13.23	 58.99	 8.44	 0.28	 2.80	 11.17	 5.08	
2005	 9.43	 60.53	 10.66	 0.04	 3.93	 11.16	 4.26	
2006	 11.35	 54.80	 10.18	 0.09	 4.62	 15.25	 3.71	
2007	 13.60	 47.04	 8.96	 0.07	 4.17	 21.71	 4.46	
2008	 19.10	 41.46	 13.70	 0.27	 4.44	 14.45	 6.59	










Paper	 Debentures	 Stocks	 Others	
2004	 	143,747.9				 	640,856.6				 	91,743.0				 	2,997.6				 	30,411.6				 	121,368.7					55,240.3				
2005	 	122,062.8				 	783,530.0				 	137,952.6				 	539.8				 	50,852.2				 	144,425.9					55,188.8				
2006	 	179,922.3				 	868,961.7				 	161,461.6				 	1,460.1				 	73,222.9				 	241,917.6					58,891.3				
2007	 	246,744.3				 	853,346.5				 	162,488.4				 	1,194.4				 	75,617.8				 	393,866.1					80,922.8				
2008	 	308,351.4				 	669,255.7				 	221,109.0				 	4,394.0				 	71,651.6				 	233,201.1				106,299.7				
December	 values;	 repo	operations	with	public	 and	private	debt	 securities;	 public	bonds	=	 federal	
debt	securities;	in	constant	million	R$	of	July	2015,	deflated	with	general	price	index	IGP.	








2004	 	640,856.6				 34%	 	1,860,806.36				 	30,411.6				 69%	 	44,109.1				
2005	 	783,530.0				 39%	 	2,005,586.88				 	50,852.2				 60%	 	85,007.0				
2006	 	868,961.7				 40%	 	2,159,032.90				 	73,222.9				 47%	 	155,476.6				
2007	 	853,346.5				 36%	 	2,353,952.26				 	75,617.8				 36%	 	209,991.3				
2008	 	669,255.7				 27%	 	2,468,770.58				 	71,651.6				 29%	 	248,232.3				
December	 values;	 repo	operations	with	public	 and	private	debt	 securities;	 public	bonds	=	 federal	
debt	securities;	in	constant	million	R$	of	July	2015,	deflated	with	general	price	index	IGP	












corporate	bond	market,	 reaching	only	R$	12.5	billion	 in	 the	whole	year,	which	represented	only	9%	of	the	total	Brazilian	capital	market	volume	issued	in	2008.	With	the	rising	uncertainties	surrounding	the	build-up	and	breakout	of	the	crisis,	investors	started	to	ask	for	high	interest	rates	and	short	terms.	Therefore,	part	of	the	 retreat	 of	 the	 debentures	 was	 compensated	 by	 the	 increased	 issuance	 of	commercial	 paper,	 reaching	 a	 volume	 of	 R$	 35.7	 billion	 corresponding	 to	 a	market	 share	 of	 25%.	 The	 highest	 market	 share,	 with	 a	 contribution	 of	 34%,	came	from	new	issues	in	the	stock	exchange,	reaching	a	volume	of	R$	49.0	billion	in	2008.	




*	 end	 of	 month	 data;	 IPCA:	 variation	 in	 12	 months;	 real	 interest	 rate	 SELIC:	 SELIC-IPCA	 (SELIC:	
accumulated	in	the	month,	annualized);	expected	IPCA:	1	year	forecast	














































































































2004	 74,648	 2.25	 14.39	
2005	 136,116	 3.91	 22.15	
2006	 241,375	 6.45	 33.51	
2007	 312,089	 7.73	 33.60	
2008	 348,369	 7.99	 31.46	
*	in	constant	2014	R$,	deflated	with	IPCA;	**	credit	operations	outstanding	of	financial	institutions	
under	private	control	



















2004	 7.60	 17.50	 17.46	 40.46	 29.77	 5.54	 -	 143.97	
2005	 5.69	 18.24	 18.15	 39.52	 30.76	 6.27	 21.43	 147.45	
2006	 3.14	 13.19	 13.14	 36.58	 25.37	 6.87	 16.09	 142.04	
2007	 4.46	 11.18	 11.11	 32.30	 22.16	 6.85	 13.79	 138.05	




The	average	real	interest	rate	SELIC194	dropped	from	15.4%	between	June	1995	and	December	2003	 to	9.6%	during	 the	years	2004	 to	2008.	On	 the	one	hand,	this	was	 an	 important	 improvement	with	 respect	 to	 the	 funding	 conditions	 in	Brazil.	Apart	from	representing	a	significant	cut	in	the	main	financing	cost	factor,	it	 raised	 the	 demand	 for	 debentures,	 especially	 by	 institutional	 investors	 that,	confronted	with	the	perspective	of	a	lower	base	rate,	were	inclined	to	raise	the	share	 of	 debentures	 in	 their	 portfolios.	 The	 improved	 domestic	 financing	conditions	together	with	uncertainties	about	the	US-American	interest	rate	path	during	 the	 second	 semester	 of	 2004,	 led	 Brazilian	 companies,	 especially	 non-exporting	 firms,	 to	satisfy	 their	 funding	needs	on	 the	domestic	market	 through	the	issue	of	debentures	(Paula	et	al.	2009,	29).	On	the	other	hand,	the	Brazilian	interest	rates	remained	on	a	prohibitively	high	level	for	the	development	of	the	corporate	bond	market	to	really	get	going.	The	fact	that	most	companies	opted	for	issuing	equity	instead	of	debt	securities	is	a	clear	sign	that	the	interest	rate	was	still	too	high.	Although	economic	prospects	were	 improving	and	companies	started	 to	demand	 finance,	 the	corporate	bond	market	grew	very	little.	During	the	period	from	2004	to	2008,	the	total	volume	issued	in	stocks	was	R$	247.9	billion,	compared	to	R$	97.9	billion	in	debentures,	which	 reversed	 the	previous	dominance	of	debentures	 in	 capital	markets	 from	1995	 to	 2003:	 In	 the	 earlier	 period	 (1995-2003),	 stocks	made	 up	 28%	 of	 the	total	 volume	 issued	 and	 debentures	 represented	 38%	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 capital	markets;	in	the	more	recent	period	(2004-2008),	the	market	share	of	stocks	rose	to	33%	on	average,	while	debentures	diminished	to	17%	of	all	issues.		
Table	19:	Capital	markets,	volume	issued	(in	mio.	R$),	2004-2008	
	 in	constant	million	R$	of	2014	(deflated	by	IPCA)	
	 Stocks	 Debentures	 Deb.	Leasing	 Commercial	Paper	 CRI	 FIDC	
2004	 	15,489				 	16,101				 	169				 	3,793				 	682				 	8,690				
2005	 	22,645				 	16,075				 	50,439				 	4,214				 	3,366				 	13,737				
2006	 	48,604				 	30,986				 	76,856				 	8,195				 	1,663				 	22,142				
2007	 	112,207				 	22,253				 	49,193				 	14,455				 	2,259				 	17,965				
2008	 	48,954				 	12,488				 	21,262				 	35,700				 	6,749				 	18,073				
Source:	ANBIMA;	IBGE;	own	calculations		Since	the	problem	of	an	increased	level	of	the	interest	rate	was	not	resolved,	the	debate	about	its	possible	causes	continued,	as	well.	Rogoff	(2005,	19)	suggested	that	 its	 “history	 of	 serial	 default	 and	 high	 inflation	 implies	 that	 Brazil	 starts	paying	 a	 significant	 default	 risk	 premium	even	 at	 relatively	 low	 levels	 of	 debt.	Debt	levels	need	to	come	down	below	25-30%	to	be	safe”.	Some	authors	argued	that	Brazil	was	paying	too	high	a	risk	premium,	because	the	country	was	trapped																																																									194	SELIC	interest	rate:	monthly	data,	accumulated	in	the	month	and	annualized;	deflated	with	 consumer	 price	 index	 IPCA:	 monthly	 data,	 variation	 in	 12	 months	 in	 %;	 real	interest	 rate:	 SELIC-IPCA;	 average	 real	 interest	 rate	 SELIC:	 arithmetic	 medium	 of	monthly	values	during	the	relevant	period.	
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in	 a	bad	equilibrium,	where	 interest	 rates	only	needed	 to	be	kept	at	 such	high	levels,	 because	 of	 a	 vicious	 cycle	 that	 started	 with	 the	 elevated	 level	 of	 the	interest	 rate,	which	was	 suppressing	 economic	 growth	 perspectives	 as	well	 as	productive	 investments,	while	 it	 also	 raised	 the	public	 debt	 burden	by	making	the	 debt	 more	 expensive.	 The	 lack	 of	 productive	 investments	 caused	 supply	shortages,	resulting	in	rising	prices.	Furthermore,	the	increasing	expenditures	on	interest	 payments	 added	 to	 a	 rising	 aggregate	 demand.	 These	 inflationary	tendencies	needed	to	be	controlled	by	raising	the	interest	rate,	which	eventually	further	 aggravated	 the	 situation.	 According	 to	 the	 bad	 equilibrium	 hypothesis,	there	exists	another	equilibrium	with	lower	interest	rates,	which	would	alleviate	the	 debt	 service,	 hence	 decrease	 the	 fiscal	 deficit,	 and	 ultimately	 ease	 the	pressure	 on	 inflation	 (Arida,	 Bacha,	 and	 Lara-Resende	 2005,	 266–67;	 Arnold	2011,	15).	Consistent	with	this	line	of	reasoning	was	a	statement	made	by	one	of	my	 interview	 partners	 working	 in	 the	 financial	 market,	 suggesting	 that	 the	elevated	 price	 the	 country	 was	 paying	 for	 its	 debt	 was	 not	 justified:	 “[…]	 the	Brazilian	debt	is	one	of	the	lowest	in	the	world.	Brazil	is	one	of	the	best	credits	in	the	world”	(F01	2010,	39).	However,	as	Arnold	(2011,	13)	pointed	out,	 the	reduction	 in	 the	Brazilian	debt	ratio	 was	 mostly	 achieved	 through	 a	 growing	 economy	 and	 not	 because	 of	 a	genuine	fiscal	effort.	The	author	was	concerned	about	the	increased	tax	burden	behind	the	primary	surpluses,	suggesting	that	the	fiscal	stance	should	have	been	improved	 instead	by	 cutting	down	expenditures,	which	 supposedly	owed	 their	downward-rigidity	 especially	 to	 the	 lack	of	 a	 shift	 from	 the	pay-as-you-go	 to	 a	fully	funded	private	pension	system.	The	“scarcity	of	domestic	saving	as	one	obvious	candidate	explanation”	(Arnold	2011,	13)	was	listed	by	many	orthodox	authors	analyzing	the	level	of	the	interest	rate	 in	 Brazil	 (Arnold	 2011;	 Hausmann	 2008;	 Segura-Ubiergo	 2012).	 Their	argument	 that	 the	Brazilian	 interest	 rate	was	 at	 such	 a	high	 level,	 because	 the	savings	 rate	 was	 too	 low,	 is	 –	 from	 a	 Keynesian	 point	 of	 view	 –	 based	 on	 a	theoretical	 fallacy.	 In	 a	 Keynesian	world	 the	 savings	 rate	 is	merely	 a	 residual,	because	the	decisions	are	made	on	the	level	of	consumption	and	investment.	In	the	 orthodox	 chain	 of	 argument,	 low	 savings	 stand	 at	 the	 beginning	 and	 they	represent	 the	 available	 funds	 for	 investment	 projects.	 Since	 there	 is	 a	 high	demand	for	investment	projects	to	be	realized,	but	only	a	small	amount	of	funds	stemming	 from	 savings,	 their	 argument	 goes,	 the	 price	 for	 those	 funds	 (the	interest	rate)	is	very	high.	Those	authors	suggested	that	the	state	should	increase	the	share	of	public	savings	by	reducing	public	“consumptive”	expenditure.	Although	 the	 Brazilian	 treasury	 succeeded	 in	 reducing	 its	 exposure	 to	 the	exchange	rate	risk	during	the	2000s,	public	debt	was	still	exposed	to	the	interest	rate	 risk,	 because	 it	was	 to	 a	 large	 extend	 short-term	and	 indexed	 to	 the	 base	rate,	which	 increased	the	risk	premium	embedded	in	the	 interest	rate.	Another	factor	that	was	often	cited	as	raising	the	premium	demanded	by	wealth	holders	to	compensate	for	the	lower	liquidity	premium	of	Brazilian	financial	assets	was	judicial	uncertainty	(Arida,	Bacha,	and	Lara-Resende	2005).	The	hypothesis	that	a	lack	of	a	reliable	and	efficient	jurisdiction	impedes	the	conclusion	of	long-term	debt	 contracts	has	been	both	confirmed	 (Salles	2007)	and	rejected	 (Gonçalves,	Holland,	 and	 Spacov	 2007)	 empirically.	 Apart	 from	weaknesses	 in	 the	 judicial	
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system	of	Brazil,	 other	 institutional	weaknesses	 such	as	 the	 lack	of	 full	 central	bank	 independence	 were	 pointed	 out	 as	 possibly	 contributing	 to	 the	 elevated	level	of	 the	Brazilian	 interest	 rates	 (Rogoff	2005,	48).	These	authors	suggested	mitigating	the	effects	of	institutional	weaknesses	by	improving	micro-regulatory	rules	as	well	as	granting	further	independence	to	the	Brazilian	Central	Bank.	The	weak	transmission	channel	of	monetary	policy	was	also	being	referred	to	by	many	authors	as	one	of	the	main	reasons	why	the	real	interest	rates	were	so	high	in	Brazil.	Raising	the	base	rate	was	a	blunt	instrument,	because	inflation	was	not	so	 much	 driven	 by	 demand,	 but	 more	 pushed	 by	 cost	 pressures	 and	 the	indexation	 of	 prices	 in	 the	Brazilian	 economy.	 There	 have	 been	many	 authors,	who	 emphasized	 the	 central	 role	 of	 the	 exchange	 rate	 in	 the	 monetary	transmission	channel	in	Brazil,	starting	with	Barbosa-Filho	(2008).	Squeff	(2009)	gave	 empirical	 evidence	 that	 inflation	 was	 determined	 by	 the	 exchange	 rate.	Between	 2004	 and	 2008,	 the	 inflation	 targets	 were	 met,	 mainly	 because	 the	Brazilian	 currency	 appreciated	 during	 that	 time,	 keeping	 import	 and	 export	prices	low	(A.	Modenesi	and	Ferrari	Filho	2011;	Serrano	and	Summa	2011).	The	currency	 appreciated	 because	 of	 the	 high	 interest	 rate	 level	 that	 was	 causing	capital	inflows.	Araújo	 and	Modenesi	 (2009)	 also	 showed	 that	Brazil	 had	a	weak	 transmission	channel	of	monetary	policy	and	emphasized	the	central	role	of	the	exchange	rate.	They	 argued	 that	 the	 low	 sensitivity	 of	 inflation	 to	 the	 SELIC	 interest	 rate	resulted	 in	 high	 costs	 for	 Brazil.	 These	 costs	 included	 a	 slowdown	 of	 the	economy,	an	overvaluation	of	the	domestic	currency,	and	an	increase	in	the	stock	of	public	debt.	Also,	this	paper	drew	attention	to	a	trade-off	between	monetary	policies	 aiming	 at	 financial	 stability	 and	 price	 stability:	 Because	 the	 exchange	rate	 played	 such	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 transmission	 channel	 of	 monetary	policy	 to	 control	 inflation	 (in	 the	 authors	 view,	 the	 exchange	 rate	 appreciation	was	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 stabilization	 policy),	 measures	 to	 control	 potentially	destabilizing	 capital	 inflows	 became	 less	 desirable.	 The	 paper	 concluded	 that	given	the	high	costs	of	current	policies	against	inflation,	and	their	limited	impact	on	 the	 price	 level,	 the	 inflation	 targeting	 regime	 was	 not	 appropriate	 for	 the	Brazilian	necessities.	Presenting	 a	 model	 that	 was	 challenging	 the	 New	 Consensus	 approach	 by	incorporating	different	theoretical	assumptions,	i.e.	demand-led	growth,	a	paper	by	 Ricardo	 Summa	 (2012)	 showed	 that	 the	monetary	 authority	 didn't	 control	inflation	 via	 the	 traditional	 credit	 channel,	 but	 via	 the	 exchange	 rate.	 Another	finding	 was	 that	 inflation	 targeting	 (IT)	 incurred	 real	 costs	 that	 depended	 on	different	factors	and	increased	with	the	ambition	of	the	inflation	target.	At	last,	a	theoretical	paper	was	recently	published	that	argued	in	favor	of	an	exchange	rate	targeting	regime	instead	of	an	IT	regime,	in	order	to	achieve	a	higher	level	in	the	long-term	 growth	 rate	 (Ferrari,	 Freitas,	 and	 Barbosa	 Filho	 2013).	 All	 of	 this	literature	with	 a	 focus	on	 the	 exchange	 rate	 in	Brazil	 pointed	 to	 the	over-	 and	misuse	of	 the	SELIC	 interest	rate	as	 the	main	 instrument	of	monetary	policy	to	control	 inflation.	 Since	 it	was	 actually	 the	 appreciating	 exchange	 rate	 that	was	keeping	 inflation	 low,	 these	authors	suggested	a	change	 in	the	monetary	policy	regime,	which	would	allow	a	reduction	in	the	interest	rate.	
		 212 	
The	 positive	 economic	 situation	 in	 Brazil	 together	 with	 the	 high	 interest	 rate	level	caught	the	attention	of	international	investors,	who	directed	the	majority	of	financial	 flows	 into	 Brazil	 towards	 the	 stock	 exchange	 and	 the	 public	 bond	market	 (Paula	 et	 al.	 2009,	 4).	 The	 low	participation	of	 foreign	 investors	 in	 the	corporate	bond	markets	might	come	as	a	surprise	in	light	of	the	massive	capital	flows	 to	Brazil.	 Indeed,	as	one	of	 the	 interview	partners	stated:	 “Another	point	that	distinguishes	Brazil	 […]	 is	 that	 the	demand	 for	domestic	debt	securities	 in	Brazil	is	completely	local.	There	are	only	domestic	investors	in	the	domestic	debt	market.	Ten	percent	of	 the	public	debt	 is	 in	 the	hands	of	 foreigners,	and	of	 the	debt	denominated	in	domestic	currency	zero	percent	are	in	the	hands	of	foreign	investors;	also	very	peculiar	in	this	sense”	(F01	2010,	20).	The	bias	towards	sovereign	relative	to	private	bonds	might	have	been	caused	by	preferential	 tax	 treatments	and	regulations,	which	should	have	been	abolished,	because	a	wider	investor	base	would	have	improved	market	liquidity	(Leal	and	Carvalhal-da-Silva	 2006,	 60–61).	 The	 lack	 of	 liquidity	 in	 the	 corporate	 bond	market,	 in	 turn,	might	have	been	 the	main	 reason,	why	 international	 investors	preferred	 to	 buy	 equity	 securities.	 Related	 to	 the	 increased	 importance	 of	 the	stock	market	 to	 the	detriment	of	debentures	 could	also	have	been	 the	 issue	of	judicial	 uncertainty.	 With	 minority	 shareholder	 rights	 improving,	 while	 debt	regulation	 mechanisms	 continued	 to	 be	 poor,	 it	 might	 have	 become	 more	attractive	to	participate	in	the	profits	of	a	company	by	owning	a	share	of	it	(and	incurring	 the	 risk	 of	 its	 stock	 price	 not	 reflecting	 the	 expected	 positive	development)	than	to	buy	a	debt	security	promising	certain	payments,	as	long	as	one	 might	 not	 be	 able	 to	 hold	 the	 company	 responsible	 for	 honoring	 its	obligations.	The	 phase	 of	 economic	 growth	 in	 Brazil	 in	 combination	 with	 advantageous	conditions	 on	 the	 international	 financial	 markets	 led	 Brazilian	 companies	 to	seize	the	moment	of	high	international	liquidity,	rendering	the	issuance	of	debt	securities	abroad	the	relevant	channel	 for	Brazilian	companies	to	reach	foreign	investors.	 The	 volume	 of	 equity	 and	 debt	 securities	 issued	 abroad	 during	 the	period	 between	 2004	 and	 2008	 represented	 about	 37%	 of	 the	 total	 volume	issued	 by	 Brazilian	 companies	 on	 the	 domestic	 capital	markets195.	 On	 the	 one	hand,	this	shows	that	tapping	international	markets	was	an	important	source	of	funding	 for	 Brazilian	 companies.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 these	 numbers	 also	 show	that	 the	 local	 capital	markets	 supplied	about	 twice	as	much	 funding	as	 foreign	investors.	What	is	more,	the	domestic	market	gained	dramatically	in	importance,	inverting	 its	 share	with	 the	respective	share	of	 securities	 issued	abroad,	which	had	 represented	 63%	 of	 the	 total	 volume	 issued	 by	 Brazilian	 companies	 from	1995	 to	 2003.	 On	 average,	 there	was	 no	 growth	 of	 the	 volume	 issued	 abroad	between	 the	 two	 periods	 (US$	 21.6	 billion	 per	 year	 between	 2004	 and	 2008	compared	 to	 US$	 21.8	 billion	 annually	 between	 1999	 and	 2003),	 while	 the	Brazilian	 capital	 markets	 experienced	 a	 boom	 phase.	 The	 fact	 that	 Brazilian	companies	didn't	 issue	more	abroad	can	be	partly	explained	by	the	decrease	in	exchange	 rate	 indexed	 public	 bonds	 that	were	 used	 to	 hedge	 (Lopes,	 Antunes,	and	Cardoso	2007,	49).																																																									195	The	total	volume	issued	abroad	measured	in	US$	was	converted	into	R$	by	using	the	average	exchange	rate	of	the	respective	year.	
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2008	was	marked	 by	 the	 contagion	 of	 the	 international	 financial	 crisis,	 which	was	 felt	 more	 severely	 from	 October	 of	 that	 year	 onwards.	 The	 volume	 of	debentures	 issued	 in	 the	 primary	 market	 reached	 R$	 22.8	 billion	 in	 the	 first	quarter	 alone,	 but	 strongly	 declined	 from	 the	 second	 quarter	 onwards	 due	 to	several	factors.	The	decline	of	debenture	issues	was	in	part	compensated	by	the	issuance	of	company	shares	and	commercial	paper,	which	together	represented	about	59%	of	the	total	volume	issued	during	that	year.	 In	the	third	quarter	the	whole	capital	markets	started	to	nosedive.	Taking	a	 closer	 look	at	 the	 course	of	 events	during	 the	 crisis	year	and	starting	with	 the	 first	 quarter	 of	 2008,	 one	 finds	 that	 debentures	were	 dominating	 the	primary	market,	representing	77.1%	of	all	private	securities	issued	(Paula	et	al.	2009,	 32–33).	 As	 in	 the	 previous	 years,	 leasing	 companies	 issued	 the	 large	majority	 of	 these	 debentures.	 Yet,	 these	 types	 of	 debenture	 issues	 sharply	dropped	with	the	introduction	of	reserve	requirements	on	the	resources	passed	on	 to	 financial	 institutions	 by	 the	 leasing	 companies	 (ANBIMA	 2008).	 Because	the	 reserve	 requirements	 turned	 this	 form	 of	 funding	 more	 expensive,	 banks	started	 to	 use	 another	 instrument	 more	 frequently,	 the	 so-called	 CDBs.	 With	international	 liquidity	 drying	 up	 due	 to	 the	 increased	 risk	 aversion	 after	 the	subprime	 crisis	 broke	 out,	 banks	 strongly	 increased	 competition	 with	debentures	 for	domestic	 resources	and	paid	wealth	holders	up	 to	107%	of	 the	interbank	 rate	 DI	 for	 applications	 in	 CDBs.	 Furthermore,	 the	 increase	 of	 the	monetary	 policy	 rate	 in	 the	 first	 semester	 of	 2008	 required	 higher	 returns	 of	debentures.	 From	 this	point	on,	 investors	 started	 to	 ask	 for	high	 interest	 rates	and	 short	 terms.	 All	 of	 this	 together	 led	 to	 a	 harsh	 decline	 of	 the	 volume	 of	debentures	 in	 the	 primary	market	 from	 the	 second	 quarter	 of	 2008	 onwards,	representing	 merely	 2.8%,	 10.2%	 and	 3.0%	 of	 total	 private	 securities	 issued	during	 the	 remaining	 quarters	 of	 2008.	 Because	 of	 their	 short-term	 nature,	commercial	 paper	 partly	 compensated	 for	 the	 retreat	 of	 debentures	 from	 the	second	 semester	 onwards,	 making	 up	 26.4%,	 15.9%	 and	 53.2%	 of	 the	 total	volume	issued	in	the	last	three	quarters	of	2008.	








Dec	04	 67,413	 10%	 2.03%	
Dec	05	 75,226	 12%	 2.16%	
Dec	06	 79,670	 6%	 2.13%	
Dec	07	 96,443	 21%	 2.39%	
Dec	08	 127,538	 32%	 2.92%	
*	accumulated	in	the	year	
Source:	BACEN		The	 growth	 of	 BNDES	 disbursements,	 especially	 between	 2004	 and	 2006,	was	not	only	slow	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 remaining	credit	market,	but	also	compared	 to	the	boom	in	the	capital	markets.	In	2008,	the	international	financial	crisis	caused	the	 primary	 capital	markets	 to	 retreat	 and	 the	 government	 decided	 to	 employ	counter-cyclical	 policies,	 strongly	 increasing	 BNDES	 disbursements.	 After	 the	government	 announced	 the	 Growth	 Incentive	 Program	 (PAC)	 in	 2007,	 the	disbursements	of	the	BNDES	to	the	PAC	already	summed	up	to	R$	32.0	billion	in	2008	(BNDES	2008,	56).		
Table	21:	Capital	markets,	volume	issued	vs.	BNDES	disbursements	(in	%	of	total),	2004-2008	
	 in	%	of	total	volume	
	 Stocks	 Debentures	 Deb.	Leasing	 Commercial	Paper	 CRI	 FIDC	 BNDES	disbursements	
1995	 11.4	 40.4	 0.0	 6.6	 0.0	 0.0	 41.7	
2004	 13.8	 14.3	 0.2	 3.4	 0.6	 7.7	 60.0	
2005	 12.2	 8.7	 27.2	 2.3	 1.8	 7.4	 40.5	
2006	 18.1	 11.6	 28.7	 3.1	 0.6	 8.3	 29.7	
2007	 35.6	 7.1	 15.6	 4.6	 0.7	 5.7	 30.6	
2008	 18.1	 4.6	 7.9	 13.2	 2.5	 6.7	 47.1	
Source:	ANBIMA;	BACEN;	own	calculations		Leal	and	Carvalhal-da-Silva	(2006,	39–40)	analyzed	the	corporate	bonds	issued	in	2004	and	 found	differences	between	 the	public	and	private	placements.	The	majority	 of	 privately	 placed	 bonds	 was	 convertible,	 secured,	 and	 used	 the	interest	 rate	 TJLP,	 which	 the	 authors	 explained	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 debt	securities	were	 usually	 subscribed	 by	 the	 Brazilian	 development	 bank	 BNDES.	Requiring	 convertible	 bonds	 allowed	 BNDES	 to	 enjoy	 the	 upside	 in	 case	 the	funded	 company	 succeeded	 and	 to	 react	 more	 flexible	 in	 case	 the	 funded	company	should	not	be	able	to	repay	its	debt	in	a	timely	manner.	In	2004,	BNDES	held	 a	 corporate	 bond	portfolio	 of	 about	R$	 15.6	 billion	 (in	 constant	 2014	R$,	deflated	with	 IPCA),	which	was	 equivalent	 to	 21%	of	 the	 total	 stock	 of	 bonds.	Based	on	the	assumption	that	the	non-public	debt	holdings	of	investment	funds	as	well	as	pension	funds	were	mostly	made	up	of	bank	certificate	deposits,	and	
		 215 	
corporate	bonds	only	represented	a	small	fraction	of	these	holdings,	the	authors	came	to	the	conclusion	that	(Leal	and	Carvalhal-da-Silva	2006,	40):	“BNDES	may	be	by	far	the	single	 largest	 institutional	bondholder	 in	Brazil.”	Even	though	the	development	 of	 the	 capital	 markets	 was	 one	 of	 its	 stated	 goals,	 BNDES	might	have	been	displacing	issuing	companies	from	the	market	 into	its	own	portfolio,	which	 was	 mainly	 (with	 a	 share	 of	 91%)	 composed	 of	 companies	 from	 the	private	 sector.	 In	 general,	 the	 issuing	 companies	 were	 part	 of	 the	 industrial	(74%)	and	the	service	(26%)	sectors.	The	BNDES	portfolio	had	a	relatively	long-term	profile,	with	66%	of	 its	 holdings	maturing	 in	more	 than	5	 years	 and	 less	than	ten	percent	(7%)	maturing	within	12	months.	Furthermore,	more	than	half	of	the	portfolio	was	rated	B	or	better.	Almeida	 (2009,	 47)	 analyzed	 the	 capital	 structure	 of	 the	 30	 largest	 Brazilian	companies	and	found	that	all	of	them	were	financed	by	the	BNDES.	Furthermore,	BNDESPAR	 was	 directly	 holding	 shares	 of	 11	 of	 them.	 Additionally,	 it	 was	indirectly	a	shareholder	of	another	11	of	those	companies.	Taken	these	holdings	together,	they	made	BNDESPAR	a	very	important	player	in	the	creation	of	22	out	of	the	30	biggest	multinationals	in	Brazil.	The	author	argued	that	the	discourse	of	promoting	technological	diversification	and	innovation	was	inconsistent	with	the	industrial	policy	that	aimed	at	building	so-called	“national	champions”.	The	 strong	 ties	 between	 the	 state	 and	 major	 corporations	 in	 Brazil	 received	criticism	 from	 different	 sides	 (A.	 E.	 S.	 Garcia	 2012,	 124–26).	 In	 one	 view,	expressed	 by	 Lazzarini	 (2012),	 the	 companies	 were	 captured	 by	 the	 state	through	its	interventions,	while	the	other	critical	view,	expressed	by	Tautz	et	al.	(2010),	took	an	opposing	starting	point	and	saw	the	state	being	captured	by	the	major	 corporations	 and	 private	 players.	 Lazzarini	 (2012)	 characterized	 the	Brazilian	 economic	 system	 as	 what	 he	 called	 “relationship	 capitalism”	(capitalismo	 de	 laços),	 where	 the	 state,	 mostly	 represented	 by	 the	 BNDES,	became	 a	 “connecting	 actor”	 (ator	 de	 ligações)	 through	 its	 equity	 holdings	 of	various	major	 corporations,	which	 turned	 into	 “connecting	 actors”,	 as	well.	 As	stakeholder	of	most	of	these	companies,	the	BNDES	put	the	other	stakeholders	of	different	 companies	 in	 contact,	 planned	 alliances,	 and	 facilitated	 privileged	access	 to	 public	 authorities,	 that	 way	 creating	 public-private	 networks.	 The	author	argued	that	the	privatization	process	during	the	1990s	had	increased	the	complexity	of	the	ownership	networks,	because	the	BNDES	was	a	key	player	in	transferring	 public	 enterprises	 into	 private	 ownership,	 which	 involved	 high	volumes	of	public	capital,	mostly	stemming	 from	the	BNDES,	as	well	as	several	joint	ventures	of	public	and	private	investors,	in	which	the	BNDESPAR	took	part.	According	to	this	view,	the	increased	role	of	the	state	in	the	companies	caused	a	higher	political	interference	in	business	decisions	as	well	as	inequalities	in	terms	of	access	to	information	and	political	influence,	fostering	clientilism.	On	 the	 contrary,	 Tautz	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 argued	 that	 the	 BNDES	 under	 the	 Lula	presidency	 deepened	 an	 accumulation	 pattern	 that	 was	 characteristic	 for	 the	Brazilian	capitalism	since	the	privatizations	of	the	1990s,	 i.e.	the	formation	and	reinforcement	 of	 private	 conglomerates	 with	 the	 support	 of	 public	 funding.	Therefore,	 the	 strengthening	 of	 domestic	 private	 groups	 led	 to	 increased	 state	activities,	as	the	BNDESPAR	guaranteed	a	continuous	stream	of	public	resources,	leveraging	 the	 capital	 of	 the	 private	 companies.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 state	 was	
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2004	 7.60	 9.75	 17.50	 17.46	 40.46	 29.77	 5.54	 n.a.	
2005	 5.69	 9.75	 18.24	 18.15	 39.52	 30.76	 6.27	 21.43	
2006	 3.14	 6.85	 13.19	 13.14	 36.58	 25.37	 6.87	 16.09	
2007	 4.46	 6.25	 11.18	 11.11	 32.30	 22.16	 6.85	 13.79	
2008	 5.90	 6.25	 13.66	 13.49	 44.66	 29.19	 9.60	 21.78	
Source:	BACEN		In	2006,	the	BNDES	established	norms	for	the	acquisition	of	debentures	as	well	as	their	trade	in	secondary	markets	with	the	aim	to	incentivize	primary	market	activity	 and	 to	 raise	 liquidity	 in	 the	 market.	 Another	 program,	 initiated	 by	BNDESPAR	in	the	same	year,	also	aimed	at	stimulating	the	debentures	market	so	that	it	might	offer	an	alternative	source	of	funding	for	more	Brazilian	companies.	The	program	envisaged	 the	 issuance	of	debentures	with	 special	 characteristics	by	 BNDESPAR	 and	 was	 supposed	 to	 pave	 the	 way	 for	 private	 companies	 to	follow	 in	 this	 direction	 (Lopes,	 Antunes,	 and	 Cardoso	 2007,	 62ff.).	 The	debentures	were	plain,	i.e.	non-convertible,	and	indexed	to	the	price	index	IPCA.	At	the	time,	the	vast	majority	of	debentures	were	indexed	to	the	interbank	rate	DI,	 implying	zero	duration,	and	this	was	the	first	 issue	ever	of	an	IPCA-indexed	debenture.	 There	 were	 600,000	 debentures	 placed	 with	 a	 nominal	 value	 of	R$	600	million	and	maturity	term	in	January	2012.	The	placement	was	increased	by	20%	from	an	initial	500,000	debentures	due	to	the	high	demand	of	1.8	million	debentures.	The	price	was	set	at	R$	898.33	corresponding	to	a	real	rate	of	return	of	 8.525%	 per	 year.	 Apart	 from	 the	 use	 of	 the	 IPCA	 for	 indexation,	 other	innovative	 characteristics	 that	were	expected	 to	promote	CBMD,	 especially	 the	development	 of	 the	 secondary	 market,	 included	 a	 widespread	 distribution	among	 a	 large	 number	 of	 investors,	 the	 request	 that	 negotiations	must	 not	 be	realized	 outside	 electronic	 platforms,	 and	 the	 appointment	 of	 two	 market	makers.	Especially	the	goal	to	reach	the	small	investors,	i.e.	a	distribution	not	only	among	institutional	 investors,	 was	 achieved	 with	 the	 distribution	 of	 99.9	 thousand	debentures	 among	 4,250	 retail	 investors	 (Lopes,	 Antunes,	 and	 Cardoso	 2007,	65ff.).	 The	 interest	 during	 the	 book	 building	 process	 was	 also	 remarkable,	 as	5,800	 investors	 gave	 their	 orders	 with	 a	 total	 nominal	 volume	 of	 R$	 149.5	million,	 corresponding	 to	 about	165,000	debentures.	Although	a	 large	 share	of	the	orders	was	not	attended	due	to	the	requested	remuneration,	it	is	also	worth	noting	 that	almost	half	of	 the	4,250	 investors	applied	a	nominal	amount	below	R$	5,000,	and	a	large	majority	of	73%	of	the	retail	investors	did	not	invest	more	than	R$	15,000	 (all	 of	 these	 values	 cited	 in	 nominal	 terms,	 i.e.	 not	 adjusted	 to	inflation).	Secondary	market	negotiations	also	 topped	expectations	as	 trades	at	BovespaFix	between	the	first	day	of	negotiation,	December	21st,	2006,	and	March	14th,	 2007,	 corresponding	 to	 a	 quarter	 of	 a	 year,	 have	 summed	 up	 to	 115	negotiations,	 which	 was	 more	 than	 all	 remaining	 negotiations	 at	 BovespaFix	during	the	whole	year	2006	represented.	
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In	the	first	semester	of	2007,	BNDESPAR	issued	debentures	with	a	nominal	value	of	R$	1.35	billion.	Similar	to	the	earlier	issue,	it	focused	its	efforts	at	distributing	the	debentures	 among	 retail	 investors	 and	was	 able	 to	 establish	 an	 innovative	remuneration	in	the	corporate	bond	market.	Part	of	the	issue	was,	again,	indexed	to	the	 inflation	rate	 IPCA,	while	another	part	was	a	 fixed	rate	bond.	That	made	BNDESPAR	the	first	corporate	 issuer	to	place	a	 fixed	rate	debenture.	According	to	 Mr.	 Lagrota,	 head	 of	 BNDES	 fund	 raising,	 the	 successful	 placement	 of	debentures	with	these	characteristics	was	a	sign	that	BNDESPAR	was	fulfilling	its	role	and	contributed	to	capital	market	development	(ANBIMA	2007).		The	immediate	effect	on	the	corporate	bond	market	might	have	been	limited	to	a	greater	 awareness	 among	 retail	 investors	 of	 this	 type	 of	 debt	 security	 and	 the	establishment	 of	 certain	 benchmarks,	 such	 as	 the	 introduction	 of	 fixed	 rate	debentures	and	debentures	indexed	to	an	index	other	than	the	interbank	rate	DI.	Therefore,	 it	 would	 probably	 take	 some	 considerable	 time	 before	 these	benchmark	issues	opened	the	way	for	a	corporate	debenture	issue	with	similar	characteristics	by	a	private	company.	Especially,	due	to	a	series	of	barriers	that	still	hampered	CBMD	in	Brazil.	Nevertheless,	the	attempt	of	BNDESPAR	to	attract	a	broader	public	to	the	debenture	market	and	reach	more	retail	investors	was	an	important	step	on	the	way	towards	a	broader	investor	base	of	this	market.	
3.2.3 2009-2014:	Government	program	to	foster	market	for	
debentures	The	 consequences	 of	 the	 international	 financial	 crisis	 in	2008	 and	2009	 in	 the	credit	market,	 i.e.	 the	 slowdown	of	 private	 bank	 activities,	were	 attenuated	by	the	 counter-cyclical	 deployment	 of	 public	 banks,	 which	 required	 that	 the	national	 treasury	 issued	 large	 volumes	 of	 public	 bonds	 (Torres	 Filho	 and	Macahyba	 2012,	 7).	 Against	 this	 background	 of	 relative	 scarce	 resources,	 the	government	met	with	the	private	sector	in	2010	to	identify	measures	that	might	reduce	the	relative	delay	of	the	corporate	bond	market,	given	the	great	potential	that	 was	 attributed	 to	 this	 funding	 mechanism,	 especially	 with	 respect	 to	 the	industrial	and	infrastructure	sectors.	Four	main	characteristics	of	the	corporate	bond	 market	 were	 identified	 as	 posing	 the	 main	 barriers	 to	 corporate	 bond	market	development	(CBMD)	(Torres	Filho	and	Macahyba	2012,	54):	1)	a	highly	concentrated	 investor	base	 in	the	primary	market,	2)	 lack	of	secondary	market	liquidity,	 3)	 low	 transparency	 in	 the	 price	 formation	 process,	 and	 4)	 wealth	holders’	high	preference	 for	debt	securities	 that	were	 indexed	 to	 the	overnight	interest	rate.	At	 the	end	of	2010,	 the	government	announced	a	set	of	measures	that	 basically	 aimed	 at	 broadening	 the	 investor	 base	 in	 the	 primary	 and	secondary	markets	of	long-term	corporate	debt	securities.	The	 government	 passed	 the	 law	12,431/2011	 in	 a	 clear	 attempt	 to	 create	 and	develop	a	long-term	corporate	bond	market	(Araujo	and	Martins	2012,	15).	The	new	legislation	included	tax	incentives	for	foreign	investors	to	acquire	long-term	debt	 securities,	 as	well	 as	 tax	 incentives	applying	 to	all	 (foreign	and	domestic)	investors	 of	 so-called	 infrastructure	 bonds	 (afterwards	 specified	 in	 decree	7,603/2011).	 It	 furthermore	 created	 a	 new	 type	 of	 investment	 fund	 aimed	 at	
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investments	 in	 research,	 development	 and	 innovation	 and	 provided	 for	improvements	in	infrastructure	investment	funds	as	well	as	in	the	conditions	of	issuing	 debentures	 and	 financial	 debt	 securities(ANBIMA	 2013a,	 2011,	 2014b,	2014a;	 Freitas	 2011).	 Furthermore,	 the	 law	 removed	 legal	 and	 regulatory	barriers,	 such	 as	 the	 problem	 of	 double	 taxation	 of	 recurrent	 revenues,	which	negatively	affected	the	secondary	debenture	market	(Torres	Filho	and	Macahyba	2012,	 55).	Although	 the	package	 received	a	positive	 feedback	 from	 the	private	sector	when	it	was	announced,	several	factors	delayed	the	first	issues	under	the	new	regulation	(Torres	Filho	and	Macahyba	2012,	59ff.).	The	 government	 initiative	 to	 promote	 CBMD	 was	 complemented	 by	 a	 joint	initiative	of	BNDES	and	ANBIMA	to	create	 the	so-called	New	Market	 for	Fixed-Income	Securities	(NMRF196),	named	after	the	new	market	in	the	Brazilian	stock	exchange	 that	 created	 a	 special	 segment	 for	 companies	 adhering	 to	 strict	corporate	governance	rules	(Araujo	and	Martins	2012,	16).	Complying	with	the	rules	 of	 the	 NMRF	 would	 distinguish	 the	 bond	 issues	 by	 establishing	 special	conditions	 concerning	 the	 term	 of	 the	 bond,	 a	 standardization	 of	 issuance,	 as	well	as	a	ban	of	repurchases	within	12	months	after	the	issue	and	a	prohibition	of	indexation	to	the	SELIC	or	DI	interest	rate.	Additionally,	market	liquidity	was	supposed	to	be	raised	by	the	institution	of	a	liquidity	improvement	fund	as	well	as	a	liquidity	guarantee	fund,	but	hitherto	the	plans	of	these	liquidity	funds	were	not	yet	put	in	practice	(IMF	2012b).	Two	state-controlled	companies,	Cemig	and	BNDESPAR,	were	the	first	to	issue	corporate	bonds	under	the	rules	of	the	NMRF,	during	the	first	semester	of	2012.	Although	 the	measures	 implemented	 to	 foster	CBMD	were	 comprehensive	 and	tackled	 various	 problems,	 there	 was	 an	 important	 caveat	 to	 the	 strategy	employed,	 i.e.	 its	strong	reliance	on	the	participation	of	 international	 investors,	which	 proved	 to	 be	 problematic	 before,	 due	 to	 the	 volatility	 and	 pro-cyclical	nature	of	international	capital	flows	(Hermann	and	Martins	2012).	Before	 the	NMRF	was	 installed	and	the	government	 initiative	became	effective,	another	legal	innovation,	CVM	instruction	n.	476/09,	had	already	set	a	landmark	in	Brazilian	capital	market	regulation	and	fundamentally	altered	dynamics	in	the	domestic	 corporate	 bond	 market	 by	 significantly	 raising	 the	 number	 of	debenture	issues.	While	the	debenture	market	had	registered	an	annual	average	of	 38	 placements	 between	 2003	 and	 2008,	 this	 number	 skyrocketed	 to	 253	issues	 per	 year	 on	 average	 between	 2009	 and	 2014.	 Similarly,	 the	 issuance	volume	markedly	increased,	starting	off	 from	a	total	volume	of	R$	107.1	billion	issued	during	the	earlier	period	and	going	up	to	R$	415.6	billion	during	the	later	period.	 Furthermore,	 a	 clear	migration	 towards	 the	new	modality	with	 limited	distribution	took	place	in	the	debenture	market,	concentrating	about	90%	of	the	placements	and	a	little	more	than	80%	of	the	volume	issued	since	its	coming	into	force.	CVM	 instruction	 n.	 476/09	 created	 the	 possibility	 for	 companies	 to	 issue	debentures	and	commercial	paper	more	easily,	exempting	the	 issuing	company	from	 a	 number	 of	 requisitions.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 distribution	 of	 these																																																									196	According	to	the	Portuguese	term	Novo	Mercado	de	Renda	Fixa	(NMRF).	
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securities	 was	 restricted	 to	 a	 maximum	 of	 20	 qualified	 investors197	that	 were	expected	to	understand	the	risks	involved.	The	measure	opened	the	debentures	market	even	 for	privately	held	companies,	as	 the	 issuer	was,	unlike	before,	not	required	to	register	with	the	CVM.	Furthermore,	the	need	for	credit	classification	as	well	 as	 the	 obligation	 to	 publish	 a	 listing	 prospectus	was	 removed.	 In	 sum,	CVM	instruction	n.	476/09	considerably	reduced	bureaucracy	 in	 the	process	of	debenture	issuance.	A	disadvantage	of	the	new	regulation,	according	to	Fernandes	and	Nunes	(2014,	129),	was	that	it	further	aggravated	the	liquidity	problem	in	secondary	markets	by	restricting	distribution.	Yet,	 the	problem	of	highly	concentrated	distribution	already	existed	before.	Another	factor	that	might	be	responsible	for	low	market	liquidity	 was	 the	 small	 number	 of	 debentures	 in	 the	 market,	 which	 might	effectively	be	 increased	as	a	consequence	of	 this	regulation.	Therefore,	 it	might	be	the	first	step	in	solving	the	liquidity	problem,	to	raise	the	number	and	volume	of	 debentures	 outstanding	 in	 the	 market,	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 liquidity	 and	broaden	the	investor	base	in	a	later	stage.		
Figure	14:	Volume	of	corporate	bonds	issued	according	to	type	of	placement	(in	bn.	R$),	1995-2014	
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improvements	 could	 be	 noticed,	 the	 Brazilian	 secondary	market	 for	 corporate	bonds	 remained	 highly	 concentrated	 in	 a	 few	 series	 and	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	debentures	were	only	rarely	traded.	
3.2.3.1 Public	debt	management:	continuous	improvements	and	
further	challenges	A	 recent	 IMF	 working	 paper	 confirmed	 that	 Brazil	 had	 a	 relatively	 low,	 yet	slowly	rising	participation	of	foreign	investors	in	the	domestic	government	debt	market,	even	though	Brazil	was	among	the	few	emerging	market	countries	that	were	 the	main	 target	of	 international	 financial	 flows	 in	recent	years	(Arslanalp	and	Tsuda	2014).	Due	to	 the	 increasing	share	of	 foreign	 investors,	Brazil	had	a	well-diversified	 investor	 base	 in	 the	 domestic	 public	 debt	 market.	 These	investors	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 prolonging	 the	 term	 structure	 of	 public	bonds,	 as	 they	were	usually	demanding	 fixed	 rate	bonds	with	 longer	 terms.	As	long	as	their	participation	wouldn't	grow	much	further,	the	exchange	rate	risks	that	their	presence	implied	would	pose	a	minor	threat.	The	 investor	base	of	 the	Brazilian	public	bond	market	could	be	 improved	even	further	 by	 a	 continuous	 reduction	 of	 the	 participation	 of	 financial	 institutions	and	 investment	 funds,	 while	 raising	 the	 participation	 of	 retail	 investors	 and	pension	funds.	The	 international	 financial	 crisis	 and	 the	 counter-cyclical	 fiscal	 reaction	 left	 a	clear	mark	in	the	Brazilian	public	finance	in	2009:	the	primary	surplus	was	cut	down	 from	3.33%	of	 GDP	 in	 2008	 to	 1.95%	 in	 2009,	 raising	 the	 public	 deficit	from	1.99%	of	GDP	in	2008	to	3.19%	in	2009	and	increasing	the	net	public	debt	from	R$	1,640	billion	in	2008	to	R$	1,833	billion	in	2009.	In	the	following	years,	from	2010	to	2013,	 the	primary	surplus	was	on	average	 lower	than	during	the	decade	before	(2000-09:	3.2%	of	GDP	vs.	2010-13:	2.4%),	but	that	did	not	result	in	 higher	 nominal	 deficits	 (3.4%	 of	 GDP	 vs.	 2.6%,	 respectively),	 because	 the	internal	 interest	 payments	 decreased	 (6.03%	 of	 GDP	 vs.	 4.95%,	 respectively).	The	lower	interest	rate	 level	was	the	main	reason,	why	the	consolidated	public	sector	had	to	make	less	interest	payments.	In	2014,	the	public	accounts	deteriorated,	as	public	spending	expanded	at	twice	the	rate	of	revenues,	resulting	 in	 the	 first	primary	deficit	 (0.59%	of	GDP)	since	the	 implementation	of	 the	 inflation	targeting	regime	in	1999.	The	public	deficit	also	 reached	 its	 highest	 level	 under	 this	 regime.	 While	 the	 nominal	 deficit	 in	2013	amounted	to	R$	168	billion,	representing	3.05%	of	GDP,	these	figures	more	than	doubled	in	2014,	reaching	R$	344	billion	or	6.23%	of	GDP.	This	result	was	due	to	a	number	of	 factors	combined,	 including	the	double	deficit	(Brazil	had	a	public	 deficit	 together	with	 a	 current	 account	 deficit	 since	 2008),	 a	 stagnating	economy	with	high	inflation	rates	(so-called	stagflation),	and	a	strong	increase	in	public	expenditure,	which	might	have	been	related	to	the	presidential	election	at	the	end	of	the	year.		
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Table	23:	Government	budget198	(in	%	of	GDP),	2009-2014	
	 Nominal	result	 Interest	payments	 Primary	result	
	 total	 internal	 external	 total	 internal	 external	
2009	 3.19	 4.85	 -1.66	 5.14	 5.14	 -0.01	 -1.95	
2010	 2.41	 4.59	 -2.18	 5.03	 5.00	 0.02	 -2.62	
2011	 2.47	 4.90	 -2.43	 5.41	 5.43	 -0.02	 -2.94	
2012	 2.31	 2.79	 -0.48	 4.54	 4.56	 -0.02	 -2.23	
2013	 3.05	 3.47	 -0.42	 4.83	 4.82	 0.00	 -1.77	
2014	 6.23	 6.07	 0.16	 5.64	 5.62	 0.02	 0.59	
Source:	BACEN		Due	 to	 the	 build-up	 of	 foreign	 exchange	 reserves,	 Brazil	 expanded	 its	 net	external	creditor	position.	That	was	also	the	main	reason	why	the	net	public	debt	remained	relatively	stable	at	around	R$	1.8	trillion	(slightly	decreasing	between	2010	and	2013,	only	to	reach	a	record	high	in	2014),	while	the	net	internal	debt	continued	to	increase,	from	R$	2.2	trillion	in	2009	to	R$	2.7	trillion	in	2014.	That	means,	my	interview	partner’s	expectations	turned	out	to	be	correct,	at	least	in	the	short	to	medium	term:	some	of	the	experts	stated	that	they	expected	public	debt	to	fall	and	corporate	issues	to	grow	(F01	2010;	U04	2010).	The	structure	of	the	public	debt,	in	terms	of	the	share	of	fixed	rate	bonds	and	the	different	 forms	 of	 indexation	 continued	 to	 improve.	 Since	 2007,	 the	 sovereign	bond	market	was	mainly	composed	of	three	types	of	bonds:	an	increasing	share	of	fixed	rate	bonds	as	well	as	inflation	indexed	bonds	and	a	decreasing	share	of	bonds	that	were	 indexed	to	 the	SELIC	 interest	rate.	This	 type	of	bond	becomes	less	 attractive	 during	 periods	 of	 falling	 interest	 rates,	 which	 explains	why	 the	period	 of	 monetary	 policy	 rate	 cuts	 in	 2012	 overlapped	 with	 the	 particularly	strong	decline	of	 its	participation.	Public	debt	management	was	able	 to	 reduce	the	 share	of	 LFTs	 to	 its	 lowest	 level	 since	1995	 –	 and	 still,	 17.2%	of	 all	 public	bonds	 in	 2014	 were	 indexed	 to	 the	 SELIC	 interest	 rate.	 Although	 the	 level	 of	exchange	rate	indexed	bonds	continued	below	1%,	the	national	treasury	did	not	extinct	this	type	of	indexation.	There	was	a	debate	about	whether	the	reduction	of	LFTs	caused	an	increase	in	repo	 operations	with	 the	 central	 bank	 and	 the	 possible	 implications	 of	 such	 a	substitution	 (Costa	 2011,	 2013).	 The	 Brazilian	 Central	 Bank	 used	 repo	operations	 in	 the	 open	market	 to	maintain	 the	 SELIC	 interest	 rate	 close	 to	 its	target,	which	was	 set	 by	 the	Monetary	Policy	 Committee	COPOM.	The	 stock	 of	these	repo	operations	started	to	increase	drastically,	when	the	country	decided	to	 build-up	 its	 foreign	 exchange	 reserves.	 When	 the	 central	 bank	 bought	 US	dollars	 (US$)	 it	 simultaneously	 injected	 real	 (R$)	 into	 the	 Brazilian	 economy,	which	needed	to	be	sterilized	in	order	not	to	create	 inflationary	pressures.	The																																																									198 	Consolidated	 public	 sector	 (until	 November	 2001	 including	 Petrobras	 and	Eletrobras)	borrowing	requirements	without	exchange	devaluation,	 flows	accumulated	in	 12	 months,	 December	 values;	 positive	 values	 represent	 deficits;	 nominal	 result	 =	primary	 result	 +	 interest	 payments;	 total	 borrowing	 requirements	 are	 differentiated	into	internal	(domestic)	and	external	(international)	borrowing	requirements.	
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Figure	 19:	 Term	 to	 maturity	 and	 duration	 of	 public	 bonds	 vs.	 term	 to	 maturity	 of	 corporate	
debentures	(in	months),	2009-2014	
		





















2009	 	3.41				 	14.12				 	26.54				 	23.91				 	0.05				 	12.05				 	10.62				 	1.77				 	3.61				 	3.93				 2,040,790.8	
2010	 	3.47				 	12.40				 	27.55				 	24.14				 	0.05				 	11.46				 	11.01				 	2.55				 	3.52				 	3.84				 2,183,875.5	
2011	 	3.88				 	11.65				 	31.37				 	20.34				 	0.05				 	9.52				 	11.89				 	3.62				 	2.88				 	4.79				 2,416,011.1	
2012	 	4.00				 	11.11				 	31.14				 	20.73				 	0.04				 	9.12				 	12.85				 	3.88				 	2.84				 	4.30				 2,613,314.3	
2013	 	4.46				 	11.73				 	29.19				 	20.12				 	0.09				 	8.48				 	13.40				 	5.06				 	2.42				 	5.07				 2,693,360.1	
2014	 	4.43				 	13.69				 	28.27				 	19.13				 	0.11				 	6.69				 	14.86				 	5.73				 	2.12				 	4.96				 2,827,500.7	





























Paper	 Debentures	 Stocks	 Others	
2009	 19.92	 40.66	 11.38	 0.28	 3.71	 17.65	 6.41	
2010	 20.50	 39.91	 9.93	 0.06	 4.18	 17.99	 7.44	
2011	 19.60	 40.32	 8.56	 0.25	 3.63	 14.72	 12.91	
2012	 21.09	 40.38	 5.41	 0.16	 3.81	 14.15	 15.01	
2013	 24.19	 36.76	 4.38	 0.24	 3.75	 13.90	 16.73	
2014	 27.72	 35.24	 3.19	 0.33	 3.61	 11.73	 18.18	
December	 values;	 repo	operations	with	public	 and	private	debt	 securities;	 public	bonds	=	 federal	
debt	securities;	values	of	each	year	always	add	up	to	100	








Paper	 Debentures	 Stocks	 Others	
2009	 	406,576.5				 	829,724.0				 	232,248.0				 	5,677.8				 	75,675.5				 	360,113.9				130,775.2				
2010	 	447,591.2				 	871,600.3				 	216,939.1				 	1,209.7				 	91,270.7				 	392,795.8				162,468.8				
2011	 	473,637.5				 	974,017.9				 	206,801.8				 	6,102.4				 	87,743.2				 	355,746.2				311,962.1				
2012	 	551,074.0				 	1,055,335.1					141,309.6				 	4,090.3				 	99,514.0				 	369,746.2				392,245.1				
2013	 	651,398.8				 	990,131.8				 	118,076.5				 	6,520.5				 	101,080.3				 	374,292.0				450,484.7				
2014	 	783,671.0				 	996,465.2				 	90,277.3				 	9,344.0				 	102,003.8				 	331,634.6				514,104.8				
December	 values;	 repo	operations	with	public	 and	private	debt	 securities;	 public	bonds	=	 federal	
debt	securities;	in	constant	million	R$	of	July	2015,	deflated	with	general	price	index	IGP	
Source:	ANBIMA;	own	calculations																																																									200	This	 R$	 value	 has	 been	 deflated	 to	 constant	 July	 2015	 R$,	 using	 the	 general	 price	index	IGP.	
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	Even	though	the	investment	fund	industry	decreased	its	public	bond	holdings	as	a	share	of	its	aggregate	portfolio,	it	maintained	its	30%	share	of	the	outstanding	public	bonds	 in	the	market.	Due	to	the	strong	growth	in	the	debenture	market,	with	the	market	value	more	than	doubling,	the	fund	industry	lost	market	shares,	despite	the	increase	in	debenture	holdings	(in	R$).		
Table	 27:	 Investment	 fund	 holdings	 of	 public	 and	 corporate	 bonds	 (in	 mio.	 R$)	 and	 respective	
market	share	(in	%),	2009-2014	




2009	 	829,724.0				 30%	 	2,739,572.29				 	75,675.5				 27%	 	282,694.2				
2010	 	871,600.3				 30%	 	2,930,848.46				 	91,270.7				 27%	 	337,895.2				
2011	 	974,017.9				 32%	 	3,023,637.33				 	87,743.2				 22%	 	396,646.3				
2012	 	1,055,335.1				 33%	 	3,181,866.98				 	99,514.0				 20%	 	504,872.2				
2013	 	990,131.8				 31%	 	3,177,641.18				 	101,080.3				 17%	 	584,536.0				
2014	 	996,465.2				 30%	 	3,301,051.28				 	102,003.8				 15%	 	674,856.0				
December	 values;	 repo	operations	with	public	 and	private	debt	 securities;	 public	bonds	=	 federal	
debt	securities;	in	constant	million	R$	of	July	2015,	deflated	with	general	price	index	IGP	














*	 end	 of	 month	 data;	 IPCA:	 variation	 in	 12	 months;	 real	 interest	 rate	 SELIC:	 SELIC-IPCA	 (SELIC:	
accumulated	in	the	month,	annualized);	expected	IPCA:	1	year	forecast	



























































Target	Selic	(LHS)*	 IPCA	(LHS)	Real	interest	rate	Selic	(LHS)	 expected	IPCA	(LHS)*	Target	inlation	rate	(LHS)	 Exchange	rate,	average	(RHS)	
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2009	 4.31	 8.65	 8.61	 35.96	 20.98	 5.12	 13.85	 159.08	
2010	 5.91	 10.66	 10.64	 39.11	 21.40	 4.80	 15.53	 170.71	
2011	 6.50	 10.90	 10.87	 34.12	 20.20	 3.98	 15.60	 169.88	
2012	 5.84	 7.16	 6.94	 25.90	 15.03	 3.63	 11.00	 138.22	
2013	 5.91	 9.90	 9.78	 27.27	 19.89	 2.92	 14.30	 148.09	
2014	 6.41	 11.58	 11.51	 30.48	 21.65	 2.65	 16.00	 200.99	
*Natural	person	
Source:	BACEN		While	 the	base	 rate	was	 lowered,	 the	national	monetary	 council	 (CMN)	passed	resolution	 4,019/2011,	 which	 formally	 adopted	 a	 macroprudential	 policy	framework,	 following	 the	 recommendations	 of	 international	 institutions	 (FSB,	IMF,	 and	 BIS	 2011a,	 2011c,	 2011b).	 These	 macroprudential	 policies	complemented	monetary	policies	and	enhanced	the	toolkit	of	the	BACEN.	All	 of	 these	 measures	 combined	 led	 to	 a	 profound	 change	 of	 the	 Brazilian	sovereign	bond	yield	curve,	which	developed	 into	a	 textbook	shape	within	one	year.	The	difference	between	the	two	yield	curves	is	striking:	While	the	end-of-August	 2011	 curve	 is	 almost	 completely	 flat	 and	 above	11%	 for	 all	maturities,	the	end-of-August	2012	curve	is	concavely	ascendant,	resembling	the	non-linear	negative	 relationship	between	maturity	 and	 yield.	 In	 other	words,	 longer-term	
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Source:	ANBIMA	(from:	Araujo	and	Martins	2012,	13)		As	 liquidity	 suddenly	 dried	up	because	 of	 the	 international	 financial	 crisis,	 the	problem	of	the	dominant	role	of	short-term	instruments,	such	as	the	CDBs,	in	the	funding	of	Brazilian	banks	became	apparent	(Torres	Filho	and	Macahyba	2012,	17–18).	That	was	why	a	new	instrument	was	created	that	aimed	at	an	improved	liquidity	 management	 of	 banks,	 the	 Financial	 Bills	 (LFs).	 The	 instrument	 was	widely	accepted,	especially	after	the	central	bank	exempted	its	use	from	reserve	requirements.	 In	 2009,	 the	 advantage	 for	 banks	 to	 raise	 funds	 through	 their	leasing	companies	was	removed,	when	 the	central	bank	decided	 to	 include	 the	repo	 operations	 between	 bank	 and	 leasing	 company	 into	 the	 regulation	 of	reserve	 requirements.	 Together,	 these	 regulations	 could	 explain	 the	 sudden	decline	in	debentures	issued	by	leasing	companies	since	2009	(Torres	Filho	and	Macahyba	2012,	44).	Most	 issues	of	LFs	were	 indexed	to	 the	 interbank	rate	DI,	private	 placements,	 and	 merely	 had	 the	 minimum	 term	 of	 two	 years	 (Torres	Filho	and	Macahyba	2012,	17–18).					
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financial system as a whole would be generated – rationally, everyone would migrate to poupança. 
So, the Ministry of Finance changed the rule to avoid this problem. In the new rule the poupança 
yields a variable remuneration that changes with the prime rate (70% of the prime rate) when the 
prime rate gets below of 8.5% p.y.. This measure, considered a politically difficult decision (IMF, 
2012a: 1), removed the Selic’s virtual floor, allowing it to reach its lower levels in history. 
As a consequence of this process the Brazilian yield curve changed substantially, assuming a 
textbook shape (Figure 11). In other words, the curve became ascendant, which means that bonds 
with longer maturity yields more (though not linearly), in line with what is stated by the liquidity 
preference theory, and longer than before – now there are vertices on 9.5 and 10 years for the pre-
fixed bonds. Moreover, it is relevant to notice that the cuts on prime rate were effectively 
incorporated in the yield curve as the rates in each maturity decreased substantially. 
 
Figure 11: Brazilian yield curve (rate x term) 
 
Source: Anbima. Yield curve based on public bonds with pre-fixed interest rates. 
 
Thereby, one can state that the BCB’s approach on monetary policy changed substantially 
after the crisis, especially after August 2011. A macroprudential framework was added to the 
inflation targeting, making a wider range of instruments ‘available’  to  the  BCB  to pursue its goals. 
As Silva and  Harris   (2012:  49)  stress:   ‘A combination of policies is effective involving monetary 
and macroprudential policies to act in a complementary fashion to ensure both macroeconomic and 
financial stability.’  We   should   keep   in  mind   that   inflation   targeting  was not abandoned but it is 
undeniable that relevant changes occurred. 
 
c. Financial policy 
 The   2008’s   financial   crisis   impacted   heavily   Brazilian   financial   and   capital   markets  



















































	 Stocks	 Debentures	 Deb.	Leasing	 Commercial	Paper	 CRI	 FIDC	
2009	 	63,410				 	37,152				 	-						 	30,464				 	4,362				 	13,605				
2010	 	190,913				 	67,260				 	127				 	23,802				 	9,644				 	17,429				
2011	 	22,642				 	60,495				 	13,121				 	21,493				 	14,823				 	17,575				
2012	 	16,116				 	101,425				 	39,445				 	25,529				 	11,677				 	6,827				
2013	 	25,427				 	74,884				 	21,282				 	22,143				 	15,408				 	6,303				
2014	 	15,410				 	74,368				 	20,000				 	30,514				 	14,497				 	6,154				









2009	 380,341	 8.49	 33.94	
2010	 429,241	 8.69	 33.83	
2011	 473,121	 9.07	 34.59	
2012	 568,985	 10.71	 40.91	
2013	 622,005	 11.33	 44.26	
2014	 674,856	 12.22	 48.40	
*	in	constant	2014	R$,	deflated	with	IPCA;	**	credit	operations	outstanding	of	financial	institutions	
under	private	control	
Source:	BACEN;	CETIP;	IBGE;	own	calculations		As	mentioned	before,	the	high	level	of	corporate	bonds	indexed	to	the	interbank	rate	DI	might	 have	 been	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 fact	 that	most	 of	 the	 debenture	issues	 were	 actually	 debt	 renegotiations	 and	 directly	 obtained	 by	 the	coordinating	banks	 (Torres	Filho	 and	Macahyba	2012,	 45–47).	Apparently,	 the	companies	were	not	expecting	that	the	gains	they	would	obtain	from	distributing	their	 bond	 to	 a	 greater	 public	 would	 be	 large	 enough	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	
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additional	 costs	 of	 acquiring	 a	 broader	 investor	 base.	 The	 coordinating	 banks	were	 not	 incentivizing	 the	 issuing	 company	 to	 make	 an	 effort	 to	 broaden	 the	investor	 base.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 it	 was	 common	 practice	 that	 they	 offered	 a	distribution	guaranty,	which	obliged	 them	to	buy	any	 fraction	of	 the	 issue	 that	was	not	distributed	among	the	remaining	 investors,	and	often	the	coordinating	bank	even	bought	 the	entire	volume	 issued.	That	might	also	explain	 the	strong	increase	 in	 offerings	 made	 on	 a	 restricted	 efforts	 basis	 according	 to	 CVM	instruction	n.	476/09.	Yet,	even	before	2009,	 there	were	almost	no	 issues	with	more	 than	 a	 hundred	 investors.	 Furthermore,	 the	 large	 majority	 of	 retail	investors	 could	 not	 be	 expected	 to	 present	 a	 sufficient	 level	 of	 financial	sophistication	to	adequately	understand	all	risks	 involved	in	a	debenture	issue,	whose	listing	prospectus	often	comprised	hundreds	of	pages.	The	low	liquidity	in	the	corporate	bond	market	was	mainly	connected	to	the	high	share	of	bonds	indexed	to	the	interbank	rate	DI,	which	inhibited	price	variations	of	 the	 bond	 according	 to	 base	 rate	 alterations	 and,	 hence,	 eliminated	 the	possibility	 to	 speculate	 with	 these	 type	 of	 debt	 securities	 on	 such	 an	 event	(Torres	Filho	and	Macahyba	2012,	47–48).	Furthermore,	 the	secondary	market	liquidity	was	very	 low	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 investors	 in	 the	primary	market	usually	 disposed	of	 specialized	 risk	 evaluation	 teams	 that	 thoroughly	 analyzed	each	 transaction	 before	 a	 decision	was	 taken.	 Therefore,	 the	 participation	 in	 a	book	building	process	 involved	considerable	costs	 that	 implied	 the	expectation	of	 a	 favorable	 risk-to-return	 ratio	 in	 the	 long	 run,	 which	 meant	 that	 those	investors	usually	held	the	bond	to	maturity.	This	reasoning	was	all	the	more	true,	the	 higher	 the	 interest	 rate,	 and	would	 not	 be	 valid	 anymore,	 if	 for	 whatever	reason	 the	 perception	 emerged	 that	 the	 credit	 risk	 of	 the	 companies	 changed.	This	means,	 in	turn,	that	a	corporate	bond	is	a	financial	asset,	which	requires	a	constant	monitoring	and	is	therefore	generally	less	suitable	for	natural	persons.	In	2008,	Brazil	started	to	 implement	capital	control	measures	(Prates	and	Fritz	2012,	 14ff.).	 Due	 to	 the	 international	 financial	 crisis,	 capital	 inflows	 came	 to	 a	temporary	 halt,	 but	 soon	 returned	 in	 2010,	 when	 capital	 controls	 were	intensified.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 2011,	 the	 IOF	 tax	 on	 portfolio	 inflows	 to	 equity	 and	fixed-income	 securities,	 which	 were	 linked	 to	 infrastructure	 projects,	 was	removed.	This	tax	exemption	reawakened	foreign	investors`	interest	in	Brazilian	corporate	bonds,	whose	potential	impact	on	CBMD	is	definitely	larger	than	that	of	domestic	investors.	In	 particular	 from	 2009	 to	 2011,	 the	 overvalued	 exchange	 rate	 made	 the	Brazilian	 industry	 less	 competitive	 internationally,	 which	 caused	 the	 share	 of	industrialized	 products	 in	 the	 export	 basket	 to	 decrease	 (Araujo	 and	 Martins	2012,	 7).	 After	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 COPOM	 to	 reverse	 the	 interest	 rate	 path	 in	August	 2011,	 the	 exchange	 rate	 started	 to	 depreciate.	 While	 this	 relieved	 the	exchange	 rate	 pressures	 on	 the	Brazilian	 industry,	 this	 relief	might	 have	 come	too	 late	 for	 some	 companies.	 Furthermore,	 the	 depreciating	 exchange	 rate	caused	inflation	pressures	to	rise.	While	the	inflation	expectations	continued	to	rise	well	above	the	inflation	target	of	4.5%	until	the	end	of	2014,	reaching	6.7%,	the	 actual	 prices	 rose	 quickly	 during	 2012,	 before	 they	 remained	 at	 a	 level	 of	about	6.5%	during	the	first	semester	of	2013,	decreased	to	5.6%	in	January	2014,	and	afterwards	rose	again	to	the	2012	level.	Due	to	the	rising	prices	and	inflation	
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expectations,	 together	 with	 an	 ever-stronger	 devaluation	 of	 the	 domestic	currency,	the	COPOM	continued	to	raise	the	SELIC	interest	rate,	which	elevated	the	 real,	 i.e.	 inflation	 adjusted,	 base	 rate	 in	December	2014	 to	 its	 highest	 level	since	August	2011	(5.2%	per	year).	The	rising	interest	rate	level	towards	the	end	of	the	analyzed	period	showed	that	this	 important	barrier	 to	CBMD	in	Brazil	was	only	 temporarily	reduced,	but	 its	causes	 were	 not	 removed.	 Therefore,	 it	 might	 be	 helpful	 to	 return	 to	 the	discussion	of	possible	reasons	for	the	elevated	base	rate	in	Brazil.	“History	is	one	of	the	most	widely	heard	explanations	for	the	high	general	level	of	interest	rates.	Former	 BACEN	 president	 Armínio	 Fraga	 once	 called	 the	 high	 SELIC	 rate	 ‘the	consequence	of	a	long	history	of	misbehavior’.	But	though	history	certainly	plays	a	 role,	 this	 explanation	 is	 not	 fully	 satisfactory,	 because	 other	 countries	 with	turbulent	economic	histories	manage	to	keep	inflation	in	check	with	much	lower	real	interest	rates”	(Arnold	2011,	13).	On	the	one	hand,	Brazil’s	previous	history	of	 high	 and	 volatile	 inflation	 certainly	 serves	 as	 an	 explanation	 for	 many	institutional	and	other	factors	that	were	special	to	Brazil	and	might	have	been	at	the	root	of	the	problem	of	the	high	real	interest	rates	(Bacha	2010,	2–3).	On	the	other	hand,	the	removal	of	the	lower	bound	set	by	the	regulation	of	the	Savings	Account	has	shown,	that	it	was	possible	to	adapt	institutional	inheritances	from	the	high	inflation	period	to	the	current	situation.	Some	 authors	 argued	 that	 inflationary	 pressures,	 which	 stem	 from	 increasing	amounts	 of	 BNDES	 credits	 fuelling	 demand,	 could	 at	 least	 partly	 explain	 the	question	of	why	the	SELIC	interest	rate	didn’t	come	down	further	(Arnold	2011,	14;	 Bacha	 2010,	 17–18;	 Hausmann	 2008,	 18–19;	 Segura-Ubiergo	 2012,	 9–10).	BNDES	 credits	 were	 granted	 at	 subsidized	 rates	 below	 the	 SELIC	 rate	 and	independently	of	monetary	authorities.	Although	these	 investments	might	have	enhanced	capacity	in	the	long	run,	this	would	take	time	and	until	then	it	would	drive	up	aggregate	demand.	So	these	authors	argued,	in	the	short	run,	the	BACEN	was	forced	to	keep	the	SELIC	rate	at	a	higher	level	because	of	the	expansionary	credit	policy	of	the	BNDES.	One	suggestion	to	deal	with	this	problem	was	to	link	the	granting	of	directed	credits	to	monetary	policy.	This	discussion	will	be	picked	up	in	the	following	sub-section.	
3.2.3.3 Public	banks:	specific	measures	complementing	government	
efforts	The	 government	 used	 the	 BNDES	 as	 an	 instrument	 to	 extend	 liquidity	 and	 to	compensate	 for	 the	 retreat	 of	 private	 credit,	 causing	 a	 rapid	 increase	 of	 its	participation	 in	 total	 credit	 from	16%	 to	 21%,	 in	 a	 little	more	 than	 two	 years	between	2008	and	2010	(Torres	Filho	and	Costa	2013,	27–29;	Ferraz	et	al.	2012).	The	 increase	 in	market	 share	was	 not	 a	 consequence	 of	 a	 decreasing	 stock	 of	credits	 from	 private	 institutions201,	 but	 due	 to	 the	 strong	 increase	 of	 BNDES	disbursements,	which	climbed	from	2.92%	of	GDP	in	2008	to	4.33%	in	2010.	As	a	consequence	of	the	sudden	increase	of	BNDES	disbursements,	the	government																																																									201	In	fact,	private	banks	continued	to	increase	their	credit-to-GDP	ratio,	only	at	a	slower	pace.	
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Dec	09	 183,455	 44%	 4.10%	
Dec	10	 213,954	 17%	 4.33%	
Dec	11	 165,648	 -23%	 3.17%	
Dec	12	 175,801	 6%	 3.31%	
Dec	13	 202,625	 15%	 3.69%	
Dec	14	 187,837	 -7%	 3.40%	
*	accumulated	in	the	year	




	 Stocks	 Debentures	 Deb.	Leasing	 Commercial	Paper	 CRI	 FIDC	 BNDES	disbursements	
2009	 19.1	 11.2	 0.0	 9.2	 1.3	 4.1	 55.2	
2010	 36.5	 12.9	 0.0	 4.5	 1.8	 3.3	 40.9	
2011	 7.2	 19.2	 4.2	 6.8	 4.7	 5.6	 52.5	
2012	 4.3	 26.9	 10.5	 6.8	 3.1	 1.8	 46.7	
2013	 6.9	 20.3	 5.8	 6.0	 4.2	 1.7	 55.1	
2014	 4.4	 21.3	 5.7	 8.7	 4.2	 1.8	 53.9	
Source:	ANBIMA;	BACEN;	own	calculations		The	role	of	the	BNDES	and	the	aim	of	its	activities	were	highly	debated	recently,	among	other	things,	because	its	disbursements	as	well	as	its	funding	through	the	national	treasury	grew	substantially	in	recent	years	and	because	of	its	practice	to	elect	 so-called	 national	 champions,	which	were	 then	 supported	 and	 pushed	 to	become	 large	 multinational	 corporations,	 sometimes	 implying	 spectacular	merger	and	acquisition	transactions	(M.	Garcia	2011).	Since	the	majority	of	these	companies,	due	to	their	size	and	reputation,	would	have	had	access	to	domestic	or	 even	 international	 capital	markets,	 their	 support	 through	 the	 BNDES	might	not	 have	 been	 compatible	 with	 its	 goal	 to	 function	 as	 a	 complement	 to	 the	private	 financial	 sector,	 compensating	 for	market	 failures.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 by	concentrating	on	the	largest	companies	and	the	best	credit	risks	in	its	portfolio,	the	BNDES	hampered	the	development	of	the	private	credit	system,	including	the	corporate	bond	market.	Furthermore,	 the	effectiveness	of	monetary	policy	was	hampered	by	the	large	fraction	of	loans	with	subsidized	interest	rates	that	didn't	fluctuate	with	 the	 SELIC	 interest	 rate.	Also	 related	 to	 the	 subsidized	 rates	was	the	critique	of	 lacking	transparency	with	regard	to	the	funding	costs	of	BNDES.	The	development	bank	received	loans	at	the	Long-term	Interest	Rate	TJLP	from	the	national	 treasury,	which,	 in	 turn,	 issued	public	bonds	 at	 the	 SELIC	 interest	rate,	 which	 was	 considerably	 higher	 than	 the	 TJLP.	 That	 was	 why	 the	 actual	funding	 costs	 of	 the	 BNDES	 disappeared	 among	 the	 interest	 payments	 and	should	have	been	made	explicit.	Lazzarini	 et	 al.	 (2015,	 238–39)	 analyzed	 a	 sample	 of	 publicly	 owned	Brazilian	companies	accounting	 for	31%	of	outstanding	BNDES	 loans	and	69%	of	equity	held	 by	 the	 development	 bank	 in	 2009,	 testing	 hypotheses	 built	 upon	 the	industrial	policy	view,	on	 the	one	hand,	and	on	 the	political	view,	on	 the	other	hand.	The	 industrial	policy	view	suggests	 that	 companies	 receiving	 funds	 from	public	 finance	 for	 development	 schemes	 would	 otherwise	 not	 realize	 the	investment	 projects	 (Bruck	 1998b;	 Yeyati,	 Micco,	 and	 Panizza	 2004).	 The	authors	 could	 not	 find	 the	 expected	 increase	 in	 capital	 investments,	 market	valuation,	 or	 overall	 profitability	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 subsidized	 funding.	 Yet,	they	also	could	not	find	evidence	supporting	the	political	view,	which	is	skeptical	about	public	finance	for	development,	as	it	causes	credit	misallocation	in	at	least	two	ways:	First,	by	lending	to	companies	that	would	otherwise	fail	(soft-budget	constraint	 hypothesis)	 (Kornai	 1979);	 and	 second,	 by	 channeling	 funds	according	 to	 politicians	 partialities	 serving	 nepotism	 or	 their	 own	 personal	
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2009	 4.31	 6.00	 8.65	 8.61	 35.96	 20.98	 5.12	 13.85	
2010	 5.91	 6.00	 10.66	 10.64	 39.11	 21.40	 4.80	 15.53	
2011	 6.50	 6.00	 10.90	 10.87	 34.12	 20.20	 3.98	 15.60	
2012	 5.84	 5.50	 7.16	 6.94	 25.90	 15.03	 3.63	 11.00	
2013	 5.91	 5.00	 9.90	 9.78	 27.27	 19.89	 2.92	 14.30	
2014	 6.41	 5.00	 11.58	 11.51	 30.48	 21.65	 2.65	 16.00	
Source:	BACEN		In	 order	 to	 increase	 secondary	 market	 liquidity	 in	 the	 corporate	 debentures	market,	 the	BNDES	decided	to	directly	participate	 in	this	market	with	 its	 fixed-income	 department	 and	 launched	 a	 debenture	 acquisition	 program,	 worth	R$	11.9	billion,	in	2011	(Coutinho	2011).	In	order	to	positively	influence	CBMD,	the	 bank	 defined	 a	 set	 of	 rules	 that	 would	 guide	 its	 acquisitions	 in	 public	placements:	BNDES	disallowed	 itself	under	 the	program	 to	acquire	debentures	that	 were	 indexed	 to	 the	 interbank	 rate	 DI.	 Furthermore	 it	 required	transparency	 in	 the	 book	 building	 process	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 pricing	 and	distribution;	the	presence	of	a	market	maker;	a	minimum	maturity	of	two	years;	and	 to	 prohibit	 call	 options	 for	 debentures	 with	 terms	 less	 than	 six	 years.	Additionally,	 it	would	look	for	efforts	to	distribute	the	debentures	among	retail	investors;	 the	 use	 of	 the	 resources	 by	 the	 issuing	 company	 for	 investments	 in	fixed	assets	or	for	corporate	restructuring;	fixed	rate	bonds	or	indexation	to	the	IPCA	or	a	biannual	or	quarterly	floating	rate;	as	well	as	maturities	longer	than	6	
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years.	 Finally,	 BNDES	 restricted	 itself	 to	 acquire	 only	 5	 to	 20	 percent	 of	 the	volume	issued,	depending	on	the	additional	criteria	lined	out	above.	Its	 subsidiary,	 BNDESPAR,	 continued	 to	 issue	 debentures,	 aiming	 at	 the	development	 and	 standardization	of	 the	primary	market	 (Freitas	 2011,	 18).	 In	2010,	 BNDESPAR	 issued	 in	 public	 placements	 of	 three	 series	 simple,	 i.e.	 non-convertible,	debentures	with	a	total	value	of	R$	2.5	billion.	In	order	to	establish	alternative	 forms	 of	 indexations	 that	 might	 serve	 as	 a	 substitute	 for	 the	interbank	 rate	 DI,	 it	 issued	 the	 different	 series	 with	 an	 IPCA	 indexation,	 a	forward-looking	3-month	interbank	interest	rate	created	in	a	similar	way	to	the	3-month	LIBOR	rate	and	adjusted	every	three	months,	and	a	fixed	rate	debenture.	BNDESPAR	 continued	 its	 effort	 to	 play	 a	 pioneering	 role	 by	 introducing	 these	innovative	indexations,	which	were	more	appropriate	to	long-term	funding	than	the	 overnight	 interest	 rate	 DI.	 Similar	 to	 the	 first	 debenture	 issue	 in	 2006,	BNDESPAR	made	an	effort	for	a	widespread	distribution	among	retail	investors	of	 its	 debentures.	 Furthermore	 it	 hired	 market	 maker	 that	 increased	 market	liquidity	by	offering	daily	buy	and	sell	quotations	in	an	electronic	platform.	
3.3 Summarizing	the	evolution	of	corporate	bond	markets	in	
Brazil	under	the	influence	of	public	policies	
Corporate	 bonds	 offered	 an	 important	 funding	 source	 for	 the	 early	 Brazilian	industrialization	and	the	legal	roots	of	debentures	in	Brazil	even	date	back	to	the	19th	 century.	 Yet,	 due	 to	 legislative	 innovations	 in	 1933,	 i.e.	 the	 Usury	 Law	 in	combination	 with	 the	 prohibition	 of	 monetary	 adjustments,	 long-term	 debt	contracts	 during	 the	 1940s	 became	 unviable,	 when	 inflation	 rose	 and	 real	interest	 rates	 turned	 negative,	 so	 that	 corporate	 bond	 markets	 in	 Brazil	practically	disappeared.	To	circumvent	growing	difficulties	 to	 finance	and	 fund	the	 Brazilian	 developmentalist	 state	 policies	 that	 were	 guided	 by	 an	 import	substitution	industrialization	(ISI)	strategy,	the	public	development	bank	BNDES	was	created	in	1952.	Although	the	Brazilian	democratic	governments	at	the	time	recognized	the	need	for	reforms,	it	was	only	after	the	military	coup	in	1964	and	through	authoritarian	impositions	that	the	financial	markets	were	restructured,	laying	 the	 ground	 for	 the	 current	 Brazilian	 financial	 system	 (SFN).	 Two	main	pillars	of	the	financial	restructuring	were	constituted	by	the	Law	of	the	Banking	Reform	 of	 1964,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 which	 reorganized	 the	 monetary	 policy	authorities	by	instituting	the	National	Monetary	Council	(CMN)	and	the	Brazilian	central	bank	(BACEN)	and	by	the	Capital	Market	Law	in	1965,	on	the	other	hand,	which	envisaged	the	establishment	of	 the	capital	markets	as	a	distinct	segment	from	the	banking	sector	in	the	SFN.	Among	the	legal	adjustments	of	the	Capital	Market	 Law	 were	 new	 terms	 and	 conditions	 for	 the	 issuance	 of	 debentures	including	 the	 permission	 of	 monetary	 adjustment	 clauses,	 which	 led	 to	 the	revival	of	the	primary	market	for	debentures	after	decades	without	any	activity.	
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In	1964,	the	Monetary	Adjustment	Law	initiated	the	indexation	of	the	Brazilian	economy	 and,	 as	 a	 consequence,	 not	 only	 corporate	 bonds,	 but	 also	 sovereign	bonds	(the	so-called	ORTNs)	were	indexed	to	the	inflation	rate.	Soon	 after	 the	 reforms	 were	 implemented,	 the	 Brazilian	 economy	 entered	 a	period	that	became	known	as	the	Economic	Miracle	(Milagre	Econômico).	Taking	advantage	of	a	benign	international	scenario,	the	Brazilian	government	issued	a	sovereign	 bond	 abroad	 in	 1972,	 terminating	 a	 four-decade	 absence	 on	international	 financial	 markets,	 and	 four	 years	 later,	 the	 first	 corporate	 bond	issuance	 abroad	 by	 a	 Brazilian	 (state-owned)	 company	was	 completed.	 In	 the	same	year,	the	Securities	Commission	(CVM)	was	created	to	discipline,	monitor	and	 promote	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 securities	 markets	 and	 the	 so-called	 new	 Corporate	 Law	 was	 passed,	 which	 extended	 the	 range	 of	 possible	types	 of	 debenture	 issues	 with	 varying	 degrees	 of	 guaranties	 and	 a	corresponding	cap	on	the	issuance	volume.	In	1979,	the	so-called	Special	System	for	Settlement	and	Custody	 (SELIC)	was	 implemented	 to	electronically	process	financial	transactions	with	sovereign	bonds,	and	five	years	later,	its	counterpart	for	 private	 fixed-income	 securities	 was	 created,	 the	 Clearing	 House	 for	 the	Custody	 and	 Financial	 Settlement	 of	 Securities	 (CETIP).	 The	 interest	 rates	charged	during	the	daily	trading	operations	registered	in	the	SELIC	represent	an	important	benchmark	in	Brazil	as	it	reflects	the	interest	paid	on	sovereign	debt	securities.	While	the	transition	from	the	military	regime	to	the	New	Republic	stood	out	 in	the	1980s	in	political	terms,	the	disappointing	economic	evolution	of	the	country,	coining	 the	 term	 “the	 lost	 decade”,	 was	 marked	 by	 low	 growth	 rates,	 rising	external	 debt,	 a	 series	 of	 unsuccessful	 price	 stabilization	 plans,	 and	 a	 gradual	opening	 of	 the	 country,	 both	 economically	 and	 politically.	 The	 government	financed	its	rising	budget	deficits	through	the	issuance	of	sovereign	bonds.	As	a	consequence	 of	 the	 large	 supply	 of	 high-yielding	public	 bonds,	wealth	 holders’	demand	 for	 company	shares	declined.	The	government	 reacted	by	creating	 the	BNDESPAR,	a	subsidiary	of	the	BNDES,	 in	1982	to	stimulate	the	Brazilian	stock	exchanges	 and	 to	 fill	 the	 gap	 of	 the	 absent	 private	 investor.	 The	 high	concentration	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 corporate	 bond	 market	 was	 reduced	 when	 in	1981-82	the	number	of	placements	strongly	increased.	Yet,	the	market	stagnated	again	 soon	 after	 due	 to	 various	 modifications	 in	 taxation	 and	 rules	 that	prohibited	 some	 institutional	 investors	 to	 purchase	 debentures	 and	 it	 only	recovered	 towards	 the	 end	of	 the	decade,	when	 the	 tax	 burden	on	debentures	was	 leveled	 with	 that	 of	 other	 important	 financial	 assets.	 Other	 factors	 that	exerted	 a	 positive	 influence	 on	 the	 market	 development	 included	 a	 gradual	diminution	 of	 subsidized	 credits,	 the	 policy	 of	 decontrolling	 interest	 rates	 by	monetary	authorities,	and	the	relaxation	of	the	requirements	for	the	registration	of	 a	 publicly	 owned	 company.	Moreover,	 corporate	 bond	market	 development	was	fostered	by	the	implementation	of	the	National	Debentures	System	(SND)	in	1988,	which	was	developed	by	ANDIMA	and	CETIP	to	improve	the	transparency	as	well	as	the	reliability	in	the	debentures	market.	The	 Brazilian	 economy	 underwent	 a	 profound	 transformation	 process	 in	 the	1990s	 that	 was	 characterized	 by	 a	 partial	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 state	 from	 the	economy	through	more	 intense	privatization,	by	 the	 liberalization	process,	and	
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by	 the	 success	 of	 the	 Plano	 Real	 in	 containing	 inflation.	 In	 1990,	 the	 Collor	administration	 launched	 the	National	Program	of	Denationalization	 (PND)	 that	aimed	at	 repositioning	 the	 state	 in	 the	economy,	 reducing	 the	public	debt,	 and	incentivizing	 private	 investments,	 in	 order	 to	 make	 funding	 for	 Brazilian	companies	 available,	 to	 increase	 international	 competitiveness,	 and	 to	modernize	the	industrial	facilities.	The	BNDES	was	in	charge	of	the	privatization	process,	which	called	 for	 the	participation	of	both	domestic	and	 foreign	wealth	holders	 as	 investors.	 Additionally,	 the	 BNDESPAR	 intensified	 its	 purchases	 of	company	shares	as	well	as	debentures.	Nevertheless,	 the	 corporate	 debentures	 market	 remained	 in	 a	 very	 incipient	stage	during	the	first	period	analyzed	in	more	detail	in	this	study,	from	1995	to	2003.	Despite	the	strong	reduction	of	the	inflation	rate	after	the	implementation	of	 the	 Plano	 Real,	 Brazil	 continued	 to	 experience	 macroeconomic	 instabilities.	Faced	 with	 great	 uncertainties,	 economic	 agents	 were	 not	 forming	 long-term	expectations,	 which	 discouraged	 entrepreneurs	 to	 realize	 investment	 projects	and	 raised	 the	 demand	 of	 wealth	 holders	 for	 short-term	 financial	 assets	 with	high	liquidity	premiums.	As	a	consequence	of	the	conservative	monetary	policy	stance,	market	participants	were	generally	expecting	rising	interest	rates,	which	further	 increased	 the	 demand	 for	 short-term	 and	 interest	 rate	 indexed	 bonds.	Against	 this	 background,	 public	 debt	 management	 was	 less	 concerned	 about	creating	benchmarks	for	a	corporate	bond	market,	but	rather	about	being	able	to	issue	sovereign	bonds	in	order	to	roll	over	the	public	debt	on	the	best	possible	terms.	 Only	 the	 largest	 companies	 were	 able	 to	 issue	 debentures	 under	 these	conditions,	 resulting	 in	 a	 highly	 concentrated	 and	 relatively	 small	 market.	Instead	 of	 issuing	 long-term	 debt	 securities	 on	 the	 domestic	 market,	 most	Brazilian	 companies	 either	 opted	 for	 tapping	 international	 bond	 markets	 or	sought	access	to	public	banks	as	a	source	of	long-term	funding.	Between	 2004	 and	 2008	 the	 Brazilian	 economy	 grew	 in	 a	 more	 stable	macroeconomic	scenario,	benefitting	from	a	benign	external	context.	Public	debt	management	 improved	 the	 public	 debt	 structure	 by	 adjusting	 the	 indexation	profile	 and	 by	 prolonging	 terms	 and	maturities,	which	 initiated	 the	 process	 of	creating	a	yield	curve.	Especially	the	increased	participation	of	foreign	investors	helped	 in	 this	 process.	 Their	 demand	 for	 sovereign	 bonds	 went	 up	 after	 the	introduction	of	an	income	tax	exemption,	which	was	limited	to	public	bonds	and,	thus,	 increased	 the	 competitive	 disadvantage	 for	 corporate	 bonds.	 As	 a	consequence	 of	 the	 positive	 economic	 outlook,	 Brazilian	 companies	 started	 to	look	 for	 sources	of	 funding	 to	 realize	 investment	projects.	 Faced	with	 the	high	level	of	the	interest	rates	in	Brazil,	most	companies	decided	against	the	issue	of	debentures	 and	 instead	 chose	 to	 place	 their	 shares	 on	 the	 domestic	 capital	markets.	 The	 debentures	 market	 continued	 highly	 concentrated,	 also	 on	 the	demand	side	due	to	a	strong	dominance	of	institutional	investors,	which	was	one	of	 the	main	 reasons	 for	 its	 low	 liquidity.	 Investment	 funds	 lost	market	 shares,	mainly	 to	 financial	 institutions	 buying	 the	 debentures	 issued	 by	 their	 own	leasing	 companies	 and	 to	 the	 BNDES,	 which	 bought	 most	 privately	 placed	debentures.	On	the	supply	side	of	the	market,	the	BNDES	initiated	a	program	of	debenture	 placements	with	 the	 aim	 of	 setting	 benchmarks.	 In	 2008,	when	 the	corporate	 bond	 market	 showed	 first	 signs	 of	 a	 positive	 development,	 it	 was	interrupted	by	the	international	financial	crisis.	
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The	 Brazilian	 government	 reacted	 with	 counter-cyclical	 policies	 to	 the	international	 financial	 crisis	 including	 increased	public	bank	activities	and	was	able	 to	meet	 its	 higher	 financing	 needs	 on	 the	 domestic	 bond	market	without	impeding	further	improvements	of	the	public	debt	structure,	also	with	respect	to	the	different	forms	of	indexation.	International	investors	raised	the	demand	for	long-term	fixed	rate	bonds	and	helped	to	prolong	the	term	structure	of	sovereign	bonds.	Despite	 the	 increase	 in	 public	 debt,	 interest	 payments	 remained	 stable,	because	 the	 interest	 rate	 level	 was	 lowered,	 reflecting	 the	 change	 in	 the	monetary	policy	stance.	As	a	consequence	of	the	easing	of	monetary	policy,	 the	construction	of	a	well-shaped	yield	curve	for	sovereign	bonds	with	maturities	up	to	ten	years	was	completed.	At	the	same	time,	the	drop	in	the	base	rate	raised	the	demand	 for	 higher	 yielding	 private	 debt	 securities,	 but	 the	 corporate	 bond	market	only	attended	a	part	of	 this	demand,	as	pension	 funds	mainly	acquired	Financial	 Bills	 (LFs)	 and	 retail	 investors	 mostly	 bought	 receivable	 debt	instruments.	The	 BNDES	 implemented	 a	 program	 that	 allowed	 it	 to	 actively	 engage	 in	 the	secondary	debentures	market,	acquiring	corporate	bonds	fitting	certain	criteria	in	order	to	positively	influence	the	structure	of	the	corporate	bond	market	and	to	significantly	 raise	 its	 liquidity.	Additionally,	 the	debenture	 issue	program	of	 its	subsidiary,	 BNDESPAR,	 was	 continued	 and	 succeeded	 in	 placing	 benchmark	issues,	 establishing	 new	 indexations	 and	 developing	 standards.	 While	 these	measures	made	an	 important	contribution	 to	 the	 joint	government	and	private	sector	 efforts	 to	 promote	 corporate	 bond	market	 development	 (CBMD),	 other	activities	 of	 the	 BNDES	 had	 counterproductive	 effects.	 More	 specifically,	 by	following	a	cherry-picking	strategy,	i.e.	focusing	on	contracting	large	companies	and	selecting	 low-risk	borrowers,	 the	BNDES	might	have	been	able	 to	perform	well	with	respect	to	non-performing	loans	in	its	credit	portfolio,	but	this	conduct	also	exerted	negative	effects	on	CBMD.	Government	 action	 to	 promote	 the	 development	 of	 the	 corporate	 debenture	market	comprised	two	important	legal	innovations.	The	first,	CVM	instruction	n.	476/09	 created	 a	 limited	 distribution	 modality,	 which	 opened	 the	 market	 for	privately	 held	 companies	 and	 significantly	 reduced	 the	 requirements	 for	 the	issuance.	This	new	regulation	dominated	the	market	both	in	terms	of	number	of	placements	 (90%)	 as	 well	 as	 volume	 issued	 (80%)	 and	 caused	 fundamental	changes	in	the	dynamics	of	the	debentures	market.	While	the	limited	distribution	further	 aggravated	 the	 problem	 of	 restricted	 liquidity	 in	 a	 first	 moment,	 the	measure	contributed	to	a	rising	number	and	volume	of	debentures,	which	might	cause	market	 liquidity	 to	 increase,	 in	 a	 second	moment.	 The	 law	12,431/2011	was	 the	 second	 important	measure	 implemented	 by	 the	 government	 to	 foster	CBMD.	 It	 created	 so-called	 infrastructure	 bonds	 that	 promised	 investors	 tax	incentives.	 Foreign	 investors	 had	 the	 additional	 option	 to	 profit	 from	 tax	incentives	 if	 they	 acquired	 long-term	 debt	 securities.	 Furthermore,	 the	 law	improved	the	conditions	of	issuing	debentures	and	removed	legal	and	regulatory	barriers,	 such	 as	 the	 problem	 of	 double	 taxation	 of	 recurrent	 revenues.	 A	relevant	objection	to	the	focus	on	international	investors	has	been	the	volatility	and	pro-cyclical	nature	of	international	capital	flows.	
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A	joint	initiative	of	BNDES	and	ANBIMA	complemented	these	measures	through	the	 creation	 of	 a	 special	 segment	 in	 the	 corporate	 bond	market,	 the	 so-called	New	Market	for	Fixed-Income	Securities	(NMRF).	Debenture	issues	in	the	NMRF	were	distinguished,	as	they	had	to	comply	with	certain	requirements	ensuring	a	minimum	 term,	 standardization,	 and	 a	 one-year	 ban	 of	 repurchases.	Furthermore,	the	issues	were	not	allowed	to	include	an	indexation	to	the	SELIC	or	DI	 interest	 rate,	which	was	an	 important	 contribution	 to	 raising	 liquidity	 in	the	market,	 because	 debentures	with	 such	 an	 indexation	 experienced	 no	 price	variations	 in	 the	 event	 of	 base	 rate	 adjustments,	 eliminating	 their	 speculation	potential.	Secondary	 market	 activities	 increased	 strongly	 between	 2011	 and	 2014,	 but	were	 still	 highly	 concentrated	 so	 that	 market	 liquidity	 remained	 very	 low	compared	 to	other	 countries.	Nevertheless,	 the	 size,	depth,	 and	 liquidity	of	 the	corporate	 bond	 market	 significantly	 improved:	 Considering	 the	 monthly	averages	 of	 the	 period	 between	 2011	 and	 2014,	 the	 number	 of	 series	 traded	almost	doubled,	the	number	of	trades	more	than	tripled,	and	the	volume	traded	more	 than	 doubled.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 concentration	 of	 secondary	market	activities	 increased	 even	 further,	 as	 the	 three	 series	with	 the	 highest	monthly	trading	volume	raised	their	market	share	from	an	average	of	about	30%	between	2011	 and	 2013	 to	 more	 than	 60%	 in	 2014.	 The	 turnover	 ratio,	 which	 is	 a	common	measure	of	market	liquidity,	increased	from	0.40%	in	2011	to	0.65%	in	2014.	In	sum,	despite	major	progress	in	the	development	of	the	Brazilian	market	for	 corporate	 debentures,	 especially	 in	 terms	 of	 primary	 market	 activity,	secondary	market	activity	remained	highly	concentrated	in	a	few	series	and	the	vast	majority	of	debentures	were	traded	only	occasionally.	
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4 Conclusions	
The	thesis	analyzed	the	development	of	the	Brazilian	corporate	bond	market	and	focused	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 and	 its	 policy	 actions	 as	 fundamental	determinants.	 The	 evolution	 of	 the	 relevant	 corporate	 bond	 market,	 i.e.	 the	market	for	debentures	issued	by	non-financial	companies,	was	examined	over	a	period	 of	 twenty	 years,	 between	 1995	 and	 2014.	 The	 empirical	 research	followed	 a	 triangulation	 method,	 combining	 insights	 gained	 from	 expert	interviews	 not	 only	 with	 relevant	 macroeconomic	 and	 bond	 market	 data,	 but	also	 with	 knowledge	 acquired	 from	 literature	 analysis.	 The	 interplay	 of	surveying	the	literature	and	examining	the	interviews	as	well	as	the	data	led	to	the	 definition	 of	 three	 major	 determinants	 of	 CBMD	 in	 Brazil:	 (i)	 public	 debt	management	due	to	the	strong	impact	of	changes	in	the	public	bond	market	on	the	 evolution	 of	 the	 corporate	 bond	 market,	 (ii)	 monetary	 policy,	 because	 a	stable	monetary	policy	stance	providing	for	macroeconomic	stability	is	a	crucial	precondition	for	CBMD,	and	(iii)	public	finance	for	development,	which	is	one	of	the	 main	 sources	 of	 long-term	 finance	 and	 funding	 for	 Brazilian	 companies.	These	 determinants	 are	 directly	 related	 to	 the	main	 research	 questions:	What	was	the	role	of	the	Brazilian	state	in	the	development	of	a	domestic	market	for	corporate	 bonds?	 How	 did	 the	 state	 influence	 CBMD	 through	 the	 three	 main	determining	 factors	 identified	 above?	Did	 the	 state	 hamper	 or	 foster	 CBMD	 in	this	way?	Taking	a	Post	Keynesian	approach,	 the	analytical	 framework	allowed	exploring	the	influence	of	public	debt	management,	monetary	policy,	and	public	finance	for	development	on	CBMD	by	showing	how	these	policy	variables	affect	the	processes	of	forming	expectations	and	choosing	assets.	The	structure	of	the	thesis	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	After	an	introductory	chapter,	 important	 contributions	 to	 the	 finance	 and	 development	 debate	were	discussed	and,	 inter	alia,	 relevant	 theoretical,	empirical	and	analytical	concepts	were	 presented.	 The	 literature	 review	 of	 conducted	 research	 on	 financial	development	and,	more	specifically,	on	bond	market	development	in	developing	and	 emerging	 market	 economies	 and,	 in	 particular,	 Brazil	 showed	 the	 under-examination	of	the	role	of	the	state	in	the	development	of	a	domestic	corporate	bond	market	in	Brazil.	After	the	research	gaps	in	the	current	literature	as	well	as	the	 aim	of	 this	 study	were	 identified,	 the	 next	 step	 consisted	 of	 laying-out	 the	theoretical	 framework	 for	 the	 empirical	 analysis.	 First,	 the	 Post	 Keynesian	capital	 formation	 process	 that	 comprises	 of	 two	 stages,	 namely	 short-term	finance	 and	 long-term	 funding,	 was	 presented.	 The	 emphasis	 was	 laid	 on	 the	second	 stage,	 showing	 the	 importance	of	bond	markets	 as	 a	 source	of	 funding.	Second,	 the	 expectation	 formation	 process	 of	 economic	 agents	 in	 a	 monetary	economy	 that	 is	 reigned	 by	 uncertainty	 was	 explained,	 in	 order	 to	 better	understand	 their	 decision	 making	 and	 asset	 choices,	 considering	 furthermore	that,	 faced	 with	 an	 uncertain	 future,	 economic	 agents	 have	 a	 preference	 for	liquidity.	Finally,	 the	components	of	a	general	model	of	asset	choice	that	define	the	net	return	of	an	asset	were	discussed	in	the	light	of	how	the	identified	policy	variables	might	influence	CBMD.	
		 246 	
Building	 on	 the	 theoretical	 background	 that	 was	 provided	 in	 chapter	 2,	 the	empirical	 analysis	 was	 carried	 out	 in	 chapter	 3.	 Starting	 off	 with	 a	 historical	overview	of	Brazilian	financial	system	development,	a	macroeconomic,	political,	and	institutional	contextualization	of	the	financial	development	in	Brazil	during	the	 period	 of	 investigation	 was	 given.	 The	 main	 analytical	 research	 was	presented	 in	 sub-chapter	 3.2,	 which	 was	 divided	 into	 three	 sections,	 each	covering	 one	 sub-period.	 Low	 CBMD	 and	 adverse	 effects	 stemming	 from	 the	policy	variables	marked	the	first	sub-period	between	1995	and	2003.	Public	debt	management	 was	 mainly	 concerned	 about	 rolling	 over	 the	 public	 debt,	compromising	 the	 public	 debt	 structure.	 Monetary	 policy	 reacted	 to	macroeconomic	instabilities	with	high	and	volatile	interest	rates	and	the	lack	of	private	 long-term	 funding	 sources	 was	 only	 partly	 compensated	 by	 public	finance	for	development	institutions.	During	 the	 second	 sub-period	 from	2004	 to	2008,	Brazil	 experienced	high	and	sustained	economic	growth,	which	was	not	accompanied	by	the	corporate	bond	market.	 The	 benign	 economic	 situation	 opened	 up	 policy	 space,	 but	 the	promotion	 of	 CBMD	 was	 not	 high	 on	 the	 agenda.	 As	 a	 result,	 public	 debt	management	was	able	to	improve	the	public	debt	structure,	but	rather	as	an	end	in	 itself	 than	 a	measure	 to	 foster	 CBMD.	 Similarly,	 the	monetary	 policy	 stance	was	 still	 relatively	 tight,	 even	 though	 the	 base	 rate	 was	 lowered.	 Isolated	measures	to	improve	CBMD	by	public	finance	for	development	institutions	were	piecemeal	 and	 could	 not	 revert	 the	 overall	 hampering	 impact	 of	 this	 policy	variable.	Only	in	the	last	sub-period,	covering	the	years	between	2009	and	2014,	the	 development	 of	 a	 domestic	 market	 for	 corporate	 bonds	 became	 a	 more	important	 and	 overarching	 policy	 goal.	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	 continued	improvements	 in	 the	public	debt	 structure,	 a	 loosening	of	 the	monetary	policy	stance,	and	several	measures	aiming	at	CBMD,	especially	with	the	involvement	of	public	finance	for	development	institutions,	the	Brazilian	corporate	bond	market	showed	first	signs	of	a	positive	trend.	
4.1 Brief	summary	of	key	findings	
The	theoretical	understanding	of	domestic	corporate	bond	market	development	in	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	 economies	 is	 deepened	 by	 this	 research	mainly	in	three	ways.	First,	the	study	points	out	that	these	economies	are	usually	characterized	 by	 structural	 heterogeneity,	which	means	 that	 only	 part	 of	 their	economy	 functions	 as	 a	monetary	 economy	 and	 that	 there	 are	 other	modes	 of	production,	 too.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 development	 of	 a	 corporate	 bond	market	helps	 to	 propagate	 the	 monetary	 economy	 mode	 of	 production.	 Second,	 the	thesis	 explains	 the	 important	 role	 of	 bonds	 as	 a	 source	 of	 funding	 and,	 thus,	enriches	the	perspective	of	Monetary	Keynesians.	More	specifically,	bringing	the	funding	 step	 into	 focus	 broadens	 their	 view	 of	 the	 capital	 formation	 process.	
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Third,	 by	 spelling	 out	 the	 influences	 of	 each	 of	 the	 policy	 variables	 on	 the	development	of	a	corporate	bond	market,	the	mechanisms	at	work	are	clarified.	As	a	result,	 I	am	able	 to	assess	 the	role	of	 the	state	and	 its	 impact	on	CBMD	in	Brazil,	which	is	my	original	contribution	to	knowledge.	The	key	findings	of	 this	research	are	related	to	the	policy	variables	public	debt	management,	monetary	policy,	and	public	finance	for	development.	Thus,	one	of	the	 key	 findings	 is	 that	 the	 first	 policy	 variable,	mainly	by	 changing	 the	public	debt	 structure,	 determines	 the	 development	 of	 the	 domestic	 market	 for	corporate	bonds	through	different	effects,	namely	the	market	creation	effect,	the	signaling	effect,	and	the	competitiveness	effect.	A	broad	definition	of	the	market	creation	effect	comprises	any	positive	influence	that	the	sovereign	bond	market	might	have	on	its	corporate	counterpart.	As	shown	above,	Brazilian	public	debt	management	was	 able	 to	 expand	 its	 investor	 base	 by	 building	 up	 institutional	investors	such	as	private	pension	funds	and,	later,	also	raising	the	participation	of	 foreign	 investors.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 it	was	 able	 to	 improve	 the	 public	 debt	structure,	 raising	 the	 share	 of	 long-term	 fixed	 rate	 bonds.	 The	 corporate	 bond	market	profited	from	the	existence	of	 institutional	investors,	when	they	started	to	shift	their	portfolio	away	from	the	dominance	of	sovereign	bonds	and	raised	the	share	of	higher	yielding	corporate	bonds.	Furthermore,	the	market	creation	effect	 describes	 the	 positive	 externalities	 that	 arise	 after	 the	 necessary	 bond	market	 infrastructure	 is	 installed	 for	 the	 public	 bond	 market,	 but	 is	 also	 at	corporate	 bond	market	 participants’	 disposal.	 In	 line	with	 this	 is	 the	 practical	example	of	the	electronic	trading	platform	for	sovereign	bonds	SELIC	that	served	as	a	model	for	its	private	market	equivalent	CETIP.	Empirical	evidence	provided	by	Laeven	 (2014,	 17)	 showed	 that	 countries	with	deeper	public	 bond	markets	tend	 to	 have	more	 developed	 corporate	 bond	markets,	 in	 accordance	with	 the	market	creation	effect.	The	 sovereign	 bond	 market	 served	 as	 a	 point	 of	 reference	 in	 the	 Brazilian	economy	 and	 influenced	 economic	 actors’	 long-term	 expectations	 by	 setting	benchmarks.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 public	 debt	 management	 exerted	 a	 signaling	effect	that	hampered	or	fostered	CBMD,	depending	on	whether	the	structure	of	the	 public	 debt	was	worsened	 or	 improved.	 Such	 positive	 or	 negative	 changes	were	 manifested	 in	 the	 characteristics	 of	 sovereign	 bonds,	 which,	 in	 turn,	determined	the	requirements	that	needed	to	be	fulfilled	by	corporate	bonds.	For	example,	the	treasury	offered	the	indexation	of	sovereign	bonds	and	this	forced	corporate	 bond	 issuers	 to	 make	 a	 similar	 offer.	 The	 high	 share	 of	 base	 rate	indexed	 bonds	 such	 as	 LFTs	 not	 only	 resulted	 in	 a	 high	 share	 of	 DI-indexed	corporate	 bonds,	 but	 also	 had	 an	 adverse	 signaling	 effect	 on	 CBMD	 by	representing	 a	 low	 state	 of	 confidence	 and	 a	 weak	 economic	 outlook.	 On	 the	contrary,	public	debt	management	exerted	a	positive	signaling	effect	on	CBMD,	when	 it	 was	 able	 to	 extend	 the	 sovereign	 bond	 yield	 curve,	 because	 the	 yield	curve	reflects	current	market	sentiments	and	signals	the	interest	rate	path.	The	 third	 effect	 that	 was	 discussed	 in	 the	 course	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 the	competitiveness	effect,	which	is	a	consequence	of	the	inferior	competitiveness	of	corporate	bonds	relative	to	sovereign	bonds	in	their	ability	to	win	over	the	favor	of	 wealth	 holders.	 It	 is	 not	 to	 confuse	 with	 the	 crowding-out	 effect	 that	 is	inherently	 linked	 to	 the	 loanable	 funds	 theory	 by	 explaining	 a	 rise	 in	 interest	
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rates	with	a	public	debt	financed	increase	in	government	spending	that	results	in	public	bonds	crowding-out	corporate	bonds.	From	a	Post	Keynesian	perspective,	there	 is	 no	 automatic	 crowding-out	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 higher	 government	spending,	because	it	could	always	be	financed	through	credit	expansion	ex	nihilo	by	 banks.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 not	 the	 size	 of	 the	 public	 debt	 that	 matters,	 but	 its	structure.	Due	 to	 the	general	 competition	between	 financial	 assets	 to	win	over	the	 favor	 of	wealth	 holders,	 public	 and	 private	 bonds	 also	 compete	with	 each	other.	Wealth	 holders	 consider	 the	 different	 characteristics	 of	 these	 bonds.	 As	Paula	et	al.	(2009)	mentioned,	Brazilian	corporate	bonds	faced	great	difficulties	to	prevail	against	the	competitive	advantages	of	the	sovereign	bonds.	Although	it	might	not	be	in	the	primary	interest	of	public	debt	management,	abolishing	the	preferential	rules	for	and	favorable	tax	treatment	of	public	bonds,	also	identified	by	 Leal	 and	 Carvalhal-da-Silva	 (2006,	 7),	 would	 help	 to	 foster	 CBMD.	 The	empirical	 analysis	 in	 chapter	 3	 showed	 that	 the	 competitiveness	 effect	 was	especially	 strong	 in	 the	 first	 sub-period	 examined.	 Furthermore,	 one	 could	observe	the	opposite	effect	when	the	base	rate	was	lowered	strongly	during	the	third	 sub-period	 and	wealth	 holders	 searched	 for	 higher-yielding	 alternatives.	Along	general	lines,	public	debt	management	was	able	to	improve	the	structure	of	the	public	debt	throughout	the	three	phases	analyzed,	in	terms	of	prolonging	the	term	structure	as	well	as	ameliorating	the	index	composition	of	the	sovereign	bonds.	Throughout	 the	 theoretical	 chapter,	 the	 important	 contribution	 of	 monetary	policy	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 corporate	 bond	 market	 (and	 vice	 versa)	 was	discussed	 and	 the	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 case	 confirmed	 the	relevance	 of	 this	 policy	 variable.	 However,	 while	 the	 empirical	 research	produced	the	result	that	a	 low	and	stable	monetary	policy	rate	 is	necessary	for	CBMD,	it	also	showed	that	it	is	not	a	sufficient	condition.	This	is	the	second	key	finding	 of	 the	 thesis	 and	 it	 was	 reached	 by	 comparing	 the	 three	 sub-periods.	During	the	first	sub-period,	the	monetary	policy	rate	was	very	high	and	volatile.	At	the	same	time,	there	was	no	considerable	development	of	the	corporate	bond	market.	 In	 the	 second	sub-period,	one	could	observe	 that	monetary	policy	was	able	to	lower	the	base	rate	and	keep	it	more	stable	than	previously.	Although	the	corporate	bond	market	showed	first	signs	of	a	positive	development,	it	was	still	very	limited.	The	constrained	development	could	be	explained	mainly	with	three	factors.	 First,	 most	 companies	 had	 access	 to	 cheaper	 funding	 sources	 on	 the	Brazilian	 stock	 markets,	 through	 the	 public	 development	 bank	 BNDES,	 or	 on	international	 financial	 markets.	 Second,	 sovereign	 bonds	 and	 other	 financial	assets	 were	more	 attractive	 to	 wealth	 holders	 (competitiveness	 effect).	 Third,	there	was	 not	 a	 coordinated	 government	 program	 aiming	 at	 the	 promotion	 of	CBMD.	 Instead,	 the	decreasing	base	 rate	was	an	 isolated	measure,	 just	 like	 the	actions	 of	 the	BNDES	 to	make	 benchmark	 issues	 and	 to	 set	 itself	 rules	 for	 the	acquisition	of	corporate	bonds.	The	change	in	the	monetary	policy	stance	identified	in	the	third	sub-period	was	accompanied	 by	 several	 improvements	 in	 CBMD,	which	 could	 be	 attributed	 to	coordinated	 government	 action.	 Monetary	 and	 fiscal	 policy	 applied	 counter-cyclical	 measures	 and	 the	 development	 of	 a	 domestic	 market	 for	 corporate	bonds	became	an	overarching	policy	goal.	As	a	result,	legislation	was	passed	that	simplified	the	issuance	process	and	broadened	market	access	(CVM	instruction	n.	
		 249 	
476/09)	 and	 supported	 the	 funding	 of	 long-term	 and	 infrastructure	 projects	through	 fiscal	 incentives	 (law	 n.	 12,431/2011).	 Moreover,	 BNDES	 programs	were	installed	to	place	benchmark	issues	and	to	improve	market	liquidity	as	well	as	 the	 quality	 of	 issues	 on	 the	 corporate	 bond	 market	 through	 its	 subsidiary	BNDESPAR.	 Furthermore,	 the	 joint	 initiative	 of	 the	 public	 development	 bank	BNDES	together	with	the	private	association	ANBIMA	created	with	the	so-called	New	 Market	 for	 Fixed-Income	 Securities	 (NMRF)	 a	 differentiated	 market	segment	 that	 increased	 market	 transparency	 as	 well	 as	 liquidity.	 In	 short,	without	 a	 low	and	 stable	monetary	policy	 rate,	 there	was	no	 significant	CBMD	(first	sub-period).	Yet,	a	lower	and	more	stable	base	rate	alone	could	not	achieve	CBMD,	 either	 (second	 sub-period).	 Only	 when	 the	 desired	 monetary	 policy	stance	 was	 accompanied	 by	 the	 fulfillment	 of	 other	 prerequisites,	 a	 positive	development	of	the	corporate	bond	market	was	observed.	The	 third	 key	 finding	 is	 related	 to	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 policy	 variable	 public	finance	 for	 development	 on	 CBMD.	 The	 public	 development	 bank	 BNDES	 was	less	 engaged	 in	 structural	 policies	 through	 the	 promotion	 of	 specific	 high-technology	 sectors	 and/	 or	 SMEs,	 but	 mainly	 facilitated	 access	 to	 favorable	financing	 and	 funding	 conditions	 for	 the	 so-called	 national	 champions.	 Even	though	there	was	little	evidence	during	the	first	half	of	the	analyzed	period	that	the	 placement	 of	 corporate	 bonds	 was	 suppressed	 by	 public	 finance	 for	development	schemes	and	despite	a	few	(mostly	isolated)	measures	to	foster	the	buildup	of	a	corporate	bond	market,	generally,	the	activities	of	public	finance	for	development	 institutions	 hampered	 CBMD.	 The	 empirical	 evidence	 revealed	several	 factors	 with	 detrimental	 effects	 on	 CBMD	 that	 were	 connected	 to	 the	Brazilian	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 institutions.	 A	 major	 barrier	 to	 the	evolution	of	the	corporate	bond	market	consisted	in	the	provision	of	 long-term	funding	at	subsidized	rates	mainly	to	large	corporations.	There	were	strong	ties	between	the	state	and	the	market.	Not	only	were	 thirty	of	 the	 largest	Brazilian	companies	 financed	 by	 the	 public	 development	 bank	 BNDES,	 its	 subsidiary	BNDESPAR	additionally	held	shares	of	 twenty-two	of	 those	companies.	What	 is	more,	BNDES	was	the	single	largest	institutional	bond	holder	in	the	country.	Its	pro-cyclical	 behavior,	 at	 least	 during	 the	 first	 two	 examined	 sub-periods,	 was	another	 factor	 that	 did	 not	 work	 in	 favor	 of	 CBMD.	 Moreover,	 the	 subsidized	interest	 rate	 TJLP	 was	 set	 independently	 of	 the	 base	 rate	 or,	 in	 other	 words,	without	 taking	 the	 current	monetary	 policy	 goals	 into	 consideration.	 All	 in	 all,	public	 finance	 for	 development	 was	 not	 able	 to	 tap	 the	 full	 potential	 of	 its	complementary	 functionality	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 corporate	 bond	 market	 and	ended	up	restricting	the	progress	of	this	market.	From	the	analysis,	it	became	apparent	that	the	hypothesis	–	that	the	state	played	a	major	role	in	the	development	of	the	Brazilian	corporate	bond	market,	but	that	it	only	exerted	it	passively	and	not	pro-actively	to	foster	CBMD	–	was	true	for	the	most	 part.	 In	 order	 to	 evaluate	 the	 hypothesis	 more	 accurately	 and	 verify	 or	falsify	it,	we	need	to	answer	the	research	questions.	First,	to	find	out	whether	the	state	was	 a	 protagonist,	 a	 response	 is	 required	 to	 the	 question:	What	was	 the	role	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 state	 in	 CBMD?	 This	main	 research	 question	was	 further	specified	 by	 asking:	 How	 did	 the	 state	 influence	 CBMD	 in	 Brazil	 through	 the	policy	variables?	Finally,	this	research	analyzed	whether	the	state	hampered	or	fostered	CBMD	in	this	way.	By	responding	the	two	additional	questions,	we	can	
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test	the	hypothesis,	because	the	answers	will	allow	us	to	classify	the	more	or	less	active	attitude	of	the	Brazilian	state	towards	CBMD.	The	case	study	showed	that	the	Brazilian	state	had	a	protagonist	role	in	the	evolution	of	the	domestic	market	for	 corporate	bonds	 throughout	 the	entire	period	of	 investigation.	 I	 also	 found	that	the	degree	to	which	the	state	took	on	and	filled	that	role	changed	over	the	sub-periods.	In	 the	 first	 sub-period,	 between	 1995	 and	 2003,	 the	 analysis	 showed	 that	 the	hypothesis	was	 true.	During	 the	years	between	2004	and	2008,	 the	hypothesis	was	 predominantly	 true,	 because	 merely	 one	 out	 of	 three	 policy	 variables	implemented	 any	measures	 directly	 aiming	 at	 the	 promotion	 of	 CBMD.	 Public	debt	 management	 was	 able	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	 benign	 economic	environment	 and	 improved	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 public	 debt.	 Monetary	 policy	continued	to	show	signs	of	conservatism,	but	nevertheless	reduced	the	base	rate.	Only	 the	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 institutions	 BNDES	 and	 BNDESPAR	adopted	programs	that	were	purposely	directed	at	the	buildup	and	improvement	of	 the	domestic	corporate	bond	market,	albeit	 limited	 in	their	effective	 force.	A	fundamental	 difference	 to	 the	 third	 sub-period	 was	 the	 lack	 of	 coordinated	policy	actions	to	foster	CBMD.	In	the	final	sub-period,	between	2009	and	2014,	CBMD	 became	 an	 important	 policy	 goal	 and	 various	 policy	 measures	 were	adopted	to	advance	the	corporate	bond	market	in	Brazil.	The	coordinated	actions	included	the	creation	of	a	regular	yield	curve,	which	was	facilitated	by	continued	improvements	in	the	public	debt	structure	together	with	a	significant	reduction	of	 the	monetary	policy	 rate.	 Furthermore,	BNDES	and	ANBIMA	constituted	 the	NMRF,	 as	 already	 mentioned	 above.	 In	 addition,	 regulatory	 and	 legal	 changes	were	introduced	by	CVM	instruction	n.	476/09	and	law	n.	12,431/2011.	In	sum,	the	state	behaved	less	passively	and	took	on	a	more	active	role	in	stimulating	the	development	of	a	corporate	bond	market	during	the	last	sub-period.	Therefore,	we	can	conclude	that	the	hypothesis	did	not	hold	anymore	in	this	phase.	
4.2 Discussion	
The	 thesis	 argued	 that	 a	 domestic	market	 for	 corporate	 bonds	 could	make	 an	important	contribution	to	the	economic	development	and	financial	stability	of	a	country.	Therefore,	 it	would	be	 crucial	 to	understand	how	 the	 state	 influenced	CBMD	and	 in	what	ways	 it	might	be	able	 to	promote	this	market	development.	The	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 would	 constrain	 policy	 makers	 in	 their	 ability	 to	purposefully	implement	and	adjust	policy	measures	aiming	at	the	advancement	of	CBMD	-	hence,	the	significance	of	this	research.	From	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 policy	 variables,	 we	 learned	 that	 public	 debt	management	and	monetary	policy,	broadly	speaking,	act	in	the	interest	of	CBMD.	Public	 debt	 management	 aims	 at	 improving	 the	 public	 debt	 structure,	 which	mainly	 fosters	 CBMD	 through	 the	 signaling	 effect,	 but	 also	 ameliorates	 the	
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competitiveness	 effect.	 In	 addition,	 various	 gains	 achieved	 by	 public	 debt	management	 for	 the	 sovereign	 bond	 market	 also	 led	 to	 enhancements	 in	 the	corporate	bond	market,	because	of	the	market	creation	effect.	The	full	potential	of	these	positive	effects	might	be	exploited,	if	public	debt	management	included	CBMD	 more	 explicitly	 in	 its	 goals.	 This	 could	 lead	 to	 more	 awareness	 of	 the	adverse	 effects	 that	 certain	 types	 of	 indexations	 have	 on	 CBMD,	 possibly	resulting	 in	 the	 extinction	 of	 LFTs,	 for	 example.	Monetary	 policy,	 similarly,	 by	aiming	at	macroeconomic	stability,	while	trying	to	keep	the	base	rate	low,	helps	to	advance	corporate	bond	markets.	Moreover,	 I	 showed	that	 improvements	 in	monetary	policy	and	in	CBMD	are	mutually	reinforcing.	Corresponding	to	public	debt	management,	monetary	policy	should	also	include	CBMD	more	explicitly	in	its	objectives,	 in	order	 to	exploit	 the	 full	potential.	To	cite	one	example	of	how	monetary	 policy	 could	 promote	 the	 development	 of	 a	 corporate	 bond	 market	more	clearly,	the	central	bank	could	accept	corporate	bonds	(that	might	need	to	meet	 special	 requirements)	 as	 collateral	 in	 its	 repo	 operations.	 In	 short,	 even	though	both	policy	variables	sometimes	 take	measures	 that	hamper	CBMD,	 the	targets	of	public	debt	management	and	monetary	policy	are	generally	consistent	with	the	development	of	a	corporate	bond	market.	The	objectives	of	public	finance	for	development,	the	third	policy	variable,	stand	more	 easily	 in	 contradiction	 with	 the	 promotion	 of	 CBMD.	 This	 ambiguity,	related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 both	 are	 sources	 of	 funding,	 was	 discussed	 in	 the	theoretical	 chapter.	 In	 theory,	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 institutions	 and	corporate	 bond	markets	 could	 also	 complement	 each	 other,	 but	 the	 empirical	research	revealed	that	this	was	not	the	case	in	Brazil.	Instead,	developmentalist	state	 policies	 aimed	 at	 the	 creation	 of	 “national	 champions”.	 Some	 authors,	 as	well	 as	 the	 institution	 itself,	 justified	 the	 BNDES	 funding	 of	 major	 companies	with	the	lack	of	long-term	debt	markets	in	Brazil.	Yet,	is	the	public	development	bank	 actually	 filling	 in	 the	 gap	 of	 long-term	 funding?	 Other	 authors	 claim	 the	opposite:	 that	 Brazilian	 companies	 have	 few	 options	 to	 acquire	 long-term	funding,	because	of	 the	BNDES	activities.	 It	 is	not	 easy	 to	answer	 this	 chicken-and-egg	 question,	 but	 at	 least	 the	 major	 corporations	 that	 received	 BNDES	funding	 had	 alternative	 funding	 sources.	 Thus,	 we	 can	 conclude	 that	 the	activities	of	the	BNDES	hampered	the	progress	of	long-term	debt	markets,	such	as	those	for	corporate	bonds.	A	related	argument	concerns	the	widespread	use	of	subsidized	 interest	 rates	 of	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 institutions,	which	(supposedly)	forced	monetary	policy	to	tighten	its	stance.	Although	there	might	be	some	truth	to	this	argument,	it	does	not	give	a	complete	answer	to	the	puzzle	of	elevated	interest	rates	in	Brazil.	Therefore,	this	thesis	suggests	evaluating	the	situation	 also	 from	 a	 different	 perspective,	 according	 to	 which	 the	 funding	 of	national	 champions	by	 the	BNDES	might	 be	 a	 functional	way	of	 alleviating	 the	tight	monetary	policy	stance	of	the	Brazilian	central	bank.	The	great	importance	of	the	state	in	the	Brazilian	economy	and,	in	particular,	the	strong	 ties	 between	 the	 BNDES	 and	 major	 corporations	 were	 a	 controversial	issue.	 In	 the	 discussion,	 the	 concept	 of	 “relationship	 capitalism”,	 which	 led	 to	clientilism,	 was	 introduced.	 Other	 authors	 saw	 the	 state	 captured	 by	 major	corporations,	which	 implied	corruption	and	 lobbyism.	However,	a	 recent	 study	(Lazzarini	 et	 al.	 2015)	 found	 no	 empirical	 evidence	 for	 credit	misallocation	 in	Brazil.	Nevertheless,	the	BNDES	was	criticized	for	its	financial	support	of	socially	
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and	environmentally	harmful	projects,	which	contradicted	its	own	objectives.	In	addition,	the	above	cited	study	by	Lazzarani	et	al.	(2015)	also	could	not	find	any	evidence	 that	 would	 support	 the	 industrial	 policy	 view	 or,	 in	 other	 words,	BNDES	 funding	did	not	raise	 the	 investments	of	companies.	The	explanation	of	the	 authors	 is	 that	 the	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 institution	 followed	 a	cherry-picking	 strategy	 and	 took	 the	 best	 credits	 off	 the	 market.	 In	 fact,	 the	BNDES	 portfolio	 had	 a	 long-term	 profile	 and	 half	 of	 the	 companies	 in	 the	portfolio	were	 rated	B	or	better.	As	a	 result,	 the	public	development	bank	was	able	 to	 produce	 low	 default	 rates,	 but	 its	 contribution	 to	 the	 economic	 and	financial	development	as	well	as	to	the	society	at	large	arguably	remained	below	potential.	The	Brazilian	corporate	bond	market	remained	relatively	underdeveloped	in	an	international	comparison,	even	though	first	signs	of	progress	could	be	observed	more	recently.	The	empirical	analysis	provided	evidence	that	the	Brazilian	state	had	a	protagonist	 role	 in	 the	development	of	a	 corporate	bond	market,	but	 for	the	 most	 part	 did	 not	 actively	 engage	 in	 the	 promotion	 of	 CBMD	 and	 mainly	exerted	 its	 influence	 passively.	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 passive	 stance,	 the	impact	of	the	policy	variables	at	times	hampered,	at	times	fostered	the	evolution	of	the	domestic	market	for	corporate	bonds.	Even	though	the	general	aim	of	both	public	 debt	 management	 as	 well	 as	 monetary	 policy	 was	 in	 line	 with	 the	enhancement	 of	 CBMD,	 these	 policy	 variables	 also	 created	 barriers.	 A	 major	reason	for	these	barriers	was	the	failure	of	clearly	defining	a	policy	goal	aiming	at	 the	 promotion	 of	 the	 debentures	market.	 In	 addition,	 these	 policy	 variables	also	 hampered	 CBMD	 due	 to	 constrained	 policy	 spaces.	 The	 objectives	 of	 the	third	policy	variable	were	not	as	clearly	aligned	with	CBMD,	because	advancing	the	domestic	market	for	corporate	debentures	was	not	necessarily	in	the	natural	interest	 of	 public	 finance	 for	 development.	 In	 fact,	 the	 developmentalist	 state	policies	would	have	to	be	adjusted	in	order	to	be	consistent	with	CBMD.	To	complete	the	circle,	we	come	back	to	one	of	the	key	theoretical	findings	of	this	thesis,	namely	 that	 the	advancement	of	 corporate	bond	markets	 contributes	 to	the	dissemination	of	the	monetary	economy.	The	empirical	research	found	that	the	 improvements	 in	 the	 Brazilian	 debentures	 market	 were	 relatively	 limited	and	that	the	state	economy	continued	to	play	a	major	part	in	Brazil.	From	these	results	we	 can	 draw	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 Brazilian	market	 economy	 is	 still	characterized	by	structural	heterogeneity.	At	 the	same	time,	one	could	observe	examples	 of	 how	 the	 two	 modes	 of	 production	 might	 converge:	 the	 national	treasury	 funding	 its	 financial	 contributions	 to	 the	 BNDES	 system	 through	sovereign	bond	issues;	allowing	the	BNDES	to	issue	LFs;	and	the	joint	initiative	of	BNDES	and	ANBIMA	to	create	the	NMRF.	Furthermore,	the	theoretical	chapter	emphasized	the	relevance	of	funding	in	the	capital	 formation	process	 and	presented	 corporate	bond	markets	 as	 a	possible	source	 of	 funding.	However,	 it	 should	 be	 clear	 that	 the	 provision	 of	 funding	 is	important,	independent	of	its	source.	Therefore,	it	might	be	a	functional	solution	for	 the	 Brazilian	 financial	 system	 to	 rely	 mainly	 on	 public	 finance	 for	development	institutions	to	provide	long-term	funding.	Yet,	one	has	to	be	aware	of	the	risks	involved,	related	to	rent-seeking	behavior,	corruption,	inefficiencies	etc.	In	light	of	the	recent	corruption	scandals	that	shake	up	the	Brazilian	society,	
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Note:	According	to	the	interview	partners,	the	interviews	were	grouped	into	four	categories:	 university	 professors	 (U),	 associations	 (A),	 financial	 market	participants	 (F),	 and	 state	 institutions	 (S).	 The	 category	 abbreviations	 serve,	together	with	a	number	to	make	each	interview	identifiable,	as	source	reference	for	citations	throughout	the	thesis.	Citing	an	interview	partner	who	belongs	to	a	state	institution	might	be	referenced	with	“S03”,	for	example.	
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Appendix	A List	of	Interviews	
Number	 Date	 Category	 Code	 Length	of	interview	
1	 10/19/10	 University	professor	 U12	 2	hours	
2	 10/20/10	 University	professor	 U01	 ¾	hour	
3	 10/21/10	 University	professor	 U02	 0.5	hour	
4	 10/22/10	 University	professor	 U03	 ¼	hour	
5	 10/28/10	 Association	 A01	 0.5	hour	
6	 10/28/10	 Financial	market	participant	 F01	 1	hour	
7	 11/8/10	 University	professor	 U04	 ¾	hour	
8	 11/9/10	 University	professor	 U05	 1	hour	
9	 11/9/10	 Association	 A04	 1	hour	
10	 11/10/10	 Association	 A02	 1	hour	
11	 6/21/11	 Financial	market	participant	 F03	 1	hour	
12	 6/28/11	 Association	 A05	 2	hours	
13	 6/29/11	 University	professor	 U13	 1	hour	
14	 7/8/11	 University	professor	 U14	 1.5	hours	
15	 7/8/11	 University	professor	 U15	 2	hours	
16	 7/11/11	 University	professor	 U06	 1	hour	
17	 7/11/11	 University	professor	 U16	 2	hours	
18	 7/11/11	 University	professor	 U17	 ¾	hour	
19	 7/12/11	 Financial	market	participant	 F05	 1	hour	
20	 8/17/11	 University	professor	 U07	 ¼	hour	
21	 8/17/11	 Financial	market	participant	 F04	 1	hour	
22	 8/17/11	 State	institution	 S03	 1	hour	
23	 8/18/11	 Association	 A03	 2	hours	
24	 8/19/11	 Financial	market	participant	 F02	 0.5	hour	
25	 8/19/11	 University	professor	 U08	 1.5	hours	
26	 8/19/11	 State	institution	 S01	 1	hour	
27	 8/1/12	 State	institution	 S02	 1	hour	
28	 8/27/12	 University	professor	 U09	 1.5	hours	
29	 8/27/12	 University	professor	 U10	 1	hour	












































































































1st	 14/12/2010	 01/04/2011	 11.37%	
2nd	 01/04/2011	 01/07/2011	 12.19%	
3rd	 01/07/2011	 03/10/2011	 12.659%	
4th	 03/10/2011	 02/01/2012	 11.399%	
5th	 02/01/2012	 02/04/2012	 10.709%	
6th	 02/04/2012	 02/07/2012	 9.29%	
7th	 02/07/2012	 01/10/2012	 8.119%	
8th	 01/10/2012	 02/01/2013	 7.56%	
9th	 02/01/2013	 01/04/2013	 7.359%	
10th	 01/04/2013	 01/07/2013	 7.449%	
11th	 01/07/2013	 01/10/2013	 8.45%	
12th	 01/10/2013	 02/01/2014	 9.66%	
1st	 13.12.2010	 500	 11.37%	
2nd	 14.12.2010	 1.000	 01.01.2014	
1st	 13.12.2010	 500	 11.37%	
2nd	 14.12.2010	 1.000	 01.01.2014	
1st	 13.12.2010	 500	 11.37%	
2nd	 14.12.2010	 1.000	 01.01.2014	














First	 20.04.2012	 409	 01.07.2016	 11.169%	 July	1
st	of	
2016	 Aaa.br	
Second	 24.04.2012	 302	 01.07.2016	 TJ3	+	0.55%	 July	1
st	of	
2016	 Aaa.br	



















1st	 24/04/2012	 30/06/2012	 04/04/2012	 9.40%	
2nd	 01/07/2012	 30/09/2012	 02/07/2012	 8.36%	
3rd	 01/10/2012	 02/10/2012	 01/10/2012	 7.80%	
4th	 01/01/2013	 31/03/2012	 02/01/2013	 7.60%	
5th	 01/04/2013	 30/06/2013	 01/04/2013	 7.72%	
6th	 01/07/2013	 30/09/2013	 01/07/2013	 9.01%	
7th	 01/10/2013	 02/10/2013	 01/10/2013	 9.93%	
8th	 01/01/2014	 02/01/2014	 03/01/2014	 10.68%	
9th	 01/04/2014	 30/06/2014	 01/04/2014	 11.34%	
10th	 01/07/2014	 30/09/2014	 01/07/2014	 11.34%	
11th	 01/10/2014	 31/12/2014	 01/10/2014	 11.53%	
12th	 01/01/2015	 31/03/2015	 02/01/2015	 12.82%	
13th	 01/04/2015	 30/06/2015	 01/04/2015	 13.54%	
14th	 01/07/2015	 30/09/2015	 01/07/2015	 14.60%	
15th	 01/10/2015	 31/12/2015	 01/10/2015	 15.23%	
16th	 01/01/2016	 31/03/2016	 04/01/2016	 15.30%	





The	 establishment	 of	 a	 domestic	 corporate	 bond	 market	 can	 help	 to	 solve	common	problems	in	developing	and	emerging	market	economies	by	providing	a	market	 for	 long-term	 debt	 securities	 in	 local	 currency,	 in	 order	 to	 enhance	economic	development	and	mitigate	financial	fragilities.	This	thesis	answers	the	question	 of	 how	 the	 Brazilian	 state	 influenced	 the	 development	 of	 a	 domestic	corporate	bond	market	through	its	actions	in	public	debt	management,	monetary	policy,	and	public	finance	for	development.	The	research	design	follows	a	mixed	method	and	triangulation	approach	to	combine	the	results	of	the	conducted	field	research	including	expert	interviews	with	those	of	the	descriptive	data	analysis	and	 the	 literature	 review.	 The	 analytical	 framework	 builds	 on	 Post	 Keynesian	theories	explaining	the	processes	of	capital	formation	and	asset	choice	in	a	world	reigned	 by	 uncertainty.	 The	 hypothesis	 is	 that	 the	 Brazilian	 state	 had	 a	protagonist	role	in	the	development	of	the	domestic	corporate	bond	market,	but	only	exerted	it	passively	and	not	constructively.	The	theoretical	understanding	of	domestic	corporate	bond	market	development	in	 emerging	 market	 and	 developing	 economies	 is	 deepened	 by	 this	 research	mainly	in	three	ways.	First,	the	study	points	out	that	these	economies	are	usually	characterized	 by	 structural	 heterogeneity,	which	means	 that	 only	 part	 of	 their	economy	 functions	 as	 a	monetary	 economy	 and	 that	 there	 are	 other	modes	 of	production,	 too.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 development	 of	 a	 corporate	 bond	market	helps	 to	 propagate	 the	 monetary	 economy	 mode	 of	 production.	 Second,	 the	thesis	explains	the	important	role	of	bonds	as	a	source	of	(long-term)	funding	(vs.	short-term	finance)	and,	thus,	enriches	the	perspective	of	Monetary	Keynesians.	More	specifically,	bringing	the	funding	step	into	focus	broadens	their	view	of	the	capital	 formation	 process.	 Third,	 by	 spelling	 out	 the	 influences	 of	 each	 of	 the	policy	 variables	 on	 the	 development	 of	 a	 corporate	 bond	 market,	 the	mechanisms	at	work	are	clarified.	As	a	result,	we	are	able	to	assess	the	role	of	the	state	and	 its	 impact	on	corporate	bond	market	development	 in	Brazil,	which	 is	my	original	contribution	to	knowledge.	The	key	findings	of	 this	research	are	related	to	the	policy	variables	public	debt	management,	monetary	policy,	and	public	finance	for	development.	Thus,	one	of	the	 key	 findings	 is	 that	 the	 first	 policy	 variable,	mainly	by	 changing	 the	public	debt	 structure,	 determines	 the	 development	 of	 the	 domestic	 market	 for	corporate	bonds	through	different	effects,	namely	the	market	creation	effect,	the	signaling	 effect,	 and	 the	 competitiveness	 effect.	 The	 second	 key	 finding	 of	 the	thesis	 is	 reached	 by	 comparing	 three	 sub-periods	 in	 the	 empirical	 research:	 a	low	 and	 stable	 monetary	 policy	 rate	 is	 necessary	 for	 corporate	 bond	 market	development,	but	it	is	not	a	sufficient	condition.	The	third	key	finding	is	related	to	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 policy	 variable	 public	 finance	 for	 development	 on	 the	development	of	a	corporate	bond	market.	The	public	development	bank	BNDES	was	 less	 engaged	 in	 structural	policies	 through	 the	promotion	of	 specific	high-technology	 sectors	 and/	 or	 SMEs,	 but	 mainly	 facilitated	 access	 to	 favorable	financing	and	funding	conditions	for	the	so-called	national	champions.		 	
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Appendix	D Kurze	Zusammenfassung	(Deutsch)	
Die	 Entwicklung	 eines	 heimischen	 Unternehmensanleihenmarktes	 kann	 dabei	helfen,	 übliche	 Probleme	 in	 sich	 entwickelnden	 und	 aufstrebenden	Volkswirtschaften	zu	lösen,	indem	ein	Markt	für	langfristige	Schuldtitel	in	lokaler	Währung	zur	Verfügung	gestellt	wird,	um	so	die	wirtschaftliche	Entwicklung	zu	stärken	 und	 finanzielle	 Instabilitäten	 abzumildern.	 Diese	 Dissertation	beantwortet	die	Frage	danach,	wie	der	brasilianische	Staat	auf	die	Entwicklung	eines	 heimischen	Marktes	 für	 Unternehmensanleihen	 durch	 sein	 Vorgehen	 im	öffentlichen	 Schuldenmanagement,	 in	 der	 Geldpolitik	 und	 in	 der	 staatlichen	Entwicklungsfinanzierung	 Einfluss	 nimmt.	 Das	 Forschungsdesign	 folgt	 einem	Ansatz	 des	 Methoden-Mix	 und	 der	 Triangulation,	 um	 die	 Ergebnisse	 der	Feldforschung,	 einschließlich	 Experteninterviews,	 mit	 denen	 der	 deskriptiven	Datenanalyse	 und	 der	 Aufarbeitung	 der	 Fachliteratur	 zusammenzuführen.	 Der	Analyserahmen	baut	auf	postkeynesianischen	Theorien	auf,	welche	die	Prozesse	der	 Kapitalbildung	 und	 Anlageentscheidung	 in	 einer	 von	 Unsicherheit	beherrschten	 Welt	 erklären.	 Die	 Hypothese	 besagt,	 dass	 dem	 brasilianischen	Staat	eine	entscheidende	Rolle	in	der	Entwicklung	eines	heimischen	Marktes	für	Unternehmensanleihen	 zukam,	 dass	 er	 diese	 Rolle	 aber	 nur	 passiv	 und	 nicht	konstruktiv	ausfüllte.	Das	 theoretische	 Verständnis	 von	 der	 Entwicklung	 eines	 heimischen	Unternehmensanleihenmarktes	 in	 sich	 entwickelnden	 und	 aufstrebenden	Volkswirtschaften	 wird	 durch	 diese	 Forschungsarbeit	 vor	 allem	 in	 dreierlei	Hinsicht	 vertieft.	 Erstens	 hebt	 die	 Studie	 hervor,	 dass	 diese	 Volkswirtschaften	normalerweise	von	struktureller	Heterogenität	geprägt	sind.	Das	bedeutet,	dass	nur	 ein	 Teil	 ihrer	Marktwirtschaft	 geldwirtschaftlichen	 Prinzipien	 folgt	 und	 es	darüber	hinaus	weitere	Produktionsweisen	gibt.	In	diesem	Zusammenhang	trägt	die	 Entwicklung	 von	 Unternehmensanleihenmärkten	 zur	 Verbreitung	 der	geldwirtschaftlichen	 Produktionsweise	 bei.	 Zweitens	 erklärt	 diese	 Arbeit	 die	wichtige	 Rolle	 der	 Unternehmensanleihenmärkte	 als	 Finanzierungsquelle	 und	erweitert	damit	die	monetärkeynesianische	Perspektive,	weil	der	Fokus	auf	die	langfristige	Finanzierung	(„Funding“	 im	Gegensatz	zum	kurzfristigen	„Finance“)	im	Kapitalbildungsprozess	gelenkt	wird.	Drittens	werden	die	Wirkmechanismen	aufgedeckt,	 indem	 die	 Einflüsse	 der	 verschiedenen	 Politikvariablen	 auf	 die	Unternehmensanleihenmarktentwicklung	 genau	 durchdekliniert	 werden.	 Im	Ergebnis	sind	wir	in	der	Lage,	die	Rolle	des	Staates	sowie	seinen	Einfluss	auf	die	Entwicklung	eines	heimischen	Unternehmensanleihenmarktes	zu	evaluieren.	Die	 zentralen	 Forschungsergebnisse	 stehen	 in	 Verbindung	 mit	 den	Politikvariablen	 öffentliches	 Schuldenmanagement,	 Geldpolitik	 sowie	 staatliche	Entwicklungsfinanzierung.	Dementsprechend	 ist	 eine	 zentrale	 Erkenntnis,	 dass	die	erste	Politikvariable	vor	allem	durch	ihre	Anpassungen	der	Schuldenstruktur	die	Entwicklung	eines	heimischen	Marktes	für	Unternehmensanleihen	bestimmt,	indem	 sie	 unterschiedliche	 Effekte	 ausübt,	 die	 als	 Marktbildungseffekt,	Signalwirkung	 und	 Wettbewerbseffekt	 bezeichnet	 werden.	 Zu	 einer	 zweiten	wichtigen	 Erkenntnis	 dieser	 Dissertation	 führt	 der	 Vergleich	 von	 drei	Teilzeitabschnitten	 im	 Rahmen	 der	 empirischen	 Analyse:	 ein	 niedriger	 und	
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stabiler	 geldpolitischer	 Leitzins	 ist	 eine	 notwendige,	 aber	 keine	 ausreichende	Bedingung	 für	 die	 Entwicklung	 eines	 heimischen	 Marktes	 für	Unternehmensanleihen.	 Das	 dritte	 zentrale	 Forschungsergebnis	 ist	 mit	 dem	Einfluss	 der	 staatlichen	 Entwicklungsfinanzierung	 auf	 die	Unternehmensanleihenmarktentwicklung	 verbunden.	 Die	 staatliche	Entwicklungsbank	BNDES	 legte	den	Schwerpunkt	 ihrer	Aktivitäten	weniger	auf	strukturpolitische	 Maßnahmen	 wie	 die	 Förderung	 von	 bestimmten	Hochtechnologiesektoren	 und/	 oder	 von	 kleinen	 und	 mittelständischen	Unternehmen,	sondern	ermöglichte	hauptsächlich	den	so	genannten	nationalen	Champions	Zugang	zu	günstigen	Finanzierungsbedingungen.	
